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The basic premise of this volume of articles is that there is a need to 
 respond to the challenge issued by Jerry Bentley – one of the pioneers 
of the now well-established field of ‘World History’ – for historians to 
attempt both to ‘globalize history’ and to ‘historicize globalization’. 
Though directed at historians, it is a challenge that raises broader ques-
tions about the interplay between the global and the local in all fields of 
endeavour. While the joint editors of this volume are both historians, 
the contributions are from specialists in history, political science, inter-
national relations, sociology, literature, art history and architecture, all 
of whom address this issue to a greater or lesser degree with regard to 
Singapore. A major aim of the contributors was to emphasise the contri-
bution of the ‘local’ to the ‘global’.
Since the late 1990s there has been a proliferation of studies on 
Singapore.1 Initially, these works were written by non-professional his-
torians and government bodies responding to the government’s call as 
part of the official 1997 launching of the National Education Programme, 
which was intended to educate the people about the struggles that led to 
the success story that was Singapore’s. The response included publica-
tions on the “Singapore Story”, especially the memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew 
and biographies of other political figures, such as S. Rajaratnam, Lim 
Kim San, and David Marshall. This form of historical writing culminated 
in the 2010 publication, Men in White.2 Professional historians then 
became involved not simply in producing the standard histories of the 
nation state of Singapore, but also in offering an alternative ‘history from 
below’. Of  particular note is the 2008 publication entitled, The Scripting 
of a  National History: Singapore and Its Past.3 There has also been a trend 
towards giving greater emphasis to Singapore’s international involvement 
from its earliest history, which has been reconstructed through archaeo-
logical finds, to the present day. The most recent example, published in 
2009, is simply entitled Singapore: A 700-Year History,4 a book which dis-
cusses Singapore’s position within a wider regional and global context.
This volume continues the latter trend by arguing that much of what 
has occurred in this island state is the result of powerful global forces 
that were adapted through local agency. A subsidiary theme is the 
 re-assessment of Singapore history not as the story of ‘big men and major 
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events’ but of the ordinary and the prosaic, which together provides an 
alternative version of the past. It eschews the laudatory tone adopted by 
some previous works on Singapore, which stress the nation’s remarkable 
economic success in the world. Instead, it situates Singapore within a 
larger picture as one of many societies attempting to cope with the global 
movement of a vast number of peoples, ideas, and businesses. Here 
Singapore is not viewed as an isolated community with unique problems 
and solutions, but as a society that is always responding and itself con-
tributing to rapid changes fuelled by an explosion of information made 
possible by the latest technology.
Singapore in Global History is a testament to the increasing sophisti-
cation displayed by those now engaged in reconstructing Singapore’s 
past. These contributions should be viewed as examples of the way that 
Singaporeans have sought to explain parts of their past by adopting a 
global perspective while continuing to acknowledge local agency – an 
achievement that Jerry Bentley would have appreciated. This is precisely 
the type of study that is needed to create complementary narratives to 
balance the dominant political ones that focus on the achievements of the 
founding fathers of Singapore.
Leonard Y. Andaya
Department of History, University of Hawai‘i at Manoa
Notes
1 An excellent overview of recent Singapore historiography can be found in Ho Chi Tim’s 
“Past Trends and Future Possibilities for the Study of Singapore History”, paper pre-
sented to the International Association of Asia Scholars, Singapore, 22-25 June 2010.
2 Sonny Yap, Richard Lim, and Leong Weng Kam. Men in White: The Untold Story of 
Singapore’s Ruling Political Party. Singapore: Straits Times Press, 2010.
3 Hong Lysa and Huang Jianli. The Scripting of a National History: Singapore and Its Past. 
Singapore: NUS Press, 2008.
4 Kwa Chong Guan, Derek Heng, and Tan Tai Yong. Singapore: A 700-Year History: From 
Early Emporium to World City. Singapore: National Archives of Singapore, 2009.
1 Globalising the History of Singapore
Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied & Derek Heng
World studies, which are more commonly referred to now as global 
 studies, have become an increasingly important field of study, both in 
the social sciences and humanities since the early 1970s. Beginning with 
discussions among economists and political scientists who sought to 
reconceptualise distributive and interactive dynamics between states and 
societies located in different parts of the world at the height of the Cold 
War, the boundaries of global studies have since widened as they gained 
the attention of geographers and sociologists in the final decades of the 
twentieth century. Their contribution to the institutionalisation of global 
studies in academia has mainly involved fresh approaches that enhance 
our understanding of the often unequal relationships between devel-
oped and developing countries. Keywords such as “interactive zones”, 
“world systems” and “free markets” have become indispensable in any 
discussion about the world as a whole. The justification for the need to 
develop new vocabularies, promulgate new generalisations and invent 
new methodologies lay primarily in the assumption that humankind was 
facing “globality” and “globalisation”, a condition and a process whereby 
traditional boundaries of space, knowledge and power are broken down, 
compressed, and intensified, by the advancement of information and 
transportation technology.
Where do scholars of the humanities fit into these developments? 
 Historians in particular had a great deal to contribute to global studies, 
both as an academic discipline and as a subject of wider general inter-
est after the Second World War. Historical monographs that sought to 
explain the evolution of human societies from earliest times up to the 
advent of modernity had long preceded the social sciences. Works such as 
William McNeill’s Rise of the West (1963) and Marshall Hodgson’s three-
volume The Venture of Islam (1974) quickly come to mind. These two 
books represented a new wave of scholarship aimed at decentering the 
cyclical models of human development that had earlier been developed 
by Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee. And yet the global perspec-
tives that characterised these writings were quickly overshadowed by the 
pertinent concerns of the time. The dismantling of empires, the creation 
of new states and the outbreak of revolutions and insurgencies across 
the globe called for more formulaic, if not social scientific, approaches 
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to understanding societies. Hence, McNeill’s magnum opus was to give 
way to Immanuel Wallerstein’s macroscopic study of modern capitalism; 
Hodgson’s appeal for an inter-regional perspective to offset Eurocentrism 
in global studies did not gain the attention it deserved until the coming 
of the Saidian anti-Orientalist critique (Said 1978). And it was only with 
the end of the Cold War that a change in academic praxis was ushered 
in, as discussions about the validity of past models and theories began 
to emerge in the social science circles and the work of global historians 
regained its much neglected importance. To understand the extensive 
effects and drastic changes wrought by modern-day globalisation and to 
give future generations an entirely new set of scholarly options, earlier 
patterns of global interactions became the subject of scholarly scrutiny 
approached in a more historically and empirically grounded way.
So what has emerged from this new wave of scholarship? Essentially 
three different modes of approaching, narrating and teaching global his-
tory. The first mode conceived global history as an extension of the study 
of Western civilisation. The fundamental theme such studies share is the 
rise of Europe as a world power. Appended to this master narrative are the 
roles and contributions of non-European states and polities in creating 
the conditions for Western hegemony in world affairs. The second mode 
aimed at decentering Europe’s importance by giving more prominence to 
contemporaneous nations and civilisations. Here, Europe was portrayed 
as an equal competitor with other nations and civilisations in the struggle 
for primacy and survival within a global context. A recent variant of this 
mode tries to break down accepted ideas of nations, civilisations and the 
self to create more scope for ‘cross-cultural’ identifications and exchanges 
as well as overlapping boundaries. The third and perhaps most radical 
mode acknowledged the existence of nations and civilisations, while see-
ing these imagined spaces as mere nodes within intersecting political, 
economic and ideological systems that defined the course of humanity. 
Not ignoring the forces at play in local settings, this mode of representing 
global history sought to establish causal relationships between the struc-
tures and strictures of everyday life and patterns at more systemic levels, 
such as the flows of knowledge, capital and labour within a globalised 
economy (Dirlik 2005, 394).
This is, of course, not the place to discuss in detail the usefulness of 
each of these ways of approaching global history. However, one implicit 
feature that links all of these approaches is the prevalence of Eurocen-
trism and its attendant presuppositions. The notions of space, as a case 
in point, are unceasingly laden with assumptions that are inherent in 
western historiography. This can be seen in the consistent reliance on 
what Marshall Hodgon has termed a “Jim Crow world map”, which is 
a projection of the “western image of the world”. By placing Europe at 
the upper centre of the map and by assigning the land area the status of 
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a “continent”, Europe appears to be “far larger in scale than the Middle 
East, China and India” (Hodgson 1994: 4-6). Europe then becomes a 
‘core entity’ that had the upper hand throughout the march of modern 
history. The consequence of taking this perspective is to view and narrate 
global history, even in its most sophisticated form, around key themes 
such as the rise and decline of pre-modern empires, trans-regional socio-
economic interactions, the onset and impact of European colonialism 
from the late fifteenth century onwards, decolonisation and the challenge 
of globalisation, as well as postcoloniality (Lockard 1995: 7-35). And, 
because of the continuing sway of such telos and paradigms, a sense of 
the universal applicability of concepts derived from the European expe-
rience to explain developments emerged across the globe (Fernandez-
Armesto: 2006).
It is in the face of these trends and problems facing the field of global 
history that this volume was conceived. Southeast Asia’s unique location 
at the interstices of the Indian Ocean, South China Sea and the Pacific 
Rim, the rapid flows of migrants and the movement of goods and natural 
resources in and out of the region necessitate, in our view, the employ-
ment of global history as a method for exploring and explaining continui-
ties and transformations in the region. Indeed, over the past few decades, 
something fascinating has been taking place in Southeast Asian history. 
Once entrenched within the ‘country’ and ‘nation-state’ paradigms, the 
field has been challenged both by established specialists and new interloc-
utors, armed with fresh and often powerful global perspectives. Because 
of these new developments, Southeast Asian scholars have been forced to 
rethink, and at times to even abandon, their previous assumptions about 
the region’s impact on the world and about how the world has shaped 
the region’s tangled pasts. Scholars such as Wang Gungwu, Reynaldo 
Ileto, Benedict Anderson, Anthony Reid, James Scott, Victor Lieberman, 
Craig Lockard and Engseng Ho loom large in current attempts to look 
at Southeast Asian pasts through new global spectacles. The long-term 
implication is the widening of the scope of global history towards incor-
porating uncharted geographical spaces, enabling new modes of enquiry 
and rethinking long-held ideas of nationhood and regionalism.
Engseng Ho’s The Graves of Tarim (2005), for example, deserves some 
elaboration here, as it has important methodical implications for the 
study of Southeast Asian pasts within a global historical perspective. Tak-
ing as its axis of analysis the tombs and shrines of the Hadrami Arabs, 
the book demonstrates the intertwined histories of people and places, 
of individuals and social collectives, texts and material remains located 
across the Arab World, South Asia and Southeast Asia. By grafting the 
fates and fortunes of a diasporic community – the Hadramis – within a 
global historical framework and devising new conceptual tools for dis-
cussing Southeast Asian experiences vis-à-vis the wider world, Engseng 
Ho has questioned the preponderance of the nation and its imagined 
borders within any unit of analysis. New ways of illustrating connect-
edness, convergences and parallels rather than variances and specifici-
ties – across oceans and continents – have sprung forth from this acute 
analysis of the trans-regional or internationalism that shaped the con-
tours of the identity, politics, culture and ideas of a people in  Southeast 
Asia. In that regard, Southeast Asian studies have a lot to offer to the 
global history discourse. By locating Southeast Asia in global history, 
which Engseng has eloquently done, we may at the same time rectify the 
undue relegation of the region to second-tier status in terms of academic 
importance – a  phenomenon that is ubiquitous within academic circles 
in North  America, China and even India.
It is in the light of such innovations in the wider Southeast Asian 
scholarly literature that the case for reinterpreting Singapore’s past in 
global history can best be made. Although diminutive in size, the island’s 
unique location at the southern end of the Straits of Malacca and midway 
between the Indian Ocean and South China Sea has made it a crucial site 
for contestations, negotiations and adaptations among a number of Euro-
pean and Asian powers, all of which were connected since pre-historic 
times through trade and migration (cf. Abu-Lughod 1989 & Chaudhuri 
1990). And, as the world became increasingly and intensively connected 
from the late fifteen century onwards with the advent of European colo-
nialism, networks emanating into and out of Singapore were enlarged to 
include remote parts of North-east Asia, Australasia, the Mediterranean, 
the Pacific Rim, and West and North Africa. To be sure, these connec-
tions had implications for Singapore as had the island on the rest of the 
world. Put differently, the complex interplay of global and local develop-
ments in Singapore were in many instances moulded into new forms 
and relayed back to affect the larger external world. Charles Tilly’s anal-
ogy of a flood to explain the outbreak of revolutions is instructive in this 
regard (Tilly 1995). Several historical factors contribute to the occurrence 
of floods and, although these factors are often unrelated or, in their own 
terms, non-threatening, their confluence within a particular place at a 
particular time may result in the outbreak of major floods, or within the 
scope of Tilly’s research, revolutions. The arena in which a variety of fac-
tors converge to provoke a flood could be likened to that of Singapore. 
While being shaped by global factors and developments from the tenth 
to the twenty-first centuries, Singapore’s unique location has made the 
island a strategic launch-pad for individuals, organisations, polities and 
state machineries to influence, or at the very least, to predict major occur-
rences in the world.
In articulating a history of Singapore from a global perspective, it is also 
important to recognise that there are essentially two audiences that such 
an endeavour could address: the wider academic world and a domestic 
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audience in Singapore and in Southeast Asia. With regards to the  former, 
there are several reasons why such historical enquiries are important. 
Approaching Singapore from a global perspective would contribute to 
 current developments in historical research, especially in the areas of 
identity formation and mobility across borders. Studies on the nature of 
the society, economy and politics in Singapore from a global perspective 
would open up new vistas for improving our understanding of other areas 
such as economic networks and business history, diasporic studies, as well 
as imperial, colonial and post-colonial regime change. Such  contributions 
would no doubt be significant in the larger scheme of things.
The most important contribution has taken place in the field of city-
state studies. In his recent seminal two-volume work, Victor Lieberman 
aptly demonstrates how analytical models of social and state develop-
ments that are derived from Mainland Southeast Asian experiences may 
be applied to further our understanding of such developments in such 
diverse localities as northern Europe, the Caucasus, China and Japan, by 
including such global factors as climate and disease, as well as assumed 
human commonalities such as the development of cultural singularities 
(2003 & 2009). While Lieberman’s work centres on agrarian states with 
substantial populations, this volume is an attempt to serve as a counter-
point, by interrogating nodal centres without extensive geographical or 
social hinterlands. In this regard, there are a number of regions in the 
world that share similar geographical, demographic and economic simi-
larities with Singapore, including the Gulf of Mexico, the Arabian Sea, 
and the north China Sea, to name but three. A study of Singapore in 
global history could potentially serve as a basis for comparison by other 
historians working on the ebb and flow of city states. More to the point, 
in a world that is no longer confined to a bi-polar super-power order, 
but increasingly dominated by multinational corporations and a plethora 
of new post-colonial states, each with varying strategic significance, a 
study of Singapore as a city-state that was able to maintain a pre-eminent 
position throughout modern history would be an important step on the 
path towards questioning the current accepted narratives of global his-
tory. The core or dominant-centre perspective that is evident in the works 
of Ross Dunn (1985), Immanuel Wallerstein (1974), and Laura Benton 
(1996) could be redeveloped or even substantially revised. As a city-state 
well plugged into global historical experience, Singapore defies the argu-
ment that there was once a dominant European force that determined 
the dynamics of interactions between the core and periphery, as well as 
within the periphery itself. Rather, what comes out of all of the papers in 
this volume is a reinterpretation of what is assumed to be a periphery. 
In many ways, Singapore had established itself as a crucial centre within 
multiple and expanding global systems. The significance of this book is 
thus much wider than its title may at first sight suggest.
Above and beyond academic concerns, global history as a framework 
for understanding Singapore’s history is edifying as it addresses a chang-
ing domestic audience. As one of the contributing authors of this volume 
has correctly observed, the nation-state and ‘big man’ approaches to his-
tory appear no longer to be acceptable to today’s Singaporeans. There 
seems to be an increasing desire among young and old in the country, 
as in  Southeast Asia at large, to incorporate the collective social memo-
ries of the people into the official narrative. Alternative stories that go 
beyond great achievements of the founding fathers of the nation-state in 
the early years of decolonisation are being sought. Such new conceptions 
of the past are particularly pressing and relevant for nation-states that 
are currently affected by the wave of consumerist globalisation, chang-
ing social demographics, and economies that are overwhelmingly kept 
alive by migrant labour. We are compelled to conclude that a global mode 
of enquiry is indispensible for understanding the local. In this regard, 
global history, for these states and societies, is not merely an attempt at 
providing alternative narratives, but, as William Robinson observes:
Without understanding the existence of societies prior to the 
emergence of the nation-state, nation-states cannot be understood 
as isolated social systems under the assumption of a transhistoric 
symmetry between nation-states and social structure that rules out 
by ontological assumption and methodological fiat the study of 
social structure that is truly supra- or transnational in character. 
(1998: 566)
It is important to bear in mind that ultimately it is not so much the notion 
that the official and nation-centred narratives are irrelevant, but that there 
needs to be a recognition of multiple narratives that should be accorded 
equal importance and attention. Even though each of these narratives is 
distinct, they exist in tandem with one another in a given historical time-
frame. It is therefore not just the notion that a more coherent picture 
may therefore be developed when these narratives, like horizontal tem-
plates, are compressed vertically, but that each of these templates need to 
be understood and studied in their own right to complement and even 
interrogate the national narrative. In other words, these narratives should 
be interwoven to create an interactive historiographical dynamic that is 
distinct from the nation or country-centred historiographical trends in 
Southeast Asia, which are often saturated with teleological narratives.
Indeed, the teleologies, which largely centre on notions of innovation 
and change as well as development and progress under the auspices of 
the colonial and, in the post-1965 era, the post-colonial nation-state, have 
been projected back into the nineteenth and early twentieth century, and 
to an extent into the earlier, pre-modern history of Singapore. In particular, 
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the focus has been on Singapore’s commercial success and development 
as a major entrepot in the region, first under British rule, and then as a 
city-state after 1965, with the colonial period as the foundation and pre-
cursor for its post-colonial success. This success story has also been cast 
as a unique history vis-à-vis the experiences of the surrounding region. 
Such a narrative relies heavily on the core-periphery model developed by 
urban geographers and macro-economists working on such regional and 
global issues as trans-border labour movements, capital flows and macro-
level vertical economic integration models, including those put forward 
by Saskia Sassen (1988), Yeung Yue-Man and Lo Fu-Chen (1996), and 
Scott MacLeod T.G. MacGee (1996), which locate Singapore in a semi-
peripheral space or at best as a secondary centre.
This volume, which is entitled Singapore in Global History, is a depar-
ture from both the teleological narrative of the successful nation-state 
that has hitherto been propagated internally and the location of Sin-
gapore in the semi-peripheral space in the larger global discourse that 
has been generated externally. Initiated by two historians based at the 
National University of Singapore and Ohio State University in the USA, 
this book, the content of which was partly presented at the International 
Convention of Asian Scholars (ICAS) in South Korea in the summer 
of 2009, consists of twelve papers spread across a broad chronological 
period and range of topics, bringing together scholars working in the 
fields of political science, international relations, history, sociology, lit-
erature, art history and architecture to explore ways in which Singapore’s 
history could be examined from a global perspective. The volume makes 
a collective attempt at arguing in a radically different fashion that Singa-
pore should be conceived as both core and periphery and that the logic of 
 Singapore’s success based primarily on the roles of big men and strong 
states is far from adequate. By locating the island as a central space 
between the major termini of maritime Asia and the world, Singapore 
comes out strongly in this volume as a location where global processes 
find their nesting place and where the roots of transformative processes 
that eventually emanated to other faraway parts of a globalising world 
could be traced. By adopting these new lenses, it becomes clear that states 
and organisations, elites and subalterns, and texts and other communica-
tive media, have all added to the making of Singapore and the making of 
the globe of which Singapore is a constitutive part.
In the paper entitled “Situating Temasik within the Larger Regional 
Context: Maritime Asia and Malay State Formation in the Pre-Modern 
Era”, Derek Heng argues that instead of taking the traditional view of the 
genesis and formation of a polity in the coastal Malay region as a conse-
quence of human agency, abetted by the ability of the political progeni-
tors to attract trade and people to settle at the newly founded port-city, 
the framework of analysis should be shifted towards the role of regional 
and international forces. By re-examining the history of state formation 
in the Malay region and its accompanying political, social and economic 
developments in the Indian Ocean South China Sea, Gulf of Siam and 
Java Sea region, Heng advances the point that even though states and 
port polities were dependent on human capital to ensure their suste-
nance, it is ultimately the prevailing external forces and circumstances 
that determine the nature of these entities within the Malay region. In 
that regard, Temasik, the port polity that existed on Singapore Island dur-
ing the fourteenth century and which was active for only a little over a 
hundred years, serves as a prime example of the way in which the vicis-
situdes of a Malay port city almost entirely depends on the circumstances 
generated by external forces.
Following the same line of argument, Joey Long’s paper, entitled 
“Bringing the International and Transnational Back In: Singapore, Decol-
onisation, and the Cold War”, demonstrates the ways in which the strate-
gic policies of the British government and the United States of America 
(USA) have had a direct impact on the fortunes of political parties, social 
movements, right down to individual personalities, in  Singapore in the 
immediate aftermath of World War Two and, more so, in the period fol-
lowing the Suez Crisis in 1956. By supporting anti-communist regimes 
and non-leftist political parties in Southeast Asia, both Britain and the 
USA have determined the course of Singaporean history and the lives of 
prominent political individuals in ways that would only become visible to 
us when the archives in both countries are mined extensively and fresh 
questions about the roles of great powers are asked. As it stands, much 
of the historical writing on Singapore has made questions about global 
influences secondary to the celebration of the local.
Even so, it is equally important to recognise that the unfolding of 
events in Singapore has had regional and international ramifications. 
The task of situating Singapore within a global framework need not entail 
a conception of the island as merely a recipient of international forces 
and influences, but also as a source which made global events possible. 
Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied paper, entitled “The Global Effects of an 
 Ethnic Riot: Singapore, 1950-54”, observes that while scholarship on riots 
and rebellions in British colonial territories in Southeast Asia has, to a 
large degree, been dominated by the study of the causes, development 
and eventual suppression of these violent forms of popular resistance 
as seen through the lenses of national histories. Very little attention has 
been paid to investigating the effects and consequences of mass violence 
in a given setting, particularly during the period of decolonisation. His 
paper fills the lacunae in the available historical literature by exploring the 
global effects of the Maria Hertogh riots in colonial Singapore. He shows 
how news agencies and politicians in England reacted to the events that 
unfolded in the aftermath of the riots and brings to light the diplomatic 
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fissures and tensions that developed between British and Dutch offi-
cials, as well as their Australian, American and Muslim counterparts as a 
result of the riots. By extending Tony Ballantyne’s conception of the Brit-
ish Empire as “a complex web consisting of ‘horizontal’ filaments that 
run among various colonies in addition to ‘vertical’ connections between 
the metropole and individual colonies”, Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied 
demonstrates that both the horizontal filaments and the vertical connec-
tions of the British Empire proved to be vital in ensuring that there were 
swift reactions to the protests of the various parties who were involved in 
the riots. He also show that, paradoxically, in an age of decolonisation the 
communication links and political networks established by the British 
also functioned as avenues of resistance and critique for politicians in 
newly-independent countries, as well as anti-colonial activists and news 
agencies in Singapore and Britain itself.
One implication of Aljunied’s study is that global history can serve as a 
vital link between imperial and nationalist historiographies in  Southeast 
Asia, which have often been regarded in historiographical terms as 
being largely irreconcilable. Stephen Dobbs, in a chapter entitled “The 
Singapore River/Port in a Global Context” bridges imperial and national-
ist historiographies by arguing that the raison d’être for the founding of 
modern Singapore in 1819 and its development through the nineteenth 
century was the changing global trading milieu in which the port of this 
tiny island – specifically the modern mega-port along the Singapore River 
– was to play a major role. The port of Singapore ranked as one of the 
busiest in the world, linking the island to the rest of the globe via a web 
of international maritime trade routes. While the modern state of Sin-
gapore has diversified its economic base significantly since becoming 
independent in 1965, the role of the port in the modern city state is still 
emblematic of Singapore’s place in global history. He makes the observa-
tion that, from its modern origins, Singapore has been inextricably influ-
enced by global trends and forces, particularly in the realms of trade and 
migration, while at the same time shaping them.
In the same vein, Loh Kah Seng’s paper, entitled “The British Military 
Withdrawal from Singapore and the Anatomy of a Catalyst”, attempts 
to address the rupture between imperial and nationalist histories by 
reassessing the accelerated British military withdrawal from Singapore, 
which has been cast as a defining event in most narratives of the ‘ends of 
empire’. Britain’s decision in 1968 to bring to a close its ‘East of Suez’ pol-
icy and run down its military presence in Singapore has often been held 
as evidence of the city-state’s tangled place in imperial history, whereas 
in the nationalist narrative of newly independent Singapore’s meteoric 
rise as an economic ‘Asian Tiger’ under the enlightened leadership of 
the PAP government in the 1970s, the British pullout has been cast as a 
“blessing in disguise”. By approaching the withdrawal as a catalyst that 
not only enhanced Singapore’s road to full industrialisation but also the 
state’s efforts to socially engineer the citizenry, Loh’s paper makes the 
argument that the Peoples’ Action Party’s efforts to convert the military 
bases, develop the industries, house the citizens, discipline the labour 
force, and socialise the youth were a continuation of measures intro-
duced by the late colonial government after the Second World War in 
order to transform former colonies into viable nation-states. Alongside 
the colonial legacy which the PAP government inherited was the sub-
stantial assistance rendered by the British to ensure a successful with-
drawal. Indeed, the post-war decolonisation and the military pullout that 
accompanied it – two sides of the same historical process – can only be 
properly understood if they are located at the interstices of nationalist 
and imperial histories.
Loh’s paper, however, also demonstrates that the impact and ramifica-
tions of the global on the local, and vice-versa, can also be seen in the way 
that the international has had an impact on the experiences of individu-
als who were not necessarily of historically significance. His use of data 
from oral interviews with individuals from the lower strata of Singapore 
society, as opposed to significant individuals who tried to shape events in 
the immediate post-war and post-independence periods of Singapore’s 
history, is an important contribution to integrating social historical meth-
odology with global history.
The impact of the global on the local, and vice-versa, which are exam-
ined by Loh can also be seen in an earlier period – up to the Second World 
War – in the construction of an imperial order in Southeast Asia by the 
colonial powers on the one hand and negotiating pre-existing structures in 
the region on the other, with Singapore as the nexus where this mitigation 
process occurs. Huei-Ying Kuo, in her paper entitled “Social Discourse 
and Economic Functions: The Singapore Chinese in Japan’s Southward 
Expansion between 1914 and 1941” argues that in the face of the decline 
of British imperial power and the rise of Japan in the South China Sea, 
the Chinese bourgeoisie in Singapore, as a leading business group in 
the region, adjusted their business strategies to accommodate chang-
ing political-economic structures. While the literature has emphasised 
how the leading Chinese bourgeoisie supported anti-Japanese boycotts 
to rescue their business interests, Kuo, basing her research on Japanese 
intelligence reports, British colonial archives, and newsletters of Chinese 
business associations, argues that the development of  Chinese sub-eth-
nic, or dialect, cleavages in Singapore in the first half of the twentieth 
century reflected the diverging responses among the overseas  Chinese to 
the gradual but evident shift in the balance of power in Asia.
The paper shows that as part of Japan’s intention to compete with the 
British for the support of the Hokkiens, the most important  Chinese 
business dialect group in Singapore, British Malaya and Indonesia at that 
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time, Japan recruited Hokkien Chinese living in Taiwan, then a Japanese 
colony, to take charge of Japanese ad-hoc business organisations in prep-
aration for eventual southward military expansion. This trans-regional 
collaboration, the use of ethnic proxies and courtship only came to a 
halt in 1928, when Chinese anti-Japanese feelings surged after the Jinan 
Incident in Shandong, China. The Japanese then shifted their efforts to 
securing economic collaborators among the Cantonese in Singapore and 
British Malaya. In the process, Japanese intelligence organs began to 
construct racial taxonomies to differentiate each major South Chinese 
dialect group, and this knowledge eventually became important for the 
formulation of plans to incorporate Singapore and British Malaya into 
the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere.
Kuo’s paper reveals the vital roles that the Chinese in Singapore played 
in the realm of international trade and commerce, and why such analy-
ses are indispensible in advancing our understanding of the dynamics of 
the economic interactions in East Asia and beyond. Traditionally, schol-
arship on this social group has focused on the nature of their commer-
cial networks, social organisations, business models and  socio-economic 
capital. This group has also been framed as peripheral, albeit important, 
to the key bastion of the East Asian economy – China – with terms such 
as “greater China” and “overseas Chinese” describing their wide-ranging 
activities. Counter to this grain, Jason Lim’s paper, entitled “The Dynam-
ics of Trans-Regional Businesses and National Politics: The Impact of 
Events in China on Fujian-Singapore Tea Trading Networks, 1920-1960” 
casts the Singapore Chinese tea merchants as managing to build up an 
important economic activity, encompassing the production, processing, 
packaging, shipping and trade of tea produced in Fujian, China, with 
Singapore as the apex of their commercial activities, in the face of the 
general decline of the trade in tea in China itself. Singapore’s status as a 
commercial hub in East Asia and the congregation of  Chinese merchants 
and coolies, or blue collar labourers, on the island, enabled the Chinese 
tea merchants to develop what may be regarded as a precursor of the 
metropolitan region concept of economic production and consumption 
that economists and geographers have recently coined and articulated 
in detail, as well as the commercial phenomenon of outsourcing that 
has come to characterise the way that businesses operate in today’s glo-
balised economy.
However, in case one is tempted to get carried away with the trium-
phant sentiments that both Kuo and Lim’s papers conjure up in terms of 
the regional and global reach of Singapore’s commercial and economic 
activities in the early twentieth century, Lim also demonstrates vividly 
the limits of the ability of Singapore’s business community – and the 
island’s society at large – to mitigate the economic policies of states in 
the region, and by extension the world. He deftly shows that the ability 
of the Chinese tea merchants to build up their tea production activities 
and trade ultimately rested on their ability to seek out and leverage the 
loopholes that the political state of affairs in China accorded. Changes in 
the state of politics, particularly in the South Chinese province of Fujian, 
ultimately determined the fortunes and success of the trans-regional 
business model. In that regard, Singapore, as a global city of trade, was 
ultimately subjected to the vagaries of global political and economic 
forces and the flow of ideas.
Undeniably, attempts to connect the ideas and discourses of indi-
viduals, institutions and interest groups to the global context represent 
a growing trend among Singaporean historians in recent years (Heng 
& Aljunied 2009; Kwa, Heng & Tan 2009). While the primary focus 
has been the policies that these various actors were responsible for and 
the international implications that their policies and actions had, very 
little scholarship has attempted to link their ideas and discourses with 
developments in the wider world. Moreover, the extent to which the 
backgrounds, personal experiences, memories and political posturing 
of selected individuals had in shaping their beliefs – and in turn pub-
lic policies that had international implications – remained unexplored. 
Ang Cheng Guan’s paper, entitled “The Global and Regional in Lee Kuan 
Yew’s Strategic Thought: The Early Cold War Years” is possibly the first 
by a diplomatic historian to look closely at Lee’s strategic thought and its 
evolution from 1965 to 1990, when he stepped down as the Prime Min-
ister of Singapore. Ang argues that in his capacity as the nation’s first and 
longest serving prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew had unparalleled influence 
over Singapore’s foreign and security policies. And as one of the world’s 
leading statesmen, he was known for his proclivity for realpolitik when 
deliberating the state of global and regional affairs. By critically examin-
ing the speeches and writings made by Lee over the course of the last five 
decades, Ang successfully reconstructs Lee’s thoughts on the Indo-Malay 
world, the regional institutions of Southeast Asia, the Indochina War, 
and the roles of the major global powers at the height of the Cold War. 
Ang’s analysis is acute and nuanced, i.e. he shows how events around the 
globe influenced Lee Kuan Yew’s thinking about his own country.
While Ang’s focus is on the ideas of one of Singapore’s most influen-
tial politicians, who viewed its history through the lens of major events 
in the region and their implications, Leong Yew’s paper, entitled “A Brief 
History of the Hub: Navigating between the ‘Global’ and ‘Asian’ in Singa-
pore’s Knowledge Economy Discourse” critically analyses the disjunctures 
between the Global and the Asian in Singapore’s knowledge economy 
discourse, as manifested primarily in the policies and programmes of 
major institutions such as the National University of Singapore. Yew’s 
narrative interrogates the attendant implications of the state‘s attempts 
to fashion itself as a broker of Asian knowledge in the global arena. He 
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brings to the fore the new missions which Singapore’s universities inno-
vatively promoted and the attempts by knowledge brokers to couch all 
disciplines, regardless of their orientation, toward scientific universality 
with an ‘Asian’ tint. This movement towards producing Asian’ forms of 
knowledge displays a great deal of tension and ambivalence vis-a-vis the 
realities of the globalised present. More often than not, the attempts by 
the state and its related institutions to couch all things as Asian, and 
hence less foreign, are riven by paradoxes and contradictions, with Singa-
pore becoming increasingly dependent on global processes of knowledge 
capital accumulation.
The brokering of globalised knowledge with an Asian tint, however, 
is not confined solely to the current context; it was evident as early as 
the late nineteenth century, when Singapore was plugged into the global 
order established by the British Empire. The essays by Lai Chee Kien, 
Torsten Tschacher and Philip Holden examine imaginings of the ‘global’ 
in relation to developments at the local level through a number of pub-
lications and art works produced by various social groups in Singapore 
at different points in time. In so doing, they provide us with the roots to 
the current penchant for promoting a “globalised Asian” identity, be it 
cosmetically or in forms that reflect the self-identifications of the indi-
viduals, social groups or institutions involved.
In “Rambutans in the Picture: Han Wai Toon and the Articulation of 
Space by the Overseas Chinese in Singapore” Lai Chee Kien asserts that 
the new environments and identities of the diasporic Chinese may be 
understood through negotiations between the urban and rural, labour 
class and the literati, sub-tropical and tropical lands, ethnic and sub-
ethnic communities, in order to create a particular overseas, but specifi-
cally southern Chinese, space. He marshals evidence from botany as an 
important and recurrent motif in shaping the literary, artistic and scho-
lastic works of the overseas Chinese in Singapore, as well as the implica-
tions of this motif for identity construction. The Han Rambutan Orchard 
created by Han Wai Toon, a Hainanese who immigrated to Singapore in 
1915, is but one example of this construction of overseas identity in life 
and in works of art.
Tschacher’s “‘Walls of Illusion’: Information Generation in Colonial 
Singapore and the Reporting of the Mahdi-Rebellion in Sudan, 1887-
1890” narrates the role of newspapers in Singapore as purveyors of the 
stories and developments in Egypt and Sudan which, interestingly, had 
an impact on public sensibilities about major events the world over. As 
he explains, the texture of news and views presented in the Tamil and 
Malay language newspapers not only depended largely on the various 
newspapers’ links to the larger information order, but also on the re-
representations of received news made by the Tamil and Malay news-
paper editors themselves, for the consumption of their readerships in 
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 Singapore. Hence, while The Straits Times, which had direct access both 
to Reuter’s telegrams as well as to occasional letters from correspondents 
in Cairo, tended to provide lucid yet unsensational coverage of the Mah-
diyya revolt, the Tamil Singai Nesan attempted to redress the balance by 
tapping into other flows of information which would not have been as 
accessible to the English press. The same could be said in regard to the 
Malay Jawi, Arabic and Chinese newspapers, which drew on alternative 
repositories of information and opinion in order to promote their unique 
versions of these events that shook the Muslim World as they did Europe. 
More crucially, arguing in parallel to the explanations of Aljunied as dis-
cussed earlier on, Tschacher’s paper highlights the dynamic exchanges 
that were taking place within the Singaporean public sphere and the con-
nections with the wider world, thus rendering the island as one among 
many fertile sites through which global knowledge and information were 
relayed and broadcast.
Similarly, Holden’s paper, entitled “The Littoral and the Literary:  Making 
Moral Communities in the Straits Settlements and the Gold Coast in the 
late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century”, examines the formation 
of identities and cultures and the ways in which these  self-identifications 
were transmitted in writing during the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth century, when knowledge and information were becoming more 
 accessible especially to the literate elites in  British  colonies. This essay 
is important in another way in that it examines not just the Straits 
 Settlements, but also elite self-constitution during a similar period in 
another British colony geographically remote from  Singapore, the Gold 
Coast. Although located at opposite ends of the globe, the commonali-
ties between these two places have been generally overlooked by area 
specialists and nationalist historians and this has implications for fram-
ing questions about the nature of colonial society. Holden thus breaks 
new ground by placing the texts produced in these two contexts within 
a single analytical framework. In reading the selected poems, biographi-
cal essays, and serialised fiction published in newspapers or magazines 
contrapuntally and highlighting the social and ideological contradictions 
embedded in them, Holden historicises the emergence of para-colonial 
elite discourses about the “moral community” that sought to challenge 
or even supersede the claims by states themselves at that time. In that 
sense, he has reinterpreted Singapore’s historical pasts as one that tra-
versed the same trajectory as Ghana, despite the dominant perception 
that these two colonies have had relatively distinct pasts.
Viewed as a whole, this volume corresponds to the vision that one of 
the doyens of global history, Jerry Bentley, has eloquently outlined: ‘the 
need to globalize history and to historicize globalisation’ (2006: 18). By 
globalising and reassessing the history of Singapore to include texts, 
events, processes and networks that had previously been conceived as 
globalising the history of singapore 25
either ‘localised’ or ‘national’ in character, what this volume seeks to 
achieve is to widen our understanding of the exogenous forces that have 
impacted the island and the endogenous variables that have made the 
island a site by which the world was coloured, shaped and transformed. 
Concomitantly and often obliquely, by historicising globalisation as a 
phenomenon that affected the world long before the coming of the digi-
tal age and McDonaldisation, each of the contributors to this volume has 
provided us with new insights into the dynamics of interactions and con-
nections between the Southeast Asian region and the rest of the globe.
It is clear that the globalisation of Singapore and Southeast Asia as 
a whole had entirely different textures in the colonial and pre-colonial 
periods than those we see today. But underlying these surface differences 
are stark commonalities that came in the form of the movement of peo-
ples, goods, cultures and ideas, which speak to the importance of this 
volume in deepening our understanding of the past and the present for 
the future.

2 Situating Temasik within the Larger  
Regional Context: Maritime Asia and Malay  
State Formation in the Pre-Modern Era1
Derek Heng
Introduction
Singapore’s history as a port settlement has, until very recently, been 
considered to date from around 1819. The general consensus had been 
that no significant settlement existed prior to that date. Indeed, the late 
Raffles Professor of History at the University of Singapore – Wong Lin 
Ken – once commented that “no historian has yet adequately explained 
why Singapore failed to be a major trading centre before the nineteenth 
century” (Wong 1981: 15).
Since the 1980s, however, significant archaeological research, coupled 
with a reassessment of the historical documents relating to the island’s 
history before the nineteenth century, have led to the conclusion that Sin-
gapore did have a history prior to the modern era. This history of the 
port settlement, which was known as Temasik, dates back to the late thir-
teenth and fourteenth centuries, after which there was a gap of around 
four centuries before Singapore was once again rejuvenated as a port city 
(cf. Heng 1999, 2002; Miksic 1985).
While the historical genesis of Singapore has been successfully 
extended back into the past by more than five centuries, another issue 
remains: why did Singapore’s history as a pre-modern state only start 
in the late thirteenth to fourteenth centuries? Archaeological data sug-
gest that there was no settlement prior to the late thirteenth century and 
that the port settlement declined in the fifteenth century and ceased to 
exist in the early sixteenth century (Kwa, Heng & Tan 2009: 59 & 61). 
More recently, research on Portuguese and Spanish textual accounts of 
the Straits of Singapore indicate that all the important events from the 
sixteenth to eighteenth centuries took place in the sea around the island, 
instead of on the island itself (Kwa, Heng & Tan 2009: 63-82;  Borschberg 
2009). Its founding in the late thirteenth century has therefore been con-
sidered by historians to be an anomaly, leaving one to ponder why no port 
settlement of consequence existed before the fourteenth century or after 
the early sixteenth century. Wong Lin Ken’s comment above is highly 
relevant here. The general pattern seems to contradict the inherent 
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predisposition to settlement formation, given the island’s strategic loca-
tion at the crossroads of the Bay of Bengal, Java Sea and the South China 
Sea regions. The conclusion must be that an advantageous geographi-
cal location was, ultimately, only one factor in the eventual  formation of 
this Malay state. How then, should the seemingly anomalous occurrence 
of Temasik’s existence be framed within the study of pre-modern Malay 
state formation?
Indeed, attempts justify Temasik’s existence have so far often led to 
its raison d’être being presented as a successful international entrepot. 
Attempts to situate Temasik within the longer history of states in the 
Malay region have often led to descriptions of the polity as the succes-
sor of Srivijaya, the mantle of which was then passed on to the Malacca 
 Sultanate in the fifteenth century (Wolters 1970; Kwa 2004). The prem-
ise of this argument appears to reconcile the short-lived success and ten-
ure of the polity, although the actual reasons for this short tenure have 
never been satisfactorily elucidated or explained.
This paper aims to situate Temasik within the Malay region by moving 
away from a narrative of a series of successive states that dominated the 
region’s political history in varying degrees of regional influence over the 
course of time and recasting the heterarchical nature of the Malay region 
as an integral part of the larger context of Maritime Asia. In this process, 
the logic of Temasik’s founding and existence may be elucidated as part 
of pre-modern Malay state formation in the ‘longue durée’.
The study of pre-modern Malay state formation
The study of state formation in the Malay region has had a long 
 tradition of scholarship. Beginning with W.P. Groeneveldt (1876) and G. 
 Coedes (1964), and more recently O.W. Wolters (1999), A. Reid (1988), 
L. Andaya (2008) and P. Manguin (2002), various scholars have explored 
the causes, motivations, and characteristics of these pre-modern states. 
However, there have to date been few coherent narratives about the fluid 
nature of the political history of these polities and the place of their rela-
tively short life spans. In addition, no substantive attempts have been 
made to approach the history of pre-modern Malay state formation as a 
series of cycles or key periods over the course of time. The issues faced 
in historicising Temasik’s history are therefore characteristic of the study 
of the region as a whole.
In an attempt to centre this history within the realm of Southeast 
Asian studies, studies on state formation history conducted to date have 
focused primarily on the localised context, the centrality of the various 
aspects of the Malay state under investigation and they have been con-
fined to the period of the polity’s existence. While this has raised the 
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centrality of these polities within the larger discourse of Southeast Asian 
studies, as may be seen, for example, in Anthony Reid’s seminal work 
Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce (1988), there has been a tendency to 
view the process of state formation, chronologically and geographically, 
within the confines of Southeast Asia as a region. Indeed, much may be 
gained from exploring Southeast Asian state formation history within a 
much larger context.
The result may be seen in the historiographical processes that have 
thus far been employed. The first relates to the use of historical data. So 
far, indigenous materials have been given pre-eminence as the core data 
set from which the historical narrative and framework for understanding 
state formation has been formulated, while other materials, including 
exogenous data, have been accorded a secondary role.
While the place accorded by scholars to indigenous textual materials 
may have been based on the notion of maintaining a central focal point 
within the region (Reid 2007), these materials, all of which are oral tradi-
tions and literary traditions that have emanated from the Malay courts, 
are not without their limitations. First and foremost are the agenda and 
objectives for the textualisation of the oral traditions and courtly litera-
ture. In canonising the history of the state, of which the composers of 
these traditions and literary output are clients of the various royal courts, 
these literary sources tend to personalise the process of state formation 
(Wolters 1970: 5 & 6). To that end, even critical issues that are regional 
or extra-regional and largely beyond the mitigating efforts of individu-
als, such as trade and international diplomacy, have been presented as 
personal.
Exogenous textual data from outside of the Malay region, on the other 
hand, including primarily Chinese, Arab and Indian texts, have been 
used in two key ways. Firstly, the principle of first mention is used to 
trace or identify the genesis of Malay states and polities. Secondly, cor-
related links affecting the nature and development of states and polities, 
such as trade, may be extracted and worked into a historical narrative 
(Wolters 1986). These data may then be supplemented by other sources, 
including archaeological data, to provide complementary evidence of the 
essential types of activities and reasons for the assumptions of the his-
torical narratives, including a tentative indication of the occurrence of 
different stages of social and political organization.
Consequently, for the study of Malay state formation history, there 
has been heavy reliance on the oral traditions of the pre-modern era 
encapsulated particularly in the written traditions of the Hikayats and 
Sejarahs, the observations of Europeans of earlier centuries, such as the 
Suma  Oriental and the accounts of such early western travellers such as 
S.J. Pere de Premare (de Querbeuf 1780), and western-centric ethnologi-
cal accounts of the nineteenth century onwards by such eminent scholars 
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as Gullick (1958) and Braddell (1980). The resulting historical narratives 
of pre-modern Malay state formation have thus been subjected to the 
interpretative lens of the social and institutional imperatives of contem-
poraneous societies, both of the historians who produced the secondary 
works and the producers of the historical data sources themselves.
This trend in the scholarship on pre-modern Malay state formation 
may be seen in the works of such researchers as Wolters (1970), K. Hall 
(2001), and more recently Manguin (2002). Although spanning more 
than three decades, the primary thrust of the framework for understand-
ing the process of state formation, as proposed by these scholars, may be 
summarised as follows. Firstly, Malay state formation and development 
has been premised on the scarcity of manpower, as opposed to the rela-
tive scarcity of arable land. Consequently, the success of state formation 
has been determined by the ability to attract manpower, as opposed to 
territorial acquisition. Given the context of the Malay region as the conflu-
ence of interaction between the Indian Ocean, Java Sea and South China 
Sea regions, the ultimate mark of the ability to attract manpower has 
been based on the ability of a port polity to control trade and garner trade 
goods, thereby leading to the formation of a cosmopolitan population. 
Finally, the state or polity has attained its most developed form when it 
has established and maintained external linkages – manifested by such 
channels as tributary relations with the key states of Maritime Asia – that 
are superior to those of its competitors in the region, thus enabling the 
establishment of a regional hierarchical structure with the state at its apex.
The result has been that while the current state of scholarship has 
advanced our understanding of pre-modern Malay state formation, the 
approach towards the use of the historical sources has resulted in a sig-
nificant emphasis on both the indigenous process as well as the impor-
tance of human agency. The critical factor on which the polity’s formation 
and survival is dependent is the ability of human agency to exploit these 
external factors. This is in spite of the fact that almost all of these factors 
have been beyond the mitigating efforts of individuals or groups in the 
Malay region. Leonard Andaya, for instance, has argued that while the 
physical conditions, which are determined by geography, have remained 
constant for the Malay region for centuries, the states and societies that 
have come and gone over time have been the result of human agency 
adapting varying strategies to the consistent geographical factors (Andaya 
2008: 3-4). Manguin’s study on political leadership and state formation 
in the Malay world also argues that external trade and the influx of for-
eigners into a port settlement were crucial factors that have led them to 
flourish as states and have conferred political legitimacy on their respec-
tive rulers, relying almost exclusively on indigenous traditions (Manguin 
1991: 47-52). Finally, Hermann Kulke’s discussion on Srivijaya’s political 
structure, by nature of the fact that it relies exclusively on ‘Srivijayan’ 
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epigraphic data, depicts the formation of the Srivijayan regional political 
structure as a wholly indigenous process (1993).
It is apparent that the current approach adopted by scholars, while 
clearly important, by and large addresses questions relating to the micro, 
or polity level. The macro level, where interaction between states, poli-
ties, economic spheres and cultural flows within the given region may 
be observed, has so far not been sufficiently studied. Some of the few 
exceptions are Wolters’ work in the late 60s and early 70s on the Western 
Indonesian economy and state in the first millennium AD, Kenneth 
Hall’s works on trade and state formation from the 1980s, and that of the 
author of this chapter (Wolters 1967; Hall 1985; Heng 2009). In the case 
of the current state of scholarship on Temasik, for which indigenous texts, 
archaeological data, foreign records and colonial-era studies are currently 
available, there is still a lack of enquiry into these macro-level processes 
and the place of Temasik in the larger scheme of things. Discussions cen-
tre primarily on the dialectic between the dendritic model formulated by 
Bronson, and Karl Polanyi’s port city model of political economy (Miksic 
2004). The wider application of the heterogenetic model, which has so 
far been confined to the study of settlement patterns based on the mate-
rial remains recovered through scientific field work (including archaeol-
ogy), has by and large not been embarked on (Miksic 2000).
Taken together, it is clear that there are several issues that need to be 
addressed. The approach adopted in the use of historical information may 
require a move away from Southeast Asia to one in which all sources of 
information are examined from the same starting point. Such an approach 
may enable the various pre-eminent factors that led to state formation 
at various junctures in time and place to emerge, as opposed to being 
prematurely determined by the geographical field of study. It would also 
allow for a more nuanced understanding of the extent and limitations 
of the various indigenous and exogenous contexts, and both micro and 
macro-level issues, as circumstances that mitigated the nature of state for-
mation over the course of time. Malay state formation may then be under-
stood as a developmental process that occurred as a part of much larger 
contexts, rather than as self-contained, localised events. As Indian Ocean 
historian Sanjay Subramaniam has pointed out, the history of Southeast 
Asia needs to be viewed as part of a larger trans-regional development, 
simply because occurrences at one locality often had traceable effects in 
another (Subramaniam 1999). In this regard, the interwoven dynamics 
between developments in the Bay of Bengal, South China Sea and South-
east Asia regions and their effects on the state formation process in the 
Malay region may be traced, and an argument may be made that Malay 
state formation was determined to a large extent within these larger con-
texts. It is on the basis of these discursive parameters that the current 
discussion will now endeavour to locate the port polity of Temasik.
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Locating Temasik in the chronology of Malay polities in the first 
and second millennia AD
In order to explicate the correlation between the larger regional context 
and the founding of Temasik in the late thirteenth century, it is neces-
sary to first establish a working chronology of the rise and fall of the 
polities of the Malay region. The founding and demise of Temasik has 
been cast as a link in the chain of a series of chronological succession 
of Malay port polities that came and went through the course of the 
first and second millennia AD. In this way it is possible to reframe the 
polity’s existence within the context of the region’s political formation 
history.
The earliest references to Malay polities appear in Chinese textual doc-
uments. Kantoli, whose rulers are mentioned in the Chinese texts and 
which was mentioned in the Ming period texts by its former name Srivi-
jaya, was noted to have dispatched envoys to China in 404. At the same 
time, according to Chinese texts a polity named Holotan dispatched mis-
sions to China, in 434 and 452 (Wolters 1967: 152). The only indigenous 
source of information comes in the form of an inscription, dated between 
the 5th and 6th centuries AD and recovered at Kedah, alluding to the exist-
ence of a settlement of some form, although no ruler is mentioned in 
the epigraphic text (Wales 1940: 8-10). This period appears to have been 
characterised by competition between a few polities, all of which do not 
appear to have possessed any significant comparative advantage.
Up until this point, the regional political picture appears to have been 
one of several polities enjoying autonomy. By the 680s, however, this 
began to change. In 682, Srivijaya launched a military campaign against 
Java (Coedes 1930). This campaign appeared to have been part of a 
larger political manoeuvre by Srivijaya to exert control over its immedi-
ate region. In 684, Srivijaya erected an inscription as a political compact 
between itself and its neighbouring polities, realigning the regional geo-
political framework into a different configuration. The first of its kind 
in the Malay region, the inscription details the formation of a two-tier 
system of polities in the region, with Srivijaya at the apex of the hierar-
chy. This event was followed in 686 by a second sea and land expedition 
against Java. By 692, Melayu became a part of Srivijaya (van der Meulen 
1977: 90). Srivijaya’s sphere of influence also appears to have extended 
into the Gulf of Siam, as is evidenced by a Srivijayan inscription at Ligor 
dated 775. Finally, the Arab account Ahbar Akbar as Sin wa’l Hind sug-
gests that by 916, Srivijaya had managed to extend its control up to the 
northern tip of Sumatra as well as South Kedah on the Malay Peninsula, 
although details as to what this ‘control’ constituted are not mentioned 
(Tibbetts 1979: 32-36).
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By the late tenth century, more detailed information on the character-
istics of the Malay regional political structure becomes available. Arab 
accounts note the existence of a “king of Zabag”, ‘Zabag’ being the col-
lective Arab term denoting Sumatra and Java, but more likely indicative 
of the Malacca Straits region. They also note that the kings of Kedah and 
other islands in the South China Sea, all of whom ruled under the king of 
Zabag, were known as ‘Maharajas’. Thirdly, the raw produce of the region 
was regarded as the products of the land of the king of Zabag. This infor-
mation suggests that the geo-political structure in late tenth century was 
primarily a two-tier system, in which a measure of local autonomy was 
exercised by the Maharajas of the polities that had submitted to  Srivijaya, 
while Srivijaya maintained its pre-eminence in the international econ-
omy.
However, by the latter half of the eleventh century, the political situ-
ation in the region had begun to change. In 1071, a port polity located 
on the north coast of Borneo Island sent a mission to the Song court 
that year, while Jambi sent a mission to China in 1079 (Tu 1996: 42). 
 Srivijaya’s exclusive ability as a Malay polity to send missions to China 
was slowly coming to an end.
By the early thirteenth century, the Malay region had become more 
fragmented. According to the Zhufanzhi (1225), Jambi had by this time 
become completely independent of Srivijaya, both economically and 
politically. Although the text notes that Srivijaya continued to exercise 
some measure of influence over a significant number of settlements in 
the region, most notably Pahang, Trengannu , Langkasuka, Kelantan, 
Kuala Berang, Jiloting, Karimata, Tambralingga, Grahi, Sunda, Kom-
pei and Lambri (Chen & Qian 2000: 47), by 1230, Srivijaya’s influence 
over the Gulf of Siam had declined. A 1230 inscription, recovered at 
Tambralingga, records that Tambralingga had annexed Grahi, formerly 
a dependent of Srivijaya, and that it had declared itself independent 
(Wolters 1958).
Of the states that continued to be Srivijaya’s dependents, they were 
experiencing a significant measure of economic autonomy. According to 
the Yunlu manchao (1206), Kompei, Pahang and Kuala Beranang, all port 
polities located on the north-eastern coastline of the Malay Peninsula, 
were by this time maintaining direct trade links with the Chinese port 
city of Quanzhou (So 1998), a situation that may be contrasted with the 
economic pre-eminence maintained by Srivijaya up until the eleventh 
century.
The decline of Srivijayan influence in the Malay region and the trend 
towards political and economic autonomy continued throughout the thir-
teenth century. More importantly, the void left by Srivijaya’s shrinking 
sphere of influence was not filled by any state in the region. Rather it 
appears to have been filled by other Southeast Asia powers, notably Java, 
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and later in the fourteenth century, Sukhothai. In 1275, Javanese forces 
sacked the capital of Srivijaya, after which the Malay region witnessed 
the mushrooming of a large number of minor port polities. Marco Polo, 
passing through the region in 1292 en route from China to the Middle 
East, noted that there were eight independent port polities in Sumatra, 
each with its own ruler and language (Griffith 1997). The Daoyi zhilue 
(c. 1349) records a little fewer than twenty ports in the Malay region by 
the mid-fourteenth century, a number of which were newly nascent, 
including Trengganu, Kelantan, Pahang, Brunei (possibly Sungei Limau 
Manis) and Deli (Su 1981). It is during this period that Temasik, a port 
polity located on Singapore Island, was established. This state of affairs 
in the Malay region continued until the early fifteenth century, when 
the region was once again politically aligned under the authority of the 
Malacca Sultanate.
The key point to note in this chronology is that the histories of the 
Malay region’s polities and states are not the sum total of random or dis-
parate developments at the micro level, but that they concurred with the 
repetitive cyclical pattern of regionalization and fragmentation. This nar-
rative thus serves to highlight the point that the history of Temasik needs 
to be seen as part of a larger regional political development and as a stage 
within the longer chronology of state formation history in the region. In 
this regard, the founding and tenure of Temasik is not as anomalous as 
may at first glance appear, but rather a logical outcome of regional events 
over time.
Temasik within the larger maritime Asian context
The above narrative, however, takes the context and reasons for 
Temasik’s founding beyond the coherence of a regional narrative. If, as 
 Subramaniam proposes, every historical event is connected in one way 
or another, then it follows that the genesis of Temasik may be found not 
only in the Malay region, but also within the context of larger forces at 
play within Maritime Asia. This larger context can be seen in how foreign 
policy, trade networks and economic imperatives of larger regional enti-
ties affected the viability and survival strategies of Malay port polities, as 
is evident in the political structures that were developed over time.
The Maritime Asian context, both centred on the Bay of Bengal and 
the South China Sea, and to a lesser extent the Java Sea and the Gulf 
of Siam, produced parameters which in turn functioned as constraints 
that limited or expanded the options that Malay polities had for state for-
mation. The differences in the experiences of the varying areas of the 
Malay region – orientated either towards the Bay of Bengal or the South 
China Sea – suggests that the state formation process and the stages that 
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the Malay region’s polities went through varied significantly, depending 
on the policies of the larger states in these regions, resulting in diverse 
macro-level experiences that in turn determined the coherence of a given 
geographical region, in this case the Malay region encompassing the 
Malacca Straits and the Gulf of Siam. In the case of Temasik, its estab-
lishment and trajectory as an autonomous port polity was determined 
primarily by developments in the South China Sea and Java Sea.
Up until the seventh century AD, the polities or states of the Malay 
region appear to have been in mutual competition with each other, as is 
seen in the separate missions dispatched to China. Scholars have so far 
assumed that such a pattern in the dispatch of missions suggests a state 
of competition for the official recognition of China. However, China 
prior to the seventh century was in a state of political disunity, with only 
the Liu Song (420-479) in South China for a brief period maintaining 
an active interest in maritime trade coming into the Gulf of Tonkin 
(Liu Song Shu 5:15a & 16b). China’s relations with the region, particu-
larly in the economic realm, does not appear to have reached a critical 
mass that would have spurred a more coherent or concerted diplomatic 
strategy on the part of the Malay polities in their relations with China. 
More importantly, the absence of any mention of identifiable Malay port 
polities in Chinese official documents dating back to before the Tang 
period suggests that at least in the mind of the Chinese state, the Malay 
region did not figure significantly, if at all, in the maritime region south 
of the Bay of Tonkin. As such, it may be more accurate to interpret the 
pattern of missions as a situation where there was no coherent strat-
egy in charting or determining the region’s relations across the South 
China Sea.
On the part of the Malay region, it would appear that this state of affairs 
did not engender any circumstances that permitted any one Malay pol-
ity to supersede the others in any way, whether political or economic, at 
least in the context of the South China Sea. This appears to have had a 
significant impact on the nature of states in the Malay region. The known 
polities in the region at this time did not appear to have extended beyond 
the immediate areas around the key port settlements. Each polity appears 
to have maintained a small sphere of influence in the area immediately 
surrounding the key settlement location of the polity, with no epigraphic 
or textual data suggesting that these port polities had spheres of influ-
ence well beyond their core urban centres.
By the seventh century AD, however, a regional structure appears to 
have begun to appear. At least two more autonomous polities,  located on 
the south-eastern coast of Sumatra, were noted by the Chinese. The travel 
account of the Chinese monk Yi Xing indicates that by 671, Melayu and 
Srivijaya were active (Wolters 1983). By the 680s, Srivijaya’s ruler appears 
to have developed a political compact that continued the recognition of the 
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local autonomy and position of the local chieftains of the Malacca Straits 
region, while binding them in an oath of loyalty. This two-tier system of 
politics in the Malay region was based, according to Kulke, on a structure 
that accorded political autonomy to the localised chiefs, while maintaining 
overlordship over their external dealings (Kulke 1993: 171 & 172).
This new regional geo-political structure appears to have been made 
possible, to a significant extent, by the end of the diffused pattern of 
interaction between the Malay region’s polities and China. Jambi’s diplo-
matic mission to China in 644 represented the last of the disparate diplo-
matic efforts by Malay polities. After that, the interactive pattern gave way 
to exclusive diplomatic relations between China and the Malay region, 
maintained under the sole auspices of Srivijaya and China, which had 
been unified under the Tang Dynasty2.
Previous conclusions that the six Srivijayan missions to China between 
670 and 742 were most likely an indication of Srivijaya competing for 
China’s attention and official recognition as part of its overall strategy to 
be the dominant polity in the Malay region do not take into consideration 
that there was in fact no more competition in the diplomatic realm after 
6443. Indeed, the absence of any textual record to suggest that the Tang 
court was encouraging, implicitly or otherwise, some form of competi-
tion amongst the Southeast Asian or Malay states in attaining recogni-
tion by China as the representative state of the region, can only imply 
that China did not have a coherent foreign policy in its dealings with the 
Malay region. The Tang court only made three known attempts at engag-
ing foreigners arriving via the South China Sea: a mission in 683 that 
called at Srivijaya, an edict in 695 stating that provisions were to be made 
for foreign traders at the port of Guangzhou before they left China, and 
the appointment of Superintendent of Mercantile Shipping at Guang-
zhou in 714 to manage maritime trade (Kuwabara 1928: 8). These efforts 
pale in comparison to China’s efforts at engaging foreign trade and states 
during the Song period (960-1278), during which time there was a direct 
correlation between the maritime trade policies and foreign policy objec-
tives of the Song court (Heng 2009: 72-110).
As such, the state of affairs in China did not directly result in the 
Malay region’s geo-political reconfiguration. Instead, Tang recogni-
tion of  Srivijaya by 683 allowed it to complete the construction of the 
Malay regional structure that it had begun to construct half a century 
ago.  Srivijaya’s exclusive prerogative in driving the Malay region’s exter-
nal interactions across the South China Sea and the two-tier geo-political 
structure in the Malacca Straits established by the late seventh century, 
appear to have been based on two key premises. The first pertained to 
China, the South China Sea and the Gulf of Siam. Given that Chinese 
citizens were not permitted to venture abroad for the purpose of trade, 
China was the recipient of whatever trade was brought to its shores by 
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foreigners. China’s economic relations with Maritime Asia were there-
fore perpetuated by its foreign partners, and its vision of these foreign 
regions was based on the information and images projected by the states 
that interacted with the Tang court. China’s view of the Malay region 
would have been one that was largely based on Srivijaya’s narrative of the 
state of affairs in the region. Chinese imperial perception of the Malay 
region most likely remained largely unchanged through the course of the 
eighth to early tenth centuries, even as the market demand for foreign 
products attainable from or via Southeast Asia grew, until 904, when 
political authority of Guangzhou was passed from the Tang to the King-
dom of Min (Clark 2002: 64-70). This stability allowed Srivijaya to con-
centrate its efforts on state formation in the Malay region.
The second premise pertained to the immediate neighbouring areas in 
Southeast Asia. The feasibility of developing the geo-political configura-
tion of a two-tier system in the Malay region was actively attained through 
the military incursions initiated by Srivijaya into Java, the closest regional 
neighbour to the Malay region. Occurring in the late seventh century dur-
ing the peak of the geo-political formation process in the Malay region, 
these incursions were probably due to the perceived need to create a com-
petition-free zone at the periphery of Srivijaya’s new sphere of influence 
as a concurrent requisite of the new framework. The epigraphic inscrip-
tion commemorating the military campaigns launched in 682 and 686, 
while not noting that territorial expansion was part of the objective, may 
have been over control of the Sunda Straits. The culmination of its mili-
tary success against Java, the Tang court’s recognition, and the political 
compact with a number of polities in the Malay region, enabled Srivijaya 
to absorb Jambi, its most serious competitor in the Malay region, into its 
political fold by 692.
The availability of a regional competition-free vacuum that worked in 
the Malay region’s favour was not entirely of Srivijaya’s making. The ram-
ifications of a unified China under the Tang, which translated both into 
a revitalized market as well as Chinese territorial ambitions along the 
southern borders, led to a reconfiguration of Mainland Southeast Asia’s 
politics. The magnetism of the China market attracted the sustained atten-
tion of a number of newly emergent mainland Southeast Asian states, 
including Linyi (South Vietnam) and the Khmers in Cambodia, as is evi-
denced by the dispatch of several missions to China through the course 
of the late seventh and eighth centuries, causing a northward shift in the 
locus of prosperity in Mainland Southeast Asia (Coedes 1964: 81-109). 
The concurrent decline of Funan from the fifth century AD resulted in 
the Gulf area lacking any significant political force during this time. This 
enabled Srivijaya to extend its sphere of influence, in the second stage 
of its regional state formation process, into the southern half of the Gulf 
region, successfully bringing Ligor under its political authority by 775.
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Srivijaya’s regional hegemony being premised on the state of affairs 
in the South China Sea area that predisposed its success may be due, in 
contrast, to Srivijaya’s limited fortunes in the north Malacca Straits. This 
area was clearly an important gateway and landfall for shipping and trade 
traversing the Bay of Bengal. Interaction between the Indian sub-conti-
nent and the Malay region began as early as the late first millennium BC. 
Indian activities across the Bay, which were vibrant as early as the third 
century AD, were proactive, in contrast to China’s passivity. One of the 
earliest records of Indian activity in the region is a stone inscription dated 
to the 5th century, which contains a prayer by a sea captain for a successful 
voyage across the bay to Kedah. In addition, Kedah, known as Kadaram 
in Indian texts, was also noted in Pallava (4th-9th c. AD) texts as the first 
landfall across the bay. The implications for Malay state formation were 
consequently not the same as those resulting from the situation in the 
South China Sea.
Trade was the most important reason for communications across 
the Bay of Bengal. Yet, despite economic, cultural and social interac-
tion, there does not appear to have been any significant state formation 
activity in the northern Malacca Straits area until the late first millen-
nium AD. While such places as Lobu Tua and Kedah were well-known 
to traders from India and the Middle East (Tibbetts 1979: 118-134 & 
140-149), a number of distinctive characteristics may be noted of these 
ports. Firstly, there was an absence of some form of political focal point 
at these settlements. The various locations of the pre-tenth century 
temple sites clustered around the Sungai Mas estuary in South Kedah 
do not reflect the presence of any spatial focal point. This characteristic 
can also be seen at Lobu Tua (Guillot 1998). Secondly, the epigraphic 
relics erected in the area were commissioned by Tamil traders and not 
by the indigenous people. Thirdly, no missions were forthcoming from 
the ports of this region to China until the end of the thirteenth century.
Together, these characteristics suggest that the basis for the initial state 
formation process in the northern Malacca Straits area must have dif-
fered significantly from that of the southern Malacca Straits area. One 
major contextual factor may be noted. While itinerant traders would 
have formed a substantial portion of these traders, by the fifth century 
AD, the South Indian merchant guilds, emanating from the structures 
of economy in South India under the Cholas and Pallavas, were begin-
ning to make significant headway in the Bay area. This development 
coincided with the affiliation of the maritime merchant guilds on the 
east coast of the Indian Sub-Continent with those that controlled the 
inland trade in the sub-continent, linking the economies of these regions 
together through coherent, institutionalised socio-commercial networks 
(Hall 1978 & 2010).
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The four South Indian inscriptions recovered so far from this area – 
at Kedah (c. 5th century); at Takuapa (c. 820s-840s); at Lobu Tua (1088); 
and at Neusu Aceh (c. twelfth century) – suggest that up until the twelfth 
century, Tamil merchants and Tamil guilds played a brokering role in the 
port settlements’ rituals, trade and even taxes (Wisseman-Christie 1998). 
The Takuapa inscription records the building of a tank and its subsequent 
placement under the protection of the members of the Manikkirmam, a 
Tamil guild (Sastri 1949). The Lobu Tua inscription, commissioned by a 
Tamil guild, records the issue of tithes to be paid by arriving Tamil ves-
sels to support the upkeep of a local Hindu temple, presumably built by 
the Tamil merchants in exchange for commercial access to the area (Wis-
seman-Christie 1998: 257 & 258). The Neusu Aceh inscription makes 
references to a Tamil guild, and possibly the issue of regulations concern-
ing trading losses (Wisseman-Christie 1998: 259). The language of the 
inscriptions suggests that the Tamil guilds had significant administrative 
prerogatives at these places.
The presence of these inscriptions is in stark contrast to the absence 
of inscriptions made by the settlements’ indigenous populations. This 
state of affairs differs from that of the south Malacca Straits area, Gulf 
of Siam and Java, where the inscriptions were primarily erected by the 
indigenous people. It is likely, therefore, that the political structure of 
the north Malacca Straits settlements included the Tamil guilds in an 
integral manner.
The fact that the instructive contents of the Tamil inscriptions had not 
changed much from the fifth to the twelfth centuries AD suggests that 
nature of state formation and social formation in this part of the Malay 
region did not change much over the course of these eight centuries. 
Nonetheless, a brief interlude appears to have occurred during the ninth 
and tenth centuries. The overtures towards India initiated by Srivijaya in 
the mid-ninth century, involving the dispatch of a mission to the Pallava 
court and the building of Buddhist monasteries in Pallava territory in 
India in 860 (Sen 2003: 220), were unique efforts on the part of Srivijaya 
in its interactions with the states across the Bay of Bengal. These over-
tures also coincided with the peak of Srivijaya’s influence over this part 
of the Malay region in the late ninth and early tenth centuries. Early tenth 
century Arab accounts note that Srivijaya had managed to exercise some 
form of control up to the northern tip of Sumatra as well as South Kedah 
on the Malay Peninsula. This control however, was short-lived. A 995 
Arab text provides important data concerning this geo-political change. 
While the Malay region, including the Gulf of Siam and the north Malacca 
Straits, was known collectively as one geo-political entity and under the 
ruler of Srivijaya, Kedah was noted to have had its own ruler. Kedah’s 
produce, however, was considered part of the trade commodities made 
available by Srivijaya to foreign traders. Hence, while Srivijaya’s political 
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influence over the north Malacca Straits area appears to have receded, it 
continued to maintain a pre-eminent role in the international economy 
of the area.
This rapid decline of Srivijaya’s influence over the north Malacca Straits 
area may be seen in the nature of the overtures that it initiated with the 
Cholas between 1005 and 1016, during which time Srivijaya built at least 
one vihara at the Tamil port city of Nagapattinam, and made several gifts 
to various temple deities. While these overtures were attributed to the 
Srivijayan ruler, the Srivijayan agent who carried out these overtures was 
in fact the ruler of Kedah (Chandra 1957: 15).
The extent to which Srivijaya was able to project its influence into the 
north Malacca Straits area was therefore affected by Indian interests in 
the Bay of Bengal. Spencer and Hall have argued, for example, that the 
Chola court’s favourable acceptance of these overtures made by Srivijaya 
at Nagapattinam was not an act of rescinding its sphere of influence 
across the Bay of Bengal, but purely for the purpose of encouraging the 
arrival of traders from across the Bay (Hall 1978; Spencer 1976). In this 
regard, the political context of the north Malacca Straits could easily be 
subverted by the Indians whenever they were capable and willing to do so. 
This is clearly exhibited by the Chola raids in the Malay region between 
1025 and 1028. The contents of the inscriptions in India commemorat-
ing the event suggest that the major gateways of the Malay region into 
the Bay of Bengal were most severely affected by the campaign. The 
treasures of Kedah were plundered, while the Srivijayan ruler was taken 
into exile in India (Sen 2003: 221). Another Chola raid, conducted across 
the Bay in the 1060s, resulted in the retention of Kedah under Chola 
influence. A stone inscription dated to 1068, commissioned by the Chola 
ruler Kulothunka I and erected at Kedah, commemorates Chola overlord-
ship over that port city. The extension of regional hegemony under the 
auspices of Srivijaya over the north Malacca Straits during the late ninth 
and early tenth centuries appears to have occurred at a time when there 
was a political transition in South India, which led to a temporary sus-
pension of South Indian efforts in the north Malacca Straits. At other 
times before and after that transitional phase, the Malay regional political 
structure could not be extended into this northern area.
South Indian economic influence continued to be projected well into 
the twelfth century under the institutional auspices of the Tamil guilds. 
However, by the thirteenth century, this influence had begun to wane. 
The Tamil-language inscription recovered in the Padang Lawas area, 
dated to the thirteenth century, makes no mention of any Tamil guilds 
or traders, but instead refers to the founding of a settlement and the 
making of meritorious gifts (Christie 1998: 262 & 263). This change in 
context, from direct references to links across the Bay of Bengal to refer-
ences of indigenising South Indian settlement activities in the inland 
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reaches of Sumatra, reflects the decline of Chola political power in South 
India, the remnants of which were eventually absorbed by Vijayanagar 
in the fourteenth century. Accordingly, institutionalised Tamil influence 
receded from the Malay region. Coincidentally, it is during this time that 
Lambri, Semudra and South Kedah emerged as autonomous polities 
(Heng 2009: 105). However, unlike the ninth century, when a similar 
political transition in India led to the extension of Srivijaya’s regional 
influence in this area, the changed context in the South China Sea fore-
stalled the recurrence of such state formation.
The extent to which the form of the polity and the nature and extent of 
the regional political structure of the Malay region depended on the dia-
lectic pull of South India across the Bay of Bengal on the one hand, and 
China across the South China Sea on the other, is evident up until the late 
twelfth century. By the early thirteenth century, however, the convergence 
of differing developments across the Bay of Bengal and the South China 
Sea led the Malay region into another phase of state and regional political 
formation.
Up until the late tenth century, although the Song court (960-1278), 
which had unified China since the 970s, encouraged maritime trade 
between the states of Maritime Asia and China, the premise of this 
interaction remained largely the same as during the Tang period. Con-
sequently, the Malay region’s operative environment across the South 
China Sea remained largely unchanged. The major change during this 
period came, instead, from both Mainland and Island Southeast Asia. 
On the mainland, the rise of the Khmers, as well as Champa (coastal pre-
sent-day Vietnam), posed significant competition to the Malay region in 
the purveying of trade products from Southeast Asia to China. Increased 
intensity of interaction also occurred with Java, with the Javanese king-
doms having substantial maritime interests both across the Java Sea into 
such places as South Sulawesi, and with China and South India, and had 
commenced competing for space in the west Java Sea area. A spectacular 
mission dispatched to China in 991 was well-received by the Song court, 
and a twelve-year Javanese naval blockade against Srivijaya was imposed 
in 990 (Heng 2009: 81).4
While Srivijaya managed to maintain an upper hand in the Malay 
region’s interactions with China, significant changes in the Chinese 
context were already under way. From 982, the Song court progressively 
liberalized the Chinese domestic trade in foreign products into private 
hands. Chinese private commercial shipping was permitted to trade 
abroad from 989 and by 1090 private shipping was fully liberalized along 
the Chinese coastline (Heng 2009: 38-54). These changes saw Chinese 
maritime shipping, import trade and the domestic trade in foreign prod-
ucts liberalized to its fullest extent up until that time in Chinese history, 
resulting in the integration of the economic production of the Chinese 
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coastal hinterland, foreign markets reachable by sea, and Chinese market 
demand for foreign products, as well as the integration of commercial 
and distributive networks within China with Chinese shipping networks 
and maritime trade. One of the critical effects was that Chinese traders 
became increasingly involved in exporting Chinese products into South-
east Asia and procuring Southeast Asian products directly, and Indian 
Ocean products indirectly, from the region itself. Southeast Asian ports 
could now cater to the Chinese market by catering directly to the Chinese 
traders who were arriving in the region annual to trade (Heng 2009: 
105-110). The increasingly pervasive presence of the Chinese in South-
east Asia, and the explosion of Chinese knowledge of maritime Southeast 
Asia, dramatically altered the operative environment for polities in the 
Malay region.
By the 1070s, the pattern of exclusivity in Srivijaya’s intercourse with 
China was disrupted. Boni, a port polity located on the north coast of Bor-
neo, and Jambi, dispatched missions to China in 1071 and 1079 respec-
tively. The disruption to the established pattern was emanating not just 
from within the Malay region, but from China as well. In 1130, following 
the 1127 flight of the Song court south to Hangzhou, the court identified 
four states in Southeast and South Asia as key states in their respective 
regions, and accorded lands in China to these states so that a permanent 
representation, supported by regular visits of diplomatic representatives, 
could be established (Heng 2009: 101-102)5. At the same time, tribute 
missions began to be regarded by China as acts of obeisance by lesser 
polities in response to the pre-eminence and attractiveness of the Song 
emperor’s imperial virtue6. Sino-Malay diplomatic relations during this 
period deteriorated, marked by only three missions dispatched to China. 
The 1137 mission was accorded honour belatedly, the 1156 mission was 
told by the emperor that missions were not meant to be occasions to pro-
mote economic interests but as occasions for displaying admiration for 
the Song court’s imperial virtue, and the 1178 mission was never received 
by the Song court, but redirected while it was en route from Guang-
zhou to the court to Quanzhou and handled by the port authorities as 
ordinary trade7. These mission outcomes reflect a progressive decline 
in Srivijaya’s status in the Song court’s eyes. One of the key factors on 
which Malay regional hegemony was based was becoming inapplicable. 
The regional structure, centred on and perpetuated by Srivijaya, was no 
longer tenable.
By the beginning of the thirteenth century, Pahang and Kuala 
Beranang, polities in the Gulf of Siam that had previously subsumed 
under Sirvijaya’s economic umbrella, had already established direct eco-
nomic relations with the Chinese port city of Quanzhou (So 1998: 205-
308). The fact that only the polities in the Gulf of Siam were beginning to 
exercise economic autonomy suggests that the core of the Malay regional 
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structure in the Malacca Straits was still intact. The establishment of eco-
nomic links with Quanzhou, rather than Guangzhou, so far the primary 
Chinese port of call that Srivijaya operated at, suggests that these polities 
were still exercising some diffidence towards Srivijaya within the South 
China Sea context.
The situation deteriorated quickly thereafter. By 1225, Jambi seceded 
from the Srivijayan regional structure after an armed conflict with its 
former overlord (Chen & Qian 2000: 46 & 47). In 1230, Ligor ceded from 
Srivijaya’s sphere of influence, taking Grahi, a Srivijayan dependency, 
into its political orbit in the process (Coedes 1964: 184). The former geo-
political structure of the Malay region – a two-tier framework bound by a 
political compact premised on the exclusivity of external interactions by 
the polity at the apex – which had served as the basis of Malay state and 
regional formation since the late seventh century, was no longer relevant 
nor sustainable by the early thirteenth century.
The growth of Chinese economic activities in the region, coupled with 
the changes in the foreign policy imperatives of the southern Song court, 
coincided with the decline of South Indian influence across the Bay of 
Bengal, mitigating whatever the transition in political power in South 
India may have had on the trajectory of Malay state formation. Previously 
in the ninth and early tenth centuries, the transition of power in South 
India, coupled with the unchanged situation in the South China Sea area, 
had opened a window of opportunity for Srivijaya to proactively extend 
its political authority into the north Malacca Straits. In the thirteenth cen-
tury, however, the changed environment in the South China Sea, and the 
ascendency of Java and Thailand in maritime Southeast Asia, prevented 
any expansion of the Malay regional structure from taking place. Instead, 
these larger developments paved the way for the era of disparate autono-
mous port polities to recommence after a gap of five centuries.
China, although unified under Mongol rule by 1279, did not show 
the same level of interest in re-establishing relations with the polities 
of Island Southeast Asia, with perhaps the exception of Java. Although 
the maritime route was used to carry official communications with the 
South Asian states, the Central Asian land route was reopened, becom-
ing the primary conduit that connected the different khanates that 
spanned Continental Asia. The Malay region was therefore left, in the 
second half of the fourteenth century, to the pull of regional polemic 
forces of an ascendant Java to the south and Sukothai (Thailand) to the 
north (Miksic 2005).
Perhaps the most fundamental change in the thirteenth century, how-
ever, appears to have been the way in which the nature of state structure 
in the Malay region was transformed. Previously, the social polity in the 
southern Malacca Straits appears to have revolved around a charismatic 
individual. This framework had been evident in the structure fostered 
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by Srivijaya since the political compact was initiated in the late seventh 
century. By contrast, the social polity in the northern Malacca Straits 
appears to have revolved around a collective. The investiture of a ruler, 
however, does not appear to have been part of the state formation process 
in the north until the thirteenth century, as evidenced by the local oral 
and subsequent written traditions of the area, such as the Hikayat Raja-
Raja Pasai and the Hikayat Aceh (McKinnon 1984: 362-363; Hill 1960).
These developments were given further impetus by the broader South-
east Asian context. The rise of Singhasari in East Java in the thirteenth 
century, with its regional political ambitions, may have been a major hin-
drance to the continuation of a Malay regional order. In 1275, the capital of 
Srivijaya was sacked by Singhasari forces, thus bringing the centuries-old 
Malay regional structure to an end (Heng 2009: 106). This state of affairs 
was further exacerbated by Javanese expansionism in the Malay region in 
the fourteenth century. Between 1329 and 1357, Javanese influence under 
Hyam Wuruk extended over the southern half of the Malacca Straits 
region, to include Pasai, Palembang, Jambi, and Pahang  (Robson 1995). 
Consequently, the Malay region witnessed the mushrooming of a sub-
stantial number of port settlements in the late thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries, each being fairly limited in scale and geographical extent. This 
is reported in Marco Polo’s account of the region, in which he notes that 
there were eight polities in the Malacca Straits, all of which had their 
own ruler and language (Griffith 1997: 215-222). The Chinese text Daoyi 
zhilue (c. 1349) records at least eighteen port settlements in the Malay 
region, all of which had their own rulers or chieftains and maintained 
fairly autonomous economies (Su 1981).
A number of autonomous port polities were founded during this 
time, most notably Temasik, Kelantan and Trengganu (Su 1981: 99, 102, 
196 & 213), although a number of unrecorded port polities, including 
those located at such places as Sungei Limau Manis, present-day Brunei 
 (Jabatan Muzium-Muzium Brunei 2004), also appear to have emerged. 
All the polities of the Malay region maintained sporadic, independent 
relations with China through the late thirteenth and fourteenth centu-
ries, with missions dispatched to the Yuan court only when these were 
demanded of them by that court. This situation eventually led, by the 
third decade of the fourteenth century, to the various polities of the Malay 
region ceasing to make any attempts to reach out to the first tier states of 
Maritime Asia (Heng 2009: 64 & 65).
It is in such a context that Temasik was founded in the late thirteenth 
century. It lasted as an autonomous polity until the beginning of the fif-
teenth century, when, according to the Sejarah Melayu, it was overrun 
by Majapahit forces and the last ruler of Temasik had to abandon the 
port city and flee northwards to Muar, modern-day Johor (Brown 1970: 
50). Temasik’s short tenure as an autonomous port polity was also 
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characterised by the localised extent of its influence within the Straits of 
Singapore area, only extending into the Riau Islands and possibly South 
Johor during its peak. It was one of a number of autonomous port poli-
ties that existed in the Malay region during that time, a state of affairs 
that did not exist prior to this period and after which all of them invari-
ably lost their political autonomy to more powerful neighbours (during 
the fifteenth century). After the fourteenth century, it became a minor 
settlement whose population and economy was eventually hollowed out 
by Malacca, and which politically became the fief of the Admiral of the 
Malaccan court (Cortesao 1944: 264).
This extended narrative demonstrates that Temasik’s founding was 
an event borne out of the regional contexts that existed in Maritime 
Asia during the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. More impor-
tantly, it was also the culmination of developments that occurred over 
the course of almost a millennium and made possible by the unique 
set of circumstances in the Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea, 
without which the polity’s founding would most likely not have been 
possible. In a sense, although the strategic significance of Singapore 
Island’s geographical location was ultimately a minor factor leading 
to state formation on the island, the strategic importance of events 
and policies projected from both the Bay of Bengal as well as the 
South China Sea had a fundamental impact on state formation in the 
Malay region.
Maritime Asia as the key determinant of the characteristics  
of Temasik
While the above narrative argues for the case at the macro level, the 
impact of the parameters set by the larger maritime Asian context filtered 
down to the micro level, or the polity-level, as well. The characteristics of 
the Malay polities of the first and second millennia AD were, to a large 
extent, constrained by the parameters that the Maritime Asian context of 
this period have set in place, thus affecting the same characteristics that 
the polities ultimately developed. How did this process manifest itself in 
the case of Temasik?
The Sejarah Melayu, the only historical text containing a narrative of 
the founding of Temasik, narrates that Sri Tri Buana, originally a ruler of 
Palembang, had arrived on Singapore Island after a temporary sojourn 
at Bentan. He brought a significant entourage of political elite members 
and commoners of Palembang with him, including the Orang Laut of 
Bentan and their leader. The port polity eventually became great when 
the ruler managed to attract both international trade and foreign traders 
to the port city (Brown 1970: 28-55).
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Three key points may be elucidated from this indigenous narrative. 
Firstly, Temasik’s founding and tenure has been portrayed as a conse-
quence of political rule from Sumatra. The continuity of this political 
succession is apparent when one considers that Temasik’s tenure is fol-
lowed by that of Malacca by the last ruler of Temasik. Secondly, human 
agency and the ability to attract followers and talented individuals and to 
command the waterways led to the success of the port polity. Thirdly, the 
port polity was proactive in attracting international trade and traders to 
its port.
Other sources of information on Temasik, however, portray a different 
picture. Firstly, Temasik’s tenure was short, or more to the point, abrupt. 
Geographical texts dated to around the beginning of the fourteenth cen-
tury, including Marco Polo’s account, Ibn Said’s account from the late 
thirteenth century and the Dade nanhaizhi (c. 1307) do not mention any 
settlement at the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula. It is only in the 
mid-fourteenth century that any mention of Temasik is made. No other 
textual record of Temasik is noted after the fourteenth century, with all 
references made being to the island and Keppel Straits, rather than to a 
port polity. The unique context of the late thirteenth to fourteenth centu-
ries, when China, under Mongol rule, was more interested in keeping in 
contact with the other khanates across Central Asia, and when interaction 
with the kingdoms of the Indian Sub-Continent were more important 
than relations with Southeast Asia, only lasted until the advent of Ming 
rule in China in 1368. The absence of diplomatic overtures on Temasik’s 
part was therefore reflective of the conditions in China, although the abil-
ity of Temasik to engage China diplomatically remains questionable.
Temasik’s abrupt and short-lived existence is borne out in the archaeo-
logical record. Most archaeological remains date to the fourteenth century, 
with no artefact datable to before the late thirteenth century having so far 
been found. A small quantity of finds date to the post-fourteenth century 
period and the sites are sterile again between the sixteenth to early nine-
teenth centuries (Miksic 1985: 52-54). The archaeological remains, in the 
absence of a much longer archaeological record on Singapore Island, 
effectively stand alone from a chronological point of view.
Secondly, the notion that there was a significant volume of interna-
tional trade or the presence of foreigners in Singapore during the Temasik 
period is in fact not well-supported by the historical data from such exog-
enous sources of information as the Chinese texts of the period as well 
as the archaeological data accrued from the island. The Daoyi zhilue, for 
example, records that Temasik only made hornbill casques, lakawood, 
tin and cotton textiles available for export (Su 1981: 196). The nature 
of Temasik’s external economy, in which the port made select offerings 
available, as opposed to the notion of an international emporium that 
characterised Srivijaya some centuries ago, is in line with the economic 
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context of Maritime Asia during this period, where foreign traders would 
travel around the Malay region to obtain products from specific ports 
known for the key products that they specialised in (Heng 2001 & 2008). 
The product range, and the extent to which Temasik was an emporium, 
was therefore constrained by the nature of foreign trade operating in the 
Malay region during that time, which in turn was the result of policies 
promulgated by the larger states of Maritime Asia.
Similarly, the archaeological finds do not portray the existence of a rich 
emporium during the Temasik period. The ceramic finds predominantly 
come from wares produced in the kilns of Guangdong and Fujian, in par-
ticular those located near the ports of Guangzhou and Quanzhou. A very 
small proportion of shards come from wares produced in the Jiangxi, 
Zhejiang and Jiangsu kilns. This suggests that the economic interaction 
between Temasik and the Chinese market was confined largely to the 
immediate hinterlands of Guangzhou and Quanzhou (Heng 2004: 78). 
In addition, the coinage recovered from the sites in Singapore are limited 
to slightly more than two hundred Chinese copper coins, possibly one 
Javanese coin, and two coins of Sri Lankan origin (Heng 2006: 199). 
While these finds suggest that there were economic exchanges between 
Temasik and Java, China and South India, the quantity recovered is 
significantly lesser than those recovered from such sites as Kota Cina 
(late eleventh to late thirteenth centuries, North Sumatra), and similar 
to those recovered from such contemporaneous sites as Sungai Limau 
Manis (McKinnon 1984: 362 & 363). Comparatively, the volume and 
extent of trade that Temasik experienced was therefore lesser than that 
experienced by Malay ports during the previous two centuries. In addi-
tion, the quantity of finds also indicates that there was not much trade 
with China, reflecting the larger nature of Sino-Malay trade when China 
was under Yuan rule. The predominance of South Chinese materials in 
the archaeological remains suggests that Temasik economy was almost 
entirely orientated to South China. The Daoyi zhilue’s record of Fujian 
sojourners in Temasik, and not any other Chinese groups, is consistent 
with the nature of the material culture recovered from the Temasik sites 
(Su 1981: 213). Finally, the economy was orientated towards the South 
China Sea and Java Sea, reflecting the place of South China, Thailand 
and Java as the key economic markets that were accessible to Temasik 
and the southern Malacca Straits during this time.
As a polity, Temasik was, unlike Srivijaya in the late seventh to early 
twelfth centuries, unable to proactively influence the trajectory of its 
fortunes. This passivity, or general inability, to exercise human agency 
may be seen in the maritime characteristics of the Temasik. The Daoyi 
zhilue indicates that ships approaching Singapore Island from Karimun 
Island to the eastern entrance of the Keppel Straits were subjected to 
pirate attacks (Su 1981: 213), indicating that Temasik, even with its Orang 
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Laut subjects, were unable to maintain security in the waterways around 
its immediate vicinity. This is in contrast to the projection of Malay 
naval capabilities as recently as the twelfth century, when security in the 
Malacca Straits was brokered by Srivijaya, and all ships passing through 
that passageway had to call at its key port city (Tu 1996: 42).
The presence of such material cultural remains as the Chinese copper 
coins, as well as a horde of gold jewellery recovered from Fort Canning 
Hill, suggests that Temasik was economically and culturally under the 
influence of Java (Winstedt 1926). The political pressure exerted by Java 
on the small port polity is eulogized in the Sejarah Melayu as a series of 
stand-offs involving the prestige of the courts of Temasik and Java, which 
eventually culminated in the overrunning of Temasik by Javanese forces 
during the reign of Temasik’s fifth ruler (Brown 1970: 50).
Taken together, the conclusion provided by all these different sources 
of historical data relating to the various characteristics of Temasik as a 
polity in the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries is that the nature 
of Temasik, as with all the Malay polities that were active during this 
period, was determined primarily by the regional contexts of Maritime 
Asia. More importantly, the functional aspects of Temasik were deter-
mined to a large extent by the regional and international contexts that 
the polity found itself in. Indeed, the larger contexts, which were beyond 
the mitigating efforts of the Malay region, predisposed Malay polities to 
be small, limited entities, whose internal characteristics, including their 
respective cultures, were influenced by the larger polities of Maritime 
Asia. Temasik’s size, its currency, material culture and cultural traits, 
including the style of its jewellery, reflect the larger influences that it 
faced during its tenure of a hundred years.
The overwhelming importance of the regional and international con-
texts as factors affecting and determining Malay state formation may be 
seen in the eventual demise of Temasik in the early fifteenth century. As 
Malacca was able to capitalize on the changes in the South China Sea 
context, initially under the auspices of the Thais, and subsequently under 
the new tributary system instituted by the Ming court and facilitated in 
the first three decades of the fifteenth century by the Zheng He imperial 
voyages, the various Malay polities and settlements reconfigured them-
selves under the umbrella of Malacca.
The inability of Temasik’s ruler to control the polity’s fortunes is poign-
antly recorded in the Portuguese text, the Suma Oriental. According to 
this text, after Malacca was founded, the Malaccan ruler managed to 
broker an agreement with the Thais, whereby he would send an annual 
tribute to the Thai court in return for permission for Malacca to engage 
in international trade in the Malacca Straits, and for Singapore Island to 
fall into the economic sphere of Malacca. The Portuguese text notes that 
after that agreement, Singapore’s economy began to be hollowed out, as 
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traders and the island’s population gradually moved to Malacca (Cortesao 
1944: 264). In this account, which differs significantly from that in the 
Sejarah Melayu, Temasik’s fate was determined by its regional overlord, 
with no input or reaction from the polity. From that time on, Singapore 
Island became part of the Malaccan admiral’s personal fief, and remained 
a minor outpost of Malacca and Johor (the successor of Malacca) until the 
arrival of the British in 1819. Temasik’s demise and Singapore Island’s 
subsequent insignificance was therefore a continuation of the Malay 
state formation processes witnessed through the course of the first and 
second millennia AD.
Conclusion: the maritime Asian realm and Temasik
The above discussion indicates that pre-modern state formation in the 
Malay region has tended to be triggered by external forces, particularly 
those in the Bay of Bengal and South China Sea, and to a lesser extent in 
the Java Sea and Gulf of Siam. The combination of all these external forces 
created a variety of climates in which the polities of the Malay region 
then reacted to, taking on the various forms and functions that they did 
over the course of the first and second millennia AD. These included the 
nature, and the extent to which these polities grew or receded and the 
nature of their influence over the various sub-regions of the Malay world.
It is apparent from this discussion that, although much of the Malay 
region’s experiences has been narrated as a single regional entity sub-
sumed under various political entities over the course of time, the region 
was in effect the sum total of several sub-regions whose various polities 
were subjected differing operative environments, which in turn affected 
the nature of the polities that were formed. Scholarly attempts at coming 
to terms with the nature and process of state formation should there-
fore incorporate the larger regional and international contexts as part of 
the emerging historical picture. This imperative is particularly crucial, 
given that the length of time that almost all pre-modern Malay polities 
were active, with the exception of Srivijaya, typically did not exceed more 
than two centuries. Such an approach would put the notion of place and 
continuity in the nature of states in the region in a different perspective, 
thus aiding our understanding of the nature of the region’s pre-modern 
social polity both at the micro and macro levels. In this regard, a con-
tinuous historical narrative of Malay state formation may be based not so 
much on a succession of port polities strung together in a chronological 
fashion, but as concurrent and at times overlapping circles of spheres 
of influences, differing political structures and economic centres, which 
were initiated, perpetuated or ended by the constant changes experienced 
by Maritime Asia.
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Such an approach is particularly important in furthering our under-
standing of Singapore’s pre-modern past. In trying to come to terms with 
Temasik as an independent polity in the pre-modern Malay world, the 
anomalous nature of the timing and length of its existence present signifi-
cant challenges to historians. This paper shows that, in order to surmount 
these challenges, it would be more fruitful to attempt to understand the 
state formation and characteristics of the port polity by  re-orientating the 
nature of the enquiry on two fronts – from its time as merely an autono-
mous polity to the ‘longue durée’ of Malay state formation history; and 
from the indigenous or localised, to the exogenous or regional as the start-
ing point of enquiry. Such a shift in the orientation of historical enquiry, 
from viewing the history of a polity with different lenses, one lens at a 
time, to viewing that history through several lenses simultaneously, 
would inevitably place Temasik in a much longer regional tenure that 
would consist of several parts or stages that occurred over the course of 
a significant period of time. As a consequence, while Temasik occupies 
a minor place in the overall narrative, its raison d’être and role during its 
tenure as a port polity is given rightful significance and coherence within 
the larger framework of regional and international contexts.
Indeed, the place that Temasik occupies in this paper reflects the reality 
that the history of Malay polities is a mosaic of several smaller narratives 
that may be set within the parameters of a regional and Maritime Asian 
‘frame’. In the process, Malay state formation history may be ‘decentred’, 
moving it away from the narrative of the ingenuity of human agency and 
importance of the port polity’s functions in the region’s international 
economy, towards locating it as a subset of a much larger canvas. While 
such a result may subvert the centrality of a specific polity’s history, the 
short tenure of the polity’s existence in the pre-modern era would none-
theless be suitably reflected in the ‘longue durée’ of the region.
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3 The Singapore River/Port in a Global Context
Stephen Dobbs
There is little question that Singapore in the twenty first century is 
a  global city that is heavily dependent on international economic  forces 
for its existence, success and even failure into the future. Singapore 
meets many of the criteria to qualify for global city classification (Sassen 
1991). At the same time it is also quite unique compared with other cities 
that might make similar claims. It is an island city state with no natural 
resources (beyond the much vaunted resource of its people), dependent 
on its neighbours and the global community for even the most basic 
commodities necessary for human survival, especially food and water. 
This dependence and connectedness with a wider global environment 
is not a recent phenomenon. Over the past couple of decades, debate 
about globalisation, what it is and what it means has often obscured the 
fact that interconnectedness and flows in terms of trade, culture, religion 
and politics have long been a ‘global’ reality (Frank 1998). In the context 
of Singapore there is little doubt that in pre-modern times, such as dur-
ing the Temasik and Singapura periods, it was already linked to various 
international trade, political and cultural networks by virtue of its place in 
the realms of the great regional kingdoms of Srivijaya and Majapahit, as 
testified to by various archaeological artefacts and documentary sources 
that have been uncovered (Murfett 1999). Raffles arrival at Singapore 
on the 28th of January 1819 marked the beginning of another phase of 
global interconnectedness for the island as it took its place in modern 
history and became inextricably linked to and dependent on new global 
forces and waves of change. This chapter examines how the settlement 
and port of the island evolved along the Singapore River, linking the 
island to an international capitalist system and trading network during 
the first five decades after Raffles arrived. The changes brought about by 
this integration with a new global system would ultimately see Singapore 
become a prosperous home for millions of migrants from around the 
Asian region and the wider world. The same forces that shaped mod-
ern Singapore would see the world transformed ultimately from one of 
European hegemony, achieved via imperialism/colonialism, in terms of 
political and economic power, between the mid-nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries to one of independent nation states loosely bound together by 
structures and dependencies created in the previous century. These were 
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processes that would involve and disrupt the lives of millions of people as 
new economic, political and cultural forces transformed traditional socie-
ties and states that faced the challenge of an expanding capitalist Europe 
and United States. The political, economic and cultural consequences of 
these global developments are still being played out.
When Stamford Raffles made a claim for the British East India Com-
pany on the island of Singapore in 1819, he had a vision of extending the 
commercial influence of the company and, by default, Britain through-
out Asia. Singapore was ideally suited to the immediate purpose Raffles 
had in mind of securing a foothold for Britain in a part of the Malay world 
that others had already largely conceded was a stronghold of the Dutch 
(Raffles 1991: 374-75). Singapore, situated at the southern tip of the 
Malay Peninsula, with a sheltered harbour for vessels travelling routes 
between India and China, provided the “inch of ground” (Raffles 1991: 
374)  Raffles needed for his imperial ambitions in Southeast Asia. For 
some time he had been concerned with what he said was Dutch aggres-
sion in the Malayan Archipelago and a whole litany of purported viola-
tions of agreements with local rulers as well as interference with British 
trade1. His view of the Dutch was that they were doing everything in their 
power to prevent the British from being able to carry on rightful trade 
in the archipelago. This was a period of intense rivalry, with the leading 
political and commercial powers of Europe competing to extend their 
spheres of influence, which were already global, ever deeper into Asia.
According to Raffles, England had behaved honourably in returning 
control of Java and the Moluccas to the Dutch following the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars in 1814. By 1819, however, Dutch efforts to restrict 
 British trade were a key motivating factor in his quest for a British colony 
south of Penang and Malacca and ultimately establishing a trading fac-
tory on the island of Singapore (Wurtzburg 1954: 519). Raffles was well 
aware of the strategic significance of Britain securing a geographic posi-
tion for itself that would guarantee its growing East-West trade through 
the all-important Straits of Malacca. The trade with China had grown in 
significance for the balance sheet of the British East India Company by 
the early nineteenth century (Wong 1960: 11-15) and a secure base in the 
region of Singapore was crucial to the company’s future in the seas fur-
ther east. As various acts of parliament in Britain opened maritime trade 
to allow greater freedom of passage for free traders and British cotton 
goods manufacturers sought bigger markets in China the pressure for a 
stronger British presence in the region grew (Wong 1960: 31-34). While 
Raffles was clearly driven by motives linked to the expansion of British 
colonial power and wealth he was also laying the foundations for what 
has now become one of Asia’s most prosperous nations, still linked to 
sea-borne commerce through one of the world’s busiest ports2 and now 
also a global commercial hub.
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The establishment of a port in Singapore cemented the island’s place 
in the European imperial maritime trading system that was emerging 
in the nineteenth century. The island’s central place in the international 
commercial system that emerged has been maintained by Singapore up 
to the present day. The new settlement grew at a spectacular pace despite 
the fact that it would be a number of years before British sovereignty 
would be legally recognised by the Dutch, their main competitors in the 
region. There was a very real fear for a time that the Netherlands would 
resort to force to try to dislodge the British from their strategic settlement 
at the southern end of the Straits of Malacca. The use of force would 
probably have succeeded if taken quickly enough, changing the course of 
Singapore’s history and undoubtedly its modern status as a global empo-
rium.
Not all of Raffles’ compatriots shared his enthusiasm or vision for the 
place that Singapore would come to hold in Britain’s eastern empire. 
The claim on Singapore exacerbated tensions between the two European 
maritime and commercial superpowers in the region and this was cause 
for concern amongst some of Raffles’ contemporaries. The Government 
in India seemed indecisive and Governor Bannerman, in Penang, did 
not support the new factory idea because of personal feelings of rivalry 
towards Raffles (Wurtzburg 1954: 475-524). Even Raffles’ closest peers in 
the enterprise were not as sure as he of the island’s destiny as a  British 
factory and major global emporium. His old friend Colonel William 
 Farquhar, who had been left in charge of Singapore, wrote to Raffles in 
1822 pointing out the precarious nature of the port’s status and the fact 
that Raffles had himself given seemingly contradictory orders as to how 
the settlement was to be viewed, wavering between “extensive mercantile 
establishment” and later strictly a “military post”3. Clearly, Raffles under-
stood that the political future of the settlement was far from certain even 
whilst he seems to have clearly comprehended its future importance as a 
global trading centre. It was not until late 1823 that the Advocate-General 
felt confident enough to state that “Singapore may now be fairly consid-
ered as a British Settlement” even though no formal agreement had yet 
been reached with the Dutch4.
For a brief time in Singapore official equivocation and the general 
sense of uncertainty it engendered hindered development of infrastruc-
ture for the port and town despite the fact that merchants and others 
continued to arrive. However, the ambiguity surrounding Singapore’s 
political situation with respect to trade rivalry was resolved in March 1824 
with the signing of the Anglo-Dutch treaty. This agreement effectively 
demarcated the relative spheres of interest in the archipelago that were 
to be controlled by each power. The treaty was followed by a new agree-
ment between the local Malay authorities and the East India Company, 
in August the same year, which effectively signed over Singapore and the 
54 stephen dobbs
surrounding islands to the ‘honourable’ company and extended Britain’s 
imperial reach further into Southeast Asia5. By the time of this formal 
recognition of British sovereignty under existing international law, the 
settlement and port was already a magnet for merchants and a growing 
volume of international trade.
The origins of a global emporium along the Singapore River
With the vista of Singapore’s expansive modern container terminals in 
mind, it is difficult to envisage the rather humble beginnings of this 
mega port along the Singapore River. Even in the early years of the set-
tlement it was not uncommon for this tiny waterway to be described as a 
‘creek’6. Nonetheless, this is where the modern mega port’s roots lie. To 
speak of the port of Singapore or even the settlement of Singapore during 
the first fifty years of the island’s modern history is to speak of the river, 
for on its banks was where most of all global goods traded in the settle-
ment were handled and also where the physical centre of the town lay. 
The economic, political and social life of the young community literally 
developed on and along the Singapore River’s banks.
The purely functional benefits of the river were quickly recognised by 
those charged with turning the vision of a regional port and global empo-
rium into reality. It provided a safe avenue for the landing of cargo as well 
as a sheltered mooring for small craft. In fact, the river provided the only 
site for wharfage in the early years of the settlement7. It was particularly 
suited to the kind of regional commercial activity being carried on at the 
foundation of modern Singapore, which consisted of much bulky, low 
value, produce being imported or transhipped, then re-exported. Such 
cheap high-volume goods were more easily handled in the sheltered 
waters of the river. All the principal merchants who made their way to 
the settlement in the early years were unanimous in voicing approval 
of the river as the trading heart of the town. For example,  Alexander 
Guthrie noted that the ocean front offered no protection or facility for 
trading activities and stated that in his opinion “the most eligible situa-
tion here for carrying on a general extensive commerce is the banks of 
the  Singapore River”8. His compatriot D S Napier noted in a similar vein: 
“the Singapore River is certainly the best place adapted for carrying on 
trade, you have every convenience that can possibly be required for trad-
ing to any extent, and the facility with which boats can approach your 
godown to enable you to ship your goods”9.
The Singapore River had a very different shape and appearance to its 
present form. Even if the modern urban landscape were to be erased in 
an attempt to visualise what it was like in the past, it would be difficult 
to associate the snake-like symmetry of its current course with how it 
first appeared in those early years. Its shape and size have been radically 
transformed over the years and during the early years of the port’s devel-
opment in particular. To make the river an artery of international trade 
it first had to be contained and controlled. The north bank and a small 
hill near the present-day Fullerton Hotel, on the opposite side, were the 
only areas near the river mouth which provided ground suitable for the 
construction of buildings and landing platforms. The south bank beyond 
the rise at the river entrance was some nine feet lower than the opposite 
shore, resulting in what, at high tide, was a vast inland lake up to twelve 
feet deep, engulfing the entire China Town area as far as Pearl’s Hill. This 
same area at low tide turned into a marshy bog unsuitable for building 
and certainly not practical for the landing of goods being transported 
from ships in the bay10. As Raffles had already decided that the north 
bank of the river was to be set aside for government purposes11, the south 
bank had to be engineered to allow for the construction of portage facili-
ties such as quays and godowns (warehouses). Without these engineered 
changes to the river system there would be no Singapore emporium. The 
problem of tidal overflow and flooding was to be overcome by embanking 
the river and backfilling the marshy south bank.
Initially, the main task was to construct a crescent-shaped embank-
ment from the road opposite Ferry Point (Fullerton Hotel) to the pro-
posed bridge (Elgin Bridge)12. The previously flood-prone south side was 
built up and reinforced to provide a permanent embankment between 
the river and the land behind. With the river thus contained, the hinter-
land could be drained providing, “expensive grounds… rendered perma-
nently dry and salubrious”13. The huge amount of land fill required for 
this public works programme came from a small hill which stood where 
Raffles Place is today. An eyewitness account of how this was achieved is 
provided by Munshi Abullah, in which he describes how the hill was lev-
elled by pick and shovel, an arduous job undertaken by Chinese, Indian 
and Malay labourers who were paid one rupee a day to carry the soil 
and stone to the reclamation site (Abdullah: 1970). The riverside land 
reclaimed in this manner was set aside for the business sector to con-
duct commerce and build godowns. The reconstruction of the bank was 
done so to create a natural wharf where lighters could load and discharge 
cargo. It was originally anticipated that between twenty to thirty spacious 
godowns would be created along this line (Logan 1854: 108). In time 
this would prove to be a very conservative approximation of the space 
and needs of the port, as godowns and the associated trading activities 
extended the full length of the river, stretching for several kilometres. 
This work of levelling the hill and embanking the river took some time. 
When Singapore’s second Resident, John Crawfurd, arrived in 1823, the 
leading European merchants immediately petitioned that he continue 
this important river work, pointing out the difficulties associated with 
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landing goods via the beach. Correspondence from various traders noted 
that for a “great part of the year” and at certain times every day, depend-
ing on the tide, there simply was no alternative but to use the river and 
the “facilities it affords”14. The transformation of the river environment 
with quays and godowns was crucial to the development of Singapore as 
a major global port and trading centre.
By the time of Raffles’ final departure from Singapore in June 1823, 
much of the work of laying out a town plan for the fledgling settlement had 
been completed15 and the river was taking on the appearance of a major 
regional port with international connections. With the river thus contained 
and transformed, extensive building work commenced as communities 
of people from China, India and all over the archipelago world of South-
east Asia arrived to conduct business or to work in industries serving the 
port and island’s commerce. One contemporary observer wrote about the 
feverish work in progress as follows: “we may soon look for a well-built 
town, with numerous and convenient wharfs along the banks of the river, 
or rather an inlet of the sea, contiguous to which the principal mercantile 
part of it is marked out, and already partly occupied with… warehouses”16.
The river was now recognised as the centre of commercial activity 
and as the economic lifeline of the port colony. Resident John Crawfurd, 
under pressure to cut costs in the colony including the port works around 
the river, wrote to the colonial authorities in India highlighting the role of 
the river stating: “the existence of the river or rather creek of Singapore 
as the Government is already aware forms one of the most valuable and 
striking features of the place, as a commercial port”17. Though under 
explicit instructions from India to bring down the factory’s expenses by 
halting public works, he authorised the completion of reclamation work 
along the south bank of the river and the levelling of the hill in what 
became Commercial Square (Raffles Place). In correspondence with his 
superiors, Crawfurd described as “impractical” the attempts to reduce 
expenditure in this way, as it would impede trade and the future growth 
of the settlement, which was not in the “best interests of the Govern-
ment”18. The extent of work required is testified to by the fact that as late 
as 1858 there was more than one thousand acres of mangrove swamp 
within a quarter of a mile of the city’s centre – the river (Wheatley 1954: 
64). Even into the 1830s, sections of Boat Quay were still walled using 
“mangrove logs” (Norris 1878: 6), suggesting this important work was 
still incomplete more than a decade after the settlement was founded.
By March 1824 the number of brick-and-tile warehouses and shops 
erected for conducting business along the south side of the river had 
already reached twenty-six19. Many other plank-and-tile and thatch build-
ings also dotted the reclaimed land bordering the river. In the space of 
just several months the population living on the south side of the river 
had swelled to several thousand. The population increase and near 
instant success of the port pushed land prices in the best quarters of the 
town, including around the river, to between three and four thousand 
Spanish dollars per lot20. Where several years earlier there had only been 
jungle, swamp and mud, there now stood the completed buildings of 
Government and those of the more prosperous merchants. Economically 
and socially, the transformation of the river into a major emporium link-
ing British trading interests with Asia and beyond was proceeding apace. 
A new landscape was taking shape around the river and the prosperous 
port with trading companies, shophouses, godowns and shipping.
As the town and population grew and spread out in relation to the 
demands of regional and global trade, the river was contained and trans-
formed to accommodate this growth. All manner of businesses and 
housing spread along the river’s banks as the number of people, attracted 
to the island by commerce, increased. The importance of the river as the 
lifeline of the settlement and port continued unchallenged over the next 
few decades. Improvements to the town and port facilities were made, 
with bridges being constructed between the two banks of the river and 
general road construction and various other public works undertaken.
By the 1860s, the business sector – now housed around Commercial 
Square in impressive multi-storeyed buildings with adjoining  Chinese 
enterprises running along South Boat Quay towards the new Elgin 
Bridge – looked across the river to where government offices stood with 
the Town Hall, St. Andrew’s Cathedral and the Singapore Institution 
clearly visible behind them. In appearance, the town was a model colo-
nial establishment. It was the “Queen of the Further East” (Earl 1971: 145). 
The development of the port away from the river in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century never completely displaced the underlying assump-
tion that the river and surrounding area should be reserved for com-
merce. By the time the Suez Canal opened in 1869 and with the advent of 
the steamship revolution in the latter half of the nineteenth century, this 
small settlement and outpost of British imperialism had become a global 
port that could rival any other in the world, with the Singapore River still 
continuing to play a major role. The river’s importance as a commercial 
artery and centre of the port city did not alter significantly until major 
urban renewal schemes got under way in the 1970s and these develop-
ments, coupled with changes in technology, finally brought to an end the 
role of the river in Singapore’s maritime history.
The river’s global trade
As riverine development proceeded in step with the port’s burgeon-
ing trade, Singapore’s geographical and other commercial advantages 
became clear. The island’s fortunate geography placed it strategically on 
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the main sea routes between east and west, making it an ideal location 
for a redistribution centre and market. However, geography alone does 
not tell the whole story of Singapore’s success. Raffles had determined 
that the port of Singapore would be a free port and this more liberal trade 
policy helped ensure that Singapore stood out from rival trading ports 
in the region in what became an era of burgeoning global commerce21. 
Similarly, as new enterprises such as tin mining and plantation agricul-
ture developed in Malaya and beyond, the port of Singapore became a 
key shipment point for these resources. Its location and status as a free 
port soon attracted vessels involved in regional trade from Siam, Malaya, 
Burma, Dutch East Indies as well as China and India. Thus, Singapore by 
virtue of its location, colonial policies and historical opportunity became 
a global entrepot. The governor of the Straits Settlements noted in a let-
ter to Bengal in 1863 that “Singapore is a mere depot, where goods, the 
produce of other countries, are stored, until a favourable opportunity for 
their reshipment to their final destination.” (Wong 1960: 159)22. It was 
surrounded by many states and islands, all within reasonable sailing 
distance of its shores. In the years of its foundation, when sailing craft 
literally “ruled the waves”, Singapore’s prime location made it a natural 
emporium for the region and world beyond. Vessels wanting to journey 
to countries east of the Malay Peninsula, such as Indo-China,  Philippines, 
China and Japan had three main routes open to them during the South-
west Monsoon, all of which brought them within easy reach of Singa-
pore (Wong 1960: 195). The port opened up trade to various states in 
the region which had previously not even considered the idea of “foreign 
trade” (Wong 1960: 34), thus helping to incorporate even more regions 
into a global trade system. Singapore would be the emporium for many 
of these states’ own goods and a collection point for trade goods from 
around the region and world. Consequently, the trade passing through 
the port quickly began to reflect the diversity of goods and produce ema-
nating from virtually all points of the globe, as Northeast and Southeast 
Asia were integrated into a rapidly shrinking world and new global eco-
nomic system.
With trade as the raison d’être for British occupation of Singapore, the 
river was the focal point of regional and global trade passing through the 
island for around half a century. Even as the port’s trade grew and new 
facilities opened up at New Harbour (Keppel Harbour) to cater for techno-
logical changes and developments in shipping, the river would continue to 
play a vital role in the island’s trading activities into the 1980s. Singapore 
thus became a central port of call in Southeast Asia for sailing vessels of all 
nationalities, forming a vital link in the sea route between East and West. 
Its free port status and central location in the region proved an immediate 
attraction for maritime trade from China, Cochin China (Vietnam), and 
Siam, with annual voyages during the monsoon season being made to 
the island. Similarly, perahus (outriggers) and other craft from the archi-
pelago world of Southeast Asia increasingly traded in the harbour. Like a 
magnet, the promise of free trade and convenience attracted all manner 
of shipping, and in a comparatively short space of time the flags of most 
European and Asian nations were to be seen flying over the harbour, which 
was “filled”23 with sailing vessels and perahus of all descriptions. Through-
out the 1830s and 40s visitors to Singapore seldom failed to mention the 
large number of craft in the harbour or the amount of commercial activity 
which animated the river as “native vessels of all classes” moved to and 
fro between the anchorage and river quays (Bennett 1967: 140). It seems 
Raffles had barely departed the new settlement for Bencoolen before Far-
quhar was writing to inform the Government at Fort Williams of how well 
received the establishment was by neighbouring merchants and traders. 
In a report brimming with conviction, Farquhar declared that, in spite of 
Dutch attempts to hamper the progress of the British factory, including 
the cutting off of fresh food supplies from nearby islands24, “everything 
has gone on in the most prosperous manner inhabitants are flocking in 
from every quarter”25. By late 1820 Farquhar reported to Raffles:
It affords me the greatest satisfaction to be able to state to you 
that although scarcely one and twenty months have yet elapsed 
since the first formation of the port, [it] already far exceeds what 
Malacca could boast of during the most flourishing years of its 
long continuance in our possession.26
After giving details of vessels from various countries in the region, he 
added that Singapore had become “… the favourite rendezvous for all 
descriptions of Eastern traders” and that “cloths of various kinds of  British 
manufacture are in great demand”27. The burgeoning  cross-cultural com-
merce passing through Singapore and the general feeling of optimism 
continued, almost unabated, in the ensuing years.
It is difficult to determine the total volume of goods that were handled 
along the river, as no specific record of river trade distinct from other 
areas of the port was kept. However, based on the fact that the river was 
the principal area offering facilities for handling goods prior to the devel-
opment of New Harbour, it is reasonable to suggest that the rising trade 
figures for the period 1819-1860s largely reflect trade conducted along 
the river. As late as 1864, there were only a “few godowns on the western 
side of the town” with their own wharves, taking some business away 
from the river and the central portage facilities at Boat Quay (Cameron 
1965: 58). While some commercial services opened in New Harbour dur-
ing the 1860s, more than three-quarters of all shipping business contin-
ued to be conducted along Boat Quay (Cameron 1965: 57). The river trade 
was as varied as it was increasingly vast.
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The assortment of merchandise that passed through the port was 
staggering and evidence of the port’s increasing global trade and sta-
tus. In the early years of the settlement it was largely of a rather ‘exotic’ 
nature with much marine and jungle produce being recorded (Turnbull 
1989; Wong 1960), while later in the nineteenth century primary com-
modities such as rubber, tin, copra and sugar became the main prod-
ucts transhipped through the port. In the early years the trade very much 
reflected the Chinese and Western demand for the natural produce of the 
region and beyond. An examination of the commerce of Singapore for 
this period reveals the port’s dependence on such items as spices, ivory, 
dragon’s blood (resin used for varnish, medicine and incense which is 
derived from various trees and palms), tortoise shell, sticlac, seaweed, sea 
cucumber as well as a multitude of other exotic items and of course the 
ever pervasive opium (Trocki 1990; Turnbull 1989; Wong 1960)28. The 
godowns and shops that sprung up along the riverbanks were filled with 
such trade goods and produce from neighbouring countries and regions. 
The streets and alleys in the commercial part of the town were filled with 
the sounds of barter in a variety of languages and dialects and enlivened 
by numerous wares to be found on offer outside merchant’s shops. Eye 
witness accounts clearly bear testimony to the extent and global nature 
of Singapore’s trade from the earliest years. As one observer noted: “here 
you stumble at every step over the produce of China, and the Straits.”29 
There was a carnival-like atmosphere, which pervaded that part of town, a 
permanent “bazaar” as it was called by one observer “crammed”, with the 
“productions of almost every nation in the world” (Yvan 1855: 59).
Trading activity in Singapore was concentrated in two main seasons: 
“the junk season and the Bugis season” (Turnbull 1972: 183). The so-
called junk season saw vessels from South China arrive in Singapore 
between January and March each year. Their arrival was one of the most 
anticipated events on the Singapore calendar during the early decades 
of the settlement. Their arrival provided evidence of the settlement’s 
success and its growing importance to global trade. The Chinese ves-
sels came from all points along the mainland coast, from as far north as 
Shanghai, carried to Singapore on the Northeast Monsoon (Wong 1960: 
110-111). The arrival of the junks each year marked the beginning of a 
notable increase in commercial activity, especially in the Chinese com-
munity. As soon as the first junk was sighted, a swarm of small craft 
would race out to escort it to the anchorage and runners would spread the 
news of its arrival through the town (Earl 1971: 365-367). The excitement 
that surrounded the arrival of these junks was not without good reason, 
as the value of cargo that could be carried on a single junk was signifi-
cant. One six hundred-ton junk from Canton in 1824 had a cargo valued 
at between seventy and eighty thousand Spanish dollars. Another from 
Fukien Province, of two hundred-and-fifty tons burthen, had a cargo 
worth seventy thousand dollars30. These vessels mainly carried goods to 
meet the needs of the growing Chinese population in Singapore and sur-
rounding islands and countries. The Singapore Chronicle reported on the 
volume and value of this trade in 1829 as follows:
The whole of the Chinese Junks for the season have arrived 
and the principal part, if not the whole of their cargoes are 
already disposed of… The number which have arrived this year, 
is eight, three from Amoy, and five from Canton; and they are 
of the burthen of from 250 to 400 tons. The import cargoes, of 
both the Amoy and Canton junks are very similar, and they bring 
the same articles, year after year, with little or no variation. The 
cargoes from Amoy are chiefly composed of – earthenware – 
tiles – granite slabs – paper umbrellas – vermicelli – dried fruits – 
joss sticks – joss paper – and a few nankeens, raw silk &c., and 
are said to be of the value of from $ 30,000 to $ 60,000 Dollars. 
The cargoes from Canton, consist of the same articles, with the 
addition of – silk camlets – satins – camphor – sugar candy, and 
tea; and a much greater number of nankeens (in blue, green and 
yellow), and raw silk.31
The inventory of cargoes also often included such commodities and prod-
ucts as tea, medicines, twine, flour, crackers, paint and combs. A survey 
of merchandise carried to Singapore by junks over the years shows little 
variation in the type of goods shipped. Another important ‘cargo’ brought 
from China was people, known as ‘flesh’. The legal and forced trade in 
human beings was profitable and played a major role in Singapore’s com-
mercial intercourse with China as millions fled their homeland seeking 
better lives abroad. Singapore became a clearing house for the traffic in 
human beings on their way to all parts of Southeast Asia where they 
would, if successful, set up businesses, but most often provide labour for 
mining, construction, plantations and various service industries, and, in 
the case of many women, brothels.
An important source of merchandise found in warehouses and on 
the wharves of the river was the archipelago itself. Collectively known 
as ‘Straits Produce’ the marine, agricultural, jungle and mineral prod-
ucts of the archipelago were a major component of Singapore’s trade 
with China. The trade in these products formed the traditional basis of 
China’s commercial links with Southeast Asia and created a monopoly 
for the junk traders (Wong 1960: 51). Most of the export trade from Sin-
gapore consisted of Straits Produce and among the most desired goods 
from the region were edible seaweed, birds nest, tortoiseshell, gambier, 
gutta percha, sea cucumber, gold dust, ebony, shark fins, rattans, bees 
wax, rice, all manner of spices, tin and sandalwood. Like products that 
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originated from China, there was always a certain amount of variation in 
what constituted Straits Produce, and, at different times, certain items 
took on greater importance than others in regional/global patterns of 
trade and exchange.
The Bugis of south and east Sulawesi were by far the biggest carriers 
of Straits produce to Singapore. Large numbers of their craft – between 
forty and one hundred tons carrying capacity – could be found in the 
outer roadstead during the ‘Bugis season’, which was between June and 
November each year32. Adept mariners and traders, the Bugis had tradi-
tionally traversed the archipelago collecting the natural produce of the 
seas and various islands for inter-regional trading. With the establish-
ment of Singapore, much of what they collected found its way into the 
godowns along the river. Their voyages began with the start of the South-
east Monsoon and ended weeks or months later in Singapore, depending 
on how far they had travelled in the process of assembling their cargoes 
(cf. Pelras 1996; Trocki 1979).
There was a truly international and cosmopolitan feel to the port as its 
significance grew in tandem with trade flows. The official records show 
that a regular flow of Malay traders from Sumatra also made their way 
to Singapore carrying spices and other goods. Pepper, coffee and sago 
formed an important part of this trade (Moor 1968: 101-102). In 1825 
a fleet of twenty-five craft arrived in Singapore from northern Sumatra 
carrying two to three thousand piculs33 of pepper34. George Bennett wit-
nessed a fleet of eighteen Sumatran prows arriving in the Singapore River 
in the 1830s, loaded with unprocessed sago, and he reported that “regu-
lar fleets of ten or more” such craft were resorting there (Bennett 1967: 
210). There was also a number of sailing vessels each year from Java 
which were called the “Arab ships”, due to their being owned by Middle 
Eastern traders resident there. These craft, crewed by Javanese, carried 
large quantities of coffee, sugar and rice to Singapore (Davidson 1846: 
62 & 63). Similarly, there were many smaller craft owned by  Chinese 
working along the coast of the Malay Peninsula and islands close to Sin-
gapore. The Malay states provided a range of commodities that would 
become increasingly important to global trade including such items as 
tin, gold, cotton piece goods, black pepper, rattans, salt and aloes-wood 
(Wong 1960: 78-82).
Continental Asia provided further trade products for Singapore’s global 
emporium, in particular those from Siam (Thailand) and Cochin China 
(Vietnam). Until at least the 1860s there was a steady stream of junks 
from both these countries sailing to Singapore each year on the North-
east Monsoon. Between 1829 and 1866 an average of thirty Siamese 
and seventy-eight Cochin Chinese junks arrived annually (Wong 1960: 
tables IVB & VB, 278-279). Their arrival and the principal goods carried 
by them were detailed in the Singapore Chronicle on a regular basis. For 
example, in 1824 it was noted, that thirteen Siamese junks had called 
carrying the ‘usual’ articles, including sugar, rice, salt, coconut oil, cast 
iron, culinary utensils and sticlac. The article also enumerated the car-
goes of the Cochin Chinese junks that had arrived: “they have brought 
rice, sugar, raw silk, Tonkin lead, pickled pork, hog’s lard and livestock”. 
They also carried tea and other important items from China35.
Clearly the trade and commerce of the Asian region was central to 
Singapore’s early and later success as a major port. However, the river/
port was truly a global entrepot and not simply a regional trading cen-
tre with growing quantities of goods arriving from Britain, continental 
Europe and North America. Trade with Britain and India was a particu-
larly important factor in Singapore’s early commercial success. Between 
1823 and 1869 almost twenty percent of Singapore’s total trade annually 
was with Britain while commerce with India accounted for a further sev-
enteen percent (Wong 1960: 255-256). It was after all a primary objective 
in establishing Singapore to further the commercial interests of Britain. 
John Cameron notes the extent to which European goods were readily 
available in Singapore; describing the scene along the riverfront in the 
1860s, he stated: “from morning til night may be seen the landing of 
huge cases, casks and bales of British manufactures, as well as machin-
ery and iron-work of all descriptions” (Cameron 1965: 57 & 58). Com-
mercial tables show the following articles as ‘principal’ goods imported 
from Britain, Europe and America: anchors and grapnels, arms, beer, 
canvas, copper sheathing, cordage, cotton twist, earthen ware, gold and 
silver thread, gunpowder, iron and steel, lead, paint, provisions, cotton 
piece goods, spelter, spirits, sundries, glass ware, wines, woollens and 
iron ware and mongery36. From India, the following marketable goods 
were found in Singapore: opium, piece goods, wheat, rice, gram, gun-
nies and saltpetre37. Opium and arms were particularly profitable and 
these were sold extensively to Chinese and Southeast Asians to finance 
the colonial enterprise. Singapore became the biggest drug (Wong 1960: 
27 & 29) and guns market (Turnbull 1960: 179) of the archipelago. The 
scene along the river and in the outer harbour, as attested to by numer-
ous contemporary accounts and illustrations, was one of intense activity 
as cargo carrying lighters and a variety of small craft carrying provisions 
and trade goods moved to and fro amongst the ships at anchor outside 
the river mouth.
Conclusion
By the time new wharfage facilities opened at the New Harbour on the 
Keppel Straits in the 1860s, there were more than five hundred small 
craft moored in the lower reach of the river, near present-day South Boat 
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Quay, which were devoted solely to transporting the trade of Singapore 
between ships in the harbour and godowns along the river. Though vul-
nerable to the vagaries of global trading and economic trends, by the 
1860s, the river/port of Singapore was one of the most important in 
the British Empire and a vital link in global trading activities. From the 
deck of a ship in the harbour looking to the river-mouth it would have 
been difficult to imagine the wilderness scene described by Farquhar 
only a half century earlier. The jungle-covered hills and shoreline had 
been replaced by impressive merchant houses and a growing number 
of public buildings flanked the river/port and prosperous commercial 
town centre. The post-Suez and steam era would usher in a new phase in 
Singapore’s internationalisation and global connectedness, but the river’s 
role in this global port continued to play an important role in the overall 
functioning of the port into the 1970s. Much regional trade continued to 
pass through the river before being transhipped, often from the new deep 
water facilities at Keppel Harbour which was becoming a central focus of 
port activities by the 1860s. However, the overall increase in trade from 
the late nineteenth century, which was indicative of the growth of global 
commercial activity in which Singapore has played a crucial part, meant 
that, even as the port’s deep water facilities became more important, over-
all river trade continued to increase. As late as 1959, Singapore’s finance 
minister was telling the Legislative Assembly that the total amount of 
goods shipped via the river was greater than the total quantity of goods 
handled by the Singapore Harbour Board38. Though Singapore would 
remain part of a European colonial empire into the 1960s, by the 1860s 
it was already a cosmopolitan and international hub, with a population 
made up of people from Asian, European and Middle Eastern descent. 
Its dependence on commerce and maritime trade meant that from its 
foundation it was a global port/city connected to a web of flows that have 
included not just commercial activities but also people and ideas.
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4 ‘Walls of Illusion’:  
Information Generation in Colonial  
Singapore and the Reporting of the  
Mahdi-Rebellion in Sudan, 1887-1890
Torsten Tschacher
“News of what is going on in one corner of the world is quickly known in 
another corner.” (Singai Nesan [Cinkai Ne-can], 13 May 1889: 180).
Introduction
News spreading in an instant from one corner of the world to another  – 
this quote conjures up terms all too well-known in the world of the twenty-
first century: new media, knowledge-based economies, information tech-
nologies. But it relates to a time which few of us would think of in this 
manner: written in early 1889 by a Muslim newspaper-editor in Colombo 
(Muslim Nesan [Muslim Ne-can], 24 Cittirai 1889: 29) and reprinted some-
what later in a Tamil weekly newspaper in Singapore, with reference to 
events unfolding in the steppes and deserts of the Sudan. Surrounded 
as we are by the trappings of a technology which allows news to be 
 transmitted almost instantaneously, it may be difficult for us to see the 
late-nineteenth century as experiencing its own ‘information revolution’. 
And yet, at least as far as Singapore was concerned, in a sense this was 
the case.
There were two developments which helped transform Singapore’s 
‘information order’ in the late-nineteenth century (Bayly 1996: 3-6). 
The new technology of the telegraph, which linked Singapore to 
Europe since 1870, revolutionised the transmission of information. At 
the same time, a fundamental development took place in  Singapore’s 
newspaper market: the appearance of the first newspapers not printed 
in English, but in Asian “vernaculars”, as they were known in the 
 language of the time (cf. Birch 1879). These newspapers all formed 
part of what Timothy Harper has called a “diasporic public sphere” in 
 colonial Singapore, “a polyglot migrant world… in which communities 
not only had to find ways to relate to distant homelands, but had to 
learn to speak to each other, in many cases for the first time” (Harper 
1997: 263).
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Yet what role Singaporean newspapers played in this public sphere in 
the late-nineteenth century remains an open question. While important 
work has been done on the role of Singapore newspapers in the public 
sphere in the twentieth century (e.g. Chua 2008b), the early history of 
these developments still needs to be traced. Few studies of early news-
papers in Singapore go beyond catalogues of newspapers and an outline 
of their individual histories. Vernacular newspapers are largely looked 
at in the context of their respective ‘communities’ (e.g. Chen 1967; Roff 
1967), and, in particular, research on the Malay press has focused on the 
role of Malay newspapers in developing and formulating Malay national-
ism. But very little work has been done on how the newspapers related 
to Singaporean society at large and the role they played in Singapore’s 
inhabitants ‘learning to speak to each other’ is far from clear.
Historians have mainly been interested in two aspects of Singapore’s 
early newspapers. One is the simple aspect of the newspaper serving as 
a primary source of information about Singapore’s history. It is not at all 
surprising that one of the earliest histories of Singapore (Buckley 1902) 
was mainly based on clippings from the Singapore Free Press. The other 
has been, as mentioned above, the newspapers’ reactions to events which 
concerned their respective constituencies or communities. This chapter, 
rather than focusing on the way early Singaporean newspapers reported 
local events, will investigate how these newspapers related to an event 
in a region remote from Singapore’s shores, namely the events around 
the movement known as the Mahdiyya, which had arisen in the early 
1880s in the Sudan and kept the British and Egyptian military busy until 
1898. As a movement of Muslim revival that had developed against the 
background of domination and exploitation of the Sudan by Egypt and 
its European administrators, the Mahdiyya had the potential to gener-
ate very different responses among Singapore’s diverse diasporic com-
munities. Which elements did Singaporean editors consider of interest 
to their readers regarding this movement and how did they make sense 
of it? How did they get their information and how did they evaluate it? 
And, finally, what does all of this tell us about the information order of 
late-nineteenth century Singapore? Are we witnessing a ‘diasporic public 
sphere’ in the making, or rather isolated publics engaged in a conversa-
tion with themselves?
In order to address these questions, I will discuss articles about the 
Mahdiyya published in Singaporean newspapers between 1887 and 1890. 
The period from 1887 to 1890 was important in the development of the 
Mahdiyya (cf. Holt 1977). While the original Mahdi had passed away in 
1885, his deputy, the khalı̄fa Abdullahi, had begun to exert renewed pres-
sure on Egypt as well as the British-controlled port of Suakin on the Red 
Sea, but the Mahdiyya were repulsed on both fronts in 1888-89. At the 
same time, rumours of unrest in the Darfur region of western Sudan 
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reached Europe, kindling hopes that the Mahdiyya might succumb to 
internal unrest. Finally, continued attention to the affairs of Sudan was 
guaranteed by the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition, led by the renowned 
explorer Henry Morton Stanley to rescue Emin Pasha, the German-born 
governor of Equatoria, the southernmost province of the Egyptian Sudan, 
who had been able to fend off the Mahdiyya forces. Yet the reason for 
focusing on the period between 1887 and 1890 has above all to do with 
the vagaries of the archive. While vernacular newspapers were being pub-
lished in Singapore since 1875, it is not before 1887 that we actually have 
continuous copies of these vernacular newspapers.1 My discussion draws 
on three Singaporean newspapers, the English Straits Times, a daily, as 
well as the Tamil Singai Nesan and the Malay Jawi Peranakkan, both week-
lies. The cut-off date of 1890 is due to the closure of what was probably 
the newspaper that published most actively about the Mahdiyya in colo-
nial Singapore, the Tamil weekly Singai Nesan.
Singapore newspapers in the late-nineteenth century
The late-nineteenth century was a crucial period for the development 
of newspaper publishing in Singapore. In this period, the Straits Times 
 established itself as Singapore’s main English daily. An even more 
momentous development was the emergence of a vernacular press cater-
ing to the majority of Singaporeans not educated in English. Within a 
rather short span of time (between 1875 and 1881), newspapers were 
established in all of the three major Asian languages of Singapore, start-
ing with the Tamil weekly Singai Varthamani in 1875, the Malay weekly 
Jawi Peranakkan in the next year, and the Chinese daily Lat Pau in 1881 
(cf. Tan & Soh 1994: 1-23; Turnbull 2009: 130-2).2 Newspapers in these 
languages came to constitute the core of vernacular publishing in colo-
nial Singapore before the Japanese occupation of 1942, though in the 
first half of the twentieth century, periodicals in other Asian languages 
were also published in Singapore as well.
A fundamental problem that seems to have beset all of the early vernac-
ular newspapers in Singapore was to carve out a market for themselves. 
Among the Asian elites of Singapore, knowledge of English was fairly 
widespread, thus putting vernacular papers in an uneven competition 
with the English-language newspapers, while the habit of newspaper-
reading was not yet widespread among those who were more comfort-
able with their own vernaculars. Circulation was low in many cases. For 
the year 1887, the Blue Book of the colonial government records circula-
tion figures of 168 daily copies of Lat Pau and 300 weekly copies of Jawi 
 Peranakkan and Singai Nesan, respectively, which are rather low compared 
to the 350 and 220 daily copies of the Straits Times and the Free Press, 
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respectively (Colony of the Straits Settlements 1888: Sa2). At the same 
time, the readers of vernacular newspapers were not confined to Sin-
gapore. Jawi Peranakkan had readers all throughout the  Malay-speaking 
world, in Malaya as well as the Dutch East-Indies. Subscribers to Singai 
Nesan were found in the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Siam, the Mekong 
Delta, and South India, as well as Singapore. Similarly, Lat Pau had 
agents in many places throughout Southeast Asia (Birch 1879: 53; Chen 
1967: 41; Tschacher 2009: 60).
The main support for newspapers in nineteenth-century Singapore 
came from the mercantile elites of the respective communities and com-
mercial interests also shaped the outlook of all these newspapers to a 
certain degree. The first publisher of the Straits Times was an Arme-
nian merchant – Catchick Moses. Later, the paper was run for some 
time by its editor, Robin Woods, a law agent, and from 1861 onwards 
by two  ex-mariners, E.M. Smith and John Cameron (Tan & Soh 1994: 3; 
Turnbull 2009: 85). During the period we are concerned with here, the 
Straits Times was very much the mouthpiece of Singapore’s expatriate 
European settler community, a community as wary of attempts by the 
local colonial government to curtail its privileges as it was of the rise of 
Asian elites operating outside of its own ambit. While prepared to accept 
English-speaking Chinese as members of Singapore’s public, Malays and 
 “bullock-cart Klings,” as well as their newspapers, were thought to be 
unfit to participate in the public debates of “an English colony” (Straits 
Times, 11 November 1889; cf. Harper 1997: 282-6).
Yet the Asian-language newspapers were similarly rooted among mer-
cantile and clerical strata of Singapore’s society. Lat Pau was founded by 
See Ewe Lay, a comprador of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, and 
it seems to have mainly targeted the local Chinese mercantile elite, to 
judge from occasional addresses to local merchants and its interest in 
trade policies (cf. Chen 1967: 28, 45-9). The editor of Jawi Peranakkan, 
Muhammad Said, was a teacher and printer. According to Roff, “mercan-
tile interests” defined most its readers (Roff 1967: 51). At the same time, 
this paper was concerned with “vernacular education” and the stand-
ardisation of the Malay language, perhaps a reflection of the fact that it 
counted a number of Malay-language teachers among its audience, many 
of which were locally-born South Indians or of mixed Indian-Malay par-
entage. These were known in official publications as “Jawi Peranakkan”, 
though the paper tended to identify them rather as peranakan kling in 
the period under consideration (cf. e.g. Jawi Peranakkan 20 Rabiulakhir 
1306/24 December 1888; 9 Rabiulakhir 1307/2 December 1889; cf. Roff 
1967: 49-55; Turnbull 2009: 130-1).
This same class of people also played a role in the Tamil publish-
ing industry. Muhammad Said had himself edited a Tamil newspaper 
for a short time in the 1870s, while C.K. Makhdum Sahib, the owner 
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of Denodaya Press and publisher of Singai Nesan, was apparently born 
in Singapore.3 He had been in the printing and publishing business 
since the early 1870s and had already edited two Tamil newspapers in 
 Singapore before he established Singai Nesan in 1887. As the lists of sub-
scribers for Singai Nesan reveal, this newspaper was again primarily pat-
ronised by traders, though not exclusively so. While more than half of the 
subscribers had a mercantile background (especially trade in cloth and 
livestock as well as money-changing), at least a quarter of the  subscribers 
were engaged in clerical occupations, often as cashiers or even peons 
(labourers) for various institutions. Almost 70% were  Muslims, though 
there were also a sizeable number of Hindus among them, predomi-
nantly from mercantile and landholding castes such as the Chettiars and 
 Vellalars (Tschacher 2009: 60).
None of the early Singapore newspapers (and this is as true for the 
English as it is for the vernacular newspapers) would have been able 
to finance themselves through subscriptions and sales alone; even the 
Straits Times had nearly had to close down in 1869 due to a fire, showing 
the precarious situation of journalism in nineteenth-century Singapore 
(Tan & Soh 1994: 3). Advertisements and notices were a source of addi-
tional income for all papers. With the Straits Times and Jawi Peranakkan, 
these usually filled the first page completely as well as a substantial part 
of the second page of these four-page newspapers. Furthermore, Straits 
Settlement newspapers in the late-nineteenth century were usually still 
closely connected with individual printing presses, which published 
books and other printed material as well as newspapers. Indeed, the edi-
tor of Singai Nesan, who was at the same time the proprietor of Denodaya 
Press, claimed in 1889 that he derived sufficient income from his print-
ing press and that the newspaper was largely published for the benefit of 
the public than as a source of income (Singai Nesan, 24 June 1889: 197; 
1 July 1889: 1).
In the case of Singai Nesan, the roles of publisher, editor, and printer 
were still combined in one and the same person, whereas with both the 
Straits Times and the Lat Pau, the editor was an employee of the publisher, 
a development which had already taken place in Europe in the first half 
of the nineteenth century and which had an important impact on the role 
of the editor, as his or her autonomy increasingly became circumscribed 
by the interests of the publisher (Chen 1967: 31; Turnbull 2009: 130; cf. 
Habermas 1990: 275-81). The case seems least clear in the case of Jawi 
Peranakkan, which was published by an association with  Muhammad 
Said as its editor. Birch writes that the Jawi Peranakkan Association also 
set up the printing press, though prior to Muhammad Said’s death in 
1888, the press seems to have been more commonly known as ‘Saidi 
Press’. In an obituary published on the occasion of Muhammad Said’s 
death, Singai Nesan noted that it was he who founded (stāpittu) the press 
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and even called him (in English) the “proprietor” of the newspaper. Thus, 
it would appear that the situation regarding Jawi Peranakkan was similar 
to that of Singai Nesan, with one individual combining the roles of pub-
lisher, editor and printer, at least prior to 1888 (Birch 1879: 51-2; Proud-
foot 1993: 633; Singai Nesan, 25 June 1888: 206).
While readers of today’s newspapers are used to the idea that most 
of the content of the newspaper is written by the paper’s staff, this was 
not the case in nineteenth-century Singapore. Singapore’s newspapers at 
that time drew on a variety of sources for their articles. Besides  Reuter’s 
Telegrams (which the vernacular newspapers probably drew from the 
English press rather than subscribing to Reuter’s themselves), these 
included articles from other newspapers, both local as well as foreign. 
Articles culled and translated from the Free Press and occasionally the 
Straits Times even formed a separate section of Jawi Peranakkan. Lat Pau 
and Singai Nesan similarly drew on Singapore’s English press to aug-
ment their contents, but did not usually identify these items as such 
(Chen 1967: 37). By the end of the 1880s, both the Straits Times and the 
Free Press also occasionally published articles from Lat Pau. But it would 
be wrong to assume that the vernacular press depended solely on the 
English newspapers for its articles. In autumn 1887, for example, Jawi 
Peranakkan and Singai Nesan both reported a story culled from an Urdu 
newspaper from Madras (Jawi Peranakkan, 23 Zulhijjah 1304/12 Septem-
ber 1887; Singai Nesan, 24 October 1887: 72). Vernacular newspapers of 
the period were just as capable as English newspapers when it came to 
exploiting the growing number of newspapers world-wide as sources for 
articles, editorials and information (cf. Frost 2004: 86-7). For foreign 
news, all Singaporean newspapers, including the English ones, drew on 
news published outside Singapore. This is particularly true with regard 
to those articles which dealt with the activities of the Mahdi and his suc-
cessor in far away Sudan.
The Mahdiyya in the Singapore press
In the period between June 1887 and June 1890, the Straits Times pub-
lished at least twenty longer items which in one way or the other related 
to the Mahdiyya, not including short telegrams. While this does not form 
a particularly large part of reported news, given that the Straits Times was 
a daily, the affairs of the Sudan nevertheless seem to have been regarded 
as important. Yet it formed a visible part among those news items which 
neither dealt with local events nor with news from the metropolitan 
centre. The Sudan maintained a certain visibility in the Straits Times 
throughout the period under consideration here – readers were regularly 
reminded of the existence of the Mahdiyya.
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The English press in Singapore was not the only institution to publish 
news concerning the Mahdiyya and the events in the Sudan and Egypt. 
Vernacular newspapers also sought to provide their readers with infor-
mation on the topic. Of particular interest in this regard are the Malay 
Jawi Peranakkan and the Tamil Singai Nesan, since both newspapers were 
edited by Muslims, and had a largely Muslim readership,4 imbuing the 
topic of the Mahdi and later his deputy confronting Muslim states as 
much as Christian powers with a particular relevance. It is therefore sur-
prising that the two newspapers exhibited very different approaches to 
the topic. Jawi Peranakkan hardly published any news about the Mah-
diyya that was not taken from the English press. Beyond what was pub-
lished in English newspapers, only a handful of short notes can be found, 
most of which consist of just one sentence (e.g. Jawi Peranakkan, 1 Jama-
dil Awal 1307/23 December 1889). This is in sharp contrast to the interest 
in the events in the Sudan demonstrated by Singai Nesan. More than fifty 
articles going beyond the length of a telegram were published, some of 
them taking up almost a complete page of the newspaper. The number 
of articles about the Mahdiyya not only outnumbered those in the Straits 
Times – they also presented a different image of the conflict in the Sudan.
Of considerable interest are the sources of information used by Singa-
pore newspapers in their reports about the Sudan. As mentioned, Jawi 
Peranakkan was largely dependent on the English press for its reports. 
The Straits Times at least seems to have had a correspondent in Cairo 
(cf. Straits Times, 14 October 1887; 19 November 1887), who wrote about 
Egyptian affairs, touching on the topic of the Mahdiyya occasionally. Most 
of the items in the Straits Times seem to have been written by the editor 
himself on the basis of telegrams (e.g. Straits Times, 3 December 1888; 
10 July 1889), while a few were taken from other sources, for example 
the English-language Egyptian Gazette (Straits Times, 1 December 1888). 
While being largely dependent on telegrams, the editor of the Straits 
Times nevertheless made his own opinion about the events clear by com-
menting directly on the news received.
The situation looked different with Singai Nesan. At no point was news 
about the Mahdiyya the basis for the editorial at the beginning of the 
weekly edition. Rather, most items followed the section on Reuter’s tel-
egrams. Some of the items may well have been composed by the edi-
tor himself (e.g. Singai Nesan, 22 October 1888: 64). However, Singai 
Nesan was clearly determined to make up for the fact that it had no inde-
pendent means of gathering news about the Sudan in the form of a cor-
respondent by drawing on as wide a pool of sources as possible. Some 
items were lifted directly from the Straits Times and given a special slant 
through additions and changes, as we shall see below. While such ‘bor-
rowings’ from the local contender were usually not identified as such, 
the editor of Singai Nesan was keen to point out sources from beyond 
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Singapore. These included references to Arab newspapers, both named 
and unnamed (e.g. Singai Nesan, 26 December 1887: 107-8; 27 May 1889: 
188; 1 July 1889: 4). But Singai Nesan’s most important sources were the 
two main Muslim newspapers of the Tamil-speaking world at that time, 
Muslim Nesan and Sarvajana Nesan [Carvajana Ne-can], both published in 
Colombo. No less than eleven articles about the Mahdiyya published in 
Singai Nesan were taken from Muslim Nesan, while Sarvajana Nesan con-
tributed at least six articles with direct bearing on the events in Sudan. 
On one occasion, Singai Nesan published an article with an account of 
the death of General Gordon taken from Muslim Nesan which the Straits 
Times had received more than a month earlier “by German Mail” (Singai 
Nesan, 25 March 1889: 152; Straits Times, 16 February 1889), giving the 
impression that the editor of Singai Nesan preferred to publish an article 
with considerable delay in order to not appear to be dependent on the 
Straits Times for his news items.5
Both the Ceylonese newspapers used by Singai Nesan were of course 
themselves dependent on yet other sources for their reports about the 
Mahdiyya, but at least Muslim Nesan had a special asset regarding news 
from north-eastern Africa: Muslim Nesan’s editor, M.C. Siddi Lebbe 
 [Cittilevvai], was personally acquainted with the Egyptian national-
ist leader Ahmad ‘Ura-bı- Pasha, who had been exiled to Ceylon by the 
 British in 1882 (Azeez 1968-69: 759-60). This acquaintance made 
Muslim Nesan a particularly ‘acceptable’ source for news about the 
Sudan and Egypt, even more so since ‘Ura-bı- Pasha was known to be an 
acquaintance of the Mahdist general Osman Digna [‘Uthman Diqna] 
(Straits Times, 7 January 1889). As we shall see, the articles from the 
two Colombo newspapers published in Singai Nesan were anything 
but uncritical of British policy in the Sudan, providing a subtext to 
 Singai Nesan’s coverage of the events that complicates the relationship 
between Singapore’s vernacular press and British imperial discourse in 
the late-nineteenth century. Reporting on the Mahdiyya thus provides 
an interesting starting point for probing the relationship between Eng-
lish and vernacular press in colonial Singapore.
The origins and motivations of the Mahdiyya
The Straits Times’ ideas about the origins and aims of the Mahdiyya were 
simple: the Mahdiyya was a dangerous group of religious fanatics out to 
conquer ‘infidel’ countries. In the context of what has been written about 
British attitudes towards the Mahdiyya in the late 1880s, this is some what 
surprising. In his study on Islam, Europe and Empire, Norman Daniel has 
argued that interest in the Mahdiyya had lapsed in Britain after 1885. 
This, in his eyes, indifferent attitude towards the Sudan changed only in 
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the early 1890s, primarily through the agency of Sir Reginald Wingate, 
who had long experience of fighting in the Sudan, headed the Egyptian 
Military Intelligence after 1892, and became Governor-General of the 
Sudan in 1899 (Daniel 1966: 426; Holt 1977: 224). Wingate published 
his own account of the Mahdiyya in 1891, as well as translations of the 
account of two Austrians, who had escaped with his help from the Sudan 
in the 1890s. These accounts were calculated to revive interest in destroy-
ing the Mahdiyya by identifying it as a group of religious  fanatics rather 
than a proto-nationalist movement struggling against foreign domina-
tion.
Yet it is important that, as Daniel himself admits, “the legends to which 
he gave life already existed” (Daniel 1966: 426), and they also existed in 
Singapore before Wingate published his account. An article published 
in the Straits Times reminded the readers that the Mahdiyya was “not 
only a political, but also a religious movement,” and thus unlikely to 
make peace with those who did not share their creed (Straits Times, 10 
July 1889). The Mahdi and his successor were commonly identified as 
“false prophets”, while the “Dervishes”, as the troops of the Mahdiyya 
were known, were usually characterised as “fanatic” (e.g. Straits Times, 
1 August 1888; 3 December 1888; 11 December 1888; 6 July 1889; 10 
July 1889). There was certainly no trace of a positive evaluation of the 
Mahdiyya, as Daniel has found in some British accounts and novels, nor 
an idea of the Mahdiyya being primarily a movement against Egyptian 
imperialism (cf. Daniel 1966: Chapter 15). It should also be noted that 
letters and notes about “How Europeans are Treated at Khartoum” from 
both of Wingate’s Austrian informants had reached Cairo as early as 1888 
and were reported in the Straits Times (1 August 1888).
By and large, what was published in the Straits Times about the  Mahdiyya 
between 1887 and 1890 conformed to what Daniel has  written about 
 Wingate, who “tended always to blame Mahdism specifically, although the 
tradition that he was exploiting was quite simply anti-Muslim” (Daniel 1966: 
428). In the same vein, the Straits Times occasionally  differentiated “Mah-
dism” from Islam in general, and even claimed that the “inhabitants of the 
Nile region… would, it is said, welcome a liberating army of Mahomedans” 
(Straits Times 5 January 1889). Such statements, though, worked in two 
directions. On the one hand, they characterised the  Mahdiyya as an aber-
ration. Yet on the other hand, they reaffirmed that the people who had 
originally contributed to the success of the Mahdiyya were Muslims, and 
that the Mahdiyya, if an aberration, was nevertheless an Islamic aberration, 
thereby reinforcing through its use of the image of the “false prophet” with 
his “fanatic” followers existing negative stereotypes about Islam.
This becomes nowhere clearer than in a long article written by the 
Straits Times’ Egyptian correspondent, which placed the events in Sudan 
in a wider context of disaffection in the Arab-Muslim world (Straits Times, 
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19 November 1887). The article, entitled “A Mahomedan Crisis,” begins 
quite innocuously by recounting the special reputation Cairo enjoys 
among the world’s Muslims as a centre of learning. Yet not all is well in 
Egypt:
For some time past a deep under-current of bitter fanatic feeling 
has been running through the Mahometan world… Carriers from 
Mecca and Medina have been bringing in startling tales how Islam 
is rousing itself, how the preachings of excited dervishes in Arabia 
have stirred up that long-hidden fanatical feeling, which only finds 
a vent in deeds of bloodshed and destruction.
The main aim of this undercurrent, the writer asserts, is opposition to 
the Turks and ambitions to depose the Ottoman Sultan as Caliph and 
replace him with an Arab. The Mahdiyya is presented both as a result of 
this sentiment as well as providing an example to emulate:
What [the Arabs] will do will be to act as the Soudanese rebels, 
with whom every true Arab Mahomedan sympathises, and put 
to flight the armies of the aliens. We hear from all parts that the 
bold tribesmen of Arabia have expressed their sympathy with 
Mahdism, and they wish to do that which their congeners in the 
Soudan have put into practice under the leadership of the Mahdi.
This movement, the article stressed, posed not only great dangers to Egypt 
and Turkey, but also to Europe, if the “flood of fanaticism” were to be let 
loose. While in contrast to the original expansion of Islam, “Europe would 
not be endangered by such a flood” today, the interests of European nations 
in the Muslim world would certainly be, and that should be prevented.
Mass the descendants of the Saracens in the Soudan and give 
them the discipline and enginery of modern armies, and they 
become as terrible as gunpowder, if touched by the electric spark 
of religious fanaticism. With sympathy and aid from without, the 
Moslem world on fire, they would change the face of Egypt, for no 
ordinary force could stand before their fiery valour.
The article contextualised the Mahdiyya against the background of a 
number of threats perceived by British public opinion in the 1880s. The 
first stirrings of Arab nationalism are here integrated with notions of 
Muslim revival and then blended with the centuries-old spectre of the 
Saracen induced by a violent religion to wage war against the infidel. 
Against this dark vision of a global Muslim conspiracy, the Mahdiyya 
assumes more threatening proportions than it ever attained in reality. 
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This article, one of the longest published about the Mahdiyya in the 
period under consideration, would certainly have impacted the way the 
readers of the Straits Times evaluated events in the Sudan.
One of those who were obviously impressed by the article was the editor 
of Singai Nesan. Just two days after its original publication, a note appeared 
in Singai Nesan that a translation would appear in the next issue. The arti-
cle, tellingly, was not identified as being from the Straits Times, but sim-
ply as what “a person” (oruvar) had written from Cairo (Singai Nesan, 21 
November 1887: 87). The next issue duly carried the translation, though 
not without the editor introducing some subtle and not-so subtle changes 
(Singai Nesan, 28 November 1887: 91-2). Already the title had been changed 
from “A Mahomedan Crisis” to the simple “Cairo.” The changes in the text 
are even more telling. The “undercurrent of bitter fanatic feeling,” which 
was observable in the Muslim world according to the English version, 
simply became “an idea of sorts” (or [sic] vitamāna ennam). Most tellingly, 
while the Straits Times warned that “the preachings of excited dervishes in 
Arabia have stirred up that long-hidden fanatical feeling, which only finds 
a vent in deeds of bloodshed and destruction,” Singai Nesan presents its 
readers with the positive prospect that through the teachings of dervishes 
“all truths that have been forgotten” (maraintupo-ykkitanta unmaikal ellām) 
are being made known. Where the English article presents its readers with 
a gloomy conspiracy of world-shattering proportions, the Tamil translation 
tells the optimistic story of Islamic revival.
The alarmist warnings of the original regarding what impact a general 
wave of sympathy for the Mahdiyya could also have on European nations 
and the comparisons drawn with the time when “Saracen” armies swept 
away a largely Christian political order in the Mediterranean world are 
again largely absent in the Tamil translation. True, the translation also 
predicts the possibility of a “great disturbance” (perunkalakam), but its 
outcome would certainly have appeared as much more positive to its 
readers (at least the Muslims among them), than the one presented in 
the Straits Times:
… it seems as if the time is quickly approaching when perhaps 
a great disturbance will happen in the world, all Muslims unite, 
bring the affairs of religion into the pure, old condition, make a 
sultanate from amongst themselves, perceive someone from those 
of the lineage of the Lord of Prophets and make him Caliph.
However, Singai Nesan was not content to tell the story of the Mahdiyya 
through English eyes, even if modified. In August 1889, when everyone 
was waiting for news of the great battle expected in the environs of Wadi 
Halfa, the paper published a two-part article originally printed in the 
Ceylonese newspaper Muslim Nesan with the provocative title: “Will the 
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Dervishes Win?” (Singai Nesan, 19 August 1889: 28; 26 August 1889: 
32).6 Most of this article was devoted to an account of the events which 
had made the Mahdiyya possible and led to the present situation. Accord-
ing to the article, the problems began when the Egyptian Khedive Isma-‘ı-l, 
covetous of the riches of the Sudan but unable to defeat the “obstinate 
Arabs” (murattarapikal), called in the English to help him. General Gor-
don subdued the Sudan and introduced harsh laws. On pain of punish-
ment, “some parts of that country were reformed and slowly became 
stable.” It was in this situation that the Mahdi appeared in El Obeid. His 
knowledge and piety attracted people to him and this made the Egyptian 
authorities uneasy. They called for troops, but were unable to defeat the 
Mahdi’s followers. Next followed the English, who controlled the Khedive 
by now, but they were similarly roundly defeated: “It is easily imaginable 
for our readers how much blood of the English was spilled in vain in the 
Sudanese wilderness. So many renowned commanders of the English 
army were sacrificed” (Singai Nesan, 19 August 1889: 28). Yet in the eyes 
of the article, the worst deed was actually that the English now decided to 
abandon the Sudan.
It it clear to the readers how debased a deed it was that the English 
sundered the Sudan, which had been conquered by Isma-‘ı-l Pasha 
with much loss of life and wealth, from the Egyptian state and that 
they did not go after the Sudanese Arabs (Singai Nesan, 26 August 
1889: 32).
For, the article stated, the English actually had another agenda. As the 
Sudan brought much revenue to Egypt, it was clear that the Egyptian 
state would experience financial difficulties once sundered from the 
Sudan. While outwardly feigning sympathy, the English planned that, 
“after it had come so far that Egypt would be unable to pay its debts, they 
should take charge of that country themselves.”
While this article clearly had its own agenda, it revealed a quite detailed 
knowledge of the events that had led up to the Mahdi’s rebellion (cf. Holt 
1977: 32-5). While displaying some amount of sympathy for the  Sudanese, 
and being restrained in its evaluation of the Mahdi, the real sympathies 
of the writer of the article nevertheless lay with Egypt. The Sudanese 
Arabs were described as savages, noble maybe, but in need of “reform” 
nevertheless, which was after all good for the stability and prosperity of 
their own country as well.7 Yet the English were from the beginning only 
out for revenge and gain for themselves, which they ultimately realized 
could be achieved more easily by denying Egypt Sudanese revenues than 
by launching a war with an unsure outcome against the Mahdiyya. This 
seems directed at the relatively common claim on the part of the British 
government, that Britain was devoted to restoring financial stability in 
‘walls of illusion’ 79
Egypt and that the Mahdiyya was the main obstacle to it (Straits Times, 
5 January 1889; cf. Straits Times, 9 May 1890). Given that the article 
first appeared in Muslim Nesan, it is most likely that ‘Ura-bı- Pasha was 
the main inspiration behind it. Yet as much as the article criticised the 
actions of the English, in one important regard it agreed with the opinion 
of the Straits Times, namely, in regarding the withdrawal from the Sudan 
in the early 1880s as a grave mistake.
The exigencies of politics and war
Reporting on the Mahdiyya in late-nineteenth century Singapore was not 
simply a matter of information. Newspapers were directly commenting 
on matters of policy when discussing the latest news from the Sudan. 
In particular, one thing seemed to be clear, at least to the Straits Times: 
that the decision to evacuate the Sudan in 1883-84 had been a mistake. 
“When the inglorious scuttling of the British troops from the Soudan 
had been carried through under the second Gladstone administration, it 
was hoped that the Mahdi would rest from his labours and be thankful 
for having it all his own way in the interior” (Straits Times, 11 December 
1888). Yet, after enumerating the dangers which the Mahdiyya posed to 
Egypt, the paper concluded: “The policy of allowing the Mahdi free play 
has been tried and found wanting.” The editor repeatedly lamented that 
British troops had failed to proceed to Khartoum in January 1885 when 
they heard of General Gordon’s death (Straits Times, 6 July 1889; 10 July 
1889). This “inglorious” British retreat was contrasted with the behav-
iour of the German-born Emin Pasha, who remained in the province of 
Equatoria and resisted the Mahdiyya: “three years after Gordon’s death, 
his most trusted lieutenant was still devotedly and unflinchingly mak-
ing head against the False Prophet” (Straits Times, 19 December 1888). 
These statements came in the wake of parliamentary debates about 
sending British troops to support Egyptian soldiers against attacks by 
the Mahdiyya. The Straits Times noted: “The opposition in Parliament 
to the retention of Suakim has been strong enough to induce the Home 
Government only the other day to promise that no expedition there was 
at all involved [in despatching British troops to Suakin].” The editor of 
the newspaper was clearly on the side of those who proposed abandon-
ing this policy, calling several times for campaigns against Dongola 
and even Khartoum itself, but also had to admit that there was opposi-
tion to such moves (Straits Times, 3 December 1888; 5 January 1889; 18 
November 1889).
In the articles appearing in Singai Nesan, things were not quite so clear. 
In general, the newspaper seems to have been cautiously in favour of 
deploying more British troops in the region. As mentioned above, the 
80 torsten tschacher
British were severely criticised for allowing the Mahdiyya to take the 
Sudan from Egypt by withdrawing their troops. When General Grenfell 
shifted his troops from Suakin to Egypt after his victory over the forces 
of the Mahdiyya there in December 1888, an article which originally 
appeared in Muslim Nesan criticised this decision as improper, since the 
troops would still be needed in Suakin (Singai Nesan, 25 February 1889: 
136).8 Similarly, Singai Nesan published several articles largely based on 
articles from the Straits Times which advocated a greater British involve-
ment in the affairs of the Sudan (Singai Nesan, 10 December 1888: 92; 17 
December 1888: 96; these are based on Straits Times, 3 December 1888 
and 11 December 1888, respectively). But at the same time, some arti-
cles seem to urge greater caution. In April 1888, Singai Nesan remarked 
that there were still some parliamentarians who did not accept that it 
was wise to abandon Suakin, though “vain financial expenses and loss of 
lives” were happening to English and Egyptians alike (Singai Nesan, 30 
April 1888: 180).
One important aspect in all of these considerations was the value 
and qualities of the combatants, English, Egyptian and Sudanese. The 
Straits Times generally held a dim view of the Egyptian soldiery, who 
were believed to be neither a match for the Mahdiyya nor particularly 
enthusiastic about fighting them (Straits Times, 3 December 1888; 11 
December 1888). Yet at the same time, there were also reservations about 
 endangering British troops in what was after all officially an affair of the 
Egyptian state:
But the British soldier is a scarce and valuable article and we 
cannot afford to “use him up” for any but the most necessary 
purposes. The Egyptian is not absolutely a hero, and we should 
be sorry to set a thousand of him in the open before half that 
number of the men who barred our road to Khartoum; but he can 
fire a rifle from behind a wall, and he can reinforce the police, 
and for present purposes in Egypt that suffices (Straits Times, 11 
October 1888).
Similarly, the troops of the Mahdiyya were generally seen as being 
successful only on account of their “fanaticism” and the fact that they 
stood against troops even less skilled than they were. Victories against 
them were taken as proof “that the fanatical hordes of the Mahdi can-
not stand against disciplined valour” (Straits Times, 6 July 1889; cf. 
also Straits Times, 19 December 1888). The superiority of British troops 
over their Mahdist counterparts also seems to emerge from statements 
in the Malay press (cf. Jawi Peranakkan, 27 Safar 1305/14 November 
1887). Yet time and again, the Straits Times was also forced to acknowl-
edge the skill of commanders such as Osman Digna (e.g. Straits Times, 
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13 November 1889), that “the Mahdists have a knack of rising up again 
after each defeat” (Straits Times, 28 September 1888) and that “no mat-
ter how often beaten off, they returned to the charge” (Straits Times, 11 
December 1888). The latter quote was put into a more Southeast Asian 
context when translated by the editor of Singai Nesan, who compared this 
quality of the  Mahdiyya to the Malays of Aceh fighting the Dutch (Singai 
Necan, 17 December 1888).
On the whole, the articles published in Singai Nesan seem to present a 
much bleaker picture of British military prowess and consequently a bet-
ter image of the abilities of both Egyptian troops as well as the Mahdiyya’s 
forces. Indeed, when translating an article from the Straits Times, Singai 
Nesan predicted that despite the arrival of British troops in Suakin, the 
British would have difficulties in wresting the region from the Mahdiyya, 
whereas the English original had celebrated the arrival as “a significant 
turn of events” (Singai Nesan, 17 December 1888: 96; Straits Times, 11 
December 1888). Yet the divergence becomes most salient in two reports 
about the battle of al-Jummayza near Suakin in December 1888, which, 
like many articles critical of the British published in Singai Nesan, were 
taken from Muslim Nesan. The first of these articles stressed the impor-
tance of Arab troops in obtaining victory. A week later, an oral account of 
an English soldier was published, apparently received from the Central 
News Agency, in which the soldier complained about problems with the 
revolvers and the swords the British troops were using (Singai Nesan, 
18 February 1889: 132; 25 February 1889: 136). Indeed, both news items 
had been published in the Straits Times, but rather inconspicuously: the 
news about the problems with revolvers and swords as a short notice 
and the positive evaluation of the Egyptian troops as a quote from the 
Queen’s speech in parliament (Straits Times, 5 January 1889). By giving 
prominence to news which had hardly been considered in the English 
press, Singai Nesan was highlighting a problem that was widely known 
though not always considered when publishing news about the Sudan in 
the Straits Settlements: the importance of unverified rumors in reporting 
about the Mahdiyya.
The mists of rumour
“We are ignorant of the truth in the affairs of the Sudan” (Singai Nesan, 13 
May 1889: 180; first published in Muslim Nesan, 24 Cittirai 1889: 29-30). 
This was the exasperated conclusion of yet another article from Muslim 
Nesan which was republished for the benefit of a Singaporean audience. 
While telegraphy had revolutionised the speed of transmission of news 
around the globe, it had not solved the question of to what extent these 
news items were trustworthy. It was clear to everyone that information 
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being transmitted from the Sudan was problematic and often contradicted 
the very next day by yet another telegram. “Reuter’s telegrams… contrast 
strangely with previous advices,” the Straits Times noted with more than 
a hint of disbelief when a telegram in September 1888 announced the 
bad condition the garrison of Suakin was in, despite indications to the 
contrary (Straits Times, 28 September 1888). Evaluating what happened 
behind enemy lines was among the most difficult of tasks. In the same 
article, the editor of the Straits Times noted about the Mahdist general 
Osman Digna that he “continues lively and troublesome, notwithstand-
ing the many times rumour has killed him.”
One way for newspapers to deal with the problem of rumours and 
untrustworthy news was to diversify the sources from which information 
was gathered and adopted. While English newspapers, with their sub-
scriptions to telegraph services and foreign correspondents, were best 
equipped in this regard, vernacular newspapers tried their best to com-
pete by drawing on information published in other vernacular papers 
which drew on sources unavailable to English newspapers or provided 
different perspectives on an issue. Singai Nesan’s reliance on Colombo-
based newspapers, with their access to Arabic newspapers and the opin-
ions of Egyptian exiles, is a case in point. But Singapore’s only Tamil 
newspaper in this period was not simply a recycler of news from else-
where; the flow of information worked both ways. For example, during 
1889, Sarvajana Nesan published a couple of articles expressly taken from 
Singai Nesan, Among these was a two-part article entitled “The Story of 
the Nile” (n larrin varalāru), which in itself was apparently taken from 
an Egyptian newspaper (cf. Singai Nesan, 6 May 1889: 176; 13 May 1889: 
180; Sarvajana Nesan, 10 June 1889: 75-6; 17 June 1889: 80). But this 
was an exception; for the most part, much like Colombo-based newspa-
pers served Singai Nesan as sources for events in the Middle East, Singai 
Nesan and correspondents from Southeast Asia supplied Muslim Nesan 
and Sarvajana Nesan with information on events in eastern Asia.
Among these were news items which bore an uncanny resemblance 
to the war in Sudan. In Southeast Asia as well, colonial powers became 
embroiled in wars with local powers which were not always successful. 
The most glaring example was the protracted conquest of Aceh by the 
Dutch. For supplying news on the events in Aceh, newspapers in Cey-
lon drew on contacts in the Straits Settlements. During its first year of 
existence in 1883, when it was still published from Kandy, Muslim Nesan 
had already published a long account of the war in Aceh which had been 
sent by “a Muslim” from Penang, a town which was directly connected 
to the war through refugees and smugglers (Muslim Nesan, 23 Cittirai 
1883: 110-1; 30 Cittirai 1883: 125-6; 14 Vaika-ci 1883: 134-5; 21 Vaika-ci 1883: 
141-2). Six years later, Ceylonese newspapers could also draw on the Tamil 
press in the Straits Settlements. Thus, a note quoted as being from Singai 
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Nesan on negotiations between the Dutch and the Acehnese Sultan was 
published in Sarvajana Nesan (Sarvajana Nesan, 28 January 1889: 12).
At the same time, they could still rely on correspondence from Penang 
regarding Aceh. In a letter published in Muslim Nesan later in 1889, an 
anonymous correspondent from Penang likened the war in Aceh to “a 
game of little kids” (4 Puratta-ci 1889: 107). Nevertheless, it became clear 
that the correspondent’s sympathies lay with the Acehnese, pointing out 
that “the distress of being afraid of the Acehnese is troubling the Dutch 
night and day,” and that in a recent battle, the Acehnese had performed 
“admirably.” By recounting the conflict over Aceh in this way, the cor-
respondent described it in terms similar to the way that Muslim Nesan 
portrayed the conflict between the English and the Mahdists in the same 
period. In addition to the obvious benefits which the Ceylonese newspa-
pers obtained from receiving independent information on the war by this 
means, this practice therefore also allowed Tamil Muslims in Southeast 
Asia to express unabashed sympathies for Muslim struggles against colo-
nial domination and to draw parallels between them. While such a letter 
might have been difficult to publish in a Penang-based newspaper, its 
publication in Muslim Nesan would have ensured that it would ultimately 
be read in the Straits Settlements, where the Colombo-based paper also 
had an audience. In the process of trying to diversify their sources, ver-
nacular newspapers also strengthened the formulation of a wider Muslim 
identity as the wars in Sudan and Aceh became part of a vernacular flow 
of information. It was certainly not by chance that the editor of Singai 
Nesan compared the Mahdists to the Acehnese, as mentioned above.
Nevertheless, independent sources did not protect newspapers from 
 falling prey to unsubstantiated rumours and so newly-published infor-
mation still needed to be subjected to close scrutiny. Among the most 
productive aspects of the events in Sudan, at least as far as its rumour-
generating potential was concerned, was Emin Pasha and the deeds of 
the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition led by Stanley. Emin was conveniently 
isolated in Equatoria and Stanley had to choose to approach Equatoria 
through the Central African jungle (a demand of the Belgian king, Stan-
ley’s employer), so that news about these two people was hard to get. 
When news spread in August 1888 that a “White Pasha” was advancing 
down the Nile against the Mahdiyya, the Straits Times, after initial reluc-
tance, jumped to the conclusion that it was Stanley assailing the enemies 
from the south. Yet the only evidence on which this conclusion could be 
based was “the persistence of the rumour” (Straits Times, 23 August 1888; 
cf. 17 August 1888). Singai Nesan and the Ceylonese Tamil newspapers on 
which the editor drew failed to be convinced by such rumours. The edi-
tor rather tended to believe the reports that Emin and Stanley had been 
 captured by the Mahdiyya, “considering the situation in those parts and 
the news gathered with the Arabs” (Singai Nesan, 4 March 1889: 140).
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A similar event was the supposed uprising of the important Sufi-Sheikh 
Muhammad al-Mahdı- b. al-Sanu-sı- against the Mahdiyya in Darfur, which 
for a short time in early 1889 triggered news that his followers had taken El 
Obeid and even Khartoum (cf. Straits Times, 21 February 1889; Singai Nesan 
20 May 1889: 184; 1 July 1889: 4). While “hopes ran high that El Sanoussi, 
a rival prophet, would overcome the Mahdi” (Straits Times, 6 July 1889), the 
Tamil newspapers remained highly sceptical. The Colombo-based Sarvajana 
Nesan was quoted in Singai Nesan: “As countless telegrams like this about 
the Mahdists have come on many occasions earlier and turned out to be 
bare-faced lies within a few days, we will not believe this before proper news 
are published as evidence for this” (Singai Nesan, 15 April 1889: 164; first 
published in Sarvajana Nesan, 23 March 1889: 38; 30 March 1889: 41). In 
addition to the fact that such telegrams had turned out to be untrustworthy 
before, the evidence of the Arab press and what was known about al-Sanu-sı- 
was also quoted in Singai Nesan to counter hopes of a Sanu-sı--uprising (1 July 
1889: 4). In contrast to the case of Emin and Stanley, where the rumours of 
their capture by the Mahdiyya later turned out to be false, in this case the 
Muslim Tamil press was right to be sceptical: the whole matter turned out 
to be a localised conflict in Darfur (Holt 1977: 157-9). But the Straits Times, 
rather than admitting that wishful thinking had made the English press 
throughout the Empire accept these rumours as true, preferred to claim that 
simply, “events have taken the opposite turn” (Straits Times, 6 July 1889).
The supposed uprising of al-Sanu-sı- inspired what was probably the 
clearest exposition of the problems editors faced when reporting on 
the events in the Sudan. In a long article republished in Singai Nesan, the 
editor of Muslim Nesan lamented:
The Sudan is first among those countries one is unable to enter 
and gather true news. When seeing each and every day in each 
and every manner news about the Sudan coming in, it becomes 
clear that the things going on there do not reach the world in a 
proper manner. From the day the rebellion of the Mahdi began, 
there was not one among the news from the Sudan that was not 
contradicted or corrected by news that came afterwards (13 May 
1889: 180; Muslim Nesan, 24 Cittirai 1889: 29-30).
Not too little, but too much news was in a sense the problem editors were 
faced with. However, the article insinuated a further problem:
From the day the English got entangled in the war between the 
Mahdi and the Egyptian government, we know that news which 
came in about the unrest in the Sudan have been inspected in a 
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few places before they reached us and have been corrected when 
the need was perceived.
In short, the article blamed the Egyptian and especially the English 
government for censoring, changing, and fabricating news. A similar 
charge had been made a few months earlier by Sarvajana Nesan regard-
ing reports by English and Egyptian newspapers that Osman Digna had 
been defeated. Sarvajana Nesan advised its readers not to believe this 
claim lightly, pointing out that during the Crimean War a Russian gen-
eral had covered up news about his own defeat by reporting a victory 
(Singai Nesan, 18 February 1889: 132; first published in Sarvajana Nesan, 
16 January 1889: 7). While this article left it up to the reader to imagine 
a similar deed from the side of the British, the editor of Muslim Nesan 
found clear words to close his article: “The English… have raised a wall 
of illusion (māyaiyāna matil) between us and the things which we see. We 
are ignorant of the truth in the affairs of the Sudan.” Many editors of ver-
nacular newspapers in the British Empire would have agreed with him.
Conclusion
What does the analysis of reporting on events in remote Sudan tell us 
about the role of newspapers in Singapore’s information order in the 
late-nineteenth century? The evidence reveals several asymmetries which 
impacted the way in which editors responded to reporting about a series 
of events that they could evaluate only on the basis of news gathered 
by others. In this, they knew themselves to be part of an information 
order far larger than Singapore. Everywhere in the British Empire, 
from London to Australia (cf. Singai Nesan, 1 July 1889: 4), and beyond 
it, people commented on and evaluated what they had heard about the 
 Mahdiyya and fed those comments into an ever increasing stream of 
news. Political interests, both those of the Mahdiyya and of its enemies, 
added further rumours to this stream, making it even more difficult for 
editors to decide which news to trust. The choice was far from being 
apolitical or neutral: it was part of a larger set of editorial policies, which 
were calculated to intervene in public debates, even if, on the part of the 
editor, neutrality was pure pretence.
In this situation, access to reliable information was crucial to staking 
a claim in the public debate about the Mahdiyya. The Straits Times had 
direct access both to Reuter’s telegrams and to the occasional letter from 
a correspondent in Cairo. While the Malay Jawi Peranakkan seems to have 
remained content with being dependent on the English press in report-
ing on the Mahdiyya, the editor of the Tamil Singai Nesan attempted to 
redress the imbalances in the medial playing field by tapping into flows 
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of information which would not have been as accessible to the English 
press. This included the opinion of non-English newspapers, both Tamil 
and Arabic, as well as information about Muslim networks and personal-
ities, as revealed in the discussion about al-Sanu-sı-. Behind much of this 
stood the shadowy authority of ‘Ura-bı- Pasha in the form of articles by 
the Tamil press of Colombo, where the Egyptian nationalist leader lived 
in exile. Regarding the availability of alternative flows of information, 
Singai Nesan had an advantage over Jawi Peranakkan or even Lat Pau. 
There were neither many Malay nor Chinese newspapers in existence 
in the late 1880s. In contrast, at least 35 Tamil periodicals, ranging from 
monthlies to dailies, were founded in 1887 alone (Samy 2000: 130-42). 
But this alternative repository of information and  opinion was Singai 
Nesan’s only advantage in the context of Singaporean publishing.
In contrast to Jawi Peranakkan, with its large potential readership 
throughout the archipelago, and Lat Pau, with a sizeable Chinese com-
munity in Singapore, Singai Nesan was, like the Straits Times, catering 
to a small migrant community. Like the Straits Times, Singai Nesan was 
essentially a provincial newspaper compared to the press in  London 
or Madras. The degree to which the editor of the Straits Times seems 
to have ignored this fact is striking. Throughout the period, the Straits 
Times reported on the issue of the Mahdiyya as if it was a big London 
 newspaper shaping the outlook of a public which could influence 
the decisions that would be taken by the government regarding the 
Mahdiyya. In reality, of course, despite all its counselling and support-
ing various policies, the Straits Times was a minor voice from a remote 
outpost of the empire, which would be heard in London only long after 
the decisions had been taken, if it was heard at all. Reporting on the 
Mahdiyya removed the Straits Times further from its Singaporean con-
text by allowing it to imagine itself and its readers as part of an infinitely 
wider metropolitan public.
On the vernacular side, there is relatively little sense of coverage about 
the Mahdiyya contributing to the way the nascent publics created by 
vernacular newspapers imagined themselves. The Malay press seems 
to have not taken much interest in the matter, while on the Tamil side, 
Muslim editors may have felt sympathies for the Mahdiyya’s struggle 
against the British, but tended nevertheless to favour Egypt and the 
Ottoman Empire as recipients of Muslim loyalties. If anything, the con-
junction of news about the Mahdiyya with those about other Muslim 
struggles against colonial powers, such as the war between the Dutch 
and the Acehnese, helped to sharpen an idea of a wider transnational 
Muslim community beset by colonial policies. While the images of 
Muslim revivalism transmitted in the course of reporting about the 
Mahdiyya may have contributed to a greater receptivity regarding this 
topic among Muslims in Singapore, they certainly had much less of 
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an impact than, for example, the coverage of Meiji Japan had on the 
formation of “Islamic nationalism” in the Dutch East Indies (Laf-
fan 2003: 160-5). True, the criticism levelled against the British in the 
articles published in Singai Nesan was substantial for its time, but it 
would be wrong to portray it simply as resistance to a British colonial 
order. Much more, reporting on events occurring beyond the confines 
of Singapore was an attempt by the nascent vernacular newspaper to 
communicate with the established English press as equals, a first effort 
at “learning to speak with each other” (Harper 1997: 263) and attempt-
ing to  overcome the limitations and fragmentations of Singapore’s 
public sphere.
Yet the case should also alert us to the fact that fundamental ques-
tions about the nature of the public sphere in colonial Singapore still 
need to be addressed. As this article reveals, the Habermasian idea of 
the  public sphere as a sort of middle ground between the private and 
the state is problematic in a situation of empire, where the state can 
be  imagined both in terms of the local colonial government and the 
overarching imperial structure. Reporting on the Mahdiyya allowed 
vernacular editors in other parts of the British Empire to voice criti-
cism against a proxy, namely British imperial policies in north-east-
ern Africa,  without having to implicate their own governments in 
Singapore or Ceylon directly. Mark Frost has noted similar tendencies 
among the Chinese settled in Southeast Asia (Frost 2004: 89-90). 
Frost’s  highlighting of the importance of maritime linkages for the 
development of a colonial public sphere are highly pertinent in this 
regard. Singapore’s colonial public sphere – almost from its inception – 
reached beyond the  confines of the island, connecting to other parts 
of the Empire way beyond the places where Singapore’s cosmopolitan 
population had links.
Notes
1 This was clearly due to the effects of The Book Registration Ordinance 1886, which 
came into operation on 1 January 1887 and required printers to deliver three copies of 
every book printed in the Straits Settlements to the government (Garrard 1898: vol. 2, 
967-9).
2 Tan & Soh (1994: 22) claim that Singai Varthamani [Cinkai Varttamāni] was first pub-
lished in 1876. Yet an article published in 1890 by the editor of Singai Nesan, who had 
after all also edited Singai Varthamani, states that this paper, of which no copies are 
extant, was originally founded in 1875 (Singai Nesan, 9 June 1890: 186).
3 This is suggested by the title page of a Tamil book printed at Denodaya Press (Cevat-
tamaraikka-yar 1886). I wish to thank the Roja Muthiah Research Library in Chennai for 
allowing me access to and supplying me with copies of this book.
4 While the readership of Jawi Peranakkan, as a Malay newspaper, would have been over-
whelmingly Muslim, the readers of Singai Nesan of course also included Hindus and 
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Christians. Nevertheless, as the lists of subscribers reveal, there was a clear Muslim 
majority among the subscribers.
5 The article in Muslim Nesan was apparently itself a translation of a local English 
 newspaper, the Lanka Examiner (6 Pankuni 1889: 4).
6 The second part of this article was first published in Muslim Nesan, 31 A-ti 1889: 85-6. 
The first part was apparently published a week earlier, on 24 A-ti 1889, but this issue is 
 missing at the Department of National Archives in Colombo, Sri Lanka.
7 The Sudanese Arabs are described as ‘obstinate’ or ‘rough’ (murattu) and ‘savage’ (kāttu, 
literally ‘of the forest’), exactly the terms used in South India for communities per-
ceived as ‘criminal’, such as the Kallars (cf. Pandian 2009: 35-40).
8 This article appears to have been published in volume 6 (1888) of Muslim Nesan, of 
which no copies seem to be available anymore.
5 The Littoral and the Literary:  
Making Moral Communities in the Straits 
Settlements and the Gold Coast in the late 
Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century
Philip Holden
In late 2009, I returned to Singapore after several months abroad. Eager 
to catch up on the popular history I had missed, I started browsing in the 
relevant section of Borders on Orchard Road. I picked up, not  without 
some effort, the weighty 800-page Men in White: The Untold Story of 
 Singapore’s People’s Action Party. Opening the first few pages, I scanned 
its table of contents. The name of a single politician, understandably, 
was prominently featured early on in the story, yet he kept returning and 
returning, almost two decades after he stepped down as prime minister 
of Singapore. “Can PAP,” the book’s authors wondered even in their last 
chapter, “survive LKY?” (Yap, Lim and Leong 2009: 641).
Historians in Singapore over the last two decades have, of course, 
 worked to problematise the identification of a national history with a 
single life. Kevin Tan’s and Lam Peng Er’s Lee’s Lieutenants (1999) was 
an early attempt to tell the stories about other prominent politicians in 
 Singapore’s governing party since independence; much recent work in 
both history and memoir has concentrated on the period of decolonisa-
tion from the late 1940s to 1965 and told the story of political actors who 
have often been excluded from – or misrepresented in – the national 
narrative.1 Further studies have questioned the building blocks that 
serve as a foundation for national story-telling: the division between 
the ‘Chinese-educated’ and ‘English educated,’ for instance, or between 
‘Communist’ and patriotic nationalist.2 Taking a longer perspective, Kwa 
Chong Guan and others have placed Singapore’s colonial and post-inde-
pendence history within a much longer narrative of the island’s situa-
tion as a node in networks of trade. According to this view, Singapore’s 
history is cyclical, rather than linear, intimately connected to the region 
in which it is located, and a product of negotiation between commu-
nities rather than the fiat of colonial governors or post-independence 
prime ministers.
Yet, for all such historical revisionism, popular history in Singapore often 
defaults to a focus on Stamford Raffles and Lee Kuan Yew as representa-
tive figures in a developmental narrative. In this paper, I want to trace the 
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roots of what we might call a popular national imaginary in Singapore. In 
doing so, I am particularly interested in examining how the concepts of 
cultural difference and community were made use of in the emerging self-
identification of para-colonial elites as moral communities in the Straits 
 Settlements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These 
 elites, we will see, have largely been disavowed in nationalist historiogra-
phy. If we return to them, however, we will learn much about the formation 
of modern communities during an earlier period of globalisation, and in 
particular two elements of their self-constitution that remain as their lega-
cies in Singapore today: the manner in which the modern individual and 
the new community operate as moral signifiers for each other, and the 
manner in which culture comes to be reconstructed and defined as a moral 
good under modernity.
In examining elite Anglophone discourse on the moral community, 
I make two further strategic moves. The first is comparative: this essay 
looks not only at the Straits Settlements, but also at contemporary elite 
self-constitution at a similar period in another British colony geographi-
cally remote from Singapore, the Gold Coast. To a degree, the choice is 
arbitrary: similar conclusions might be drawn from the study of other 
indigenous or migrant elites in other areas of the British Empire, such 
as India or Hong Kong. Yet the Gold Coast does have connections with 
 Singapore. There were commonalities in colonial leadership: from 1895 
to 1920, the Gold Coast had three governors with extensive prior experi-
ence in Malaya or the Straits Settlements and whose names are inscribed 
onto the landscape of postcolonial Singapore: William Maxwell, John 
Rodger, and Hugh Clifford. The two countries’ experience of decolonisa-
tion also went in parallel. The year 1957 marked not just the independ-
ence of Malaya, but also that of the Gold Coast as Ghana: the centres of 
the two new national capitals, Kuala Lumpur and Accra, became the sites 
of modernist buildings which embodied the promise of the newly inde-
pendent states. Two years later, the People’s Action Party came to power 
in Singapore in 1959 as a socialist party with strong links to national 
liberation movements in Africa and Asia. Lee Kuan Yew, as first Prime 
Minister of independent Singapore, knew Ghana’s first Prime Minister 
and later President, Kwame Nkrumah and indeed sent him a letter of 
condolence after he was ousted in a 1966 coup, praising “the vision and 
unity which you strove” and expressing the continued hope that “what 
you stand for, a united Africa and a great Ghana, [would] triumph and 
flourish” (Milne 1990: 24). Yet historical developments over the last 
half century have resulted in Africa in general, and Ghana in particu-
lar, coming to stand for failed modernity within nationalist discourse in 
Singapore. In his memoirs From Third World To First, looking back three 
decades, Lee now only remembered the excesses of the end of Nkrumah’s 
regime, seeing Ghana’s failure as a developmental state due to “tribal 
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loyalties” exceeding a “sense of common nationhood” and exacerbated by 
the absence of “long years of training and tutelage in the methods and 
discipline of modern government” (Lee 2000: 399). The way this chapter 
plots parallel elite histories and historiographies that have diverged to 
the extent that they are now incommensurable may help us to question 
the manner in which history is scripted and indeed to think through the 
ideological ‘common sense’ that equates modernisation with the discipli-
nary culturalism on which it is based.
If the importance of para-colonial elites has been excluded from 
 nationalist historiography, much the same might also be said of the types 
of the historical text this chapter concerns itself with. Nationalism and 
the novel have often been closely associated, both in projects to create a 
 national literary canon in post-independence periods and in  retrospective 
scholarly accounts of the construction of national imaginaries. This 
 chapter, however, looks at more ephemeral and less monumental forms of 
literary production: poems, biographical essays, and serialised fiction pub-
lished in newspapers or magazines over which members of these elites 
exerted editorial control. Concentrating on such texts has two advantages. 
First, they are part of tight circuits of production and consumption. Early 
novels written by West Africans and members of the Straits Settlements 
elites were often published abroad: Joseph J. Walters’s Guanya Pau (1891) 
in the United States, J.E. Casely Hayford’s Ethiopia Unbound (1911) in Lon-
don, and Lim Boon Keng’s Tragedies of Eastern Life (1927) in Shanghai, 
whereas newspapers and magazines, in contrast, were read locally and 
regionally, and drew their contributors from a more tightly-bound local 
community.
Second, the brevity of such writings makes it easier to question the 
ideological field in which they are situated than is possible within the 
longer narrative of the novel. The novel in a single volume is immer-
sive, drawing the reader away from a social world for hours at a time. 
 Reading short stories, poems, and serials, a reader must continually sur-
face into a social world as each piece ends. The effect, in contrast to the 
composed picture of the novel, is one of a fragmented,  multi-perspective 
collage. Thus short literary narratives, while at times enforcing social 
and  ideological norms, also offer readers the ability to question them. 
Their formally literary qualities distance or defamiliarise readers from 
the events that they describe, creating the paradigmatically modern expe-
rience, in Theodor Adorno’s words, of not being “at home in one’s home” 
and thus opening up a space for questioning the process of  historical rep-
resentation (1974: 39). It was perhaps in this respect that the anti-colonial 
activist and short story writer Frank O’Connor referred to the short story 
as expressive of a quintessentially modern “attitude to life” (2003: 1); its 
brevity, he argued, extracted it from larger ideological fields. If the novel, 
by its nature, needed to present a vision of ‘normal society’ to which its 
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protagonists might respond, the short story centred on a moment frozen 
from a larger narrative – frequently the product of a specific “submerged 
population group” and such stories dramatised an intense “awareness 
of human loneliness” (2003: 5), promoting a certain remoteness from a 
sense of community. This negotiation between individual and commu-
nity at the formal level may be useful when we think about the metaphor-
ical connection between community and individual that para-colonial 
elites strove to make.
Making the Moral Community
The Gold Coast and the Straits Settlements in the late nineteenth century 
had emerged from parallel histories of trade, followed by colonisation 
by a succession of European powers before finally gaining formalised 
status as British Crown colonies.3 In the Gold Coast, African polities had 
coalesced around forts set up by European powers and had then gained 
autonomy from inland states, with representatives of different groups 
jostling for overall political control. Missionary activity from the 1830s 
onwards resulted in the formation of Creole mercantile elites who were 
literate in English and contemporary writings often make a distinction 
between the ‘better’ and ‘poorer’ or ‘literate’ and ‘illiterate’ classes; this 
distinction was reinforced by the selective adoption of European dress 
and by ‘residential segregation’ according to class in coastal towns such 
as Cape Coast and Accra (Gocking 1999: 54). Crucially, the formation 
of the Gold Coast elites was not simply a process of Anglicisation. One 
scholar has noted that a parallel process of “Akanisation” took place, in 
which, through mechanisms of colonial indirect rule, the hierarchical 
structures of Akan polities were privileged over the looser social groups 
of ethnic groups such as the Ga and the Ewe (Gocking 1999: 4).
By the late nineteenth century the Gold Coast elites were well 
 established in towns such as Accra, Cape Coast, and Elmina. While many 
elite families could locate a European trader in their family tree, they had, 
if anything, become more African as the century progressed. West Afri-
cans from the Gold Coast or Sierra Leone occupied most of the positions 
in colonial service, including many senior ones. Indeed, on one occa-
sion in the 1880s seven of the nine district commissioners in the colony 
were Africans (Gocking 2005: 41). Yet in the late nineteenth century the 
elites were also subject to new pressures. Renewed racism and a growing 
emphasis on the partially invented traditions of indirect rule resulted in 
Africans being removed from positions of authority in the colonial ser-
vice, perhaps most clearly epitomised by Governor  William Maxwell’s dis-
missal of John Farrell Easmon from his position as Chief Medical Officer 
in 1897 (Patton 1989). At the same time, the rise of a ‘scholar’ class of 
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primary-school educated Africans threatened the ‘native gentlemen’ of 
the elite from below (Gocking 1999: 59). The elite’s literary societies and 
clubs, which were established in most of the coastal towns in the 1890s, 
their social rituals, the newspapers they published, and their participa-
tion in an albeit circumscribed colonial public sphere have been seen 
by one scholar as an active negotiation with acquired cultural capital, 
their imitation and appropriation of elements of  English culture consid-
ered a pragmatic and “highly selective performance of an identity which 
was adopted at strategic moments to secure their social and  economic 
position” (Newell 2002: 33). Yet if Englishness was  performed, so was 
a modern African identity: the community imagined various circles of 
proto-national identity (Fanti, Aborigine, West African, and African) as it 
attempted to discover a locally-inflected modernity.
The Straits Settlements also emerged not simply from acts of imperial 
foundation but from a history of trading networks into which European 
powers gradually inserted themselves. As with the Gold Coast, the islands 
and littoral settlements of Penang, Malacca and Singapore did not for-
mally become a Crown Colony until the second half of the nineteenth 
century.4 The British “Forward Movement” and imposition of indirect 
rule over the Malay States of the Malayan peninsula in the late nineteenth 
century has parallels with British movement inland into Asante on the 
Gold Coast: the ports of the Straits Settlements, like those of the Gold 
Coast, had hybrid populations and non-European political organisations 
that supplemented the rule of the colonial state. While these communities 
have often been seen as distinct, recent historical research has suggested 
the importance of a heterogeneous but nonetheless identifiable Anglo-
phone community of Asians in Singapore, in particular.5 This chapter 
concentrates on the Straits Chinese, a hybrid community of residents of 
Chinese descent in the Straits Settlements which absorbed cultural ele-
ments of both Malay and European culture, and whose members often 
served as a comprador class in the colony. While the contemporary herit-
age industry in Singapore tends to fetishise Straits Chinese or Peranakan 
identity through the markers of clothing, food, and custom, recent histori-
cal research has suggested that the category of ‘Straits Chinese’ in the late 
nineteenth was much more fluid than is now popularly thought. Histo-
rian Mark Frost has conceptualised the Straits Chinese as a “transcultural 
diaspora”, in which a public performance of Chinese identity masked a 
hybrid social reality (2003: 2). Similarly, sociologist Jürgen Rudolph has 
described Straits Chinese community identity as historically situated, 
moving from a largely political identity under colonialism to an ethnic 
one in contemporary Singapore (1998: 67). As we will see, elements of 
the Straits Chinese also sought other identities that would reach beyond 
ethnicity in the colonial public sphere, at times campaigning on behalf 
of all “Straits-born”  subjects, or reaching out to a community of  “Asiatics” 
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(“Our Programme” 1897: 1; “Editorial” 1905b: 41). Like the coastal elites in 
Ghana, the Straits Chinese sought to create a culturally inflected moder-
nity expressed at least partly through the English language that invoked a 
new relationship to tradition. The quarterly Straits Chinese Magazine, for 
instance, saw its purpose to ‘restore’ to all Straits-born people “the knowl-
edge of their forefathers in English dress” (“Our Programme” 1897: 2). 
The scale of recent indentured migration and the presence of a  cultural – 
although not  political – homeland far away from the colony itself did, of 
course, make the details and context of cultural performance different 
for the Straits Chinese compared to their Gold Coast elite counterparts. 
Nonetheless, we can see significant parallels: the presence, for instance 
of literary and debating societies, and also difficulties in working with 
less and less room for political manoeuvre, as race became a increasingly 
important mechanism in colonial governance, exemplified by the colo-
nial authority’s ambivalence regarding non-European participation in the 
Straits Volunteer Force.
The socio-political concerns of elite communities of this period in the 
Straits Settlements and the Gold Coast appear unusual when viewed from 
the present, across the historical watershed of decolonisation. While they 
demanded equal treatment for all colonial subjects, they frequently did 
so through elaborate effusions of patriotism, requesting, in the words 
of a Straits Chinese Magazine editorial, that there be “strict and impar-
tial administration of justice” by the colonial authorities, but rarely ques-
tioning the legitimacy of the colonial order itself (‘Editorial’ 1905a: 6). 
A poem representing an imaginary history of the Fante people that was 
published in The Gold Coast Leader in 1902 describes a search for liberty 
in opposition to “mightier foes” such as the Asante. Although European 
colonialism involved the past imposition of “might o’er right,” it might 
yet be reformed through recognition of the equality of all peoples:
England at last becomes the mistress
Of all our coast, Assinee to Volta,
Confederate as Aborigines strive to stand,
Safeguard our rights our customs all.
We seek our rights not ungrateful
To sing with Her, ‘God Save the King.’ (‘The Fanti Land’ 1902: 4)
The Straits Chinese Magazine, similarly, published a black-bordered 
 editorial to mark Queen Victoria’s death in 1901, lauding in the mon-
arch’s reign a “peaceful transition” in the British empire from “the regime 
of personal rulers to that of a pure Democracy united by allegiance to a 
constitutional head” (‘Her Late Majesty’ 1901: 1). An accompanying poem 
expressed hope for the continuation of both nation and empire: “May it 
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never once be weak/In the cause of truth and justice in the days that are 
to come!/Loving liberty, may strangers “neath the Old Flag find a home!” 
(Scabose 1901: 3).
If we peel back the surface of such pro-imperial rhetoric, however, 
we notice other deeper, and ultimately more persistent, structures of 
thought. Like many elite communities throughout colonial empires, 
both the Gold Coast and the Straits Settlements elites took on modes 
of Victorian, and normatively masculine, self-fashioning in order to be 
able to act in a colonial public sphere. These involved a series of discipli-
nary practices, in which manliness – and thus, by extension, civilisation 
and responsible citizenship – was enacted through a rational restraint on 
the appetites of the body. Martin Danahay has noted that male Victorian 
identity was modelled on a Weberian Protestant work ethic that stressed 
“self-discipline, self-denial and hard work” (Danahay 2005: 7). Idealised 
bourgeois masculinity was also enacted in the dual spheres of the pub-
lic and the domestic, the respectable inner life of the home fortifying 
the male protagonist as he strode forth into the external world of work.6 
Articles in the Straits Chinese Magazine urged respectability upon mem-
bers of the community and the adoption of suitable domestic roles. An 
article addressed to “Straits Chinese Fathers,” for instance, urged them 
to cease “a career of dissipation,” exchanging the “temporary exhilaration 
in the caresses of a mistress” for “the deep, constant and abiding devo-
tion of a pure wife, and “the excitement… of the gaming table, or of the 
opium pipe of the music halls” for “the joys of a united family circle” (Lew 
1901a: 50). Such disciplinary practices should also extend to exercise, diet 
and dress: young men were urged to take up “riding, cycling, tennis, 
 football and boating” (Lew 1901b: 139) to avoid the excesses of “costly 
garments, dandy shoes or fancy hats,” and to avoid the “excitement for 
the material body” characteristic of the “wealthy gourmand,” in which 
“the Malay sambal, the Indian curry, the European dishes and pâtés and 
Chinese pork” were “served at one meal, accompanied by the choicest 
and strongest wines and drinks of all nations” (Lin 1900: 110). Contem-
porary articles in newspapers in the Gold Coast made similar pleas: “The 
impenetrable jungle around us is not darker than the dark primeval for-
est of the human mind uncultured,” wrote the reformer Joseph Ephraim 
Casely Hayford (1910: 3). Cultured respectability, other writers noted, was 
founded on a domesticity that acknowledged separate ‘spheres of labour’ 
for men and women (Brew 1898: 4).
Such structures of thought, however, did not result in the whole-scale 
adoption of contemporary English bourgeois social practices. Both the 
Straits Settlements and Gold Coast elites disputed elements of English 
social custom. Newspaper articles relished showing how much resi-
dent Europeans failed to live respectable or disciplined lives, yet they 
also made a parallel and more significant argument – that distinctive 
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elements of non-European cultural traditions contained the possibility of 
a modern rationality that might exceed that of Europe, with its Classical 
and  Christian foundations. The Straits Chinese Magazine, for instance, 
noted that Confucianism concurred with “all the best teaching of the 
Roman and Greek Stoics, without the excesses which disfigure European 
stoicism” (‘News and Notes’ 1899: 70), while another article argued for 
a return to traditional Chinese costume for women, since it was “unim-
peachable from the standpoint of decorum” (Soh 1907: 3). What appears 
to be happening here is that individual self-fashioning, which under the 
codes of Victorian masculinity has little cultural specificity, acquires cul-
tural markers. An article in the Straits Chinese Literary Association Recorder 
expressed this succinctly:
The past fifty years have witnessed the adoption of numerous 
European methods in the East; but unfortunately the innovation 
has not always been advantageous. Whereas the Asiatics have been 
benefited in many ways, they have been taught habits of luxury 
and intemperance through their contact with Western people. It 
should be borne in mind that temperance and frugality have been 
regarded as two of the best traits in Asiatic character. (Tan 1918: 7)
Such comments do, of course, draw on an elegiac element of colonial 
discourse, exemplified by the fictional writings of administrators such 
as Hugh Clifford, that mourn the erosion of indigenous cultures when 
confronted with modernity. Yet what is surely important here is that the 
essence of such cultural difference is imagined in terms of ‘character,’ 
‘temperance and frugality.’
In the Gold Coast, similar energies were spent exploring the underly-
ing rationalities of Fante and other cultures. One focus of discussion that 
united community and individual conduct was the question of polygamy. 
Methodist churches mapped ideas of ‘civilisation’ and ‘progress’ onto the 
domestic, promoting the idealised nuclear family, monogamous marriage, 
and the figures of the ‘frock lady’ and ‘respectable’ man. Many members 
of the elites, however, resisted, arguing – mostly from an androcentric 
point of view – that monogamy undermined the stability of traditional 
society and, due to the difficulty of divorce, promoted social hypocrisy and 
illicit sexual relations (Newell 2002: 4).
The production of moral communities based upon notions of disci-
plinary cultural difference was enabled by a continual slippage between 
political and individual governance, with each serving as a metaphor for 
the other. In the words of a contemporary in a parallel colonial situation, 
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, “[r]eal home-rule,” was “self-rule or self-
control” (1997: 118). Indeed, later anti-colonial nationalism took up this 
story of internal and external struggle, while changing the identity of its 
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actors. The old elites were seen by both Nkrumah’s Convention People’s 
Party and by Singapore’s People’s Action Party as weak and compromised 
by collaboration with colonial power, and were now described in terms of 
unmanliness and lack of discipline. Nkrumah initially worked with the 
United Gold Coast Convention and its leaders, who were largely drawn 
from the Coastal elites, but then dismissed them as “reactionaries, mid-
dle class lawyers and merchants” in his quest for identification with the 
masses (1957: 62). In Nkrumah’s autobiography and elsewhere, members 
of the elites are described as lacking in manliness. After hearing of the 
coup that deposed him in 1966, Nkrumah describes the terror of the min-
isters who accompanied him, “in striking contrast to the calmness and 
courage of the 66 other personnel – the security officers and members of 
my personal secretariat. These were men. Compared with them, the politi-
cians were old women.” Significantly, he concentrates predominately on 
the reaction of his foreign minister, Alex Quaison Sackey, who came from 
an elite family and had been educated in Cape Coast (Nkrumah 1968: 11). 
In Singapore, much of the energy of Lee Kuan Yew, Goh Keng Swee and 
other political leaders immediately after self-rule in 1959, was directed 
to castigating the “English-educated,” who lacked the discipline of the 
masses. In a 1959 speech, Lee referred to English-educated Malayans 
as “devitalised, almost emasculated, as a result of deculturalisation” (Lee 
1959), while Goh, in two articles in the People’s Action Party’s journal 
Petir in 1960, called for their “rectification” as a class (1960a 7; 1960b 4). 
As we move to look at the literary production of Gold Coast and Straits 
Settlements elites, it is germane to remember that while as groups they 
have been disavowed by nationalist histories, their structures of thought 
regarding culture, modernity, and morality have perhaps remained more 
central to a deep structure of such history than we might imagine.
Literature, cultural capital and the moral community
In both the Gold Coast and the Straits Settlements, elite uses of the liter-
ary looked both inwards and outwards. Literary texts might, it was felt, 
enable the imagining of a modern community and then bind it together 
through knowledge of shared cultural history. At the same time, the pres-
ence of a literature in English would increase the cultural capital of elite 
communities in a colonial public sphere at a time when the tightening of 
mechanisms of government threatened to close it down. Armed with this 
capital, the community might become an actor both within the colony 
and potentially internationally.
In the Gold Coast, newspaper editorials and articles stressed the 
importance of a literate reading community. In part this was no doubt 
simply a question of self-interest, with newspaper editors concerned 
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about increasing sales; editorials discouraging the lending of newspa-
pers to friends were frequent, and young men in particular were enjoined 
to buy their own personal copies of a newspaper and “read it through” 
(‘What’s in a Name’ 1902: 3). Literacy was seen as a means of entering the 
modern world and participating in a colonial public sphere for both men 
and women, but articles also emphasised that the passive act of reading 
should evolve later into a more active engagement in writing. “[F]rom 
Assinee right down to Togoland,” the Gold Coast Aborigines editorialised, 
“we may have a few, manly, well-bred men who possess the talent of writ-
ing off-hand pungent paragraphs expressing with clearness and courage 
their opinion on any person or performance: for the good of the dear 
fatherland, we hope these may not hide their talents” (‘The Gold Coast 
Aborigines’ 1898: 3). Both the Aborigines and the Gold Coast Leader pub-
lished articles giving guidelines to potential contributors with regard to 
both content and form. While most were implicitly addressed to male 
readers, the Western Echo ran a “Ladies’ Column” from its inception, urg-
ing women in the colony to send “contributions to this Column… Any-
thing, even in the shape of extracts or notes from whatever papers or 
Journals you may have read, would always be acceptable”  (Cancoainid 
1885: 2). Several newspapers held competitions for the best letters or 
other contributions from their readers.
Print for many journalists in the Gold Coast was perceived as a pecu-
liarly modern form of expression, at a time in which, one commentator 
noted: “The power of the Pen had been… fast superseding that of the 
voice” (‘Journalism’ 1899: 4). Not all print culture was necessarily liter-
ary expression, but the concept of literature, in the sense used by writ-
ers in the Gold Coast at that time and in common with contemporary 
English and European practice, was not confined to fiction or poetry, but 
also included history, biography, and accounts of travel and ethnography 
that were expressive of the elites’ own unique experience of modernity. 
Editorials and articles frequently bemoaned the absence of a local liter-
ary culture and the ignorance regarding local history and society that 
its absence fostered, both within the colony and abroad. Works such as 
John Mensah Sarbah’s Fanti Customary Laws (1897) or J.B. Anaman’s The 
Gold Coast Guide (1894) were praised in contrast to the proliferation of 
writing on the Gold Coast by “Colonists and Travellers” in which “we 
are maligned, traduced, vilified and disgraced for the simple reason that 
things are viewed from an impossible stand-point” (‘By the Way’ 1899: 
3). Literary self-representation and the construction of a literary tradition, 
articles repeatedly noted, were a prerequisite for nationhood, with the 
newspaper itself becoming “the universally-acknowledged “voice of the 
nations,” the weekly or daily history of the world” (‘Journalism’ 1899: 4). 
Such control over the way in which history and tradition was told was 
not merely a matter of bourgeois accumulation of cultural capital; it also 
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had real consequences in terms of political autonomy. Struggles between 
the colonial government, the churches, and different elements of elite 
communities with respect to the introduction of the Marriage Ordinance 
in 1884 and changes to the Gold Coast Native Jurisdiction Ordinance 
in 1910 often centred on the ability of social actors to put forward the 
most persuasive interpretations of traditional custom and law, appealing 
to historical precedent.
One literary form that incorporated community attributes in individ-
ual expression was biography.The genre was present in the Gold Coast 
newspapers in a variety of forms, including obituaries.7 The Gold Coast 
Aborigines commenced, soon after its foundation, a series of biographies 
in which “there will be given now and then brief sketches of the lives 
and labours of some of the flowers of this land who have come, done 
great deeds and noble but whose works have followed them and seem as 
it were to have been written on water”; the specific object of telling the 
stories of such lives was to encourage emulation by a younger generation 
(‘Sketches’ 1898a: 3). The first life chosen was that of Philip Quaque, 
born in the Gold Coast in 1741, who at fourteen went to study in England, 
eventually gaining an MA at Oxford and returning to the Gold Coast 
as missionary: the outward contours of Quaque’s life were sketched, 
but attention was also given in a subsequent article to “the inner man” 
(‘Sketches’ 1898b: 3). Biographies tended to emphasise the acquisition 
of a metropolitan higher education, professional qualifications, and hon-
ours as cultural capital. An article on William Addo, for instance stressed 
both his study for the Bar at the Inner Temple in London, but also a love 
of literature in which books were “his constant companion” (‘William 
Addo’ 1896: 2). At times, editorial comment made the goals of biographi-
cal representation explicit. J.E. Casely Hayford concluded his biographi-
cal account of the life of Hendrick Vroom, itself occasioned by Vroom’s 
being awarded a C.M.G., with a stark warning: “It goes without saying 
that it would be a retrograde move if in the second century of our exist-
ence the policy initiated by the Colonial Office and followed by several of 
our Administrators be now set aside and the system of importing Euro-
peans, as in the early stage of the Colony, to fill up posts that had been 
occupied by natives, be reintroduced” (Casely Hayford 1896: 2). Casely 
Hayford was prescient: only five years later, governor George Maxwell 
would halve Vroom’s salary as district commissioner on the grounds that 
he was a “native of the Gold Coast” (Gocking 2005: 47).
Even articles following generic conventions closer to our contemporary 
understandings of the literary were heavily – and transparently – didac-
tic. “The Sorrowing Mother,” published in the Gold Coast Aborigines, for 
example, presents the current state of the Gold Coast in the guise of a 
great grandmother whose daughter and grand-daughter have died young, 
soon after giving birth to a child. Having endured such circumstances 
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because “her religion had taught her that such was the cross that she 
must bear,” she realises in a vision that the problem is something that 
she herself is empowered to solve. She undertakes a domestic house 
maintenance and cleaning programme with unmistakable parallels to 
contemporary improvements in municipal hygiene and, as a result, her 
great grandchild now prospers (‘An Allegory’ 1896: 3).
Literary texts in the Straits Chinese Magazine were similarly concerned 
with the reclamation of history and the accumulation of cultural capital. 
The stress on literacy in the Gold Coast newspapers was to an extent 
replaced with a concern for translation between three written languages: 
English, written Chinese – a language in which many Chinese members 
of the elite were not literate – and romanised Malay, reflecting the patois 
spoken in the Straits Chinese community but also, more crucially, the 
lingua franca in the colonial entrepot. The first issue of the magazine 
featured a version of “Annie Laurie” in Malay and several articles over 
the decade-long publication history of the magazine introduced Malay 
texts to non-Malay-speaking readers. Chinese literary texts were also 
translated, and articles appeared targeting those partially literate in Chi-
nese, in which parallel English and Chinese versions of a classical text 
were given. Much critical energy was devoted to illustrating the fact that 
literatures in Malay and Chinese had literary canons that equalled that 
of English. Tan Teck Soon’s series of essays on “Some Genuine Chinese 
Authors,” for instance, began by noting the absorption of Chinese in the 
Straits Settlements in commerce and work, remarking that “we seldom 
associate any of them with literature or literary achievement of any kind,” 
before proceeding to enlighten readers regarding “some of the best prod-
ucts of the Chinese mind” (Tan 1897: 63, 64).
As was the case with their Gold Coast counterparts, the writers in the 
Straits Chinese also aimed to reclaim history and the means of represen-
tation through literature. The fact that Singapore and the other Straits 
Settlements were migrant societies resulted in less attention being given 
to local history and a greater concern for parallel Asian experiences of 
modernity in the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, Japan, and in partic-
ular China. As in the Gold Coast, writers confronted misrepresentation 
by colonial officials and travellers. One editorial, for instance, attacked 
the representation of Chinese characters as avaricious and deceitful in 
the writings of the colonial official Hugh Clifford and indeed implicitly 
critiqued the rhetorical economy of the “Native States romance” which 
presented Malays as nature’s gentlemen in constant need of British pro-
tection from rapacious Chinese capitalism (‘Chinaman in Pahang’ 1898: 
38). Unlike the Gold Coast newspapers, the Straits Chinese Magazine did 
feature many articles by Europeans, such as the colonial official and ama-
teur linguist Richard James Wilkinson, and D.J. Galloway, the founding 
president of the Singapore Medical Association. However, their presence 
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if anything increased the cultural capital of the Straits Chinese writers, 
who wrote most of the articles, often based on professional expertise. 
For example, the two founding editors of the magazine, Song Ong Siang 
and Lim Boon Keng, were university graduates in law and medicine, 
 respectively.
The Straits Chinese Magazine also carried model biographies, com-
mencing a series of accounts of “Some Local Chinese Worthies” with an 
account of the ‘intrepid’ Teochew immigrant Seah Eu Chin, who rose to 
become a member of the Singapore Chamber of Commerce and a Justice 
of the Peace. In such stories, literature as cultural capital is emphasised 
in tandem with a narrative of self-making through the accumulation of 
wealth: Seah’s last years, readers are told, “were most happily spent in 
the cultivation of Chinese literature of which he was by no means a poor 
scholar” (Lin 1899: 84). Unlike the Gold Coast newspapers, the maga-
zine did not serialise a novel or long travelogues, but it did feature a con-
siderable number of short stories during its decade of publication. These, 
too, were heavily didactic in tone and often concerned to make a specific 
intervention in a colonial public sphere. Thus the short story “A Victim 
of Chap-ji-ki” centres on the discovery by a man that his wife has become 
addicted to gambling. The news drives him mad, but at the narrative’s 
conclusion his brother and friend resolve to form an “Anti-gambling Soci-
ety” (Lew 1898: 72). In “Lost and Found,” an employer finds that a trusted 
Straits Chinese engineer is imprisoned on suspicion of being a member 
of a secret society: he is taken to the Chinese Protectorate and threatened 
with deportation until it is established that Singapore is his birthplace. At 
the conclusion of the narrative, he is found to be innocent despite this 
treatment: “contrary to the spirit of British justice deprived of my liberty 
before trial and conviction” and his employer notes with satisfaction that 
as a Straits Chinese his employee is “a creature with some backbone and 
stamina in him” (Lew 1900: 176). The story exemplifies a concern that 
was much discussed in the magazine’s pages: the precise status of the 
Straits Chinese as British subjects, and their right to be tried under Brit-
ish, not Chinese, legal jurisdiction.8 As in many of the stories, individual 
discipline becomes a metaphor for the disciplinary mechanism that a 
modern community needs to enact to ensure its coherence and survival.
Literature’s other face
Up to this point, we have seen how literary texts function as both cul-
tural capital and as disciplinary technologies in the creation of modern 
communities made up of autonomous individuals, how they place the 
self and community in history. The production of moral selves and com-
munities is a response to colonial govermentality enacted through racial 
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categories. The elites in both the Straits Settlements did not put aside 
such categories, but they reworked them, alternately trying on a dizzying 
variety of universal, cosmopolitan, regional and local identities in order 
to gain purchase within a colonial public sphere. It is undeniable that 
there were clear historical differences between the Gold Coast and the 
Straits Settlements, accompanied by marked differences in languages, 
social practices, and lifeworlds. Yet parallels perhaps also suggest that 
culture itself has a history – which the modern imagining of a cultural 
community necessitates a certain placing of a newly-imagined ethnicised 
self with reference to both past and future.
In this process, literary texts may serve as something more than cul-
tural capital goods or as guides to conduct for the production of modern 
individuals. For literary texts operate according to a different rationality 
from historical ones, often achieving their effects through juxtaposition 
or association rather than transparent representation or causal connec-
tion. The work of Russian literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin on the novel 
is helpful here. Novelistic texts, Bakhtin argues, are not univocal, but con-
tain “a diversity of social speech types… and a diversity of individual voices, 
artistically organized” (Bakhtin 1981: 262). The formal qualities of the text 
– its artistic organisation in Bakhtin’s terms – thus allow what Bakhtin 
terms “heteroglossia” to enter the text of the novel, in which a “multiplic-
ity of social voices” overlap (1981: 263). A reader of “artistic prose,” as 
opposed to non-fictional or non-narrative reportage is thus confronted 
with a “socially heteroglot multiplicity” of meaning caused by intersecting 
languages and the socio-ideological positions which they represent (1981: 
278). The novel, in Bakhtin’s terms, orchestrates such diverse voices, 
bringing them into dialogue, but it does not reduce them to a single voice. 
Thus the novel – and ‘artistic prose’ in general – at a  formal level resists 
simple didacticism or transparent allegory, foregrounding contradictions 
central to the social order from which it emerges.
Bakhtin is useful in considering two of the most complex literary texts 
produced by the Gold Coast and Straits Settlements elites. The novel 
Marita: or the Folly of Love was published in instalments in the Western 
Echo from 1886 to 1887, and, after the newspaper closed in December 
1887, continued to be serialised in the Gold Coast Echo in 1888, although 
it appears never to have been finished. Its author “A. Native” may possi-
bly be either J.E. Casely Hayford or John Hutton Brew, but it is likely we 
will never know the true identity behind the pseudonym. “The Travels of 
Chang Ching Chong” – the most generically complex of all the stories in 
the Straits Chinese Magazine – was published in four instalments in 1898: 
the title’s adoption of a Chinese name used as a racial insult from the late 
nineteenth century onwards is the first indication that it is something 
more than the ‘autobiography’ it purports to be. While both texts have 
didactic elements, they are also complex enough to exceed the apparent 
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intentions of their authors, revealing, in their layering of different voices, 
the constitutional contradictions involved in the fashioning of ethnicity 
in a colonial public sphere.
Marita’s plot concerns the struggles of Mr Quaibu, a member of the 
Gold Coast elites who is initially a churchgoer but not a ‘class member’ 
baptised into full membership of the Methodist church. Quaibu and his 
partner Miss Wissah have lived “as man and wife for more than eight 
years, enjoying all the blessings of married life” but her growing religios-
ity causes the “innocent and harmless pleasures that used to amuse her” 
to be “considered by her as sinful” (2002: 45), and she demands a full 
church wedding (2002: 41). The intricacies of the plot concern Wissah’s 
wilfulness after the ceremony and the manner in which she is exploited 
by a group of ‘scholars’ – men with primary education – who hold reli-
gious gatherings outside of church. The narrative frequently diverges 
into discussions regarding the nature of marriage between Quaibu, his 
friends as well as both African and European church officials and a series 
of embedded stories of the failure and success of other marriages. The 
didactic function of the text is clear: Fante modernity consists of picking 
and choosing elements of European modernity – and Christian marriage 
is not one of them. The Fante people, indeed, are critiqued as “excessively 
imitative in their nature” (2002: 41). In striving to advance as a “nation” 
they have “acquired all the evil but very little of the good qualities of the 
European” (2002: 42). Yet the refusal of Christian marriage is hardly 
progressive: it makes an androcentric demand for female submission 
central to Fante identity. Indeed, in disputing Christian marriage in the 
colonial public sphere, Marita paradoxically makes use of colonial dis-
course concerning the unfitness of Africans for modernity. In discours-
ing on the difference between the “white virago” and the “black scold,” 
Quaibu notes that African women are culturally unable to appreciate the 
benefits of modern life:
Whilst the white lady has, by the highly civilized society in which 
she was brought up and moved, wholesome checks to or upon her 
natural wicked propensities, as in this instance; the black woman 
could never dream, at all events according to the present state 
of society, of being so fortunate, the society in which she moves 
being primitive, consequently she could have no checks upon her 
waywardness. (2002: 115)
Wissah’s illiteracy and consequent vulnerability are repeatedly 
 foregrounded in the narrative, yet at the same time no model of female 
 education or social advancement is proposed. Educated African women, 
indeed, are portrayed as inverting a necessary social hierarchy. One of 
the embedded narratives, for instance, explores the fate of a self-made 
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man who marries Mrs Allen, a “woman of the first water in the town 
of  Dobblesie [i.e. “double C” – Cape Coast]”. Her continued control over 
property and marital assets results in her husband, in his own words, sell-
ing “my virile qualities, and to a woman too who does not scruple to make 
use of my helplessness in order to trample upon it!” (2002: 105, 109).
At the formal level of the narrative, we can detect some of the stylis-
tic qualities illustrative of Bakhtinian heteroglossia and dialogisation. 
 Marita, as we have noted, contains many staged – and often overly stagey 
– discussions of issues to do with polygamy and monogamy, which 
represent the voices of different elements of Gold Coast  society: the 
Church, native ‘gentlemen,’ ‘primary-educated scholars,’ and women. 
Yet the schematic pedagogy of the text is undermined by a  further sty-
listic quality. The novel contains a series of embedded narratives nes-
tled within each other, almost like Russian dolls, to the extent that their 
relation with the framing narrative of Quaibu and Wissa is lost. These 
narratives commence with the consciously allegorical story of a man 
who leaves his homeland and prospers in another country, only to find 
his closest friend and business partner grows cold towards him under 
the influence of his new wife, who has been attracted to a new religion 
that has recently arrived in the country. The result, the man’s friend tells 
him, is that she has become “so proud and unbearably independent of 
the man who has made her what she is that at times I have even con-
ceived a notion of killing her and myself to end my misery” (2002: 87). 
After taking advice, he adopts a firm attitude towards her, which results 
in her submission.
In the first of a number of ambiguities, this embedded narrative is 
introduced to readers directly by a first-person narrator who may or 
may not be Quaibu’s friend, Bonsoe Penin; we return to the main narra-
tive, only to be guided away into further sub-narratives. The first, which 
concerns the Allens and their imbalanced marriage in terms of class, 
immediately gives way to the second, which introduces the aptly named 
young man Mr Littlemonie and his marriage to the spoilt Miss Peckdore. 
Finally there is a third story of marital conflict set in England. Stylisti-
cally, the narratives differ: the first of the four narratives is Bunyanesque 
in its use of allegory, for example, while the story featuring Littlemonie 
is more Dickensian, or perhaps influenced by contemporary melodrama 
in its setting up of conflict between characters whose names mark them 
out as representative types. A common response of scholars to both the 
narrative digressions and stylistic unevenness has been to see them as 
evidence of a lack of skill on the part of the author. Roger Gocking, for 
instance, notes the “rambling” nature of the narrative and its frequent 
“melodramatic excesses” (1999: 90, 91). A Bakhtinian reading, while not 
discounting questions of authorial skill, might focus on the way in which 
such stylistic variance gives a textual embodiment to “the co-existence of 
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socio-ideological contradictions” of the society in which the text is written 
and read.
While the four narratives share a similar structure, their final denoue-
ments differ. In the narrative of the old man, the woman eventually sur-
renders to her husband’s authority; significantly, in narrational terms, 
the encounter between husband and wife occurs in private and readers 
only see its results in the wife’s renewed submissiveness. The narratives 
of the Allens and the Littlemonies both conclude with a marital break-
down that deprives the man of his masculine self-sufficiency. Mr Allen 
complains of being forced to “sacrifice my manhood, … sell my virile 
qualities” (2002: 109), while Mr Littlemonie also finds that “his virile 
quality” has “been taken away from him by the woman” who has become 
his wife. (2002: 112). In the story of marital conflict in England, there is a 
different outcome, in which the married couples’ young child appeals to 
his mother to acquiesce to a more passive role and, on hearing him, she 
sheds “tears of contrition” (2002: 115).
In Bakhtinian terms, we might say that two ‘languages’ are at war with 
each other: one that seeks to maintain a traditional patriarchal order, and a 
second that seeks to refashion society in what Carole Pateman has termed 
a new specifically modern (or fraternal) form (1989: 35). The paradox, as 
we have seen, is that a vigorous assertion of imagined African patriarchal 
difference also appears to obviate any possibility of achieving an indige-
nous or indigenised modernity. There is no possibility of African women 
becoming ‘highly civilised’ – and the possibility of her providing a motor 
for masculine self-development by civilizing the domestic sphere is thus 
discounted. Marita’s author continues by using the analogies of clay and 
iron vessels with reference to Christian marriage. “Is it not better,” the 
narrator asks, “to be contented with our clay vessel which we can repair 
when it breaks until by education, trade, or profession and general habits 
or custom we could mend the iron vessel when it does break?” (2002: 
116). Yet such an argument provides no illustration of how such a change 
might occur; it thus comes dangerously close – although this is clearly 
not its intention – to reproducing the colonial rhetoric that Africans are 
not fit subjects for modernity and must remain in perpetual tutelage. The 
repeated iterations of the same narrative with different actors thus pro-
duces not the insight that allegory often brings – its defamiliarisation of 
the present through analogy – but rather a sense of confinement within 
immutable structures of thought, in which the tradition of a moralised 
community is reified.
“The Travels of Chang Ching Chong” is a narrative that, while less 
lengthy than Marita, also displays a dizzying mixture of generic slippage 
and narrative recursion. The story is putatively the ‘autobiography’ of a 
young Chinese man Ho Yuan, who is taken on board a Spanish ship 
and transported overseas. He rather implausibly learns Spanish during 
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a fifty-day voyage that ends in shipwreck on an island near the Philip-
pines which has “never been visited by civilised man” (‘Travels’ 1898: 15). 
The protagonist and his Spanish companions establish a model colony 
called Santa Maria, but he is restless, and leaves the island with several 
other crew members on a raft. After further adventures, he is captured 
by cannibals and then rescued by a Chinese pirate who lives among the 
savages, whom he terms “sycophants”, having made futile attempts to 
civilise them. Despite the pirate’s offer of his daughter’s hand in mar-
riage, the hero of the story leaves for the nearby port city of Ganiserop, 
a transparent anagram for Singapore. In Ganiserop, gender hierarchies 
are reversed: women beat their husbands and the protagonist eventually 
enters a ladies’ club, where he learns to “dress myself in fancy costume, 
wash my body with rose water, powder my face, trim my hair in approved 
fashion, learn to dance and sing, and become initiated in the difficult art 
of pleasing the ladies” (1898: 142). He is rescued by a woman who falls 
in love with him; they marry, and return to China, committed to living in 
“equality” and becoming “objects of admiration to the villagers[,] for we 
still reside in the hamlet of my forefathers” (1898: 144).
As in the case of Marita, a number of languages are present in “The 
Travels of Chang Ching Chong” and indeed the story’s artistic failure may 
lie in its inability to orchestrate them meaningfully. As with Marita, two 
key concerns are metaphorically intertwined: the question of cultural 
tradition and self-governance, and the question of gender relations in 
modern society. The protagonist’s voyage out into the world allegorises 
the historical experience of European colonialism: he first travels with 
the Spanish, founding a colony named after one of Columbus’s ships 
and indeed the initial shipwreck is reminiscent of Columbus’s loss of 
the Santa Maria off the coast of Haiti in 1492. His second experience of 
the colonial order of things is one of ruling subject peoples through a 
scientised from of racism: Chen, the Chinese pirate who rules over the 
race of ‘sycophants’ has given up his initial hopes of civilizing the ‘black’ 
natives. What menaces the small Chinese community in particular is the 
spectre of miscegenation: he complains of “the degradation of his com-
panions” who have married “natives,” and in particular the presence of 
“half-castes” who mimic Chinese identity:
“I had often wished” said he “that some natural calamity would 
blot out these effete descendants of our great nation. The only 
connection they have with the traditions and customs of our 
country is the queue.” (1898: 86)
While such conscious identification with ethnicity vanishes in Ganis-
erop – several characters have Chinese names and reference is made 
to Chinese languages, although Mullio, the protagonist’s lover, has 
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a non-Chinese name – it is re-asserted at the end of the story in the return 
to China and “the hamlet of my forefathers” (1898: 144).
A parallel language to the public one of community identification 
through race is a more private one, that of gender. The gender roles of 
Chang’s parents follow conventional prescriptions and he escapes into 
the masculine space of the ship and the Spanish colony. Women only 
return in the person of Chen’s daughter, who bears the conventionally 
feminine Chinese name Kwei-hwa and is described as a personification 
of Chinese female beauty. The women in Chen’s domain have an ambiva-
lent place. The narrator claims that he has “lifted his women folk out of 
the degraded position they were in our native land,” and yet they remain 
cloistered at home, and are praised for their modesty and their skill in 
weaving (1898: 87). In Ganiserop Kwei-hwa is unaccountably forgotten 
by the protagonist and the inverted gender regime there is presented as 
monstrous – although the nature of its monstrosity suggests that colonial 
or patriarchal regimes orders may be similarly preposterous. The return 
to China is marked by Mullio’s marriage, childbearing and the adoption 
of a demeanour within Chen’s extended family that might be described 
as modern yet modest, very much in line with strictures regarding wom-
en’s education in order to be better wives in accompanying articles in the 
Straits Chinese Magazine.9
The contradiction in “The Travels of Chang Ching Chong” comes not 
through reiteration, as in Marita, but in a failure of allegory. Discuss-
ing Ganiserop, Chang hears that its prosperity is largely the result of the 
presence of a race of visitors:
Not very long after the white men had established themselves as 
masters in Ganiserop, there arrived in the harbour a fleet of strange 
ships, the bows of which carried two painted eyes. The sails also 
were unlike anything known to the natives. The men were mostly 
young or middle-aged, but there were a few old men. Of women 
and children there were none. These men speak a language so 
strange that they are not understood in their own tongue to this 
day. They began to exchange commodities and carried on a brisk 
business. When the fleet left after four months’ stay, about twenty 
men remained to establish a depot for the sale of the rare products 
of their land. For many years these people came and went; and 
every time a fleet of ships came they brought with them a new 
band of adventurers. No one knew how this nation had been 
able to produce the wares which everybody so much admired. It 
transpired afterwards that these men came from the wonderful 
land of Tasugan, where gods walked among men, and mortals 
possessed the wisdom of the gods. To make my story short, I may 
say that the Tasuganese in course of time settled very largely in 
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the island, and through their influence and industry, the town 
of Ganiserop is now a model city and is the seat of a very high 
civilisation. (1898: 139)
The Tasuganese are clearly the Southern Chinese immigrants who set-
tled in Singapore in the nineteenth century and yet the narrative cannot 
represent them as being Chinese. In part this is no doubt due to a lack of 
skill – and indeed planning – on the part of a writer who has already used 
up all his allegorical options, but slippages in literary texts are significant. 
The Chinese identity that Chang has constructed during his travels: based 
on being “a disciple of Confucius,” following the “sacred doctrines of our 
sages,” and cultivating a sense of racial difference, ancestry and belong-
ing to a homeland, has no place in the lifeworld of the colonial entrepot 
(1898: 84, 87). The Chinese lifeworld in the Straits Settlements – and 
indeed Straits Chinese identity – is not based on the disciplinary crea-
tion of a moral community, but on the traffic of goods, languages, and 
cultures. The story responds to colonial critiques of  Chinese immoral-
ity and obsession with money by producing a perfected, moralised view 
of  Chinese culture that cannot find a place in Ganiserop/Singapore. 
 Chinese culture in Singapore is represented in terms of fullness, luxury, 
the ‘exchange of commodities’ and ‘rare products,’ yet it cannot explicitly 
be named Chinese and indeed the protagonist can only claim ethnicity 
by returning to China.
Literary texts do not undo social and ideological contradictions, but in 
their representation of different languages of community they illustrate 
the fault-lines of elite self-fashioning, of repeated attempts to manufacture 
a culturally specific modernity that undercut themselves. The similarities 
of the experiences of Anglophone elites in two very different parts of the 
world enables us, as retrospective readers, to historicise the way in which 
culture has been taken as central to the construction of the modern com-
munity. We look back at these literary productions through the experience 
of more than a century of a particular historical narrative: the rise of anti-
colonial nationalism, independence, and then the growing challenges to 
national sovereignty brought by neo-liberalism and its associated renewed 
migrations of capital and labour in the late twentieth century.
The experiences of Ghana and Singapore in this narrative have been very 
different. Singapore’s economic development has continued in a linear 
fashion under single party dominance. Ghana’s has been interrupted by 
economic mismanagement and coups, but the country has also recently 
experienced genuine political competition in a vibrant multi-party democ-
racy and the state has largely avoided the violence that has afflicted much 
of the rest of West Africa. If Ghana has served as Singapore’s other, it, 
like all others, emerges on examination as surprisingly similar. What may 
be most interesting in this period of reconfiguration of state sovereignty 
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is the emergence of other claims of moral community that challenge or 
supersede the disciplinary authority claimed by the state and the manner 
in which their proponents deploy culture to authorise them, in contrast to 
the claims of citizenship and secularity made by the state.
Both Marita and “The Travels of Chang Ching Chong” conclude with 
the establishment of a stable, nuclear family divorced from the sphere of 
economic production. Their uneasy homologies of individual and com-
munal self-rule find temporary resolution here; the family is a rhetorical 
place that will soon be appropriated by the nation-state and be sacralised 
as a space of cultural and social reproduction, even as it begins to lose 
its status as an economic unit. As Singapore and Ghana live, with both 
uneasiness and some dexterity, with the consequences of the globalisa-
tion of capital, we find haunting similarities in claims of moral commu-
nity made from outside the state, with sexuality now replacing gender as 
an object of disciplinary attention.10
Notes
1 Works providing historical re-assessments of the period include Barr and Trocki’s 
edited volume. Among the many works that incorporate direct testimony and memoir, 
see Chin (2003), Chin & Hack (2004) and Poh, Tan and Koh (2010).
2 See, for example, Huang (2008) and Chua (2008a).
3 Inevitably, there are also key differences between the two colonies. Whereas the Gold 
Coast was historically the site of the export of forced labour through slavery, the Straits 
Settlements, at a later period, were the sites of the importation of indentured labour 
from both China and the Indian subcontinent. Such a difference explains the manner 
in which the enforced migrations of peoples produced under colonialism are config-
ured very differently in present-day Ghanaian and Singaporean historical imaginaries. 
I owe this suggestion to Ross Forman.
4 For accounts of Singapore history that emphasize the place of colonialism within a 
much longer historical process, see Kwa (2004a), and Kwa, Tan and Heng (2009).
5 For a discussion of a slightly later period that nonetheless has important conceptual 
implications, see Chua (2008).
6 See Tosh (2007); Tosh further notes that there were increasing tensions in the domes-
tic ideal in Britain by the end of the Nineteenth Century.
7 For a discussion of the role of biography in Gold Coast Newspapers, see also Kimble 
(1963): 520-522.
8 See, for example Song (1899): 61-67.
9 It is tempting to relate the figure of Mullio and the gender regime of Ganiserop to the 
figure of the New Woman in Britain and the debate surrounding women’s changing 
roles in society. As Sally Ledger has noted, British feminists of the late nineteenth and 
early centuries had complex relationships to imperialism that spanned both “complic-
ity and resistance” (1997: 63). However, the object of attention here seems not to be 
colonialism, but rather the preservation of cultural identity in modernity. As Partha 
Chatterjee notes, the notion of the New Woman in anti-colonial  nationalist discourse 
is moulded into a “specific ideological form” by an emergent nationalist bourgeoisie, 
with women’s status in society now related to the construction of a moral cultural 
community (1993: 131).
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10 I owe the connection between current struggles regarding homosexuality in South and 
East Africa and colonial conflicts regarding polygamy to Neville Hoad. Similar parallels 
can easily be found in West Africa. Polygamy has had a different valence in Singapore, 
given its identification as a feudal practice by anti-colonial progressives paralleled by 
the postcolonial state’s acceptance of polygamy in Muslim marriages. Attempts by con-
servative Anglicans to make homosexuality an object of social contention, however, 
bear close parallels to the situation in West Africa.
This chapter examines the strategies and effects of the Japanese-Chinese 
alliances in Singapore as well as their impacts on changing Japanese views 
of overseas Chinese in the South Seas (present-day Southeast Asia). The 
literature on Chinese in Singapore in the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury has emphasised how the British colonial city port developed as the 
centre of Chinese anti-Japanese nationalism in the region from the 1920s 
to the 1930s (Akashi 1970; Leong 1977, 1979; Wang 1981; Yong 1987; 
Heng 1988; Yen 1989; Ku 1994; Horimoto 1997). Based on research into 
Japanese intelligence reports on the South Seas, this chapter,  nonetheless, 
emphasises Singapore’s role in shaping Japanese strategies in dealing 
with the Chinese in the South Seas in the early twentieth century.
The importance of Singapore in the formulation of Japan’s strategies 
during its southward advance rested not only on trade but also on the 
 Chinese responses to the Japanese expansion. The responses varied among 
the different Chinese sub-ethnic groups. The latter, who were organised 
along origin and dialect lines, developed into different immigrant and 
business networks such as the Hokkien, Teochew, Cantonese, Hakka, 
and Hainanese. In the late Meiji (1868-1911) and Taisho-  (1912-1926) 
eras, Japan’s main aim was to cultivate ‘Japan-China friendship’ (Nisshi 
Shinzen [日支親善]) in dealing with the Chinese in the South Seas. It 
successfully incorporated the transnational Chinese networks, above 
all the most influential Hokkien networks in Java and Singapore, into 
the Japanese state-sponsored programmes centred in  Taiwan, then a 
 Japanese colony. This agenda, however, failed after the late 1920s, when 
the Chinese bourgeoisie, especially those from the Hokkien and Teochew 
circles, began to organise Chinese anti-Japanese nationalist movements. 
After that, Japan began to work more closely with the non-Chinese mer-
chants, including the Malays and Indian merchants, while framing the 
Chinese as outsiders and exploiters of the natives in the region. Although 
some Chinese (especially those from the Cantonese sub-ethnic group) 
continued to import goods from Japan to Singapore despite the surge of 
 Chinese anti-Japanese nationalism throughout the 1930s, Japan viewed 
these Cantonese merchants as competitors rather than collaborators. On 
the eve of Japan’s territorial expansion into the South Seas in the late 
6 Social Discourse and Economic Functions:  
The Singapore Chinese in Japan’s Southward 
Expansion between 1914 and 1941
Huei-Ying Kuo
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1930s, Japan coined sophisticated racial discourses to emphasise the 
essential differences among various Chinese sub-ethnic groups in the 
South Seas as well as emphasising their distinctiveness from the generic 
Han Chinese. These discourses, while heavily influenced by Japan’s expe-
riences of earlier encounter with various Chinese groups in the region, 
reflected a Japanese strategy to prevent the formation of a unified Chinese 
solidarity among the South Seas Chinese with allegiance to the Republic 
of China. This chapter concludes that the Japanese changing views on the 
Chinese in the South Seas in general and in Singapore in particular rep-
resented not only the influences of German racial science, but also Japan’s 
unconvincing attempts to establish partnership with certain Chinese sub-
ethnic groups in the South Seas between the 1910s and the 1930s.
This chapter is organised as follows: the first section points out Japan’s 
contradictory views on the status of the Chinese in the South Seas in the 
Meiji discourses, characterised by disparaging the Chinese and China on 
the one hand and praising the economic achievements of the  Chinese 
in the South Seas on the other hand. The second section introduces the 
Japanese strategy of building up goodwill with the Hokkien merchants 
in the South Seas through the Taiwan connections between the 1910s 
and 1920s. The third and fourth parts elaborate how the Chinese bour-
geois communities in Singapore – especially those of the Hokkien and 
Teochew vis-à-vis the Cantonese groups – responded differently to the 
expanding Japanese power between the late 1920s and throughout the 
1930s. The Hokkien and Teochew elites organised Chinese  anti-Japanese 
movements, while the Cantonese continued to trade Japanese goods. 
The Japanese empire reacted to both developments as threats to its inter-
ests in the South Seas. To prevent the formation of pan-Chinese soli-
darity transcending the sub-ethnic cleavages, Japan began to emphasise 
the essential differences among various Chinese sub-ethnic groups. 
In conclusion, I point out that as a late industrial country and the only 
non-white imperialist power in the early twentieth century, the Japanese 
empire did not set up a consistent economic strategy, nor was there a sta-
ble racial or civilisation discourse to articulate the relationship between 
Japan and the Chinese in general and the Chinese in the South Seas 
in particular. Japan’s changing dispositions toward different Chinese 
 sub-ethnic groups in the South Seas were related to the latter’s divergent 
and variable responses to the expansion of the Japanese empire.
The limits of Meiji Japan’s Nan’yo- Kakyo- [南洋華僑] discourses
Nan’yo- [南洋], literally meaning the South Seas, is the Japanese term 
for the region surrounding the South China Sea. The Japanese post-Meji 
documents call overseas Chinese in the region Nan’yo- Kakyo- [華僑], that 
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is ‘Shina’ [支那]: emigrants to the South Seas. To begin with, the use of 
the term Shina shows the Japanese sense of positional superiority over 
China and the Chinese. The use of such disparaging terms began in the 
Meiji period (1868-1912). Before then, Japan viewed China as its cultural 
mentor and designated it as Chu-goku (the Middle Kingdom [中国]). 
After the Meiji Restoration, Japanese thinkers blamed China’s poor 
leadership for East Asia’s subjugation by the Western powers (Tanaka 
1993). As early as the 1870s, “the idea of a distinctive Japanese national 
identity was intricately linked to imagining differences from people in 
China” (Sato 1997: 135). Japanese discrimination against China and the 
Chinese was further justified after the Japanese triumphs in the first 
Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), the Russo-Japanese War (1905), as well as 
the formulation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance between 1902 and 1923. 
Japan began to adopt the model of the West’s conception of the ‘white 
man’s burden’ and to view its Asian neighbours as its “Oriental others” 
and the “yellow man’s burdens” (Tanaka 1993).
In addition, the Japanese ‘yellow man’s burden’ justified their 
 self-proclaimed mission to civilise other Asian peoples, including those 
in the South Seas (Weiner 1995; Young 1999: 100-101, 105; Goto- 2003). 
Beginning in the late 1870s, Japanese merchants, workers, and prosti-
tutes started to go to the South Seas for work (Yano 1975: 32). Japanese 
Meiji intellectuals such as Shiga Shigetaka [志賀重昂] and Takekoshi 
Yosaburo- [竹越与三郎] viewed this region as an under-civilised area, 
where rich and as yet uncultivated resources represented economic 
opportunities for the Japanese (Yano 1975: 52-55). The Meiji discourse 
continued into the early Taisho- era (1912-1926). At the To-kyo- Taisho- 
Exhibition held between March and July 1914, in which cultures and 
artefacts from Korea, Taiwan, and other “colonial” (takushoku) districts 
including Hokkaido, southern Sakhalin Island, and Manchuria, as well 
as the South Seas were exhibited to “display the Empire”, peoples from 
the South Seas were introduced as underdeveloped and barbarian natives 
(Sakai 2007: 67). In August 1914, immediately after Japan joined World 
War I under the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Japan took over German terri-
tories in the Southern Pacific (i.e. the Marshall Islands, Mariana Islands 
and the Caroline Islands). These areas, which were later ruled by the 
Japan’s Southern Pacific Mandate, became known as the Inner South 
Seas (Uchi Nan’yo-).1 In December 1914, Japanese anthropological stud-
ies of Micronesian people in the Inner South Seas concluded that they 
were “lazy”, “sexually loose” and “uncivilized” (Sakano 2005: 356-357). In 
the words of the contemporary historian Goto- Ken’ichi, “the South Seas 
region was regarded as an inferior cultural zone, a narrative that allowed 
Japan to exercise a free hand in ruling the area. The inhabitants were 
called islanders, a legal term that drew a clear line between them and 
imperial  Japanese subjects” (Goto- 2003: 16).
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However, when the Japanese began to launch its systemic business 
expansion into the South Seas in the 1910s, they soon realised that nei-
ther the disparaging Shina discourse nor the Japanese claim of ‘yellow 
man’s burden’ in the South Seas provided a valid basis for understanding 
the Chinese in the region.2 In 1912, when the Bank of Taiwan opened its 
first branch office in the South Seas in Singapore, it tried to approach 
the Chinese in the region. In 1914 the bank organised a survey tour to 
investigate trade and the financial system in the South Seas. It discov-
ered the supremacy of the Chinese far-flung wholesaling and retailing 
networks in the Dutch East Indies, America’s Philippines, French Indo-
China, Siam as well as British Malaya. The survey also highlighted the 
importance of Western banks in Singapore for Chinese remittances from 
the South Seas to China. Among the ten most popular banks for Chi-
nese remittances in Singapore, eight were run by British, German, Dutch 
or French capital, alongside the Japanese Bank of Taiwan and the local 
Chinese/Teochew’s Sze Hai Tong Bank. And the British Hong Kong and 
Shanghai Banking Corporation was the most popular one, because of its 
fine connection with remittance houses in Hong Kong, the other British 
colony in Asia (Taiwan Ginko- 1914: 117). In other words, the  Japanese 
encounters with the Chinese in the South Seas showed that the lat-
ter were neither inferior Shina nor were they subjugated people in the 
Western colonies. The Chinese merchants in the South Seas were taking 
advantage of intra-Asian trade under the British status quo.
How should the Japanese empire deal with the dominance of the 
Chinese merchants in the South Seas? This became the key issue in 
the Japanese ad hoc organisation for southward business expansion, the 
South Sea Association (Nan’yo- Kyo-kai, referred to as the SSA hereafter). 
It was founded in January 1915 in To-kyo- by top politicians such as Uchida 
Kakichi [内田嘉吉], Chief of the Home Affairs, the Taiwan Office of 
the Governor-General (Taiwan So-tokufu) and Den Kenjiro- [田健治郎] 
from the Japanese Diet as well as by an advocate of Pan-Asianism, Inoue 
Masaji [井上雅二].3 The SSA specialised in collecting commercial intel-
ligence reports for Japanese zaibatsus [economic conglomerates] and in 
nurturing Japanese retailers in the region. Consistent with what the sur-
vey tour organised by the Bank of Taiwan has observed in 1914, during 
World War I, Inoue points out that “[b]ecause the Shina people had long 
migrated to the South Seas, business power of the region was in their 
hands” (Inoue 1917: 200).
What was unclear among the leaders of the SSA was the way that Japan, 
as a late comer in the South Seas trade, should deal with the Chinese dom-
inance of regional trade. Sometimes the same person proposed mutu-
ally contradictory views in this regard. For example, in May 1919, Kimura 
Masutaro- [木村増太郎], then the director of the  Singapore Commer-
cial Showcase (an organisation associated with the SSA), identified the 
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Chinese merchants in the South Seas as obstacles to Japanese business 
expansion in the region. According to his suggestion, to secure its newly 
gained economic influence in the region, Japan should be ready to com-
pete with the returning European powers as well as the long-established 
Chinese business networks. Because the Chinese merchants had aligned 
themselves with the European powers, the two challenges to Japanese 
influence in the South Seas became one (Kimura 1919: 32-38). In the fol-
lowing year, in Kimura’s lecture at the SSA’s  Taiwan Branch, he pointed 
out the importance of Japan plugging into the Chinese retailing net-
works. Given the political chaos in China, overseas Chinese merchants in 
the region did not receive any home country support. Kimura therefore 
concluded that Japan needed to cooperate with the Chinese in the South 
Seas; together they would be able to compete with Western interests in 
the region (Kimura 1920: 9-21).
Chinese trade under the Japanese agenda of ‘Japan-China 
Friendship’, 1910s-1920s
Without a consistent ideology to define the relationship between Japan 
and the Chinese in the South Seas, Japan tried to use its Taiwan con-
nections to plug into the Chinese business networks in the region. As 
80  percent of the Chinese residents in Taiwan had a Hokkien back-
ground, a Japanese survey in 1904 could state that “most Taiwanese 
were Chinese immigrants from the Fujian area; therefore we can use 
the Fujian customs as means of understanding the customs in Taiwan” 
(Taiwan So-tokufu 1904: 59). After the opening of the Singapore office in 
1912, the Bank of Taiwan further established three more branches in the 
South Seas: in Surabaya (1915), Samarang (1917), and Batavia (1918), all 
located in the Dutch East Indies. Around the same time, following the 
establishment of the first overseas branch of the SSA in Taiwan in August 
1915, the second overseas branch was set up in Singapore in Septem-
ber 1918. In the early 1920s, two more offices were opened in Surabaya 
(1921) and one in Manila (1925) in the Philippines.4 Both the Dutch East 
Indies and the Philippines were regions where most of  Chinese came 
from the Hokkien sub-ethnic group (Table 6.1). The strategy of using the 
Taiwan connections to plug into the Hokkien networks in the South Seas 
was framed as part of the project ‘Japan-China friendship’ using the sup-
port of such prominent Chinese elites in the South Seas as Kwik Djoen 
Eng ([郭春秧] and Guo Chunyang).
Kwik was the most prominent Chinese merchant connected to the 
 Japanese southward agenda. As a China-born, Java-based merchant, 
Kwik established businesses that spread throughout South China and the 
South Seas. His Kwik Hoo Tong Trading Society of Samarang handled 
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sugar trade between South China and the Dutch East Indies, tea trade in 
Taiwan, and real-estate development in Hong Kong, among other activi-
ties. He belonged to the transnational Hokkien networks in the South 
Seas. His connection with the multiple jurisdictions in the South Seas 
can be shown by the fact that he simultaneously held Japanese, Dutch 
and British nationalities. Beginning in 1913, he sought funds from the 
Bank of Taiwan to establish an ad hoc bank for Chinese merchants in the 
South Seas (Masao 1919: 6; Guo 1919a: 41-44, 1919b: 83; Taiwan Ginko- 
1939: 258-259; Lin Man-houng 2001; Post 2002).
Kwik’s request was well received. In 1918, the president of the Bank 
of Taiwan, Yagyu- Kazuyoshi [柳生一義], pointed out the importance of 
establishing a reliable bank for overseas Chinese to use to send remit-
tances back to their home country, especially to the Fujian and  Guangdong 
provinces, where most of them came from (Yonozu Cho-ho- 1918: 74-76). 
The report also listed potential overseas Chinese co-operators, including 
“the Cantonese capitalist Loke Yew [陸裕], manager of tin mines and 
cocoa and pineapple plantation as well as… owner of sugar business in 
Java”, as well as “Fujian tycoons such as Seah Lian Seah [佘連成], Seah 
Pek Seah [佘北成], Lee Choon Guan [李俊源], among others” (Yorozu 
Cho-ho- 1918: 75). The two Seah’s were brothers. They belonged to one of 
the most influential Teochew clan in Singapore in the early twentieth 
century (Xu Jiaozheng 1965: Vol. 1. A54-56; see also Song 1967: 21, 55, 
212-219). The Teochew people backed their native place of origin in the 










































































* Indicated as Chinese ‘races’ in the original source.
Source: Taiwan So-tokufu gaiji-bu (1943: 11-14)
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eastern part of Guangdong, but not Fujian. Given the paramount influ-
ence of the Seah family in Singapore, this mistaken analysis suggests 
that the Japanese lacked understanding of the Chinese communities in 
the region. Kwik’s participation in the SSA helped the Japanese better 
understand the Chinese in the South Seas. In Kwik’s analysis:
Frankly speaking, overseas Chinese in the South Seas today do 
not really appreciate the Japanese. For example, comparing the 
Japanese with the Dutch in Dutch settlements, the Japanese 
with the British in British settlements or the Japanese with the 
French in French settlements, the [Chinese] feeling toward the 
Japanese was worse. I think we should seriously consider the 
fact that this phenomenon is because of what the Europeans 
throughout the South Seas have done. Extending from economic 
ties, political relationships (between the Chinese and Europeans) 
were also operating in a way that was mutually beneficiary. The 
key rests on the well organization between [European-American 
colonial] officials and people as well as very fine communication 
between them. In short, because of the more skilful strategies of 
the European and American people, the latter were more popular 
among ordinary Chinese sojourners than the Japanese. This is my 
humble explanation about why the Japanese way was unfavourable… 
Japanese way of interacting with Chinese sojourners should better 
be conducted along the following approach: while calculating 
the economic progress, Japan must also take care of the moral 
dimension to cultivate the emotional bondage. After all, to attract 
the emotional support [of Chinese sojourners to the Japanese], on 
the one hand we have to make progress on moral dimension, on 
the other hand, we have to make the cooperation fit the economic 
interest (Guo 1919a: 42-43).
Kwik further pointed out that among all of the overseas Chinese in the 
South Seas, Japan should specifically work with those coming from Fujian 
province, not only because the “most wealthy merchants in the South 
Seas came from the Fujian”, but also because “they had the most special 
feeling toward the Japanese” (Guo 1919a: 43). By this, Kwik referred to 
the Hokkien-speaking group coming from Fujian’s south-eastern coast 
like himself.
In 1919, after six years of negotiating with top politicians in To-kyo-, 
Kwik was able to take part in founding the China and Southern Bank 
(Kanan Ginko- [華南銀行]), which attempted to serve both the Japanese 
small and medium-sized enterprises and the Chinese in the South Seas. 
Kwik was appointed as a supervisor of the bank. Japan also recruited 
prominent Taiwanese elites to the board of directors of the bank. 
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These Taiwanese elites came from the ‘big five families’, including Lin 
Hsiung-cheng [林熊徵] from the Lin family at Banqiao in northern 
 Taiwan and Lin Hsien-tang [林獻堂] (Lin Xiantang) from the other nota-
ble Lin family at Wufeng in central Taiwan (Masao 1919: 6; Guo 1919a: 
41-44, 1919b: 83; Taiwan Ginko- 1939: 258-259; Lin Man-houng 2001). 
These Taiwanese elites sat on the board of directors of the Taiwan branch 
of the SSA (Nan’yo- Kyo-kai 1917: 4). They were also important sharehold-
ers and managers of the other Japanese ad hoc business association for 
southward business expansion, the Southern Godown Company (Nan’yo- 
So-ko, est. 1920). The Bank of Taiwan contributed only 2,450 shares, or 
5 percent of the total five million yen of the founding capital of the com-
pany; the remainder came from forty-three independent investors based 
in Japan and Taiwan (57 percent), twenty-seven from Java (22 percent), 
thirty-one from Singapore (9 percent) and twenty-seven from Java (7 per-
cent). Among them, seven leaders from the big five families of Taiwan 
held 1,000 shares each. Kwik Djoen Eng’s Kwik Hoo Tong Trading Soci-
ety and its members held 2,000 shares, equivalent to one fifth of the 
total 10,150 shares from overseas Chinese capital in Java (Nan’yo- So-ko 
1936: 12-21).
In addition to the use of Japan’s Taiwan connection to connect with dom-
inant Hokkien business networks via Java to Singapore, Japan also used 
Taiwan as a stepping stone to develop a direct shipping and trading network 
between Japan and the South Seas, especially Java and Singapore. In 1912, 
the Japanese government sponsored the establishment of the South Seas 
Mail Steamship Company (Nan’yo- Yu-sen Kaisha). It operated the ship-
ping routes along Ko-be and Moji in Japan, Jilong in north  Taiwan, as well 
as Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Semarang, and Surabaya (Unekawa 
1927: 311-313). From April 1916 onwards, the Taiwan Office of the Gover-
nor-General mandated and sponsored ocean liners and tramp steamers 
to connect the waterway between Jilong and  Singapore via Java. Singa-
pore became the centre of the Japanese  triangular  Java-Singapore-Calcutta 
shipping route (Unekawa 1927: 386; 647-649).
The progress of Japan-Singapore trade was significant. Before 1914, 
only five Japanese companies were registered in Singapore. Between 
1916 and 1918, about twenty Japanese trading companies and individual 
merchants opened offices there. These included leading zaibatsus such 
as the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, Mitsubishi Sho-ji Kaisha, and Suzuki Sho-
ten (Shimizu and Hirakawa 1999: 68). To facilitate the Japanese trade in 
Singapore, in 1918, the Japanese Department of Commerce and Industry 
in To-kyo- sponsored the establishment of the first Japanese merchandise 
showcase in the South Seas in Singapore, the Singapore Commercial 
Showcase. Affiliating with the SSA, it was an exhibition, education, and 
reception centre for Japanese merchants and their business partners in 
the South Seas. The centre also recruited ten to thirty students or interns 
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from high-school graduates in Japan and provided them with courses 
on the business skills needed in the South Seas, such as fluency in the 
English, Dutch, and Malay languages as well as economics, law, and 
finance. The second overseas office of the SSA was opened in Singapore 
in February 1919 (Nan’yo- Kyo-kai 1918: 67-73; Kimura 1921: 14-22). By 
then, the Singapore Japanese Business Association listed 50 founding 
members. All were Japanese banks, shipping or trading firms (Nan’yo- 
Kyo-kai 1919: 71).
When the European powers returned to the South Seas after the end 
of World War I, Japan tried to retain its influence in the region. One 
strategy was to further develop the Japan-Taiwan-Singapore shipping 
route. In addition to the South Seas Mail Steamship Company, which 
engaged in Japanese shipping to the South Seas from 1912 onwards, the 
Japan Mail Steamship Company (Nihon Yu-sen Kaisha) and the O-saka 
 Mercantile Steamship Company (O-saka Sho-sen Kaisha) also managed 
their own regular shipping lines in the region after 1919. Among these 
shipping lines, the monthly South Seas line of the O-saka Mercantile 
Steamship Company was mandated by the Japanese colonial office in 
Taiwan (Unekawa 1927: 533). In April 1919, the O-saka Mercantile Steam-
ship Company established a direct shipping line between Jilong and 
 Singapore (Unekawa 1927: 651). Overall tramp tonnages from Japan to 
the South Seas increased from 52,501 in 1916 to 143,734 in 1919.5
An SSA leader, also a representative of the House of Peers, Baron To-go- 
An [東郷安], stated that “the colonisation of Taiwan was the first step 
of our Empire’s southward advance. Taiwan is located in the subtropical 
area that is separated from the Philippines in the South Seas by only a 
narrow strip of water. The twenty years of experience of Japanese devel-
opment in Taiwan could provide a valuable asset for us to explore South 
Seas resources” (To-go- 1919: 112). The Office of the Governor-General, Tai-
wan, played a more important role than the Japanese Ministry of  Foreign 
Affairs in setting up the SSA’s operations during its first twenty years 
(Kawarabayashi 2007).The Japanese government became aware of the 
importance of Taiwan in Japan’s southward advances in the 1920s, when 
SSA-associated leaders in Taiwan were promoted to higher ranks in the 
colonial government in Taiwan. One of the SSA’s founding members, 
Den, became the governor of Taiwan between 1919 and 1923; Den was 
succeeded by another SSA leader Uchida, who became governor between 
1923 and 1924. In addition, the Japanese Treasury offered funds to help 
the China and the Southern Bank reopen after it closed for three weeks 
in April 1927.6
The success of the Japanese attempt to cultivate ‘Japan-China friend-
ship’ in the South Seas prior to 1928 can also be verified by the fact that, 
between 1919 and 1928, although sporadic anti-Japanese riots had flared 
up in Singapore, the Hokkien elites in Singapore remained indifferent 
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(Kenley 2003: 52-53; Kuo 2006a). In addition, in September 1923, when 
an earthquake destroyed To-kyo-, top Hokkien leaders – including the rub-
ber tycoon Tan Kah Kee [陳嘉庚], the comprador of the Hong Kong 
and Shanghai Bank See Tiong Wah [薛中華], as well as the leader of 
the Ho Hong Group of Companies Lim Peng Siang [林秉祥] – organ-
ised the 1923 Singapore Chinese Relief Fund for Earthquake Victims in 
Japan (NYSP: 28 Sept., 1923; Tan Keong Choon 1981: Reel 13, p. 119). 
The beneficence went both ways. In the following year, the Singapore 
Japanese Association organised a relief fund to assist victims of China’s 
floods (NYSP: 11, Sep., 1924).
Furthermore, the Hokkien-based Home Salvation Campaign of the 
Fujian Sojourners in the South Seas (the Nanyang Minqiao Jiuxiang Hui 
or NMJH) also became a platform for potential economic and political 
cooperation between Taiwan-associated Hokkien and  British-associated 
Hokkien in the South Seas, including Singapore. The NMJH was founded 
by the Manila-based Hokkien elite Li Qingquan [李清泉] in March 1926. 
About 28 Hokkien merchants from the Philippines, Java, Malaya, and 
Shanghai participated in the founding meeting. Among them were mer-
chants associated with Kwik’s Semarang Tea Agent Association, which 
imported tea from Taiwan (NYSP: 20 Aug., 1926; Chen Tian-lai 1938: 
29, 37; Kawarabayashi 2000: 107-113). The association also recruited 
the Singapore-based Hokkien elite Lim Boon Keng [林文慶]. Lim was 
a notable ‘King’s Chinese’, who became the first Chinese recipient of 
the Queen’s Scholarship in 1887 and received the Order of the British 
Empire for his various services to the Straits Settlements (Song 1967: 
235-238). Addressing the importance of the Hokkien’s cooperation, Lim 
stated that “today, only overseas Chinese can save the Fujian province” 
(Nanyang minqiao jiuxianghui linshi daibiao dahui 1926: 22). To save 
Fujian province, the NMJH’s top priority was to found the Fujian Rail-
way Company. Its goal was to reactivate the railway project in southern 
Fujian, which had been initiated in 1905 but was soon thereafter aborted 
due to a shortage of funds. In the 1910s, Japan expressed an interest in 
participating in the southern Fujian railway project, but the Chinese gov-
ernment did not approve the Japanese proposal (Mi ed. 2002: 225-229). 
In the early 1920s, Lim Boon Keng became one of the eleven members 
of the preparatory committee for the inauguration of the railway agenda, 
together with the project’s primary planner Oei Ik Tjoe [黃奕住] (NYSP: 
28 July, 1924; 19 Jan. 1925; 29-30 Nov. 1925). It is worth noting that Oei, 
the China-born, Java-based merchant who founded a bank in Shanghai 
in the 1920s, became the largest shareholder of the Japanese Southern 
Godown Company among its investors based in China.7 Although the 
railway project remained on hold throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the 
NMJH connected the Japanese-associated and the British-associated 
Hokkien elites into the same network.
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The rise of Chinese Anti-Japanese nationalism in the Singapore 
Chinese business communities
Despite the increasing amicability between Japanese interests and 
the Hokkien elite in the South Seas in the 1910s and 1920s, the Jinan 
 Incident on 3 May, 1928 interrupted this improving Chinese-Japanese 
partnership. In response to clashes between the Japanese Kwantung 
Army and the Chinese Nationalist Army in Jinan in Shandong prov-
ince, the  Hokkien leader Tan Kah Kee organised the first and foremost 
 Chinese nationalist fundraising campaign in Singapore, the Shandong 
Relief Fund. From then on, Tan Kah Kee became one of the most influen-
tial Chinese anti-Japanese nationalist leaders in Singapore (Yong 1987). 
Prior to the Jinan Incident, Tan had been friends with Kwik Djoen Eng 
and the influential Taiwanese Hokkien Lin Hsien-tang. When Lin visited 
Singapore to supervise the businesses of the Southern Godown Com-
pany in May 1927, he was received by both Kwik and Tan (Lin  Xiantang 
2000, Vol. 1: 121). Tan also admitted that, before the Jinan Incident, he 
used glass bottles from Japan to pack his medical products (NYSP: 20 
June, 1928).
The surging Chinese anti-Japanese nationalism jeopardised the Japa-
nese Taiwan-Singapore connections. Taiwanese concerns were considered 
to be indistinguishable from Japanese interests. A local Chinese news-
paper identified the establishment of the Singapore Taiwan Association 
(founded in 1914) as the first Japanese association in Singapore (NYSP: 9 
May, 1924). Beginning in May 1928 and throughout the 1930s, whenever 
anti-Japanese sentiments were stirred up, Taiwanese merchandise suf-
fered; they were labelled ‘inferior goods’ (liehuo). Chinese agents involved 
in trading Taiwanese or Japanese goods had either to stop doing business 
temporarily or to change their trading partners permanently (Kuo 2006b).
This Chinese boycott of Taiwanese goods, especially Taiwanese tea, 
was not only an expression of patriotic fervour; it was also related to busi-
ness competition. Exports of Taiwanese tea to the South Seas, which grew 
rapidly in the early 1920s, challenged the Chinese tea trade.  Chinese 
tea agents in Singapore tended to substitute Chinese tea with tea from 
 Taiwan. But after the 1928 Jinan Incident, many Hokkien tea merchants 
in Singapore declared they would no longer import tea from  Taiwan, but 
from Fujian only. For example, the Lim Ho Thye Tea Chop (Lin Hetai cha 
zhuang) posted a notice in a Chinese newspaper, which read as follows:
Previously we have ordered tea from Taiwan. Now these inferior 
stocks [sic] are gone, but we decided not to abandon our previous 
trademark as it has been used for years. We will keep the same 
Thye Chuan Yellow bottle-gourd trademark, but the content will 
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be replaced by tea imported from our Amoy head office. These tea 
stocks were all collected from [China’s] Wuyi Mountains (NYSP: 
28 July, 1928).
The owner of the store, Lim Pun Tao [林本道], became the first chair-
person of the Singapore Tea Merchants Association.8 One of its aims was 
to boycott Taiwanese tea and to promote Chinese tea (NYSP: 26 June, 
28 July, 27 Sept., and 5 Oct., 1928; Singapore Tea Importer-Exporter 
Association 1928). Another leader of the association was Lim Keng Lian 
[林慶年] (1893-1968), owner of the Chop Lim Kim Thye. He became an 
active Chinese nationalist leader in the 1930s.9
The Taiwanese tea trade slumped sharply thereafter. In 1925, the total 
value of Baozhong tea (a semi-fermented tea) imported from  Taiwan to 
British Malaya was 487,884 Japanese yen. This was reduced to 106,076 
yen in 1928 and 22,990 yen in 1929, and represented only 4.7 percent 
of its 1925 value. Although the trade recovered after 1933, its value in 
1935 was 267,496 yen, barely more than 50 percent of its 1925 value 
(Taiwan So-tokufu shokusan-kyoku tokusan-ka 1935: 254-255). The 
amount of Taiwanese tea carried by overseas Chinese merchants also 
declined. In 1929, overseas Chinese merchants were responsible for 
selling 17 percent of Taiwanese Baozhong tea, the  Taiwanese contrib-
uted 72.6 percent of the trade, and non-Chinese merchants, including 
the Japanese and other ethnic groups, accounted for the remainder at 
3.7 percent and 6.7 percent of the trade, respectively. But in 1934, the 
amount handled by overseas Chinese merchants fell to 14.2 percent, 
the trade handled by the Taiwanese slumped to only 58.5 percent, and 
the Japanese trade in Taiwanese Baozhong tea rose to 11.6 percent, 
while the share of other ethnic groups also jumped to 15.7 percent (com-
piled from Taiwan So-tokufu shokusan-kyoku tokusan-ka 1935: 303). 
Against this backdrop, the closure of the Singapore Taiwan Association 
marked the failure of the Japanese attempt at using Taiwan connections 
to plug into the Hokkien business networks in the South Seas (Straits 
 Settlement 1934: 1127).
Concomitant with the surging Chinese anti-Japanese nationalism after 
the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s, “buy Chinese” movements 
appealed to Chinese merchants in Singapore to import merchandise 
from China to substitute Japanese goods. Some Chinese stores, especially 
those located on Circular Road and South Bridge Road, emphasised that 
they sold only Chinese textiles (Shingapo-ru sho-hin chinretsu-sho 1933a: 
47). And shoes imported from Hong Kong and South China were sold 
by those “Cantonese, Hainanese, and Teochew merchants who carried 
cheap products” (Shingapo-ru sho-hin chinretsu-sho 1932a: 24, 1932b: 28). 
Thanks to the implementation of British preferential tariffs, these “made 
in Hong Kong” products could be sold in Singapore and other British 
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territories at lower prices.10 But favourable price was not the only rea-
son that the  Chinese goods were competitive. Cotton blankets, knitwear, 
underwear, cotton handkerchiefs, and cotton towels from Hong Kong 
also appealed to  Chinese consumers because of their special designs and 
colours (Shingapo-ru sho-hin chinretsu-sho 1933a: 32-33, 1933b: 27, 38, 
1933d: 103). The inflow of Chinese industrial goods from Hong Kong 
therefore intensified the business competition between  Chinese and Jap-
anese goods in Singapore.
It is, however, noteworthy that despite all the anti-Japanese national-
ist boycotts, overall exports from Japan to Singapore continued to grow. 
During the period between 1928 and 1937, Japan’s exports to the Straits 
Settlements (including Singapore, Penang, and Malacca) rose 3.3 times 
(compiled from Nihon Naikaku To-kei-kyoku, 1996). British intelligence 
reports pointed out that not all Chinese unanimously supported the anti-
Japanese boycotts: in the wave of  anti-Japanese boycotts beginning in Jan-
uary 1932, major distributors of piece goods on Circular Road (most of 
them specialised in the trade of British textiles) stopped carrying any Japa-
nese goods for almost an entire year. But outside Circular Road, Chinese, 
Arabian and Indian merchants continued to trade Japanese textiles (Kuo 
2006a). SSA newsletters further revealed how Chinese trading in Japanese 
goods stubbornly continued, despite increasing anti-Japanese feeling. One 
survey showed that, from 1 June to 18 June 1934, among the 58 companies 
that ordered Japanese cotton textiles to Singapore, 15 Chinese agents han-
dled 33.3 percent of the trade (3,748,475 yards out of total 10,336,241 yards), 
surpassing the Indian, Japanese and other European agents in the same 
line of business.11 The other one-year survey between 1 October 1930 and 
30 September 1931 showed that near 99% of Japanese rubber shoes, such 
as rubber-soled canvas shoes and rubber boots exported from Ko-be, O-saka 
and Moji would eventually enter the markets in Singapore (Shingapo-ru 
sho-hin chinretsu-sho 1932a: 26). In addition, nearly half of Japan’s rubber-
soled shoes imported to Singapore were handled by Chinese dealers. Some 
of them ordered the shoes from Japanese import-export agents or manu-
facturers in Japan, while others built up long-term business ties with their 
co-Chinese counterparts in Japan. The latter, eleven Chinese merchants on 
High Street (Table 6.2), contributed to nearly 30 percent of the total sales 
of Japanese rubber-soled canvas shoes as well as other rubber products 
shipped to Singapore through commission trade.
Another of SSA’s report reveals that among the High Street Chi-
nese  companies, only one was run by a Hakka, while the rest were all 
run by Cantonese (Nan’yo- Kyo-kai chosa-ka 1940: 127). All ‘High Street’ 
 Cantonese textile merchants were active in the commission trade 
– usually in the form of deferred payment for 30 to 60 days – along 
the  Ko-be-Singapore networks (Shingapo-ru sho-hin chinretsu-sho 1933c: 
28-29). It has been estimated that in the early 1930s, about 53 percent of 
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 Japanese goods (worth 80,000,000 yen) exported from Ko-be to central 
and  southern China as well as to the South Seas were handled by Chinese 
merchants. By July 1937, 48 of the 98 Chinese stores in Ko-be were run 
by people from Guangdong province, 18 of them from Fujian province 
and the other 32 from the Lower Yangzi area (Chu-ka Kaikan 2000: 187). 
Given the fact that “the Cantonese only traded closely with the Cantonese, 
the  Hokkien only trusted those who were also Hokkien” (Nan’yo- Kyo-kai 
chosa-ka 1940: 127), it is reasonable to assume that more than half of the 
Japanese exports from Ko-be to Singapore were handled by the Chinese 
merchants, most of them Cantonese merchants on High Street.
To summarise, while Hokkien elites became leaders of Chinese anti-
Japanese nationalism after the late 1920s, thus ending Japan’s earlier 
attempts to cultivate the ‘Japan-China friendship’ via the Hokkien net-
works between Taiwan and the South Seas, Cantonese merchants in the 
Ko-be-Singapore networks picked up the slack in the 1930s, coming to 
constitute an important channel for about one third of growing Japanese 
export to the region. What follows will explain why this development 
did not lead to a Japan-Cantonese alliance in the same way that earlier 
 Hokkien trade facilitated a Japanese-Hokkien partnership.
Cantonese merchants as competitors to Japan’s 
southward advance
From the perspective of the Japanese empire, the Cantonese monopoly of 
Japanese trade in the South Seas was as disappointing as the  Hokkien’s 
support of anti-Japanese Chinese nationalism. In 1932, an internal report 
of the China and Southern Bank concluded that Japanese southward 
Table 6.2 Importers and wholesalers of Japanese shoes in Singapore  
(survey period: 1 Oct. 1930-30 Sept. 1931)
Import channels Number and ethnic  
origin of trade agents
% of trade amount  
(based on quantity)








Import through its own head office and 
associated manufactures in Japan
3 Japanese companies* 44




11 Chinese agents** 30.6
 * The three companies were Mitsui Company, Mitsubishi Company, and Nichinan Bo-eki 
Kabushiki Kaisha. Among them, Mitsui Company controlled 60% of this portion of trade.
** All eleven Chinese agents in this category were located on High Street.
Source: Shingapo-ru sho-hin chinretsu-sho 1932a: 26-28
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economic expansion had failed. Twenty years after Japanese official 
sponsorship of southward business expansion, “commerce, industry, and 
maritime navigation in the South Seas were still under the control of 
overseas Chinese” (Kanan Ginko- 1932: 6).
The Japanese disappointment can be explained by the following factors. 
First, the Chinese merchants of Japanese goods, the Cantonese Ko-be-Sin-
gapore network in particular, were not exclusive channels for the sales of 
Japanese goods. In the Japanese textile trade for instance, throughout the 
1930s, whenever there were Chinese anti-Japanese boycotts, the  Chinese 
merchants ordering Japanese goods would temporarily give up the trade 
– either to shift to selling Chinese products or to deny that the merchan-
dise that they had ordered from Japan was Japanese when it arrived 
(Shingapo-ru Sangyo-kan 1941: 61). Among the Chinese/ Cantonese compa-
nies that shifted from carrying Japanese goods to competing  merchandise 
from China/Hong Kong and England were the Cantonese ‘High Street’ 
agents Ng Hong Hing Company and Kwong Wah Long. The latter had 
dominated the import trade in Japanese cotton blankets to  Singapore by 
1930 (Shingapo-ru sho-hin  chinretsu-sho 1931: 51; Table 6.3).
In addition, unlike the Taiwanese elites who were recruited into  Japanese 
ad-hoc organisations engaged in a southward advance, such as the SSA, 
the China and the South Seas Bank, and the Southern Godown Company, 
the Cantonese merchants carrying Japanese goods were not included in 
any Japanese business associations in Singapore. In the  Japanese rayon 
cloth trade, the Japanese had the Japanese Textiles Importers Association 
of Malaya, the Chinese/Cantonese established the Chinese Importers 
and Exporters Association (Lianyi Gongsuo in  Chinese), the Indians had 
the Siudi Merchants Association, and the Europeans had the Singapore 
Importers Association (Shingapo-ru sho-hin chinretsu-sho 1936: 30). These 
groups operated as separate entities that competed with one another.
Last but not least, the development of Cantonese middleman trade in 
the South Seas did not help the expansion of Japanese zaibatsu such as 
Mitsubishi Company and Mitsui Company. Although some agents of 
the Ko-be-Singapore trade, mostly Cantonese, would use Japanese banks, 
these merchants were not exclusive clients of Japanese state-sponsored 
banking, shipping, insurance and trade enterprises (Shingapo-ru sho-hin 
chinretsu-sho 1936: 31). As the Japanese initial goal of southward busi-
ness advance in the 1910s was to establish a direct connection between 
manufactures in Japan and overseas exporters in the South Seas, the 
control over the export of Japanese goods by the Chinese/ Cantonese 
merchants in Ko-be was viewed as an obstacle to Japan’s agenda 
(Shimizu and Hirakawa 1999: 68-73). Nonetheless, in the early 1930s, 
the  Japanese direct export handled near 30  percent of the  textile trade 
(Nan’yo- Kyo-kai 1934: 96). And, among the Chinese merchants importing 
rubbers shoes from Japan to Singapore, the eleven Cantonese merchants 
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on High Street who controlled 30  percent of the trade did so without 
forming direct connections with either Japanese exporters or manufac-
tures (Table 6.2). Furthermore, in the late 1930s, when Chinese anti-Japa-
nese boycotts included violence against the Chinese merchants selling 
Table 6.3 Chinese textile wholesalers and retailers dealing in Japanese 
cotton cloth, sarong and rayon in Singapore, 1933
Company* Address
Kyen Ho Loong & Co. 68 High Street
Him Woo & Co. 66 High Street
Wing Hing Loong & Co.** 70 High Street
Yue Tai & Co. 72 High Street
Woo Song Loong & Co. 76 High Street
Chong Futt (chop) 86 High Street
Loe Sang Yuen Sing Kee 81 High Street
Chop Yick 79 High Street
Kwong Wha Loong** 75 High Street
Ng Hong Hing & Co.** 73 High Street
Kwong On (chop)*** 26-28 South Bridge Road
Sam Yik & Co. 20 South Bridge Road
Kwong Fook Tai 231 South Bridge Road
Lee Sang & Co.** *** 241 South Bridge Road
Chop Kwong Yick 234 South Bridge Road
Nam Sang (chop)*** 232 South Bridge Road
Choon Fat 230 South Bridge Road
Wing On*** 32 South Bridge Road
Chop Nam Seng 16 South Bridge Road
Wing Wah Cheong 34 South Bridge Road
San Lee Guan 24 South Bridge Road
Ming Kee & Co. 219 Beach Road
Teck Sang Hing (chop) 116 Rocher Road
Thakordas Chhotalal & Co. 26 Kandahar Street
Masiamull Nagindas 578 North Bridge Road
Mehamad Kasin & Co. 12-13 Boat Quay
Hasannasan & Co. 20-22 Chulia Street
G. A. M. Gabriel & Co. 24-26 Chulia Street
Kimatolai & Co. High Street
Chop Yick Tai 467 North Bridge Road
  * There is no record of the Chinese names of these companies. All were 
reported to substitute the sales of Japanese with Chinese products in 1932 
when Chinese anti-Japanese boycotts peaked.
 ** Companies also carrying British rayon in a survey in 1933.
*** Companies also carrying Chinese cotton towels in 1933.
Sources: Shingapo-ru sho-hin chinretsu-sho 1933a: 46-48, 1993d: 101-104, 1933e: 
105-108
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Japanese goods, Chinese wholesalers of Japanese goods would try to use 
Indian merchants to retail these products in Singapore (Nan’yo- Kyo-kai 
1939: 16). The original document refers to Chinese not  Cantonese whole-
salers, but given that these importers neither imported goods from Japa-
nese factories nor used Japanese export agents, it is reasonable to assume 
that this was exclusively Cantonese commission trade. The salience of 
this Cantonese trading network accounts for the Japanese response. The 
Singapore branch of the SSA viewed the  Cantonese-Indian cooperation 
as the Cantonese attempt to monopolise the supply of Japanese goods 
in Singapore. The office therefore decided to introduce exporters from 
Japan to the Indian retailers in Singapore, in an attempt to marginalise 
the Cantonese wholesalers (Nan’yo- Kyo-kai 1939: 16; see also Post 1995; 
Shimizu and Hirakawa 1999).
After ‘Japan-China Friendship’: South Seas Chinese as different 
racial groups
Competition with the Cantonese Japan-Singapore trading network 
aroused Japanese concern about the domination of the Chinese mid-
dleman trade in the South Seas. In the 1930s, Japan began to identify 
the exploitative nature of the dominance of the Chinese in the South 
Seas. In 1930, the director of the Singapore Commercial Showcase, 
Masubuchi Sahei [増淵佐平], emphasised the exploitative relation-
ship between the Chinese merchants and the native Malays in agrarian 
communities in the Malay Peninsula. He also pointed out the impor-
tance of developing Japanese small enterprises in the region to replace 
the Chinese exploiters (Masubuchi 1930: 32-33). In 1932, a report by the 
China and Southern Bank suggested that the success of the Chinese 
middleman trade in British Malaya was based on the Chinese control 
over the livelihood of the local Malay communities. For example, in 
the trade of marine goods, Chinese merchants controlled loans and 
the supply of groceries for entire fishermen’s villages. Local fishermen, 
therefore, simply had no alternative but to sell their products to the 
Chinese, regardless of price (Kanan Ginko- 1932: 3-11). Furthermore, 
Watanabe Kaoru’s [渡辺薫] article, published in the newsletter of the 
SSA in April 1934, used parallels with anti-Semitism to criticise the 
Chinese middlemen merchants in the South Seas. According to this 
view, Chinese traders controlled the trade in commodities. Instead of 
trying to increase the competitiveness of Chinese products in the mar-
kets, the Chinese in the South Seas organised  anti-Japanese boycotts 
to devastate the Japanese trade in the region. Together with rising pro-
tectionism in European and American markets, Japan should treat the 
Chinese in the South Seas as challengers to the Japanese economic 
growth (Watanabe 1934).
128 huei-ying kuo
Wanatabe’s statement marked a departure from Japan’s previous 
agenda that had sought cooperation with the Chinese merchants in the 
South Seas. After the middle of the 1930s, the Office of the Governor-
General in Taiwan also reconfigured Taiwan’s role in Japan’s imperial 
advance. In 1936, the Taiwan Colonisation Company Ltd. (Takushoku 
Kabushiki Kaisha) was established, with half of the funds coming from 
the Taiwanese colonial government and the other half contributed by 
leading zaibatsus, banks and individual investors. Lin Hsiung-cheng and 
other Taiwanese/Hokkien elite, who had been involved in Japan’s ear-
lier southward expansion, also invested in the state-run company. But 
the rationale for the Taiwan Colonisation Company was not to create a 
bridge to Japan’s connections with the Chinese in the South Seas. It was 
to use the resources of the region for Japan’s military, especially naval, 
expansion (Goto- 1995: 85-88; Wang Shiqing 2008: 2-3). Furthermore, 
from January 1939, the SSA became a legally incorporated foundation, 
directly supervised by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry 
of Colonial Affairs. One of its aims was ‘to clarify the misunderstand-
ings with the South Seas Chinese [about Japan] and to introduce them 
to the ideas of coexistence and co-prosperity’ (Kawarabayashi 2007: 121). 
Accordingly, small and medium-sized enterprises as well as the Chinese 
bourgeoisie in Western colonies in the South Seas were no longer seen 
as instrumental to the Japanese agenda of southward expansion after the 
middle of the 1930s.
The Japanese problematisation of the Chinese domination in the 
South Seas and their emphasis on the Japanese state-led agendas of 
co-prosperity resonate with the formulation of Japan-led Pan-Asianism 
(Meishuron Pan-Asianism). Departing from earlier advocates of cultural 
links between Asian peoples, especially those between the Chinese and 
the Japanese from the 1900s to the 1920s, the nascent Japan-led Pan-
Asianists in the 1930s emphasised Japan’s responsibility for freeing other 
Asian peoples from the “immaterial, historical deadlock of Eurocentri-
cism” (Hotta 2007: 168). In other words, they legitimised Japan’s expan-
sion into other parts of Asia in order to rescue peoples subjugated by 
Western colonial rule.
Alongside these changes, Japan also adjusted its discourse on the 
Chinese in the South Seas from the 1930s onwards. The Chinese in the 
region were no longer regarded as an undifferentiated part of the Shina 
people, but were viewed as different ‘races’, divided by origin and dia-
lect ties. This classification itself is nothing new. Colonial censuses in 
 British Malaya, Dutch East Indies, and Japanese Taiwan all differentiated 
the Chinese by their dialects. What distinguished the Japanese under-
standing of overseas Chinese from the other sub-ethnic classifications 
from the 1930s onwards was the association between each dialect group 
and essential racial traits. Under the influences of Japan’s experiences of 
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forming amicable partnership with the Hokkien in the 1910s and 1920s 
as well as its intensifying competition with the Cantonese after the late 
1920s, the discourses developed in the 1930s emphasise the differences 
between the Chinese from Fujian and Guangdong provinces and the 
generic Han Chinese.
In 1931, a Japanese bureaucrat based in Singapore, Kobayashi 
 Shinsaku [小林新作], provided detailed descriptions of the eco-
nomic status as well as the ethnic characteristics of each of the major 
 Chinese sub-ethnic groups with mutually unintelligible dialects: the 
 Hokkien “mostly engage in trade, their key personality trait is endur-
ance”  (Kobayashi 1931: 90-91). The Cantonese are “quick and smart” 
and, due to their greater exposure to an overseas atmosphere, they are 
more educated (Kobayashi 1931: 92). Kobayashi also pointed out the 
difference between those born in China (China-born Chinese) and their 
foreign-born counterparts in the South Seas. These new immigrants 
from China, because their “biological characteristics are not yet affected 
by the tropical hot summer”, became more diligent than their foreign-
born counterparts (Kobayashi 1931: 88-89). These observations, on the 
one hand, reflected the shift in the Japanese anthropological paradigm 
from cultural to physio-anthropology after the late 1920s (Sakano 2005: 
404-406); on the other hand, they also reflected Kobayashi’s concern 
about soaring Chinese nationalistic feelings among the China-born 
Chinese, who, unlike their lukewarm local-born counterparts, became 
enthusiastic about boycotting Japanese goods in Singapore after the 
1928 Jinan Incident (Kobayashi 1931: 295-342).
After the Jinana Incident and throughout the 1930s, a series of  Chinese 
anti-Japanese boycotts in the South Seas in general and in Singapore in 
particular marked the limits to Japan’s earlier attempts to seek ‘Japan-
China friendship’ by aligning with the Hokkien elites via Taiwan. 
Through its earlier efforts Japan had nonetheless accumulated valuable 
insights into the Chinese in the region. In 1938, the ex-Japanese officer 
from Taiwan, Ide Kiwata [井出季和太], coined the term Fujian people 
(minzoku).12 Ide emphasised the fact that the Fujian people, as well as 
the Chinese sojourners who originated from this province, were differ-
ent from the Han Chinese. Although Fujian is known as an important 
destination for several waves of southward migration by the Han  Chinese 
from the Yellow River basin (which was identified as the heartland of the 
Han Chinese civilisation) from the fourth century onward, long periods 
of intermarriage between the northern Han immigrants and the indig-
enous people in Fujian had created a unique coastal people  (minzoku) 
(Ide 1938: 25-36). Overall, his approach established a framework within 
which Japan could deal flexibly with different Chinese groups.
Ide was not alone in this respect. In the same year, a report by the 
 Taiwan Greater Asiatic Association (Taiwan Dai-Ajia Kyo-kai) pointed out 
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that “the Hokkien in Fujian and the Cantonese in Guangdong have very 
different ethnicities. [Their distinctions] are like the differences between 
dogs and monkeys. They do not like each other” (Taiwan  Dai-Ajia Kyo-kai 
1938: 27). It also highlighted the way Japan should deal with these differ-
ent groups: “the Cantonese have the most strenuous and special ethnic-
ity among the Shina peoples. They [the Cantonese] lack understanding 
of Japan’s true merits. Their feelings toward Japan are careless and 
funny. We therefore have to make a special effort to guide them” (Taiwan 
Dai-Ajia Kyo-kai 1938: 27; see also Kikakuin 1940: 18). To make a “special 
effort”, a survey by the Taiwan Colonisation Company emphasised the 
different political connections between the Cantonese and Hokkien lead-
ers in Singapore (Taiwan Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha 1942: 112-114). It 
also pointed out that Japanese territorial expansion into the South Seas 
would create an opportunity to “liquidate the network of the unreasona-
ble overseas Chinese merchants in the region”, and to “set up reasonable 
economic ties with the natives” (Taiwan Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha 
1942: 149). In a nutshell, in addition to political considerations, a core 
concern of Japanese intelligence work remained gathering information 
to facilitate the establishment of a new economic order in the South Seas.
Discussion of Japan’s relationship with other Asian peoples, accord-
ing to the contemporary sociologist Oguma Eiji, involved not only an 
understanding of the Japanese past, but also the debate as to “whether 
Japan’s independence could best be protected by returning to native tra-
ditions or by assimilating modern civilisation” (Oguma 2003: 14). Given 
that Japanese competition with other colonial powers in Asia was also 
crucial to Japanese independence, especially after the outbreak of the 
 Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, one may well question how Japan’s strat-
egies to expand its power into colonial Asia reflected the Japanese racial 
understanding of the Chinese in the South Seas. The construction of 
racial boundaries among the Chinese in Singapore can be seen as a Japa-
nese pre-emptive attempt to challenge rising Chinese solidarity, in con-
cert with growing Chinese anti-Japanese sentiment. Because the  Hokkien 
had been earlier targets of Chinese-Japanese cooperation, while the Can-
tonese had been identified as competitors for Japanese direct trade to 
the South Seas, the mistrust and derogatory descriptions of the latter 
are therefore not  surprising. Different from Western colonial expansion, 
which approached Asia from a perspective of racial superiority and with 
a Eurocentric ‘civilizing’ mission, the Japanese empire never developed 
a consistent racial or civilising discourse about itself, about the foreign 
peoples under its rule, or about the peoples that the empire aspired to 
conquer.  Japanese racial discourse on Chinese during its imperial expan-
sion, therefore, cannot be explained solely in terms of any single theory 
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about the formulation of the Japanese nation or any monotonic portrayal 
of the Chinese (cf. Oguma 2003; Sakano 2005; Hotta 2007).
Conclusion
So far the literature has explained Japan’s anti-Western imperialism and 
antagonism towards the Chinese nationalist movements in the South 
Seas between the 1930s and early 1940s in terms of Japan’s diplomatic 
setbacks after the end of World War I. These included the rejection of 
including a racial equality clause at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 as 
proposed by Japan, the Japanese navy’s disagreement with the naval cuts 
agreed at the Washington and London naval conferences in the 1920s, 
and last but not least, Japan’s reluctant decision to withdraw from the 
League of Nations because of the disputes over the Japanese  military 
presence in Manchuria in March 1933 (Goto- 2003: 18-23; Shimazu 1998: 
89-116; Horne 2004; Hotta 2007). This chapter, however, explains the 
evolving Japanese views of the Chinese in the South Seas from the oft-
neglected history of the Japanese-Chinese interactions in the trade in 
South Seas from the early 1910s up to the 1930s. Beneath the Japanese 
derogatory term ‘Shina’ for the Chinese, Japanese policies in cultivating 
Taiwan-Singapore ties between the 1910s and 1920s were rooted in their 
awe of the economic success of the Hokkien in the South Seas. From 
the 1930s onwards, when the Hokkien people in Singapore became lead-
ers of Chinese anti-Japanese nationalism, the Cantonese middleman 
trade continued to present an obstacle to Japan’s plan of controlling the 
 Japan-South Seas trade. Both the Hokkien-led Chinese nationalism and 
the Cantonese-dominated trade of Japanese goods in the South Seas 
became threats to the expansion of the Japanese Empire.
Throughout these years, the Japanese recognition of Chinese eco-
nomic dominance in the South Seas in general and Singapore in par-
ticular challenged its self-proclaimed ‘civilizing mission.’ The South Seas 
Chinese, as well as other Asian peoples in the region such as the Indians 
and native Malays, were not Japan’s yellow man’s burdens. They were 
either strategic allies or critical challengers to the growth of the Japa-
nese empire. And Japan’s views of them were continuously shaped, to a 
large extent, by different Chinese sub-ethnic groups’ responses to Japan’s 
expansion. Japan’s ideological construction of other Asian peoples and its 
own relationship with them in the Age of Imperialism, therefore, cannot 
be fully understood in terms of theories of colonial identities developed 
from observation of Western colonialism alone. And this construction 
continued to evolve and to shape Japan’s conception of its relation to 
Asia after the failure of empire in the post-war years. As a major hub 
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of Japan’s connection with the  Southeast Asian region, Singapore will 
 continue to play an important role in this process.
Notes
1 The rest of the region, such as Siam, French Indochina, British Malaya, and the Dutch 
East Indies, is called the Outer South Sea (Soto Nan’yo-). Later, the geographical scope of 
the Japanese South Seas expanded. Publication of volume two of the Great South Seas 
Yearbook (Dai-Nan’yo- Nenkan) in 1943 refers to the Nan’yo- region as not only contempo-
rary Southeast Asia but also Australia, New Zealand, the Pacific islands as well as India 
(Nan’yo- Dantai Rengo-kai 1943).
2 Although the Japanese zaibatsu Mitsui Bussan Kabushiki Kaisha set up its first branch 
office in the South Seas in Singapore in 1891, large-scale expansion of Japanese busi-
ness to the region did not start until Japan settled its northern affairs with Russia follow-
ing the Russo-Japanese War and with Korea after colonizing it in 1910 (Yano 1975: 68).
3 Among his various involvements in Japan’s overseas activities in the 1900s, Inoue was 
a member of Duke Konoe Atsumaro’s East Asian Common Culture Association (To-a 
Do-bunkai). Konoe’s goal was to assist China’s modern transformation so as to guard 
the whole of Asia from further Western encroachments. In 1911, with financial sup-
port from the tableware manufacturer Morimura Ichizaemon, Inoue founded a rubber 
estate in Johore, Malaya (Inoue 1942).
4 Based on Nan’yo- Kyo-kai’s ‘Annual Business Reports of the South Seas Association’, vari-
ous issues of Nan’yo- Kyo-kai Zasshi (1915-1942).
5 The growth of Japanese tramp tonnages during World War I did not go smoothly, 
however. It declined to 14,753 in 1917, probably due to the threat of German unre-
stricted submarine warfare, which sunk several Japanese steamers in Europe, the 
Indian Ocean, and in the waters near the northern coast of California. One year 
after the American participation in the war, in 1918, the Japanese tramp tonnages 
in the South Seas rose to 182,330. After the end of the war, the returning European 
steamers in Asia directly competed with the Japanese shipping businesses in the 
South Seas. Tramp tonnages therefore declined slightly in 1919 (Unekawa 1927: 384; 
403-404; 503).
6 The crisis was triggered by financial turmoil in the Taiwan Bank, which followed the 
bankruptcy of the Suzuki Sho-ten. The latter left Taiwan Bank with 348,000,000 yen in 
outstanding debts (Taiwan Ginko- 1939: 287-315).
7 In 1935, Oei held 160 shares among the 394 shares of the Southern Godown Company 
from China (Nan’yo- So-ko 1936: 12-21).
8 Born in Anxi, China, Lim Pun Tao went to Singapore at the age of 21 and established 
the Lim Ho Thye Tea Chop. A sideline of the tea agent was a remittance service (Chen 
Kezhan ed. 1994: 242).
9 Lim Keng Lian was born in China, graduated from Beijing University, and moved to 
Singapore in the 1920s to take care of the family tea business, the Chop Lim Kim Thye. 
The Chop Lim Kim Thye was an established tea agent in Amoy. Through the efforts 
of Lim Keng Lian’s father, the business extended to Malaya. Like other tea agents in 
Nan’yang, the Chop Lim Kim Thye also engaged in remittance services (Chen Kezhan 
ed. 1994: 180-181). For more about his business and life, see Sim (1950: 19-20) and 
 Xiamen  Huaqiao zhi bianzuan weiyunhui (1991: 159).
10 The British tariff became effective after 1932. Its initial goal was to protect the markets 
of British homeland industrial goods (such as textiles from Lancashire), but Chinese 
manufacturers in Hong Kong and trade agents in Singapore also took advantage of the 
low tariffs (Kuo 2009).
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11 In addition to the 15 Chinese/Cantonese merchants, the other 30.2% (3,120,764 
yards) of the trade was carried by 25 Indian merchants, 29.8% (3,083,223 yards) by 10 
 Japanese companies, and the rest, 3.7% (383.779 yards) by 8 European agents (Nan’yo- 
Kyo-kai 1934: 96).
12 Ide associated with Japan’s earlier attempts to cultivate ‘Japan-China friendship’ through 
his bureaucratic service in Taiwan between 1920 and 1938, which included a period as a 
secretary at the Customs Bureau and a manager of the Association for the Investigation 
of Tropical Industries (Nettai sangyo- cho-sa-kai)).He was thus able to build up consider-
able experience by investigating the trade and customs systems in South China and 
Hong Kong. He resigned his official posts in December 1938 and after that, his connec-
tion with the Japanese government was through writing reports for various intelligence 
bureaus such as the Mantetsu (Manchurian Railway) on a commission basis. In 1941, 
he became a professor at the Takushoku University (Kaneko 1980).
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Introduction
This chapter examines the business network of the Chinese tea merchants 
in Singapore and the impact of events in China on it. Large numbers 
of overseas Chinese who had migrated from Fujian to Singapore were 
familiar with Fujian tea and continued to consume it. This  consumption 
pattern led to the merchants in Fujian opening new firms in Singapore 
to trade in Fujian tea, especially semi-fermented wulong varieties such 
as Anxi tieguanyin (安溪铁观音) and Wuyi shuixian (武夷水仙). These 
merchants arrived in Singapore either to start branches of their families’ 
tea businesses from Fujian or to establish new companies to import, re-
process, and re-export teas.
Before 1949, the National Government of the Kuomintang (KMT) 
played a negligible role in promoting Fujian tea overseas. It was left to 
the Chinese merchants in Fujian to seek new markets in Southeast Asia 
as Chinese tea exports to Western Europe, North America and Japan 
declined (Buck 1997: 9). Southeast Asia was the last place they looked, 
but their work was made easier by the Chinese community, which was 
eager to consume home-grown tea. However, cracks in the networks 
began to appear from the 1930s onwards. Political events in China 
after 1949 eventually brought these networks to an abrupt end in 1960. 
Although the Communist government had tried to promote Fujian tea, 
it was determined that trade should be conducted on the political leader-
ship’s own terms.
Expanding the business network
Since 1819, Chinese merchants in Singapore had imported tea from 
China as part of a British colony involved with the entrepot trade. How-
ever, they were usually classified as ‘general merchants’ because tea was 
only one among many commodities imported. This situation changed 
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in the early 20th century with the arrival of new merchants from Anxi 
County (安溪县), a tea-growing region in Fujian province, who special-
ised in the sale of tea in Singapore. The first Anxi merchant to arrive 
was Koh Beng Jin (高铭壬), who started Koh Beng Huat Tea Merchant 
(高铭发茶庄) in 1905 (the Singapore Ann Kway Association 1974: 357). 
This firm was the first tea re-processor in Singapore. It would import 
tea from China, wither the tea to remove excess moisture, mix it with 
other teas, and then sell the product under a trademark label registered 
in Singapore. Subsequent tea merchants in Singapore from Anxi would 
conduct their trade in a similar manner.
Fujian tea production and trade had been on the verge of collapse by the 
time the Republic of China (ROC) was born in 1912. Rice, not tea, was the 
main crop for farmers in Fujian. Tea was grown only to supplement their 
income. Moreover, the farmers used traditional methods of growing, har-
vesting and processing tea (Lim 2010: 39-72). The merchants who bought 
tea from these farmers soon found that there was very little they could do 
to expand businesses in the province. The ROC was also in chaos with 
armies loyal to various warlords and the KMT fighting each other for con-
trol of the country. The government in Beijing and its rival in Guangzhou 
were not in a position to help the merchants promote the tea trade. With 
Japan, Taiwan (a Japanese colony since 1895), India and Ceylon all pro-
ducing and promoting their teas overseas, the merchants had only one 
area left to promote their products – Southeast Asia, especially the British 
territories of Malaya and Singapore. This was not surprising as, according 
to the 1921 census, about 74.5% of Singapore’s population was Chinese. 
Among the Chinese, about 43% were ‘Hokkien’ (in other words, people 
from southern Fujian and their descendants) (Nathan 1922: 18, 29 & 78).
New tea firms were opened in Singapore in the 1920s despite a trade 
depression that had forced many Chinese retail businesses to close 
(Choo 1976: 32-35). In 1920, Guan Cheong Bee Tea Merchant (源崇美茶
庄) was started by Gan Wei Hoon (颜惠芸). In 1925, Pek Kim Aw (白
金讴) started Pek Sin Choon Tea Merchant (高建发茶庄).1 An advertise-
ment in the Nanyang Siang Pau in February 1928 reported that a branch 
of Lim Kim Thye Tea Merchant (林金泰茶庄) had been officially opened 
in  Singapore by Lim See Kok and his nephew Lim Keng Lian (林庆年) 
(Nanyang Siang Pau, 2 February 1928). Gan, Pek and the two Lims were 
all from Anxi County. These firms were “small ventures started by enter-
prising immigrants who provided goods and services required by the 
local population and could build or sustain a clientele base” (Loh 2004: 
64). This base ensured that these firms survived a number of economic 
crises. Firms in Singapore were often part of a Fujian-Singapore busi-
ness  network. Chip Hong Tea Merchant (集芳茶庄), for instance, was 
a Chinese firm in Singapore with a factory in Anxi.2 Koh Kian Huat Tea 
Merchant (高建发茶庄) managed three factories in Anxi in 1939.3 Guan 
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Cheong Bee Tea Merchant owned a factory at Zhangzhou and another 
in Anxi.4 Lim Kim Thye Tea Merchant was to be a major tea import/
export company in Singapore until the death of its proprietor Lim Keng 
Lian in 1968. Lim Keng Lian came from a family of tea merchants. His 
firm was opened in Xiamen in 1917 and sold tea harvested from the 
Wuyi  Mountains. The tea would be picked, processed and then exported. 
In 1925, the family decided to expand its business and open branches 
of Lim Kim Thye Tea Merchant in Southeast Asia. In 1927, Lim Keng 
Lian formally registered the Singapore branch of his family business. By 
December that year, the firm had eleven factories in Fujian province pro-
ducing and selling shuixian, Anxi tieguanyin and the expensive dahong-
pao (大红泡) teas  (Nanyang Siang Pau, 8 December 1927). Each year, 
the firm in Xiamen would also export about 53,300 pounds of wulong 
to its branches in Malaya and Singapore (Zhongguo Minzhu Jianguo-
hui Fujian Sheng Weiyuanhui & Fujian Sheng Gongshangye Lianhehui, 
volume 1, 1986: 185). Some firms, however, expanded their business in 
reverse. Guai Sin Kee Tea Merchant, for example, was founded in Sin-
gapore, and after  accumulating enough capital, the proprietor opened a 
branch in Xiamen (Yu 1991: 159).
The average annual tea crop harvested in China was about 160 pounds 
of leaves per acre (Ukers, volume 1, 1935: 302). Tea harvesting remained 
a family and/or community affair in Anxi. The dominance of particu-
lar families could be seen during the harvesting season. Although pick-
ing leaves was generally handled by the family members, regardless of 
sex or age, the merchants who owned the tea gardens often hired addi-
tional pickers from the village. The family of Wee Tiong Yew, for exam-
ple, who opened Guai Sin Kee Tea Merchant in Singapore in the 1930s, 
hired about four or five villagers to work in the tea gardens.5 The fam-
ily of Guai Lian Kee, who also worked in Guai Sin Kee Tea Merchant, 
owned large tracts of gardens and hired several dozen odd-job labour-
ers to pick the leaves. These labourers were farmers who owned smaller 
plots of land and would finish picking leaves from their own plants after 
one or two days. With no other work in sight, they went to work for the 
Guai family as paid labourers. Guai estimated that up to sixty per cent 
of the farmers in Anxi picked leaves for other tea growers.6 The tea thus 
harvested would be processed and shipped to Singapore. Each year, the 
merchants in Singapore imported about 1,322,770 pounds of processed 
Fujian teas, mostly from Anxi County (Chen 1993: 43). As neither China 
nor Singapore kept official statistics on how much tea the Chinese mer-
chants in Singapore imported from China, an estimate has to be based 
on the amount imported by the merchants. Guai Sin Kee Tea Merchant 
imported 3,000 to 4,000 chests of tea per year in the 1930s. Since each 
chest weighed 18 kilogrammes, the annual import for Guai Sin Kee Tea 
 Merchant must have been 54,000 to 72,000 kilos.7
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In addition to supervising the harvesting of leaves from their own tea 
gardens, the merchants in Singapore would also return to China to pur-
chase as many different types of tea as possible and have them shipped to 
Singapore.8 They could be absent from Singapore for very long periods. 
Wei Jingzhe (魏静哲) went to Singapore for the second half of the year 
to settle accounts in Singapore, Malaya, Siam and the Dutch East Indies 
before returning to China early the next year in time for the  Chinese New 
Year celebrations; he would then not return until the second half of the 
following year.9 Chinese merchants in Singapore also conducted their 
import/export business with very loose standards of quality control. Some 
merchants used the tea processed by the Guai family in Anxi as the main 
standard because of the reputation the family enjoyed as manufacturers 
of good wulong tea. Merchants from Thailand, Malaya and Burma would 
flock to Anxi or Xiamen to compare their tea with that of the Guai family’s. 
Should these merchants’ tea be better than that of the Guais’, the merchants 
would ask for a higher selling price. In other words, the ‘standard’ of the 
tea was up to the tea merchants to decide.10 New challenges, however, were 
appearing over the horizon. The merchants had commenced new family 
businesses in Singapore throughout the 1920s, but their optimism about 
expanding their networks slowly evaporated from the late 1930s onwards. 
China became embroiled in military conflicts – eight years with Japan and 
another four years of civil war between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The final victory of the CCP in 1949 
brought even more problems for the overseas Chinese merchants.
The first crack in the network: export controls in China
When war broke out with Japan in 1937, the National Government in 
China saw the need to control external trade and currency exchange in 
order to finance the country’s war efforts (Chi 1980; He 1997: 40-53). 
Tea was a major Chinese export commodity, but much of costal China 
had fallen into the hands of the Japanese. In May 1938, Xiamen, the 
port where Fujian teas were exported to Singapore, fell, disrupting the 
Fujian-Singapore trade. The National Government ordered the Foreign 
Trade Commission (FTC) in the Ministry of Finance to formally exer-
cise control over tea exports. Xiamen could not be used as a port for the 
Fujian-Singapore tea trade and the FTC shifted its operations to British-
held Hong Kong. Merchants had to obtain a ‘foreign exchange certifi-
cate’ issued by the Fu Hua Trading Company – the subsidiary of the FTC 
based in Hong Kong – to be allowed to export tea.11
Since the National Government made it compulsory for the mer-
chants to export tea from Hong Kong, the merchants in Singapore felt 
compelled to respond to the new regulations. The Singapore Chinese 
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Tea Importers and Exporters Association (SCTIEA), founded in 1928, 
decided to respond by expanding their business networks. No details of 
how and why they did this were recorded in the minutes of the SCTIEA, 
but an expanded network may have made ‘block purchases’ to create 
economies of scale. Furthermore, rather than limit themselves to their 
own parochial business interests in Singapore, the merchants began to 
contact other tea merchant associations in Southeast Asia. An association 
representing all Chinese merchants in the region was ideal since it could 
negotiate with both the National Government in Nanjing and the Fujian 
Provincial Government (FPG) in Fuzhou. In 1939, the SCTIEA discussed 
the feasibility of creating an organisation that would be a single voice 
for the merchants in Singapore, Malaya, Burma, French Indochina and 
Siam: the “Federation of Overseas Chinese Tea Merchants in the British, 
French and Siamese Territories” (英法暹三属华侨茶商联合会).12 This 
proposal remained an ideal as the merchants were naïve, underestimat-
ing the difficulty of setting up an organisation that cut across territorial 
boundaries. They would have to work with the regimes in the different 
territories of Southeast Asia at a time when anti-Chinese policies were 
introduced and when the region had only just recovered from the effects 
of the Great Depression. Since the reign of King Vajiravudh (1910-1925), 
the Siamese had shown a disdain for a people considered to be the “Jews 
of the Orient” (Vella 1978: 193-194) within their borders and the French 
aimed to reduce Chinese business influence in Indochina. With the end 
of the Great Depression, the governments in Malaya and Siam introduced 
greater regulation of their economies (Chen 1978: 264 & 270; Tay 1962: 
35). The difficulty of setting up such an organisation made the SCTIEA 
aware of the political and economic situation around Singapore, and a 
year later, it scaled down its proposal and put forward the possibility of 
setting up a “Malaya Tea Company” (马来亚茶叶公司).13
Despite the greater feasibility of this plan for purchasing Fujian tea 
on behalf of all Chinese merchants in Malaya and Singapore, it was 
never discussed again in the meetings of the SCTIEA, as war loomed 
closer. Exhibiting overseas Chinese nationalism targeting Japan was 
more appealing than planning regional business deals. Drinking tea 
had become a symbol of patriotic behaviour by the Chinese community 
and the merchants had to show that they were promoting Fujian tea as a 
Chinese ‘national product’ (Lim 2008). The roots of the ‘national prod-
ucts’ movement lay in China in 1928; the promotion and sale of Chinese 
goods were regarded as patriotic because money accruing from the trans-
actions was returned to China. ‘National products’ exhibitions had been 
organized in Singapore in 1932, 1935 and 1936 and the tea merchants 
had participated in them. The merchants were also expected to exhibit 
their patriotism by boycotting Taiwan tea (including the famed ‘Formosa 
Oolong’) in their purchases, as Taiwan was a Japanese colony.14
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Unfortunately, tea export controls by the National Government badly 
affected the merchants’ business network, at least until the end of the 
war in 1945. The supply of tea for the merchants in Singapore was no 
longer assured. Businesses suffered even more when the National Gov-
ernment insisted that the merchants must comply with new regulations 
introduced on 15 March 1940 that allowed the FPG to keep track of sales 
to ensure that tea was exported only to overseas Chinese merchants. The 
FPG monitored the sales so closely that merchants could not even carry 
small quantities of tea out of the province to distribute to their relatives or 
for personal consumption.15 In desperation, the merchants in Singapore, 
having failed to organise a single organisation of tea merchants in South-
east Asia or a company representing them in Malaya, appealed directly 
to the China National Tea Corporation (CNTC), an organisation founded 
by the National Government in 1937 to work on national tea production 
and trade.16 As if the merchants did not have enough troubles, the CNTC 
responded by drafting another set of regulations called the “Supervisory 
Plan for Settling Remittances from Tea Exports to the Overseas Chinese” 
(侨销茶叶结汇出口鉴定办法) in November 1940. The merchants now 
had to register their firms with the Chinese Consulate in Singapore.17 
These additional measures were strictly applied to any merchant who 
had purchased tea from Fujian, Guangdong and Yunnan provinces, who 
owned a factory to process such tea, or who had opened an overseas 
branch of the firm. The measures introduced by the National Govern-
ment to control tea exports continued to be a major source of concern for 
the merchants until war broke out in the Pacific in December 1941. By 
the time the British surrendered Singapore to the Japanese in February 
1942, the tea merchants had begun to cease business operations. Some 
firms even remained closed throughout the three-and-a-half years of the 
Japanese occupation of Singapore.
Another crack in the networks: rivalry from Taiwan tea
The end of World War II in September 1945 brought a new challenge 
for the merchants in Singapore. Contacts with their families, friends 
and business partners had been re-established and there was a hope that 
the old pre-war business networks could be revived and expanded. Trade 
routes re-opened in 1946 and there was a steady increase in the demand 
for tea.18 Yet the war had a devastating effect on the Fujian tea industry. 
Tea plantations had been laid to waste. High overheads and transporta-
tion costs added to the problems. There appeared to be no hope for a 
revival of exports. A war-weary commentator wrote about how “it appears 
that shipments were effected solely to remind foreign customers that 
Fukien tea is still being grown” (Chen 1947: 270).
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Fujian tea now faced competition from another source: Taiwan. The 
return of Taiwan to the ROC in 1945 actually presented another challenge 
to the merchants in Singapore as both provinces processed and exported 
semi-fermented teas such as wulong to Southeast Asia. In October 1948, 
while Fujian exported about 10,000 chests of tea to the region, Taiwan had 
exported a million chests (Xiamen Shi Dang’an Ju & Xiamen Shi Dang’an 
Guan 1997: 74). Even more perplexing to the merchants was that Taiwan 
tea was cheaper. Should they forsake Fujian tea and use the cheaper Tai-
wan tea as a substitute for their trademark labels or should they remain 
loyal to their home province by continuing to import and sell Fujian tea?
The problem was magnified with the end of the civil war on mainland 
China. In December 1949, the KMT moved the seat of the National Gov-
ernment of the ROC to Taipei and most of Fujian province (including Anxi 
County) became part of the CCP-governed People’s Republic of China 
(PRC). Purchasing Taiwan tea could be misconstrued as a message to the 
PRC that the merchants were KMT loyalists. Several merchants such as 
Lim Keng Lian were indeed sympathetic to the KMT cause (Lim 2007: 
210-211) but, bearing in mind that Fujian tea was still consumed by Fujian 
immigrants in Singapore, it might be detrimental to their business inter-
ests if they were seen to be actively importing and selling Taiwan tea in 
place of Fujian tea. The end of the civil war also saw both the ROC and the 
PRC wooing the merchants for continuation of the tea trade even though 
the continuous rise in Fujian tea prices made the cheaper Taiwan tea an 
obvious alternative. The price difference could be substantial. In June 1950, 
the SCTIEA noted that while Wuyi Qizhong tea (武夷奇种茶) from Fujian 
cost S$ 36 per catty, Taiwan Nankang tea (台湾南港茶) imported through 
Hong Kong cost about S$ 200 per picul (or S$ 2 per catty), although mem-
bers had to factor in foreign exchange rates in Taiwan and export fees in 
Hong Kong.19
The picture became clearer to the merchants as the years passed. 
Whereas in 1949 the merchants found the price of Fujian tea to be too 
high, they knew by the mid-1950s that there had been a shortfall in tea pro-
duction in the province since 1949. The Fujian wulong tea trade registered 
a shortfall in 1956, but the continued importance of Anxi for the produc-
tion of wulong tea was evident as this county alone produced almost 83% of 
the entire provincial output. While the shortfall in production was a source 
of concern for the Department of Agriculture in the Jinjiang Prefectural 
Commissioner’s Office, it noted the advantage that Fujian enjoyed as it 
faced no competition from Taiwan in the production and export of high-
grade wulong. The Department proposed that Anxi County should export 
more tieguanyin since a huge overseas demand was expected.20
The merchants in Singapore also accepted the claim put forward 
by the China Tea Company (CTC) – formed in November 1949 to 
 co-ordinate tea production in China – that higher prices meant better 
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quality teas. The new assertion was made at a crucial time, coming 
barely a week after the merchants had been assured of favourable 
exchange rates from  Taiwan. In July 1957, the SCTIEA was one of three 
organisations invited by the KMT Government to join an official trade 
mission from Malaya and Singapore to Taiwan. In that same month, 
the Xiamen branch of the CTC informed the merchants that Fujian tea 
prices had increased again, but claimed that the improvement in the 
quality of exports had led to higher production costs for the farmers. 
This resulted in an increase in the price of exports with the prices of 
low-grade teas increasing by as much as 30 per cent, while prices of 
high-grade teas rose by 25 per cent (Nanyang Siang Pau, 24 July 1957). 
During an official visit to Taiwan, members of the SCTIEA had met 
Taiwanese tea producers and merchants to discuss the possibility of 
enhancing trade relations (Lim 2007: 211). Not long after the mission 
returned home, the Xiamen branch of the CTC sent free samples of 
wulong to the merchants.
In reality the purchase of tea was more a matter of taste than related to 
production methods. In 1958, the best tea from Taiwan – ‘Biao Zhun Dui’ 
tea – cost S$ 1.50 per catty, which was equivalent to the price of  third-grade 
wulong from China. Tieguanyin from Fujian cost S$ 12 per catty, but the 
price difference was now accepted by merchants in  Singapore as evi-
dence that the quality of China tea was better than that of Taiwan tea.21 
Yet, the merchants continued to wait for the prices of Fujian tea to fall. In 
October that year, the Nanyang Siang Pau finally reported that the price of 
China teas in 1958 had fallen by 13 per cent.22 This was the first time in a 
long while that the merchants in Singapore had any good news concern-
ing tea prices. The merchants did not equate falling prices as a sign that 
the quality of tea might have dropped.
The final straw: the new political agenda in China
Most pre-war firms in Fujian continued with ‘business as usual’ in the 
early years of the Communist regime. Private businesses were encour-
aged to continue trading with overseas Chinese enterprises to get for-
eign currency (Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Yuan & Zhongyang Dang’an 
Guan 1991: 618). The production of tea for Southeast Asia continued 
much as before (Zhongguo Chaye Gufen Youxian Gongsi &  Zhonghua 
Charen Lianyihui 2001: 223). However, the first years after the  victory of 
the CCP in 1949 were difficult ones for the tea merchants in  Singapore. 
Their trade was cut off by both the Central People’s Government in 
 Beijing, who were suspicious of private enterprise and by the ROC Navy, 
which was blockading the Chinese coast. There was every possibility that 
the merchants might lose their tea gardens and family businesses. This 
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would have a significant impact on their business networks, because 
their supply of tea could be suddenly cut off, reducing their business 
to just retail outlets in Singapore (and across Southeast Asia if they had 
any). It did not help that merchants were victimised by the land reform 
programme introduced by the CCP. A renowned firm in Fujian such 
as Zhang Yuan Mei Tea Merchant (张元美茶庄), founded in 1918 in 
Anxi with branches in Xiamen, Zhangzhou, Hong Kong, Rangoon and 
Guangzhou, had their tea gardens in Anxi and the Wuyi Mountains 
confiscated and redistributed to the tea farmers by 1950 (Zhang 1997: 
221). The importance of this would not be missed by the merchants in 
Singapore.
Over the next few years, the merchants in Singapore all suffered in 
some way as their business networks slowly crumbled. Despite having 
capital assets of C$ 200,000 and another C$ 200,000 invested in Xia-
men from branches in Southeast Asia, Lim Kim Thye Tea Merchant 
closed its Xiamen office in 1949 (Lin 2004: 86). Guai Sin Kee Tea Mer-
chant also lost its gardens, a factory and the old head office in Xiamen 
to the Communist government in 1950. Its landed properties in Xiamen 
were all seized by the CCP, which went on to accuse the firm of being ‘big 
landlords’ (大地主).23 Wei Jingzhe, the proprietor of Guai Sin Kee Tea 
Merchant, had to flee China after his family business assets were seized. 
He settled down in Singapore and his wife and children eventually joined 
him in 1956.24 Although the Central People’s Government later allowed 
the overseas Chinese to return home to cultivate wasteland for agricul-
ture, the official position was that they had to work towards a ‘socialist 
transformation’ of their private businesses (Hughes & Luard 1961: 20-22; 
Mao 1993: 75-78). In 1951, the ‘Five-Antis’ campaign targeted owners of 
private firms (Sun 1992: 79-82). It is not known how many tea merchants 
in Fujian were targeted as a consequence of the campaign. It is, however, 
known that, across China, many merchants were publicly humiliated, 
fined heavily or driven to suicide. Political pressure was imposed on the 
merchants to discredit them in public and subject them to state control 
(Hughes & Luard 1961: 90).
Nonetheless, by the late 1950s, the attitude of the overseas Chinese 
merchants towards the PRC had changed. They no longer believed that 
the KMT would recover the mainland; the Fujian-Singapore tea trade had 
to continue with the CCP administering the province. With the mainland 
under the CCP, each tea merchant felt safer to restart business opera-
tions, using Singapore as the nexus of a new business network. Their 
suspicions of the political agenda of the CCP, which included ‘socialis-
ing’ private enterprise, made them regard China now as a potential trad-
ing partner rather than their homeland (Huang 1995: 161-192). Despite 
the loss of political and cultural connections with Fujian, the merchants 
wanted to maintain economic and business links. This demonstrates 
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that “the maintenance of economic ties with China was mainly for per-
sonal economic gains rather than out of their burning desire to be of 
service to the motherland” (Goh 1987: 62). The merchants were prepared 
to ignore different political viewpoints in favour of economic realities. 
When  citizenship was introduced in 1957, the tea merchants applied to 
be Singapore citizens. There was no reason for them to return to a China 
where the government had seized landed property and now controlled 
tea production and trade.
After all, tea continued to be exported to Southeast Asia from Xia-
men – from 998,317 catties in 1950 it increased to 266,307 catties 
in 1952. In August 1953, out of 34 tea firms in Xiamen, at least eight 
exported tea to Singapore.25 It was under these circumstances that Koh 
Kian Huat Tea Merchant opened its first branch in post-1949 Xiamen 
in December 1953.26 The situation, however, changed for the worse by 
the end of 1953 with the announcement by the Central People’s Gov-
ernment that there was no place for private enterprises in China. Their 
work would be taken over by state enterprises and co-operatives. The 
CTC purchased all the tieguanyin produced by farmers in Anxi County 
and then sold the tea to the merchants in a bid to ‘replace the free mar-
ket’.27 The tea industry was now a state enterprise but the commodity 
continued to be sold in small packages like before, with 50 different 
brand names of Fujian tea. Exports of wulong tea exceeded the 1936 
peak level by thirty-five per cent in 1957 and were mainly exported to 
‘capitalist countries’ such as Burma, Malaya, the Philippines, Borneo 
and Canada (Fujian Ribao, 7 March 1957). In 1956, a government cam-
paign absorbed private businesses into new ‘joint state-private enter-
prises’ as part of a programme to enforce state control over trading 
activities (Hughes & Luard 1961: 94-95). State enterprises in China 
increased from 19.1 per cent of all firms in 1952 to 33.2 per cent in 
1957; co-operatives also increased from 1.5 per cent to 56.4 per cent in 
the same years. Conversely, sole proprietorships fell from 71.8 per cent 
in 1952 to a mere 2.8 per cent in 1957 (Xie & Luo 1990: 9). With Fujian 
tea production and export now under state control, the merchants in 
Singapore found it difficult to get a continual supply of tea – they had 
lost their personal contacts with the end of private enterprise and the 
state had decided that the commodity should also be exported to other 
countries.
The end of the business networks
The increasing awareness of the PRC as a potential trading partner in 
Fujian tea did not improve matters for the merchants in Singapore. 
Their business networks also suddenly came to an end. In January 1959, 
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the manager of a Taiwanese tea firm was introduced to the SCTIEA. 
He urged members of the association to continue purchasing Taiwan 
tea. He reiterated that Taiwan tea was cheaper than tea exported from 
mainland China. Unfortunately, the members of the SCTIEA were 
unimpressed by his appeal because the prices of Fujian tea were falling 
even before he arrived in Singapore. Some of the members became even 
less impressed when they noted the low sales of Taiwan teas in South-
east Asia. This reinforced their belief that Taiwan tea was inferior.28 In 
June, members of the SCTIEA were shown nine boxes of tea samples – a 
gift from the CTC. This attempt to raise the stakes came at a time when 
Fujian tea exports to Singapore were decreasing just as Taiwan was try-
ing to increase its exports. In July, the ROC Government in Taiwan made 
‘strong efforts’ to export more tea to Malaya and  Singapore, apparently 
because of a decline in imports of China tea.29 Taiwan tea was shipped to 
Singapore via Hong Kong, and yet sold at prices about 10 per cent lower 
than China tea. While Taiwan tea was regarded as ‘generally inferior’ to 
China tea, Taiwan had offset this to some extent by making more special 
offers and introducing more varieties to the Singapore market.
The Taiwanese plan to export more tea to Singapore was matched, 
however, by a push from the PRC offering exclusive rights to particular 
Singapore merchants who sold Fujian tea. The Xiamen branch of the 
CTC offered three local tea firms – Koh Kian Huat, Kim Leng Thye and 
Guan Cheong Bee Tea Merchants – a deal whereby they could purchase 
all their Fujian tea from the Xiamen branch of the CTC. Unfortunately, 
this discussion had occurred without prior approval by other members 
of the SCTIEA, who understandably were upset. However, the CTC con-
tinued to send letters to Kim Leng Thye Tea Merchant, urging the for-
mation of a single company for trade in Fujian tea.30 The CTC wanted 
to trade with a single trading company rather than many individual 
firms in Singapore. It was also likely that the tea firms in Singapore had 
very little influence on the Fujian-Singapore trade by this time and they 
were forced by the CTC to organise a single trading company. Hia Huan 
Quee, proprietor of Tian Hiang Tea Merchant, recalled that the ‘Chinese 
authorities’ had imposed restrictions on the tea trade between China and 
Singapore. From now on trade would only be conducted by the ‘Chinese 
authorities’ with a single company in Singapore and the merchants were 
expected to purchase tea in bulk through this company from the ‘Chinese 
authorities’, who would take a one or two per cent commission from the 
merchants.31
With pressure from the CTC and fears that the Fujian-Singapore tea 
trade could be adversely affected, the merchants in Singapore decided to 
comply and Giam Kay Tea Company (Pte) Ltd was registered on 9 July 
1960.32 The proprietors of the member firms joined the Company as 
‘Singapore citizens’ and all trade in China was now in the hands of the 
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Central People’s Government. The tea firms in Singapore had to place 
their purchase orders to the CTC through Giam Kay (Singapore Ann 
Kway Association 1992: 174). After the tea arrived in Singapore, it was 
distributed to member tea firms for re-processing and packing in their 
trademarked packets.33
Conclusion: regional connections and business networks
Claudine Salmon once wrote that “we still know little about the regional 
networks formed by merchants of Chinese origin” because “they did not 
document their history, which they preferred to keep secret for under-
standable political reasons” (Salmon 2000: 329). While it would not be 
appropriate to generalise and assume that the experiences of the tea mer-
chants were similar to those of all Chinese merchants in Singapore, there 
was always the possibility that some merchants did experience the same 
process, as they observed the slow breaking up of their business net-
works and/or business empires. A merchant would open new businesses 
if there were opportunities for him/her to do so. However, whether the 
merchant could maintain and use the business contacts may be beyond 
his/her control.
Singapore enjoyed a unique position in history, being declared a 
free port when the British arrived in 1819 and remaining a port for the 
entrepot trade until full independence was achieved in 1965. This unique 
position made the island very attractive for trade, usually at the expense 
of other states, which were facing dire circumstances, both politically 
and economically. The business environment was also a major factor in 
drawing the merchants to Singapore to trade. In the case of the tea mer-
chants, the presence of large numbers of Chinese who consumed Fujian 
tea became the main pull factor. This was the impetus that brought tea 
merchants from Fujian – either seeking a better livelihood or merely in 
order to open new businesses – to come to Singapore in what came to be 
regarded as a good outlet for trade.
Yet, leaving China and starting a new business meant that for those 
involved in the China trade, the nexus of their business networks was 
China, not Singapore. They were at the mercy of regional and/or interna-
tional events that had an impact on China even though they were miles 
away in Singapore. With their status as ‘overseas Chinese’, they were also 
tied politically with China as there was no such identity as  ‘Singaporean’. 
When Japan became increasing belligerent towards China, the merchants 
felt justified in campaigning for Chinese goods such as tea to be labelled 
‘national products’ and boycotting Japanese and Taiwan teas as ‘enemy 
goods’. Their identity as ‘overseas Chinese’, however, also meant subject-
ing themselves to the government of the day in China. When the National 
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Government introduced export controls in 1938, it was in response to the 
national concern that hard-earned currency could find its way to Japan 
and/or the Japanese puppet regimes of Wang Jingwei and the Emperor 
of Manchukuo. Export controls, however, affected the merchants’ busi-
ness networks badly. Would criticism of export controls by the merchants 
then be considered as an act of self-interest or anti-government protest in 
a time of war? The merchants had to tread the nationalistic ground very 
carefully, as their actions could be misconstrued as treacherous.
The end of the Chinese Civil War effectively marked the death knell 
for the tea merchants’ business networks. Cheaper Taiwan tea entered 
the market just as prices of Fujian tea soared. The situation in Fujian 
after 1949 brought new problems for the merchants, especially when 
the communists decided it was time to eradicate private enterprise and 
bring all the merchants under the control of state enterprises. None of 
the tea merchants in Singapore were known to have spoken out openly 
against this ‘socialist transformation’ of private enterprise in Fujian from 
the 1950s, but the new regulations on the conduct of trade in Fujian 
ultimately ruined their business networks. The merchants in Singapore 
lost their gardens to land reform schemes and their family’s assets in 
Fujian were seized. The merchants in Singapore now had to operate on 
their own. Throughout the 1950s, they tried to establish new networks by 
importing the cheaper Taiwan tea, but ultimately the appeal of Fujian tea 
drew them back to the negotiating table with the Chinese government. In 
1960, as the Chinese government insisted on trading with one company 
instead of several Chinese firms in Singapore, the Giam Kay Tea Com-
pany was established. With that, the ‘independence’ the tea merchants in 
Singapore had enjoyed as a result of their business network came to an 
abrupt end.
Despite the obvious regional connections in the Fujian-Singapore 
trade – through business networks – the merchants still need stabil-
ity in their personal lives. While trying their best to tackle these pre-
dicaments, the Chinese tea merchants in Singapore remained largely 
powerless as the root of their problems lay in China itself. They could 
not depend on their networks and their experience had taught them 
that they could not look to China for stability even though Fujian was 
central to their business interests. The answer was to adopt  Singapore 
citizenship when it was introduced in 1957. First, in an ironic twist 
of history, stability in the China trade could only be achieved if China 
did not remain the nexus of their business networks. As Singapore 
citizens, the merchants were freed from depending on their old net-
works for business stability. They could now purchase semi-fermented 
tea from Taiwan or green tea from Japan if they wanted to. The mer-
chants simply had to make Singapore the nexus of their business net-
works after 1957. Second, since the entire Fujian tea production and 
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trade became the responsibility of the CTC, the merchants knew they 
could not depend on their pre-1949 business networks as these had 
been effectively destroyed by the communists. The formation of the 
Giam Kay Tea Company (Pte) Ltd in 1960 confirmed their suspicions 
that the old networks could no longer be used for their trade. Sim-
ilar arrangements were made by the textile traders in Singapore in 
response to the call from China for a single textile trading company to 
trade with. It would be impossible to negotiate with the CTC or even 
Chinese government officials if they retained their status as ‘overseas 
Chinese’, a term which implied politically loyalty to the PRC. The KMT 
loyalists among the merchants also knew they would not be welcomed 
by the communists should they return to China. Calling themselves 
 Singaporeans was a way of ensuring their own protection and that of 
their business interests.
The pre-1949 Chinese business networks also morphed into a net-
work of regional connections after the mid-1950s. Before fighting 
began in the Pacific theatre of World War II in December 1941, the 
trade networks were based on the consumption patterns of their cli-
entele. The tea merchants from Fujian opened up new businesses in 
Singapore because of their belief that the large numbers of Fujian 
immigrants would consume Fujian tea. Their familiarity with the 
buying, selling and re-exporting of the commodity also put them at 
an advantage over tea merchants from other provinces in China. The 
Fujian tea merchants might not have moved to Singapore if a large 
section of the Chinese population was to consume, say, Zhejiang 
tea, since their knowledge of the production and selection of semi-
fermented teas from Fujian would then be useless. After 1949, the 
familiarity of a commodity was no longer what the merchants offered 
to their clientele. They were no longer loyal to a particular product – if 
another state or territory produced similar products, the merchants 
would attempt to purchase them. The Chinese in Singapore were still 
consuming Fujian tea in the 1950s even as the tea merchants were 
looking for cheaper alternatives from Taiwan. The merchants learned 
not to rely solely on the China trade as they sought new areas of pro-
duction and markets across East and Southeast Asia. Chinese control 
of the Fujian trade continued for the next two decades. It survived the 
Cultural Revolution and the death of Chairman Mao Zedong in China. 
When China finally opened its doors to the world for international 
trade in 1982, these controls ended and the merchants could once 
again trade freely with China.
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8 Rambutans in the Picture: 
Han Wai Toon and the Articulation  
of Space by the Overseas Chinese in Singapore1
Lai Chee Kien
Around eighty percent of the estimated 25-30 million overseas Chinese 
in 140 countries around the world live in the countries that comprise 
 Southeast Asia. (Wang 2005: 4) This large number is due to Southeast 
Asia’s proximity to China, with outmigration from its southern coastal 
areas commencing around the 16th century at a time when the region’s 
polities gradually became colonised or determined politically by  European 
powers. The ratio of overseas Chinese to other ethnic populations in the 
region’s nations has remained more or less constant through ensuing 
settlement, trade and social relations.
Up to now, scholarship on the space inhabited by the Chinese diaspora 
around the world has focused on sites of labour or enclaves known as 
‘Chinatowns’ and the socio-economic spheres and built environments 
created in the new host cities as hybrid renditions. The coalescing of con-
stitutive communities into a common ‘Chinese’ identity in those coun-
tries is an essential premise for such work. The overseas Chinese spaces 
or enclaves in Southeast Asia, however, need to be discussed differently 
from the Chinatowns of America, Australia or Europe because of their 
large populations, histories and spatial make-up.
The history of Singapore and its large ethnic Chinese population may 
be aligned along such a general narrative of diaspora in Southeast Asia. 
In this case, the British colonisers welcomed external populations in 
their colonies to drive imperial commerce and to compete and disrupt 
pre-existing local/regional economic patterns. From textual accounts, it 
is known that the human landscape soon after the establishment of the 
island’s free port in 1819 was cosmopolitan, but the exponential increase 
in immigration from Southern China and the immigrants’ eventual con-
trol of various spheres of influence would alter the island’s subsequent 
history. At the beginning of World War II, 43% of the population was 
registered as ethnically Chinese. This statistic is now about 75% and the 
Chinese are currently the majority ethnic category in censuses.
Chinese immigration to Singapore can be seen as a continual process 
since British colonisation in 1819. The first Chinese immigrants were 
mainly contract and indentured labour, but the communities grew and 
soon the need for schools to educate the locally-born was advanced. 
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This was perceived as vital in order to augment their social and economic 
positions as settler communities and as individuals. At the turn of the 
20th century, Chinese language newspapers and vernacular schools were 
established and this attracted more literate Chinese to the South Seas 
(南洋, Nanyang) to fill the various teaching and administrative positions. 
This new group of immigrants eventually became the key movers and 
leaders of diasporic cultural and literary spheres through their involve-
ment in newspapers and schools, as well as in the formation and stew-
ardship of business guilds, societies and institutions. From primary and 
secondary schools, other educational facilities would also be started, for 
example an art academy (the Nanyang Academy of Fine Arts) in 1938 and 
a Chinese language university (Nanyang University) in 1956.
In this chapter, I discuss and compare the various enclaves of a minor-
ity Chinese community in Singapore. I describe how the British colonial 
project was originally concentrated on the southern part of the island 
and trace the formation of the urban Hainanese enclave in relation to 
two areas of overseas Chinese settlement on either side of the Singapore 
River. I then follow the movements of one particular Hainanese immi-
grant from his arrival in the early part of the 20th century, his settlement 
in the urban enclave and then in the suburbs, before his return to China 
in the 1960s, after almost half a century of residence in Singapore. I 
also argue that botany and the engagements with plants and plant prod-
ucts were central to interpreting the literary, artistic and scholarly inter-
ests of the overseas Chinese and their acclimatisation to new conditions 
and milieus in the equatorial tropics. This gained potent intellectual and 
spatial expression in the Hainanese immigrant’s creation of a rambu-
tan orchard during the inter-war period. By discussing a commemorative 
painting of that orchard by a locally-born artist, I contrast the perceptions, 
attitudes and experiences of two generations of the overseas Chinese in 
Singapore, as well as the forms and tenors of their intellectual spaces.
Enclave formations and the Hainanese community
In Singapore, the categorisation of ethnic denominations was an attempt 
to map its diverse communities and also as a means of surveillance and 
control by British administrators. Besides glossing over the distinctions 
that existed between the different sub-ethnic communities, the use of 
simple categories such as ‘Indians’ and ‘Chinese’ for spatial division 
in the early colonial town plans subjugated the hegemonies among 
the  different settler groups and discounted the dynamic nature of such 
multi-ethnic communities.
It is recorded that a number of Chinese gambier farmers were already 
establishing plantations on the island under the aegis of descendents 
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of the Johor-Riau Empire in 1818. Thomas S. Raffles, acknowledged as 
the first British settler of colonial Singapore, altered its southern coastal 
landscapes soon after arrival in 1819 by creating a cantonment between 
two river systems. The European Town was located to the northwest of 
this cantonment and both were connected by four roads running parallel 
to the coast. The perpendicular road to the four, Middle Road, marked the 
midway line between the Sultan’s residential compounds and the canton-
ment at the Singapore River. Many institutions such as churches and 
schools are indeed located on the fringes of the government area today 
to mark the Europeans’ early settlement in the designated town area, but 
they were later displaced by Chinese and other ethnic groups for a num-
ber of reasons.
Chinese immigrants, perceived as ‘an industrious race’ and integral 
to the British enterprise, increased exponentially in number from 3,317 
in 1824 to 86,800 in 1881. This number was to double again in two dec-
ades by 1901. The immigrant sub-ethnic Chinese groups of the Hokkien, 
Teochew or Cantonese, had settled earlier along the south-western side 
of the Singapore River, leaving other sub-ethnic Chinese groups to settle 
within the European town. At that time, the Europeans were beginning 
to move to the interiors of the island cleared by Chinese gambier farm-
ers, dwell in bungalow houses within their plantations, and be distant 
from the city quarters and landscapes which were increasingly cramped 
by the mercantile and ‘servant’ populations.
In deference to the earlier settlement on the south-western side of 
the river, this later settlement at Middle Road was known colloquially by 
the overseas Chinese as ‘Siao Bo’ or ‘Small Town’ / ‘Lesser Town’ to its 
counterpart ‘Da Bo’ or ‘Big Town/Greater Town’ on the Singapore River. 
North Bridge Road and South Bridge Road, the two names of a continu-
ous street that connected the two ‘towns’ across the river, was acknowl-
edged as ‘First Street’ or ‘Big Street’. The parallel roads north of North 
Bridge Road in Siao Bo were sequentially numbered, with Short Street 
near Mount Sophia designated as ‘Seventh Street’.
At Siao Bo, the distances of the minority Chinese enclaves away from 
the Singapore River also suggested the sequence of their settlement: 
first the Hainanese, then the Hakka, followed by the Hokchia, Foochow 
and Henghua groups. Together with the ‘Malay’ groups (that included 
the Sultan’s families and retainers, the Arabs and the Bugis), Indian 
groups, and the Europeans who continued to reside in these areas, a truly 
 multi-ethnic and multi-religious landscape was established northeast of 
the original settlement area around the Singapore River.
Of the various Chinese sub-ethnic groups that occupied Siao Bo, the 
Hainanese community was the largest, although they were almost always 
only marginally larger than the next group, the Hakkas. They must have 
been the first of the minority Chinese groups to settle in this area as their 
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enclave is located immediately adjacent to the remaining European mon-
uments of churches, army camps and Raffles Hotel. The enclave, which 
extended from the sea shore along Beach Road, westwards towards the 
interior of the island up to North Bridge Road, had a docking area. The 
three streets that run perpendicular to these two roads: Middle Road (col-
loquially Hainan First Street), Purvis Street (Hainan Second Street) and 
Seah Street (Hainan Third Street) were used by the Hainanese and other 
Chinese communities to conceive the space of that enclave.
The first Hainanese settlers in Singapore probably arrived in the 1840s. 
As they were late on the scene and not located near the main godowns 
at the Singapore River, most of the early Hainanese settlers worked in 
the plantations or as sailors. Others were employed in the early service 
 industries and operated provision shops, ship-chandling and remittance 
services, small hotels and coffee shops. However, it was the food and bev-
erage businesses that would bring them most regional fame. For exam-
ple, Wong Gong Chan mastered a rice dish served with steamed chicken, 
which was made famous by his apprentice Mok Fu Swee through his res-
taurant ‘Swee Kee Chicken Rice’ and later ‘re-exported’ to Hainan Island 
and the East Asia as ‘Hainanese Chicken Rice’. A gin tonic called ‘The 
Singapore Sling’ was first created in 1915 by Ngiam Tong Boon, a bar-
tender at the Raffles Hotel.
The first Hainanese association and clan temple building was built 
in 1857, in three shophouses along nearby Malabar Street. In 1879, 
the association / temple was moved to its present location along Beach 
Road. There is evidence that the Hainanese were a closely-knitted society 
through the compulsory social practices and treatment of new migrants 
as well as the welfare provided for the community through the services 
and facilities near Beach Road. Besides the main association complex 
on Beach Road, there were numerous clan associations along the three 
main streets, which were differentiated not just by the various districts or 
villages on Hainan Island, but also in combination with clan surnames. 
Most of its residents, however, had all but moved out of the enclave by the 
1980s to other parts of the island.
The Island’s Interiors and its Manipulated Landscapes
As discussed above, the colonial conurbation that was Singapore Town 
was originally built on its southern edges between the two river mouths, 
but was eventually extended to the island’s northern, eastern and  western 
‘hinterlands.’ Even after World War II, the Rochore River and Canal 
served as the main town’s imagined northern boundary as the areas on 
its other bank were considered rural or countryside. We may sense the 
shape and speed of development by comparing early travel accounts. 
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Five years after the founding of Singapore in 1824, Munshi Abdullah 
needed eleven hours to reach an inland triad society living in the  jungle. 
In 1827, the Resident Councillor John Prince took five hours to walk 
from town to Bukit Timah (Blythe 1969: 47-48; Buckley 1984: 198). By 
the mid-19th century, four main roads – Bukit Timah, Thomson, Seran-
goon and Changi – had intersected the island to reach its northern and 
eastern areas, but in 1901 a bicycle journey from Cavenagh Road to the 
northern Kranji village still required an entire day (Brown 2007: 69-71).
Among other uses, the plantation of crops was designated to land 
areas on the fringes of Singapore Town or further afield. Crops such 
as sugar, cotton, nutmeg, taro, rice and coffee were experimented with, 
while the numerous gambier and pepper plantations increased in num-
ber in the northern areas, financed by merchants in the Town. Within 
a decade or so, the gambier and pepper plantations had expanded to 
Johore across the straits, and subsequently the kangchu (river lord) 
 system that was managed by mainly Teochews became formalised by 
the 1830s with the Johore rulers. Such plantations in Singapore, which 
averaged 20 to 50 acres in size, employed shifting cultivation that led to 
the clearing of large tracts of land, denuding them of jungle trees and 
plants, as well as causing soil exhaustion (Jackson 1968: 9-24; Pitt 1987: 
195-6; Trocki 2007: 104-110). Road construction to these plantations 
from the mid-19th century onwards and the enforcement of land tenure 
and quit rents for these estates exacerbated the rapid formation of vil-
lages and plantations within the island’s interior, creating  peri-urban or 
 semi-rural landscapes.
The plantation history of Singapore may be located within larger 
histories of resource acquisition and development projects elsewhere 
in the world. In the western hemisphere, colonial expansion begin-
ning in the 16th century inscribed the world through the production of 
maps and ethnographic data, which systematically rationalised the land 
forms, peoples, as well as the flora and fauna encountered for the impe-
rial cause. The Judeo-Christian belief in dictating and subordinating 
nature – founded on enlightenment ideals, imperial frameworks and 
scientific rationality – led to inscribing and controlling nature in these 
new ‘frontier’ lands. In the colonies, landscapes were reconfigured and 
demarcated for crop cultivation and mineral extraction to fuel colonial 
economies.
In Raffles’ 1822 town plan, the defensive advantages of a hill over-
looking the indigenous settlement and anchorage areas of the  Singapore 
River was recognised and he duly commissioned a hilltop fort for 
 military surveillance while ‘natives’ were displaced from the plains. A 
contiguous artificial landscape strip in this area was established, stretch-
ing from the sea shore to the closest inland hill, comprising an open, 
manicured square protected by a battery wall and Fort Fullerton, the 
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botanical and experimental gardens in between, and Fort Canning on 
Bukit Larangan (Forbidden Hill). The three man-made landscape com-
ponents conspicuously displayed to the indigenous settlers how nature 
itself could be subjugated and manipulated to form a flattened field (the 
Padang), a garden for experimentation on trees and plants, and defen-
sive arrangements on a hill. The construction of buildings on this arti-
ficial conurbation was highly selective, including a church, court house 
and government offices between the square and gardens, and the resi-
dence of its ‘founder’ on the hill.
From the Cantonment, the formal Padang space was inflected and 
copied elsewhere in Singapore. Colonial governments dispersed smaller-
scale open spaces in cities as part of infrastructural works for articulation 
and control of its various constituencies and enterprises. For example, 
a string of intermittent open areas were designated as greens or play-
grounds that punctuated coastal settlements on both sides of the main 
Padang in Singapore. These became the secondary ‘necklace’ of cleared 
areas in congested and dense urban areas or ethnic enclaves that served 
as civic green or relief spaces for its urban populations.
Besides the colonial government, the locals were also responsible for 
creating some of the public spaces. Similar to the main colonial Padangs in 
layout and configuration, these served as corollary spaces that mimicked 
spatial power via arrangements of particular structures built around arti-
ficial fields to suggest socio-political hierarchy and alliance with colonial 
policies. Cheang Hong Lim, for example, donated three thousand dol-
lars to convert land adjacent to the Central Police Station and the Police 
Court Building into a public field in 1876 for games and recreation. The 
location of the existing open space was by no means accidental, as it was 
placed strategically next to the Central Police Station, the wharves and 
godowns at the Singapore River, and the sub-ethnic  ‘Chinese’ shophouse 
enclaves to its southwest.
As the island started its urban development, private estates were also 
formed with adjacent public gardens. In the mid-19th century, Hoo Ah 
Kay was a notable businessman whose own estate comprising “avenues, 
fruit orchard, hanging gardens, Dutch walks, dwarf bamboos and orange 
trees” was occasionally opened to the public. He also donated a  23-hectare 
land plot near the Tanglin area to form the revived Botanic Gardens 
(Thomson 1991: 308). The Alkaff family developed the Alkaff Lake Gar-
dens featuring verdant grounds, lakes and a Japanese garden and which 
was opened to the public for two decades from 1929. Elsewhere in the 
southwest, the Aw brothers of Aw Boon Haw and Aw Boon Par devel-
oped parts of their cliff-side estate in 1937 to create the Haw Par Gardens, 
comprising mainly figurines from Chinese folklore set amidst a garden 
so that the overseas Chinese public could appreciate aspects of ‘Chinese’ 
culture.
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Botany in literature, art and academic writing
The early literary works in Singapore and Malaya for overseas Chinese, 
which were understandably Sinocentric, were influenced by the ‘New 
Literature’ that emerged around the time of the May Fourth Movement. 
In the 1930s, a more vernacular form of poetry and prose emerged to 
express the consciousness of local subjects in Southeast Asia. The exist-
ence, intersection and negotiation of protagonists in political and socio-
cultural spheres took place in local places and settings, with climate and 
place adjustment as important backgrounds to the narratives. This was 
known as ‘Nanyang Chinese literature’ – a term that specifically referred 
to work from Singapore and peninsular Malaya, by then acknowledged as 
its mature production centres.
Themes such as coming to terms with colonial society, bearings in 
relation to China and the new locales, and inter-ethnic identities would 
figure prominently in such work. The development of such a genre in 
the 20th century corresponded with the progressive clarification and 
adoption of subject identities as Nanyang or overseas Chinese instead of 
labour or soujourners in their host country, or indeed as erstwhile ‘main-
land Chinese.’ Such consciousness could be found not only in literature 
but also in other creative forms during that time, such as everyday lan-
guage which incorporated expressions influenced by the Malay patois.
Botany played a role in imagining the spaces of Nanyang Chinese in 
literature as metonymic or metaphoric connotations. For example, the 
rubber tree and the rubber plantation were leitmotifs for colonial occupa-
tion and exploitation, while the trope of Chinese or native females being 
raped in these plantations was used to symbolise the malfeasances of 
imperialism and capitalism (Wong 2001: 121-133). The tenor and feel 
of the tropics is eventually captured in the common literary expression 
‘jiao feng ye yu’ [蕉风椰雨], which roughly translates as “winds through 
banana groves and rain-drenched coconut trees.” Many plants and their 
fruits and products similarly became metaphors for contexts, settings and 
local conditions. Both ‘banana’ and ‘coconut’ became banners for literary 
supplements: Jiao Feng [蕉风] is a literary magazine started in 1955 and 
still in circulation, while Ye Lin [椰林] – a column in  Singapore’s earliest 
Chinese newspaper Lat Pao for literary works – ran for three years begin-
ning in 1928.
As an example of literature employing tropical fruit tropes to suggest 
acclimatisation that continued even after World War II, we may examine 
the writings of Liu Yichang, a newspaper journalist originally based in 
Hong Kong. Liu lived in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur in the 1960s and his 
articles and verses filled many newspaper columns and –  eventually – also 
novels. Describing local scenes, Liu, who was seemingly  self-Orientalist, 
waxed lyrical about observed kampong or rural life, in which imagery of 
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tropical fruit and vegetation abounded alongside that of fighting fish, sun-
sets and Malay women, etc. In 1972, Liu wrote the novella Intersection or 
‘Dui Dao,’ [劉以鬯, 對倒], on which the Wong Kar-wai movie In the Mood 
for Love was later based. The work was seemingly semi-autobiographical, 
as the lead character in the novella and subsequent film was also a jour-
nalist in 1960s Singapore. In both novella and film, the act of consuming 
fruit became synonymous with acclimatisation in Singapore:
It was the second week after his arrival in Singapore. He had gone 
into the outlying areas to visit a relative whose family managed 
a farm. He saw many durian trees there and heard stories about 
the fruit. They told him that the durian was the king of fruits: new 
immigrants who found a taste for it would never return to China.
The attenuation and acclimatisation of the local in creative realms 
through familiarisation or ingestion of fruits can also be found in art. 
One form that suggested attempts at coming to terms with the everyday 
was the medium of still life painting. In Norman Bryson’s seminal work 
Looking at the Overlooked, Charles Sterling’s distinctions between the two 
categories of ‘megalography’ and ‘rhopography’ were used to examine the 
relationships between depictions of ‘grander’ subject matter and those 
that were small or trivial. Bryson felt that the concept of rhopography 
was most applicable to still life painting because it extolled the famil-
iar, feminine, personal and domestic in such work rather than the grand 
and heroic. The framed canvases through which the subjects are brought 
into focus and excluded from their surroundings by the artist are rhopo-
graphic modes for the viewer, making such landscapes feel legible, famil-
iar, almost every-day.
Immigrant Chinese artists living in Singapore during the pre-war 
period began painting their new environments as a way of making sense 
of their new habitats and day-to-day life in the tropics. Painting tropical 
fruits became common practice for such artists in Southeast Asia, per-
haps being construed as a way to domesticate life in the tropical climates 
far away from their former milieus in southern China or Europe. They 
make strange fruit familiar through depiction and inscription as well as 
eventual assimilation and ingestion. The act of painting still life is also 
perceived as a continuation of their artistic life in the west, albeit with 
substitute subjects, as fruits from the temperate climate were ‘replaced’ 
by local ones. All early-generation artists who arrived in Nanyang painted 
still life using tropical fruits. For example, we may observe how Georgette 
Chen and Liu Kang, artists now claimed as Singaporean, changed the 
subject matter of their still life paintings in their new setting. While in 
Paris, Chen painted oranges and apples in the 1930s, and her subjects 
subsequently became rambutans, mangoesteens and other fruits in the 
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1950s when she settled in Penang and then Singapore. Liu’s early still 
life paintings inscribed the sunflowers, bread and wine bottles of 1930s 
Paris, but this changed to bananas, rambutans and other local fruits after 
he returned to Singapore.
Scholastic digests and the Han Rambutan Orchard
This engagement with botany and flora by the overseas Chinese in 
Nanyang may also be detected in the publications of scholars. Up until 
that time, westerner-led academic scholarship was mainly published in 
museum journals as well as in the publications of the Malayan Branch 
of the Royal Asiatic Society, which was set up in Singapore in 1877. The 
journal of the society, known by its acronym JMBRAS, aimed to docu-
ment the land, including its flora and fauna as well as relevant South-
east Asian subjects such as archaeology, local cultures and indigenous 
peoples. During the inter-war years, the number of immigrant Chinese 
literati made it possible to establish a different academic space alongside 
the Royal Asiatic Society. The South Seas Society was set up in 1940 by 
a group of academics and newspaper editors, partly to extend emergent 
scholarship on the study of Nanyang topics by Chinese researchers, and 
partly to counterpoint the Eurocentric scholarship found in JMBRAS. 
The society soon published its own journal, the Journal of the South Seas 
Society (or JSSS), with similar academic objectives to JMBRAS, but with 
the major difference of framing research through Nanyang lenses and 
identities.
While JMBRAS gave equal emphasis and coverage to flora and fauna 
in its published articles, JSSS gave prominence to flora at the expense 
of fauna. In fact fauna was noticeably absent and flora became a regular 
feature in the published essays. Vol. 1 No. 1 featured the mango, and 
in subsequent issues the segments featured the jackfruit, mangoesteen, 
papaya, Chinese fig, coconut, pineapple, duku, langsat, breadfruit, sour-
sop, durian and the rambutan. The reason for this bias may be the pres-
ence of many contributors who were botanists such as Chang Li Chien 
[張禮千] and Han Wai Toon. The presence of flora but the absence of 
fauna may reflect the types of scholarship that interested the group, but 
perhaps also a focus on economic activities involving plant products.
Han Wai Toon [韩槐准, 1892-1970] was a founder-member of the South 
Seas Society and, as discussed below, his rambutan orchard was a location 
where academic scholarship and literary pursuits intersected with botany. 
Han arrived in Singapore in 1915 from Hainan Island in Southern China 
and, because he had only primary school education, worked as a rubber 
tapper and then at Medical Office (Shen Nong Medical Hall) dispensing 
chemicals and medicine. Through self-study, he became conversant with 
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subjects such as chemistry, archaeology, historical  geography, Taoist dei-
ties, ceramics, and botany,  contributing numerous articles to scholastic 
journals including the JSSS. He wrote one book in 1960: Ancient Export 
ware found in Nanyang [南洋遺留的中國古外銷陶瓷], and was the first 
to formalise authentication of Chinese porcelain and ceramics through 
chemical analyses of glazes (Hsü 1962).
Han’s life-long pursuit of learning from chemistry blossomed during 
his 47-year residence in Singapore. While in Hainan, his family business 
involved the chemical dyeing of fabrics and cloth. This was intensified in 
1916, when the British colonial government auctioned the  German-owned 
pharmaceutical practice known as ‘Medical Office’ in Singapore. Han 
was part of a group that bid successfully for the practice, subsequently 
named Shen Nong Medical Hall (see Figure 8.1). While he was employed 
there, he dedicated time to self-study: initially chemistry and developing 
photographs in the 1920s. When his interest in ceramics was kindled in 
1934, he devised methods for tracing their provenance by identifying the 
inorganic glazes and dyes and the date when they were imported from 
China, a process supplemented by examining other aspects such as the 
firing skills, clay quality, fineness of the glazes, firing heat, application 
skills and type of motifs. During the Japanese Occupation, he and a busi-
ness partner created the Hua Xia Chemical Supplies Company, based on 
these interests (Hsu 1962: 70; Han 1953: 329-331, Han 1960: 2).
Figure 8.1  Shen Nong Medical Hall at Bras Basah Road, now demolished  (courtesy 
of Koh Nguang How)
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The Han Rambutan Orchard
Han eventually moved out of the city and his orchard at Upper Thomson 
Road and its chief crop of around 200 rambutan trees was a source of 
income. The orchard also became a meeting place for key members of 
the South Seas Society as well as other notable contemporary person-
alities, especially when rambutans were in season each May. In March 
1962, he returned to China on the invitation of Beijing’s Palace Museum 
as a specialist consultant on export ware. He died there eight years later 
in 1970. The orchard was sold to other owners in 1962, converted into a 
chicken farm, and eventually evacuated when the state acquired the land.
While the orchard is now part of State Land, the space may be recon-
structed from descriptions and accounts by the author and its visitors, 
as well as contemporary visual representations. In his 1953 treatise on 
rambutan cultivation, Han recalled that he first purchased a piece of 
land in Mukim Sembawang in 1933 to experiment with planting chil-
lies, tobacco and rambutans, but had to vacate it as it was acquired for 
the construction of an airfield (Sembawang Air Base). In 1936, he pur-
chased two and a half acres of sloping land for seven hundred dollars in 
central Singapore (Mukim South Seletar) for his residence and for the 
specific purpose of agricultural experimentation. He was aware of the 
previous plantation histories of northern Singapore, firstly as gambier 
and pepper plantations and then as pineapple and rubber plantations. 
The growing of gambier and pepper would have depleted the humus and 
soil nutrients in those lands, but he determined that these could again 
be used for plantations by returning chemicals and nutrients to the soils 
(Han 1953: 28-9).
He cleared the site of all vegetation and roots, paying particular atten-
tion to the removal of grasses such as lallang. These were all burnt along 
with the surface soil to create plant ash. After careful site allocation for 
habitat structures, tree-hole locations about 35 to 40 feet apart were dug 
and a combination of plant ash and fertiliser deposited into them before 
selected rambutan saplings were planted. These required constant atten-
tion in the first few years, in particular the drainage of excess rainwater, 
the use of fertilisers and protection against infestation by insects (Han 
1953: 39-41). Descriptions of the resulting setting may be obtained from 
visitor accounts. Lian Shi Sheng notes:
Han Rambutan Orchard is situated on a slope. The rambutans are 
planted along the contoured terraces. Every tree has its immediate 
ground area raised on a mound of several inches high, with drainage 
maintained around them to allow for egress of excess water. Fallen 
flowers, leaves, branches and fruit are gathered beneath the tree for 
decomposition into fertiliser for the tree. The orchard is supplied 
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by natural spring water channelled through a piping system. The 
spring water is clear and tasty, with no need for detoxification or 
filtering, and provides a year-round, readily-available water source 
for the orchard’s uses. (Lian 1955: 103)
The ideal site conditions are confirmed by Marco Hsü, who wrote: “The 
bathroom is constructed at the base of the slope, and spring water col-
lected into a vat but excess water would flow out through drains. This 
arrangement is commodious and pleasant” (Hsü 1962: 37). Han’s orchard 
was visited by well-known literati and scholars, who consumed the fruit 
and left inscriptions or images (see Figure 8.2). Marco Hsü recounted 
that the Chinese artist Xu Bei Hong [徐悲鴻] had a Chinese painting of 
rambutans dedicated to Han, and fruit from that orchard was also used 
in a still life painting by Liu Sian Teck [劉先德]. Han appreciated an oil 
painting by Liu Kang [劉抗] with the background of Han’s repository 
of books and artefacts, shrine and its adjacent areas. In the work, Han 
is shown seated at a stone table, while two people are seen eating ramb-
utans behind him at another table. The imagined connection between 
the two locations of Southern China and Singapore may be observed in 
another still-life painting of rambutans by Huang Pao Fang [黄葆芳], 
who frequented Han’s orchard. Besides the rambutans in the painting – 
possibly products of the orchard itself – the inscribed captions, such as 
“Travelling three thousand li just to taste rambutans in May” are quoted 
from the celebrated writer Yu Dafu [郁達夫] who was known to have 
been a visitor as well. The three thousand li would mark the putative 
diasporic distance or proximity between China and Singapore.
Currently the best known spatial representation of the orchard is a 
work by the artist Lim Mu Hue, entitled “Han Rambutan Orchard” 
(Hsü 1962: 37). This was commissioned by many of Han’s friends, who 
wanted to commemorate their time at the orchard when he returned 
to China in 1962. Apart from his lengthy 1953 treatise published in the 
JSSS, the work was also the only visual illustration of Han’s methods of 
Figure 8.2  Han Wai Toon, Marco Hsü and guests at the Han Rambutan Orchard 
(image courtesy of the estate of Marco Hsü)
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ideal rambutan cultivation. Aspects of tree spacing, the articulation of 
landscape to allow for natural irrigation, and the placement of human 
habitats within it can all be seen in the painting, along with the simple 
structures made of timber and corrugated aluminium panels that made 
up his house, a study and a shed containing artefacts.
Lim Mu Hue and Singapore’s changing landscapes
Lim Mu Hue [林木化, 1936-2008], who was born in inter-war Singapore, 
graduated from the Nanyang Academy of Fine Arts (NAFA) in 1955. He 
taught at the academy until 1969, and for the next five years served as an 
editor for the Chinese newspaper, Nanyang Siang Pau, before becoming 
a full-time artist. Although he had graduated with a diploma in Western 
Painting from NAFA, Lim was conversant with various artistic mediums 
including oil, ink pastel, and charcoal and became well-known for his 
woodcut prints and satirical cartoons. Beginning in 1956, his art works 
were exhibited in countless solo and group exhibitions. His essays and 
commentaries were also recorded in print, in newspapers and several 
 publications.
It should be noted that the period of Lim’s main production of art from 
the 1950s onwards coincided with the rapid reconfiguration and transfor-
mation of Singapore’s landscapes. Lim was educated in  Chinese-medium 
schools and then at the pioneer art school in Southeast Asia administered 
and staffed by diasporic Chinese. He considered the island his home and 
painted its landscapes incessantly, recording places such as Tanjong Rhu, 
Changi, Bedok, Jurong, Bukit Pasoh, as well as the Telok Blangah area 
where he eventually settled. In Lim’s woodcuts and thematic paintings, 
one can observe his attention to the details and exigencies of life. Paint-
ings of boatyards, kampongs, hill areas, and quarries give his oeuvre a 
documentary function as landscape portraits against the grain of Sin-
gapore’s instrumental physical and rapid development. In contrast, his 
other works depict landscape on a more expansive scale, capturing them 
on huge canvasses as if observed from a bird’s eye view.
As part of the emerging local Chinese-educated literati, Lim was often 
invited to Han’s rambutan orchard 81/2 miles along Upper Thomson 
Road together with art historian Marco Hsü [許鐘祜 or 瑪戈, Ma Ge]. 
Hsü urged Lim to consider seriously about painting a commemorative 
work of the plantation around 1961, a year before Han’s departure from 
Singapore. Lim had already started sketching parts of the orchard and, 
with the encouragement of Hsü and others, he meticulously detailed the 
site in charcoal studies with added purpose (see Figure 8.3). Three pre-
paratory drawings were made around 1964, two in ink and one in pencil, 
stitching together the entire site composed from all of his sketches into 
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one sweeping, panoramic construction. The final 1964 work in Chinese 
ink on sepia rice paper [xuan paper, 宣紙] measured six by four feet. 
The viewpoint is located as if in mid-air at a high vantage point above the 
orchard, looking down at its entirety on the ground. However, the neigh-
bouring areas of the orchard are not inscribed, accentuating focus on that 
space. Hsü subsequently noted that Lim had taken the liberty to remove 
some trees to emphasise the visibility of several key areas of the painting, 
but the depiction is otherwise accurate (Hsü 1967: 4).
In the final version, Lim put himself inside the painting, standing next 
to and conversing with Han in front of his house, with before them a 
large rattan basket brimming over with the harvested red fruit. Thirteen 
other human figures are interspersed at various locations in the painting, 
singly or in groups. These were Han’s family members and other visitors 
to the orchard (see Figure 8.4). The ground appears to have been altered 
and sculpted by human hands, as a gentle slope from background (Old 
Upper Thomson Road) to foreground (Upper Thomson Road). Several 
built structures that formed the Han family abode and kitchen, repository 
and study, a Tua Pek Kong shrine as well as a toilet and outdoor furniture, 
are placed along a horizontal line in the middle ground. The remaining 
middle and foreground of the painting is filled mainly with well-spaced 
rambutan trees, their roots and relative positions articulated as if tracing 
curved and diagonal lines along the contours of the landscape. The trees 
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are each raised on a mound of earth, with spots and clusters of red in the 
trees’ foliage indicating that the rambutans are in season, perhaps during 
the month of May. Other trees and shrubs such as coconut and banana 
trees are planted amidst the rambutan trees.
At the top band of the painting, six Chinese captions by different 
authors can be found, to be red from right to left. Lim inscribed the title of 
the painting, Han Rambutan Orchard [愚趣園圖], with a signature and 
Chinese seal. In prose and in verse, five other captions follow Lim in the 
following sequence: Marco Hsü, Wong Jai Ling, Chen Chong Swee, Tan 
Tee Chie, and Seah Yoon Hsia (translated). Wong, Chen and Tan – artists 
and colleagues of Lim at NAFA – describe and praise the work of Han 
and the space he had created. The commemorative nature of the paint-
ing is also noted in some of the captions. The dates are inscribed as 1965 
and the location is identified as Singapore, signed by the various writ-
ers and each imprinted with their personal seals after their  signature. In 
using such a painting format, Lim had invoked the tradition of Chinese 
landscape painting to imagine and inscribe the space of the rambutan 
orchard. The captions, signatures and seals are conventions of Chinese 
literati, even if they now reside and work in Singapore.
Living in the ‘rural North’, imagining China’s ‘South’
Han’s choice of living within and creating a hybrid plantation space may 
be interpreted in many ways. The most obvious would be to see the garden 
as a synecdoche or a ‘ya ji’ (雅集, commodious abode), a formalised spa-
tial type in Chinese landscape history. This is a site set amidst landscape 
where literati would gather for seasonal meetings for communal apprecia-
tion of poetry, painting, music, relics and artefacts, often accompanied by 
consumption of drink and food. This is a space for scholar gentry, exiled 
politicians or court officials, who may transpose their scholarly gaze and 
identities onto the landscapes into which they were cast. But such a space 
need not only be a retreat for humble scholars. As Craig Clunas has pointed 
out, there were also Chinese gardens in Suzhou during the Ming Dynasty 
planted with cash crops or fruits, and such gardens were also economic 
spaces despite their apparently verdant and poetic settings (Clunas 1996).
For precedents of the ya ji, we can perhaps best examine the 1087 
painting known as the “Elegant Gathering in the Western Garden” 
[李公麟, 西園雅集圖] by Li Kung-Lin, which depicted an assembly 
of sixteen notables in the Western Garden belonging to Wang Shen in 
Kaifeng. These included Su Shih [蘇軾 or 蘇東坡 (Su Dongpo)], his 
brother and the artist himself, with the group amusing themselves with 
poetry, painting, music and literary exposition. The painting, the activi-
ties depicted and the setting have since achieved such prominence that it 
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is now symbolic of literati activities and locations, even if other contem-
porary scholars have demonstrated that such a meeting with its protago-
nists never actually took place (Laing 1968: 426-7). Such gatherings or 
activities within landscape settings would, however, have been common 
occurrences, as can be read in other texts such as poetry and treatises. For 
example, Li Shih-chen the Ming dynasty physician who wrote Compen-
dium of Materia Medica [李時珍, 本草綱目] noted that lychee trees were 
the sites beneath which folks from all walks of life would gather during 
the fifth and sixth months of the lunar calendar, to savour ripe fruits and 
to appreciate the trees (Li 1994: 1797).
The citation of the Song Dynasty luminary Su Shih and the lychee 
fruit are important to the construction of the notational ya ji and subse-
quently as invoked identities by the literati who settled in Singapore. Su 
was an influential poet and essayist in Song Dynasty China. Formerly the 
brightest of the Northern Song administration, reforms led to multiple 
demotions and exile to the south in Lingnan (Huichou), 70 miles east 
of Canton in Guangdong province, and eventually to the southernmost 
point of China, on Hainan Island. This citation of Su and the lychee fruit 
was noted by visitors to the orchard, including Hsu Yun Tsiao (Hsu 1962: 
71, Hsu 1970: 38, and Han 2008: 332). Han himself had described his 
orchard in the following manner, seemingly along the lines of the ‘ya ji’:
After five years, the trees would provide much shade and fruit. 
When they ripen, the red rambutans would burst through the 
green foliage to create an alluring image of nature. One can 
indulge in such a scene till the sun returns west and the clouds dip 
past the hills. Wandering through the orchard, one could reach for 
the fruit and squat beneath the trees, and read Han Yu’s ‘Prelude 
to Seeing Li Yuan off to Pangu’ or recite Su Shih’s ‘Eating Lychees.’ 
This would really ‘leave a fragrance between the teeth and relax the 
mind.’ (Han 1953: 31)
The second reason for Han’s rural self-identity was perhaps to set himself 
apart from downtown Singapore, which was largely the space of other 
successful Chinese sub-ethnic groups associated with colonial enter-
prise. Han’s personal transformation from a labourer into a respected 
scholar was uncommon in colonial Singapore and even more so because 
of his insistence on the use of the Chinese and Malay languages. Like the 
Ming dynasty gardens, his move to the suburban plantation could offer 
a reclusive space to continue his scholastic practices and ‘cultivations,’ 
without sacrificing the means of economic sustenance through sales 
of his rambutans and other fruits. His juicy and well-grown rambutans 
fetched the best market prices in town each May and people who knew 
where the plantation was drove there to purchase the choice selections.
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Han’s movements across the island during his time in Singapore may, 
however, also be connected to the history of Hainanese diasporic spaces 
themselves. By 1885, the Hainanese were employed in pepper and gam-
bier plantations in the Nee Soon area at Kampong Heng Leh Peh and other 
areas, besides occupying the urban Hainanese enclave described earlier. 
The Shen Nong Medical Hall where Han learned western chemistry is 
situated along Bras Basah Road at the edge of the Hainanese enclave, but 
he later joined the ranks of Hainanese who moved to settle in other parts to 
the north of the city. Han’s orchard is sited near Lorong Pelita, the location 
of a large Hainanese enclave of chicken and pig farms, but physical ves-
tiges of this area as a settlement have since vanished (Wong 1987: 87-90).
Grafting plants, locales and identities
Lim’s painting of the orchard illustrated the innovative grafting method 
that Han had adapted for fruit trees. This was an improvised form of what 
is known as Inarch grafting in which roots and stems of different tree spe-
cies are planted adjacently and grafted together after a year to eventually 
form a single tree out of several tree roots. While in the early life of the tree, 
such a system of multiple stems had the advantage of providing structural 
support for the weak saplings, when fully grown the multi-hybridised tree 
produced up to five different types of rambutans, each with differing char-
acteristics and tastes on a single tree (see Figure 8.5). The various hybrids 
on the resultant tree are genetically strengthened and ‘weaker’ traits com-
pensated if they are then regrafted and replanted elsewhere (Han 1953: 33).
The choice of fruit and its hybridisation in his orchard may also 
be related to Han’s self-construction of social and cultural identities 
as  Southern Chinese. It must be pointed out that rambutans belong 
to the Sapindaceae family, of which there are four principal fruits: the 
Figure 8.5  A detail of Lim’s painting showing Han’s Inarch grafting method
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lychee, longan, pulasan and rambutan. While the longan and lychee are 
found mainly in subtropical regions, the pulasan and rambutan thrive 
only in the tropics (Groff 1921: 6). Early Sinic records of the rambutan 
fruit in Nanyang in fact mistakenly describe it as a form of the lychee 
fruit. Ma Huan’s Ming Dynasty work The Overall Survey of the Ocean’s 
Shores [馬歡,瀛涯勝覽] called it the ‘wild litchi’ and in Wu Qi-jun’s 1848 
work A Study of Plant Names and their Pictures [吴其浚, 植物名實圖考], 
they were referred to as ‘hairy lychees.’ Texts such as Wang Da-Hai’s 1791 
Anecdotes of Oceanic Islands [王大海, 海島逸志] liken both the colour 
and taste of rambutans to those of lychees (Ma 1970: 112, Yao 1984: 158-
159).
By his own admission, in his celebrated rambutan treatise, Han revealed 
that the choice of rambutans for his orchard was twofold. The first was 
again connected with his chemistry studies, as he was curious whether 
ammonium sulphate could be used as a fertiliser, and secondly because of 
the connection to lychees from Southern China. For him, this was a way 
to remember his erstwhile sub-tropical origins through the fruit’s surro-
gate or transferred identity. Han called this act a “foolish indulgence” and 
named his abode “the orchard of foolish indulgences” in Mandarin:
… I purchased two acres of land in Mukim South Seletar for 
residence as well as to plant rambutans: the Nanyang specialty 
which is from the same family and genus as the lychee. The fruit 
of good species of rambutans are not only delicious and delectable; 
when ripened they are such as lychees from the home country 
that we may appreciate and which serve to appease the soul. This 
is a primary pleasure a foolish person may pursue, and hence the 
orchard is named for my ‘foolish indulgences.’ (Han 1953: 82)
The invocation of the lychee in this case is not to adorn/construct a 
 Chinese identity, but specifically one of Southern China. The lychee is a 
sub-tropical evergreen that is found only in those regions and unable to 
survive in the colder climates of the temperate north. Of the many tales 
of northern China’s fascination with the fruit is that of Yang Guifei: a 
concubine so besotted with its aesthetic and curative properties that fresh 
lychees were ordered by royal decree to be brought from the south to 
the northern palace via relay stations for her consumption, at the cost of 
many lives of humans and horses, and at great court expense.
We may examine other textual productions by the orchard’s visitors to 
further discuss this identity connection Nanyang where rambutans are 
found between lychees and rambutans. In a poem by Hsu Yun Ts’iao, 
chief editor of JSSS, entitled Rhymes on Ten Famous Tropical Fruits – 
 Rambutan, Hsu proclaimed that “Lychees and rambutans belong to the 
same family, and Lingnan’s acclaim as the place for lychees should be 
shared with Nanyang where rambutans are found” [韶荔抗禮本同科… 
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不讓岭南獨頌坡]. Lingnan was a part of Southern China, and also a tex-
tual reference to the area’s most famous soujourner Su Shih, who was 
eventually exiled to Lingnan (Huichou) and Hainan Island. There, Su 
planted fruit tress of the lychee, orange and pomelo in his garden and 
wrote his most famous lychee poem Eating Lychees 「食荔枝」 that con-
cluded with the two lines: “Eating 300 lychees a day, I can be a resident 
of Lingnan” [日啖荔枝三百顆, 不辭長作嶺南人].
Back in the rambutan orchard, the overseas Chinese literati had a field 
day contemplating these lines and performing textual grafting of fruits, 
elements and places as if these were interchangeable. Huang Baofang sub-
stituted ‘lychee’ for ‘rambutan’ and ‘Lingnan’ for ‘Singapore’ in Su’s poem 
to read “Eating three hundred rambutans a day, I can be a person living in 
Singapore” [日啖毛丹三百顆, 不辞長作星洲人]. The renowned Chinese 
artist Xu Bei Hong, who was a close friend of Han, wrote the following 
dedication in a painting: “Eating a hundred rambutans a day, I don’t mind 
residing in the tropics” [日啖红毛丹百顆, 不妨長作炎方人]. Writing in 
1951, Lian Shi Sheng remarked how a Medan species of the rambutan 
grown in Han’s orchard produced a small seed within, its flesh akin to 
the lychees from Fuzhou (Lian 1951: 102). Thus, quite apart from textually 
substituting lychees with rambutans and Lingnan with  Singapore as tex-
tual and spatial ‘grafts,’ the orchard may have actually botanically hybrid-
ised the rambutan into a simulated likeness of the lychee fruit.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I discuss the construction of 20th century Chinese dias-
pora spaces in Singapore by delineating the urban enclave of the minor-
ity Hainanese sub-ethnic group and contrasting it with a space for literati 
created by one member of the immigrant Hainanese. I suggest that the 
Han Rambutan Orchard is a hybrid type of space that is non-urban and 
that its spatial form is unlike the plantations of the overseas Chinese or 
colonial British planters. I argue that the space is a textual chronotope 
that transferred imaginations of Chinese literary time and space, as well 
as the Chinese garden landscapes associated with that time and space. 
Once created, it availed a space for acclimatisation and imagination for its 
users to the tropics and to life in Singapore. Particular overseas  Chinese 
identities in Southeast Asia were also cultivated through the functions of 
this space as organised by its owner, Han Wai Toon.
I argue that engagements with tropical botany and botanical products 
played a significant role in this acclimatisation through their inscriptions 
in art, literature and academic scholarship. With their familiarisation and 
eventual ingestion, the ‘tropics’ are ‘consumed,’ internalised and made 
routine and quotidian. The creation of the Han Rambutan Orchard and 
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rambutan tree cultivation connected the spaces of Southern China and 
Singapore for the diasporic Chinese literati and intellectuals in Southeast 
Asia. Within this space, the rambutan (a tropical fruit) is considered to be 
a botanical substitute for the lychee (a sub-tropical fruit of the same fam-
ily), but also as an extant literary and locational connection to references 
associated with the fruit. Through the historical figure and poems of Su 
Shih, the imaginations of southern exile of the literati community were 
re-enacted by Han and his ‘elegant gathering’ of friends and acquaint-
ances, albeit in an area ‘further south’ than Hainan Island.
Han’s eventual return to China in 1962, despite the length of his soujo-
urn in Nanyang, reflected the latent call for his generation of immigrants 
to finally connect with the land of their birth. Besides his botanical and lit-
erary work, his eventual study of export ware permitted a connective bond 
with objects produced in China and provided a means for his ‘return.’ 
The departure of Han back to China occurred when  self-governance had 
been achieved in Singapore in 1959, but with the imminent prospect of 
a merger with Malaysia that would take place in 1963. Development was 
also encroaching on northern Singapore where he lived and worked. A 
new main road – Upper Thomson Road – was built next to his orchard 
and the Singapore Grand Prix was established in 1961 with a circuit that 
encircled his estate. This event brought large crowds and noisy vehicles 
to the otherwise tranquil surroundings of Lower Seletar one year before 
his departure.
In contrast to Han, we may observe the literary and art practices of Lim 
Mu Hue as those of Chinese literati born on the island who  harboured less 
imagined connections with China, despite being educated and immersed 
in its cultures and traditions in ‘the South Seas.’ Lim painted Singapore 
landscapes throughout his life, wrote essays and created  cartoons that 
dealt with life and situations on the island, and passed away there in 2008. 
His Han Rambutan Garden painting used the  formats and traditions of 
Chinese painting, but the treatment of its landscape spaces, elements and 
people are inflected by his ability to work in other art mediums, includ-
ing non-Chinese ones. From 1961 to 1964, Lim reconstructed an impor-
tant part of Singapore’s intellectual history and botanical  significance as 
a commemorative painting. This has permitted us to study the different 
generations of overseas Chinese communities, including Han and Lim, 
and to explore their complex self and group identities.
Note
1 The author would like to thank Mr. T.K. Sabapathy for the comments and suggestions 
he provided during the writing of this paper, the late Mr. Lim Mu Hue for first showing 
me an image of his painting entitled Han Rambutan Garden, and all friends who have 
contributed in one way or another to this paper’s eventual form.
Introduction
One of the major advances in scholarly writings about Southeast Asia in 
the past few decades has taken place in the study of ethnic riots (under 
the rubric of nation-state formation). From this perspective, episodes of 
mass violence involving two or more distinct ethnic groups are said to 
have been caused primarily by the ideological, structural, psychological, 
economic and social strains faced by local communities in their strug-
gles to preserve their cultural traditions and civil rights amidst regime 
transitions and rapid political change. While acknowledging the interplay 
of regional and global processes as precipitants of ethnic riots, scholars 
subscribing to such a paradigm have tended to give primacy to the roles 
of endogenous forces in the perpetuation of conflicts that were already 
brewing in Southeast Asian societies.
Despite being extensive and no less impactful, one visible shortcoming 
of this prevailing strand of scholarship has been a strong emphasis on 
searching for causes and motives, much to the neglect of the larger impli-
cations and effects of ethnic riots. The aftermath of ethnic riots is rarely 
if ever discussed, let alone examined systematically, but such studies are 
mainly concerned with post-conflict reconstruction, including localised 
attempts at reconciling feuding groups, state restoration of ravaged socie-
ties and the implementation of preventive measures through the recom-
mendations made by truth commissions. The picture that emerges from 
all of such studies of the aftermath of ethnic riots is that such conflicts 
have had little impact beyond their restricted settings. Put differently, the 
study of the aftermath of ethnic riots in Southeast Asia has been provin-
cialised, relegated to a localised world, and thus excluded from the wider 
connections and developments in the region and beyond.1
This essay takes a different approach. It seeks to provide an illustra-
tive example of the ways in which the study of ethnic riots and – by 
implication, Singapore’s past – could be reframed by initiating a shift 
away from the analysis of the causes, processes and conditions that 
led to the outbreak of mass violence towards the regional and global 
responses encountered and the attendant effects in the aftermath. At 
the centre of my analysis is the case of an ethnic riot that broke out 
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in colonial Singapore, more commonly known as the Maria Hertogh 
riots. This involved a legal tussle over a Dutch girl, who, after having 
been separated for more than seven years from her Dutch-Catholic 
parents and raised as a Muslim in a Malay family, faced a ruling by a 
British judge that she should be returned to the Netherlands. The riots 
that broke out from 11 to 13 December 1950, which pitched Muslims in 
 Singapore against Eurasians and Europeans on the island, have gen-
erated innumerable articles and books with varied interpretations and 
revisionist conclusions (Conceicao 2007; Firdaus 1985; Haja Maideen 
1989; Hughes 1980; Nordin 2005; Ramlah 2004 and Stockwell 1986). 
Nevertheless, like most studies of riots, pogroms and disorders in other 
parts of Southeast Asia, previous analyses of the Maria Hertogh riots 
were mainly concerned with narrating the events that up led to the out-
break of violence and the measures taken to halt it. The regional and 
global effects of the riots have received much less attention. There has 
been no comprehensive scrutiny of the variety of strategies that were 
employed by colonial states to deal with the various forms of resistance, 
the collaboration of local elites and the impact of these processes on 
local communities following the riots.
The perspective that I am offering here does not in any way imply 
that all episodes of ethnic riots in colonial and postcolonial Southeast 
Asia have had regional and global ramifications. On the contrary, this 
chapter aims to offer a new perspective that will enable historians to 
reconceptualise riots and other forms of collective violence beyond the 
confines of the locality and to incorporate regional and global processes 
into the historical narrative. Prasenjit Duara has described this method 
of analyzing the history of a country or region as ‘outside-in’. In his 
view, it is only when the local, the regional and the global are integrated 
and placed together within a singular analytical frame that we can grasp 
the meaning of events and ideas in their entirety (Duara 2009, 1). This 
is especially true in the colonies during the post-World War Two period. 
Episodes of mass violence and anti-colonial struggles seldom escape 
the watchful eye of the worldwide media and non-governmental organi-
sations that were able to transcend the constraints imposed by colonial 
regimes.
As a corollary to this, I find it useful to integrate Duara’s insights with 
those of Tony Ballantyne’s in my scrutiny of the aftermath of the Maria 
Hertogh riots in colonial Singapore. Drawing on the influential work 
of Eric R. Wolf, Ballantyne conceives the colonial empires as ‘bundles 
of relationships’ that were contingent on a composite interplay of local, 
regional and global human interactions and exchanges. It follows then 
that the British Empire is to be conceived as a complex web  “consisting 
of horizontal filaments that run among various colonies in addition to 
vertical connections between the metropole and individual colonies” 
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(Ballantyne 2003, 112-113; See also, Wolf 1982, 3-23). Although much 
both of Duara’s and Ballantyne’s discussions is confined to South and 
East Asian pasts, their insights could well be extended to understand-
ing historical change in colonial Southeast Asia. By employing ‘outside 
in’, ‘complex web’ and ‘bundles of relationships’ as lenses to analyze the 
aftermath of the Maria Hertogh riots, I will demonstrate that both the 
horizontal filaments and the vertical connections of the British Empire 
proved vital in ensuring that there were swift reactions to the protests of 
the various parties that were concerned with the riots and the legal con-
troversy. Paradoxically, in an age of decolonisation, the communication 
links and political networks established by the British also functioned as 
avenues of resistance and dissent for politicians in  newly-independent 
countries, as well as anti-colonial activists and news agencies in the 
colonies and in Britain itself. Some parallels could be drawn here with 
the postcolonial era which saw the advent of what many theorists has 
termed as the ‘global information society’. Knowledge and news have 
become easily available since the internet and disseminated in a more 
rapid pace than ever before, thereby challenging the sovereignty of 
states and governments.
This chapter begins with an exploration of the regional responses to 
this outbreak of mass violence. The word ‘regional’ here refers to cities 
and populations that reside in the areas closest to the island of Singapore, 
including the Malayan Peninsula and Indonesia. By virtue of geographi-
cal proximity and strong social bonds through ties of kinship as well as 
extra-familial relationships, the response to the riots was instantaneous 
and seemingly more dangerous in these places, when compared with 
other areas where Muslims were equally well informed about the events 
as they unfolded. I will then review the different types of responses from 
various communities, including protests, appeals and declarations from 
Muslims and non-Muslims in the Netherlands, Britain, Pakistan and 
Saudi Arabia. The final section of the chapter will analyse how the  British 
dealt with a variety of regional and global responses. Special emphasis 
will be given to the multifaceted strategies employed by the colonial 
administration in England and the colonies for the purpose of repairing 
their tarnished image and recovering their political legitimacy and public 
support, both at home and abroad.
Perils emanating from Southeast Asia
The most complex and yet spontaneous responses to the Maria Her-
togh riots came from Muslims in mainland Malaya, South Thailand and 
Indonesia. This is unsurprising, given the long historical and familial 
ties between Muslim communities in Singapore and their brethren in 
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other parts of Southeast Asia. Migratory flows in and out of Singapore 
following the re-establishment of British rule on the island had reinvig-
orated communicative networks and social ties that were broken during 
the Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1945. This, along with the con-
tinued lurid coverage of the Maria Hertogh case by Malay-Indonesian 
newspapers such as Indonesia Raya, Utusan Melayu and Melayu Raya 
had intensified Muslim disaffection and contributed, in some measure, 
to the heightening of political consciousness and social activism within 
the vibrant local population. Numerous editorial commentaries and 
reports emphasised the fact that Maria Hertogh had been deprived of 
the care of her foster mother and was coerced into accepting the Catho-
lic faith. The prominence given to Maria Hertogh’s fervent devotion to 
Islam (she had been renamed ‘Nadra’, meaning Special), together with 
her purported proficiency in the Malay vernacular rather than Dutch, 
was enough to convince Muslims in the region that the decision made 
by the British court to return her to the custody of her parents was a 
product of colonial bias towards Islam and Muslims in general (Melayu 
Raya, 21 December 1950).2
Among the various groups in mainland Malaya who were greatly 
affected by the events that unfolded in Singapore were the Muslim mem-
bers of the security forces. They were reported to be troubled by their 
commitment to defend the colonial state against the communists after 
having witnessed what they regarded as the unfair treatment of their 
co-religionists in the realm of colonial laws. The communists, predict-
ably, quickly capitalised on this state of affairs by attempting to widen the 
split between the colonial state and the uniformed security personnel. 
After more than two years of failed ideological campaigns after the dec-
laration of the Malayan Emergency in 1948, the communists had finally 
found a persuasive propaganda tool to claim that British policies were 
unfair to Muslims. A day after the quelling of the riots in Singapore, a 
group of communists distributed two propaganda pamphlets in Rom-
anised Malay, English and Chinese, highlighting jaundiced British atti-
tudes towards the local population. They called on Muslim policemen 
and soldiers to transform the Maria Hertogh case from a mere religious 
struggle into a political one, led by a communist party that was capable 
of fighting for the people. Two weeks later, an English edition of the com-
munist Freedom News was circulated, with an article entitled “Develop the 
fight against the Nadra decision into a wide struggle against the British 
Imperialists!” Posters calling for all races in Singapore to join together 
and resist the colonialists were displayed in public places in Singapore. 
Muslims and members of other communities were encouraged to join 
the ‘Anti-British Liberation Army’ in an armed struggle against colonial-
ism. Such propaganda quickly spread across various parts of the Malayan 
Peninsula in a drive to incite Muslim rage.3 
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In Kelantan, the voices that appealed for moderation were drowned 
out by a rapid escalation of anti-British feelings. Such sentiments were 
amplified by two radical groups. The first was a band of twenty young 
men in Kota Bahru who adopted the title Nikat (a Malay word which 
means ‘to engage in acts regardless of expected consequences’). Com-
manded by Ismail bin Mohamed Salleh, a clerk at a local hospital, the 
group’s objective was to kill selected Europeans who were involved in the 
Maria Hertogh case. Its supporters and sympathisers numbered eighty 
in all, one of the most prominent being Mustapha bin Mahmood, who 
was the brother-in-law of the Chief Minister of Kelantan. Another radi-
cal group originated from a small school outside Kota Bahru. Consisting 
largely of religious teachers and students who were financed by influ-
ential families within the state hierarchy, the main aim of this collective 
was to indoctrinate Malays in the nearby villages against the British, who 
they regarded as hostile to Islam. Although none of these groups actually 
initiated any violent acts, their aggressive outlook revealed the extent to 
which the Maria Hertogh case had radicalised some quarters within the 
Muslim community in Malaya. The same degree of hostility towards the 
British was observed in Johore. Members of invulnerable cults, triads 
and militant groups in this neighbouring Malay state were reported to 
have planned to enter Singapore and carry out violent campaigns on the 
island.4
Muslims in Penang and prominent members of the Malay aristocratic 
class disagreed with the radicals and came to the aid of the British by 
striving to allay suspicions and unhappiness among those who had been 
informed of the riots. In a widely-publicised declaration, Muslim elites 
in Penang appealed to their brethren in Malaya and Singapore to work 
towards the re-establishment of peace and harmony with other races. 
At the same time, they registered their despair over the arrest of Mus-
lim elites in Singapore and contributed large amounts of money to the 
 Singapore Muslim League for their legal expenses. Similarly, Sultan Abu 
Bakar of Pahang revealed his plans to organise visits and discussions 
with several influential Muslims in Singapore. He hoped to encourage 
patience and self-restraint, as well as to advocate that the Maria Hertogh 
legal controversy should not be viewed as a religious issue.5 Sultan Abu 
Bakar was not the only Malay ruler who worked to improve relations 
between Muslims and non-Muslims. In March 1952, the Sultan of Kedah 
decided to ban the screening and sale of a Hollywood film, David and 
Bathsheba, on the grounds that it “will create a religious controversy in 
the country” (Straits Budget, 13th March 1952). Since its release in Janu-
ary 1952, the film had incited protests from Muslims in Singapore and 
Malaya who had planned to use it as a catalyst to re-ignite Muslim  interest 
in the Maria Hertogh case. The main lines of objection voiced by the pro-
testers were that the film’s portrayal of King David committing adultery 
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was contrary to Quranic teachings, and that the screening of the film was 
a product of British insensitivity and indifference towards Islam.6
The fifty-five-year-old President of the United Malay Nationalist 
Organisation (UMNO), Dato Onn bin Jaafar, went beyond assuaging 
Muslim rage and such political moves contributed to a decline in popu-
lar support for him and the emergence of widespread criticism of his 
leadership. In a highly publicised statement, he remarked that “[n]ot 
only the administration but 80 per cent of Singapore residents lost con-
fidence in us because of the action of a comparative few.” He advised 
UMNO members to steer clear of destructive acts, which would dis-
rupt the notable efforts of Malays in governmental agencies. The peace 
and freedom of the country must be upheld and full support should be 
given to the British government in upholding peace and harmony in 
the country (Majlis, 26 February 1951; The Straits Times, 26 February 
1951). Both Muslim and non-Muslim elites in Malaya voiced their fun-
damental dissent with Dato Onn’s negative portrayal of Malays. A joint 
statement by the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), the Singapore 
Muslim League, the Hindu Board, and the Straits Chinese British Asso-
ciation (SCBA) argued that it was erroneous to place the entire blame 
on all members of the Malay community for the wrongdoings of oppor-
tunists and irresponsible people in the course of the riots. In fact, a 
majority of Malays in Singapore had displayed great courage by shelter-
ing Europeans and Eurasians who might otherwise have been mauled 
by the rioters (Utusan Melayu, 28 February 1951). The Qalam magazine 
singled out Dato Onn as a “lackey” in cahoots with the British with 
regard to the film and other issues concerning Islam. The President of 
UMNO was described as “mengutamakan maslahat dirinya sahaja (or 
concerned with his own interests and well-being)” (Qalam, Bilangan 
19, February, 1952).
Reflecting on the incident many years later, Tunku Abdul Rahman 
(Malaysia’s first Prime Minister) emphasised the fact that this was the 
occasion of one of his open disagreements with Dato Onn (Tunku 1977, 
190). The Tunku then mobilised selected UMNO members and gathered 
signatures for a petition on behalf of Muslim men who had been arrested 
following the riots. The strategy worked to his advantage. On 26 August 
1951, the Tunku was elected as the second President of UMNO, following 
the fall from favour and resignation of Dato Onn. Dubbed by Sir Henry 
Gurney (the British High Commissioner in Malaya) as the “hope of the 
Malayan peoples”, the straight-talking Dato Onn bin Jaafar had received 
the support of the colonial authorities in advocating a slow and methodi-
cal transition towards independence. By contrast, the British were per-
plexed by the Tunku’s political stances and manoeuvres. They viewed the 
48-year-old as an elusive figure who, despite his friendly disposition and 
close relationship with several prominent British officials, was pressing 
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for a rapid transfer of power to a Malay-led government in Malaya. To Sir 
Henry Gurney, the Tunku was far from being the “sort of leader who will 
be capable of holding UMNO together in any important controversy”; a 
prediction which turned out to be far from accurate.7
While the Tunku avoided stirring up Muslim feelings in such heated 
times, he was determined to protect the rights and interests of Malays 
and to garner support for his leadership and his party. He stressed repeat-
edly that UMNO should adopt non-violent means in campaigning for 
the release of convicted individuals and that UMNO members should 
maintain friendly relations with the British and other Europeans while 
avoiding the influence of ideologies that promoted violence. During his 
visit to Singapore in December 1951, which was hosted by the Singapore 
Branch of UMNO, the Tunku admonished the large audience that they 
should devise constructive ways to solve the social and economic prob-
lems faced by the Malay community. Rapid improvements and reform 
in the realm of education, according to the Tunku, were the crucial steps 
that had to be taken before the independence of Malaya could be formally 
declared. By the end of February 1952, the Tunku had obtained more than 
5,000 signatures on a petition against the death sentences, calling for the 
verdict to be reduced to imprisonment. He had played a decisive role in 
raising funds to aid the condemned men’s dependents and was present 
at every court proceeding to show his overt support for those who had 
been convicted.8
Religious teachers and ulama (Muslim scholars) in Malaya convened 
country-wide meetings to discuss various means by which Islamic laws 
and the rights of Muslims as colonial subjects could be safeguarded. 
Although they unanimously agreed that the Maria Hertogh controversy 
had far-reaching implications for the religious life of Muslims in South-
east Asia, major splits developed within the ranks of the Muslim laity 
with regard to the validity of Maria Hertogh’s marriage and her conver-
sion to Islam. For example, the mufti (a Muslim scholar who interprets 
Islamic laws) of Johor, registered his fundamental disagreement with the 
fatwa9 issued by the mufti of Selangor that kathis who were entrusted 
with the registration of marriages and the arbitration of marital disputes 
were not authorised to perform a marriage ceremony without the prior 
approval of the bride’s parents. This fatwa was used by the judges of the 
Singapore High Court to annul the marriage between Maria Hertogh and 
Mansoor Adabi (Nordin 1990, 335-357). Several landmark conferences 
and seminars were organised from 1951 to the end of 1953 to resolve such 
divergent interpretations of Islamic laws. In one of these sessions, a pro-
posal was mooted to the effect that a Muslim political organisation was to 
be formed and led by those who shared the aspirations of establishing an 
Islamic state modelled on Pakistan. In pursuit of this long-term objective, 
the Persatuan Islam Sa-Malaya (the Pan-Malayan Islamic Association) 
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was created in 1954 which, from the 1970s onwards, became commonly 
known as Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) (Farish 2004, 120).
If the responses of Muslims and non-Muslims in mainland Malaya 
were seen by the colonial government as threatening the legitimacy of 
their rule, developments in South Thailand and Indonesia had even 
more destabilising political implications. The ulama in South Thailand 
referred to the Hertogh case as a test by Allah and an admonition that 
divine laws should be preserved and not taken lightly. To them, the future 
course of the Muslim community in Singapore and the Federation of 
Malaya was highly dependent on the extent to which Muslims were will-
ing to struggle in the defence of Islam (Melayu Raya, 18 January 1951). 
During his meeting with the British ambassador in Jakarta, President 
Sukarno referred to the Maria Hertogh case “as another serious political 
blunder of the West.” Muslims in Indonesia, the President maintained, 
regarded the marriage between Maria Hertogh and Mansoor Adabi as 
valid. The British court’s decision to nullify the marriage had brought 
about worldwide Muslim resentment towards Britain which would not 
be easy to mediate or resolve.10
At around the same time that Sukarno made these remarks, a number 
of non-governmental organisations, Muslim elites and newspapers in 
Indonesia expressed strong and indignant views on the legal case and the 
riots. The Moslem Propagandist Front in Jakarta alleged that the Maria 
Hertogh legal controversy had brought about a widening gulf between 
Europe and Asia, and urged Muslims to be mindful of the urgent need 
to defend their religion. The Panitia Kemerdekaan Malaya (PKM, or 
the Committee for Malayan Independence) whose main objective was 
to agitate and, if necessary, to militate for the creation of an independ-
ent Malaya, called for the immediate release of Muslims who had been 
detained. They cited the series of arrests of Muslims in Singapore follow-
ing the riots as an infringement of democratic principles and the rights 
of the Malays who were natives of the island. An appeal was also sent 
to all major Muslim organisations in India, Burma, the Philippines and 
Indonesia to apply pressure on the British to stop suppressing Muslims 
in Singapore and mainland Malaya. This stance was supported by radical 
youth movements which were determined to refer their grievances about 
Britain’s suppression of nationalist movements to the United Nations 
(Antara, 23 December 1950).
Writing in a widely distributed daily newspaper, Haji Abdul Malik 
Karim Amrullah (known as Hamka), a well-respected Muslim scholar 
and prominent member of the Muhammadiyah (one of Indonesia’s larg-
est Muslim movements), remarked that placing Maria Hertogh in a Cath-
olic Convent was a clear sign of Western religious fanaticism. Hamka 
argued that, although the Muslims of Malaya had passively accepted the 
oppressive measures taken by the British during the Malayan Emergency, 
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their will to protect their religious beliefs should not be underestimated, 
as shown by the riots and other forms of resistance. Hamka’s argument 
was complemented by editorial commentaries published in Indonesia 
Raya – an influential newspaper which was circulated in several Indone-
sian provinces. The editorials severely criticised the arrests of  Muslims 
in Singapore and advocated their immediate release (Pedoman, 20 
December 1950).
Several public statements were also made by a newly-established wom-
en’s organisation, the Front Wanita Indonesia (the Indonesian Women’s 
Front), which condemned the British for insulting Islam and expressed 
sympathy for Maria Hertogh, Mansoor Adabi and the Muslims in Singa-
pore who were struggling for their religious rights. Representatives of the 
organisation urged Indonesian Muslims to give their fullest support to 
returning Maria Hertogh to Islam and to her husband. Other prominent 
Muslims in Indonesia established a provisional committee in defence of 
the marriage between Mansoor Adabi and Maria Hertogh. The commit-
tee authorised two renowned lawyers, Dr Datuk Djamin and D. Sujudi, 
to study the British court’s verdict in preparation for the pursuit of a legal 
case. Telegrams were sent to Dato Onn reminding him of his duty to 
assist Mansoor Adabi in his legal appeal to the Singapore High Court. 
On 14 December 1950, members of the committee and other Muslim 
activists staged several anti-colonial protests in public  places (Antara, 14 
December 1950).
The wider Muslim world and Europe
The Maria Hertogh legal controversy also attracted a great deal of public-
ity in major Muslim countries, as well as in Britain and the Netherlands, 
provoking strong reactions from politicians and organisations in these 
lands. Because Singapore was an arena where multiple Muslim and non-
Muslim diasporas intersected and interacted with one another, it became 
a nerve centre for the transmission of news and rumours regarding the 
legal case (Harper 1997, 261-292; Harper 2001, 16). A small yet influen-
tial number of Indian Muslims, who were deeply involved in campaign-
ing for the creation of Pakistan and had maintained close links with their 
ancestral home, kept their anti-imperialist compatriots abreast of devel-
opments regarding the battle for custody of Maria Hertogh. Arabs, who 
originally hailed from the Hadramaut region in Yemen and other parts 
of the Middle East, but were conscious of their place within a global dias-
pora, made effective use of familial, economic and political links in the 
Middle East that had been fully revived in the aftermath of the Second 
World War to promote the interests of the Muslim community on the 
island during that period (Aljunied 2007, 163-183).
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The British were anticipating adverse statements from state authori-
ties and Muslim organisations in Cairo following the quelling of the 
riots – responses that would inevitably have a rippling effect on other 
Muslim-majority countries. Much to their relief, the leaders of the Arab 
countries refrained from expressing any views on the Maria Hertogh 
case.11 A student association in Mecca wrote a rather inconsequential 
letter of protest against the British authorities’ handling of the legal case 
and their repressive measures against Muslims. The letter was pub-
lished in Malay newspapers in Singapore, and several hundred copies 
were reported to have been sent to the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
and selected religious and political leaders in Indonesia, the Middle East 
and South Asia.
While the British may have been pleasantly surprised by the rela-
tively mild reactions of the Arab world to the Hertogh case, the reac-
tions of Muslims in Pakistan were of a quite different nature, posing 
a threat to Singapore’s security. Speaking to the news agencies in his 
country, the Prime of Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, declared 
that that the marriage of the fourteen-year-old Maria Hertogh was valid 
from the perspective of Islam, with or without the consent of her non-
Muslim parents. He was reacting to the visit to Pakistan of an Indian 
Muslim who wanted government officials in Karachi to protest against 
the draconian laws used by the British to intimidate their subjects in 
Singapore.12 Liaquat’s pronouncements and the Pakistani government’s 
efforts to present the Maria Hertogh controversy in its true light, albeit 
with a  Muslim slant, did anything but mitigate the strong reactions of 
the public.  Motamer-e-Alem-e-Elami, a populist organisation in Pakistan, 
depicted British policies in Singapore as yet another example of the nega-
tive predisposition of Europeans towards Asian customs and religious 
beliefs. Street protests were launched in early 1951 against the British 
handling of the legal proceedings and the arrest of Muslim leaders such 
as Abdul Karim Ghani, who was to have led the Singapore delegation to 
the World Muslim Conference in Karachi.13
The Singapore Governor initially maintained that the World  Muslim 
Conference lacked the support of the Pakistani government, and, there-
fore, should not be regarded as a major threat. The event would pro-
vide an opportunity for the British Home Government to obtain the 
 cooperation of the Pakistani authorities in clarifying the proper facts 
of the Maria Hertogh legal case. However, they soon realised that the 
conference could pose a diplomatic hazard, since Muslim leaders who 
were vehemently anti-European had been invited to the event. As a 
proactive measure, representatives from the Colonial Office were dis-
patched to the conference in order to provide the British government 
with full details on the Maria Hertogh case and the events that ensued. 
This would prevent inadvertent remarks from being made by Muslim 
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attendees who had learned about the controversy from factions that were 
hostile to the British.14
Indeed, the time leading up to the World Muslim Conference was a 
worrying period for British officials in Singapore and in Britain. From 
9 to 12 February 1951, the Muslim World Conference proceeded as 
planned, with informal sessions held by Muslim leaders of varied nation-
alities and affiliations. News agencies from European and non-European 
countries covered the event and published day-by-day commentaries that 
were provided by the attendees. Even Ahmadi and Shi’ite delegates, who 
were regarded by the Sunni majority as heterodox, were given the oppor-
tunity to air their views on the creation of a united Muslim front. A con-
sensus was reached at the end of the conference that the Muslim world 
should form a third unified coalition in the face of the dominance of the 
communist and capitalist blocs. Several other resolutions were passed, 
yet there were no references to the Maria Hertogh riots or the legal case. 
The Foreign Office, the Colonial Office and the Singapore authorities 
were relieved but puzzled by the apparently deliberate omission of the 
Maria Hertogh case from the conference’s resolutions. The following 
report vividly depicts the views of the British Foreign Office:
The Conference surprisingly, avoided another controversial 
subject, the Bertha Hertogh case, which might have aroused the 
spirit of Islamic fanaticism if it had been ventilated. It has been 
expected that the subject would be debated, especially as one of the 
prospective delegates from Malaya, Karim Ghani, had appointed 
the girl’s ‘husband’ as his private secretary for the Conference. 
The reason for the omission is not known, but the fact that Karim 
Ghani was unable to attend the Conference owing to his detention 
in Singapore following the riots of December 1950, may have 
affected the matter. The omission of the Bertha Hertogh case is 
more surprising in view of the anti-Western tendencies of some of 
the participants of the Conference.15
One of those who attended the Muslim World Conference was a 
Singaporean Arab Muslim leader named Syed Ibrahim Alsagoff. When 
he was interviewed at the airport on his return from Pakistan, Alsagoff 
disclosed that, although many delegates to the conference expressed sym-
pathy for Muslims who had been arrested and for organisations which 
were relentlessly agitating for justice to be upheld, they did not see the 
need to discuss the Maria Hertogh case in a formal setting (The Straits 
Times, 16 February 1951).
But the wider Muslim World was hardly as critical of the British as 
those in the heart of the colonial metropole. Post-war Britain was a haven 
for third world intellectuals and anti-colonial activists, most of whom had 
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used their time in the country to champion the cause of independence, 
equality and fair treatment of all formerly colonised peoples and those 
that were still under the thumb of European rule. Muslim students living 
in London established a ‘Bertha Hertogh Committee’ to win support for 
the appeal in April and to agitate for an inquiry into conflicts between 
Islamic and secular laws. The riots in Singapore also provided politicians 
from the Conservative Party with a pretext to find fault with the Labour 
government’s management of the colonies. Having won the general elec-
tions in the previous year by a narrow margin, the Labour Party was riven 
by political divisions, personal rivalries and a spate of resignations. The 
Conservatives, on the other hand, were progressively regaining public sup-
port through a re-organisation of party organs, by embracing the notion 
of the Welfare State, forging close ties with trade unions and promot-
ing government-led development schemes. In the House of Commons 
in February 1951, opposition parties seized the opportunity to condemn 
the Home and Singapore governments for the breakdown in governance 
during the riots and the incidents that led to the death of British civilians 
and servicemen during the riots. A Conservative Member of Parliament, 
Frederick Burden, questioned the late deployment of troops to quell the 
riots in their early stages. Burden demanded an assurance from the Sec-
retary of State for the Colonies that military  forces would be promptly 
activated in the event of another major riot. Another Conservative Mem-
ber of Parliament, Arthur Harvey, asked for the earliest date by which the 
investigation of the Commission of Enquiry would be completed. James 
Griffiths (Secretary of State for the Colonies) explained that the causes 
and factors that led to the riots had yet to be fully revealed. The govern-
ment would not commit itself to Burden’s proposition. In response to 
Harvey, Griffiths wryly noted that the “gallant Gentleman will have seen 
from Press reports [that] the Commission have begun their work and are 
taking evidence” (Hansard 1951, 1276-1277).
The pride of place given to Griffiths’ comments in the press deserves 
some further elaboration. Aside from providing updates on the progress 
of the Malayan Emergency, the British media seldom gave extensive cov-
erage to incidents of violence in Malaya during the immediate post-war 
period. The aftermath of the Maria Hertogh riots was exceptional in the 
sense that it became a topic of debate for several leading newspapers 
in Britain (Lee 1967, 241).16 The Daily Express and The Daily Telegraph 
featured the riots as a symptom of the Labour government’s growing 
ineptness in managing racial and religious differences in the colonies. 
The Manchester Guardian went so far as to aver that the colonial admin-
istration in Singapore would never secure Malay support and that the 
post-war governments in both Britain and the colonies were rife with 
defects. The outbreak of riots was a “blunder” that revealed the colonial 
government’s apparent inability to identify and address the outstanding 
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socio-political grievances in the colony (The Daily Telegraph, 13 December 
1950; The Daily Express, 13 December 1950; Manchester Guardian, 13 
December 1950).
In contrast to the situation in England, the mood in the Netherlands was 
triumphal, tinged with a degree of prudence on the part of the authorities 
there. The Dutch monarch, Queen Juliana, who was actively promoting 
the welfare of children in developing countries, expressed her interest in 
knowing the true facts of the Maria Hertogh controversy. Concurrently, 
a strict warning was issued by the government to all Dutch newspapers 
to avoid sensationalism and misreporting of the riots and the legal case. 
Dozens of Christian organisations and parties were also advised to prac-
tise moderation in cheering for the Hertoghs on their arrival at Schiphol 
airport on 13 December 1950. Though the Dutch authorities were unsuc-
cessful in preventing the cheers of large crowds at the airport,  pre-emptive 
measures prevailed on other occasions. At  Bergen-op-Zoom, where the 
Hertoghs lived, no extensive celebrations were observed. Newspapers in 
the country covered the story in great detail, yet none highlighted the 
political and religious aspects rooted within the legal case except to say, 
as the British ambassador observed, “that the riots were significant of the 
present tension between the East and the West. Comment in the respon-
sible newspapers were on the lines that unhealthy interest was being 
shown in this little girl and that the sooner the whole story was forgotten 
the better it would be for all concerned. In short… the Government has 
not done badly, though for some reason or other something seems to 
have gone wrong at Schiphol itself.”17
On 27 March 1951, the Breda Court in the Netherlands declared that 
Maria Hertogh was a Dutch citizen and, therefore, under Article 86 of 
the Dutch Civil Code, she was to be considered as a child and her mar-
riage was invalid. Neither Maria Hertogh nor Mansoor Adabi were pre-
sent or represented during the proceedings. Following a request from the 
Dutch Public Prosecutor, who was acting on instructions given by Baron 
van Ittersum at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the case was adjourned 
in view of the appeal, which had yet to be heard at the High Court in 
 Singapore. Dozens of Roman Catholic organisations in the Netherlands 
demonstrated in protest of the adjournment of the court proceedings. 
The Dutch High Court was issued with warnings to categorically invali-
date Maria Hertogh’s marriage to Mansoor Adabi. Failing that, Catholic 
support for the government would be called into question. In view of 
such fervent political debate, the term of office of Jacob van der Gaag (the 
Acting Consul-General of the Netherlands in Singapore) was extended 
until the end of the appeal, as he was deemed to be acceptable to the 
Catholics in the Netherlands. The Breda Court resumed its proceedings 
on 8 May 1951. A week later, the marriage between Maria Hertogh and 
Mansoor Adabi was annulled.18
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Such determined attempts to repatriate Maria Hertogh through legal 
and other means did not reflect the overall views of Dutch society. In fact, 
several Dutch personalities had gone to the extent of advocating Maria 
Hertogh’s return to the fold of her foster mother. Three Dutch-Muslim 
organisations, namely, the Association of Islamic Students, the Moslem 
Mission in Holland and the Islam Union, made a public declaration that 
Maria Hertogh’s repatriation to Malaya would remedy the distrust that 
had developed among Muslim leaders towards the Netherlands. Several 
other newspapers in the Netherlands reported on the difficulties encoun-
tered by the girl. Nurtured and cared for by Che Aminah from an early 
age, Maria Hertogh was only fluent in the Malay language and was accus-
tomed to Malay dietary habits, beliefs, and lifestyle. This may have con-
tributed to her recalcitrance in the face of the European lifestyle of her 
natural parents and siblings.19
British strategies
Thus far, I have discussed the wide array of responses by both regional 
and global communities during the aftermath of the Maria Hertogh 
riots. While these developments may appear exceptional when observed 
in isolation, they are not atypical. Popular criticism and dissent against 
European management of mass violence in the colonies were charac-
teristic of the years following the Second World War. The African his-
torian Frederick Cooper has correctly observed that colonial regimes in 
the 1950s were perceived worldwide as relics of the old order, especially 
in their recourse to the use of brute force and naked violence to obvi-
ate resistance. They (the colonialists) “were moving targets for criticism, 
for they sought to reposition themselves in a progress-oriented world” 
(Cooper 2005, 37).
It was the recognition of the fact that the riots had turned into a dip-
lomatic and political morass that prompted the British to respond in a 
sophisticated way so as to recover their public image and political legiti-
macy. A careful reading of a wide selection of colonial documents writ-
ten during this period suggests the coming together of several decisive 
measures. The first was to capitalise on the global information order 
that flowed throughout the post-war British Empire, Europe and the 
newly independent nations. Support for native collaborators and elites in 
 Muslim countries and the Netherlands was harnessed to restrain the out-
raged populace in these places. In mainland Malaya, the British encour-
aged Muslim elites from various states and organisations to publish 
their appeals for Muslims to remain calm and express the hope that non- 
violence and the ideology of peace would be upheld by all parties. At the 
same time, close lines of communication were maintained with selected 
the global effects of an ethnic riot: singapore, 1950-1954  187
politicians in the Netherlands by way of reminding them that press sen-
sationalism surrounding the Maria Hertogh case would lead to disas-
trous consequences in Singapore. Meanwhile, the British Foreign Office 
in London instructed British ambassadors to major Muslim countries, 
who were stationed in cities such as Jakarta, Karachi, Cairo, Baghdad, 
Tehran, Jeddah, Damascus and Amman to provide updates on any distur-
bances caused by the Maria Hertogh case and to provide detailed reports 
of any attempts to exacerbate Muslim hostility towards Britain. Since 
the international context had a strong bearing on the course of events in 
Singapore, it was of paramount importance that potential threats in these 
countries were detected as early as possible. Crucial information was sent 
to London and relayed to Singapore almost immediately.20
In the realm of espionage, the British obtained intelligence regard-
ing subversive elements within UMNO, the Peninsular Malay Union 
and other Malay organisations, which promoted independence by radi-
cal means in the wake of the Maria Hertogh riots. These developments 
were suspected of having a close influence on Muslim military and police 
officers in Singapore, who had maintained strong networks with politi-
cal activists in the Malayan Federation. The British also kept abreast of a 
revival and upsurge of interest in the ideology of Pan-Islamism, which was 
enmeshed with the ideals of nationalism. Muslim students who returned 
from their studies and sojourns in Cairo and Mecca were active in spread-
ing anti-British and Pan-Islamic ideas in Malaya. Although numerically 
insignificant, such people were deemed to be potential threats to security 
in Singapore. The British intelligence services also monitored numerous 
visits by Inamullah Khan (President of the Pakistani Youth Movement), 
which were hosted by prominent Muslims in Singapore. While there 
were no signs that these visits had provoked anti-colonialist attitudes, 
the British did not discount the possibility that speeches made by such 
personalities could spark sentiments which “may be latent and could 
easily be touched off, as was shown in the Hertogh case”.21 Politicians 
and radical ulama who converged in Singapore and Malaya en route to 
Mecca during the pilgrimage season, were kept under close surveillance 
to ensure that any negative influences on the part of these personalities 
could be swiftly dealt with. Nevertheless, no untoward incidents related 
to the Maria Hertogh case were reported towards the end of 1953.22
Propaganda and a public show of respect for Muslims and Islam con-
stituted the second key component of British attempts to smooth over 
the legitimation crises they faced in the aftermath of the Maria Hertogh 
riots. Officials in the colonies where Muslims were in the majority were 
instructed to combat the propaganda of ‘extremists’ by giving widespread 
publicity to the verdicts passed by the Singapore High Court. They were 
required to emphasise, among other things, that the Maria Hertogh case 
was legal rather than discretionary, and that all judgments were decided 
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based on the provisions of law.23 Much press publicity was concur-
rently given to speeches made by high-ranking British officials based in 
Singapore in an effort to repair the damaged ties with influential Muslim 
leaders in Southeast Asia. In an inaugural address at the Southeast Asia 
Muslim Missionary Conference, which was held in Singapore on 24 and 
25 December 1950, Malcolm MacDonald, the United Kingdom Commis-
sioner General for Southeast Asia, commended the conveners for tak-
ing the lead in strengthening the religious commitment of Muslims in 
Southeast Asia in the midst of an unending battle against secular ideolo-
gies which promoted violence. He enjoined the representatives from dif-
ferent territories to establish a close working relationship so as to bring 
about a climate of religious freedom and mutual tolerance (The Singapore 
Free Press, 26th December, 1950; The Straits Times, 20th December, 1950).
During a tea party held in the following month in the presence of rep-
resentatives of different religious faiths in Singapore and Malaya, the 
Singapore Governor, Sir Franklin Gimson, spoke about the impartiality 
and independence of British courts. He stressed that maintaining law 
and order was crucial in a multi-religious and multi-racial setting such 
as Singapore, and appealed for members of all religions to work hand 
in hand with the government to prevent disorder and chaos. “Muslim 
subjects of the King”, according to the Governor, “have always held a 
high place in His Majesty’s regard and have always been considered as 
among his most loyal supporters. The Muslim community in Singapore 
has, therefore, a high reputation to maintain and I hope that they will do 
nothing to besmirch this reputation and so to bring themselves and their 
religion into disrepute” (The Straits Times, 13th January, 1951). It is worth 
noting here that Gimson’s discourse on governmental non-interference 
in judicial processes in Singapore was far from truthful. The Governor 
had taken the proactive move to conduct secret negotiations with the aim 
of inducing Mansoor Adabi to dissolve his marriage with Maria Hertogh 
in accordance with the laws of Islam. Several well-respected Muslims 
in the colony supported the plan, but all in vain. Mansoor Adabi was 
unshakable in his determination to pursue his appeal to the Singapore 
High Court, although this appeal was eventually dismissed.
The widespread press coverage given to the findings of the Commis-
sion of Enquiry was another major step taken by the British to identify 
the manifold factors that led to the outbreak of the riots and to impress 
critics, opposition parties and anti-colonial activists in Malaya and Eng-
land that improvements would be made in the management of the col-
ony. Michael Keith has pointed out that Commissions of Enquiry “exist 
in a political environment and are implicated in a political strategy from 
the moment at which they are appointed and their personnel selected 
to the moment in which they report, right on the manner in which they 
are remembered” (Keith, 1993, 74). This held true in the case of the 
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Commission of Enquiry on the Maria Hertogh riots established on Janu-
ary 1951 whose conclusions were, in many respects, designed to protect 
the integrity and legitimacy of the high command of the colonial admin-
istration. As the most prominent figure in the colony, the Singapore Gov-
ernor was not placed under oath because of the British legal concept of 
sovereign immunity. This in itself was sufficient to absolve a prominent 
civilian official of any blame for the riots.
The Commission of Enquiry interviewed a total of 136 police officers, 
government servants, Muslim elites and members of the public as part 
of its fact-finding efforts. Investigative tours were conducted in the areas 
where the riots had taken place, and several films of riot incidents and 
an anti-riot drill were also reviewed. On 7 August 1951, the Report of 
the Commission of Enquiry, popularly known as the ‘Leach Report’, was 
published and it featured in every major newspaper in Singapore, Malaya 
and England. Having been modified in accordance with the politics and 
anxieties of the time, it is unsurprising that the Leach Report failed to 
provide a balanced or definitive account of the causes and events that 
led to the outbreak of the Maria Hertogh riots. The central purpose of 
the Leach Report, Mary Kilcline Cody suggests, “seems more didactic 
than investigatory and it may be seen as a lesson for colonial govern-
ments rather than an attempt to establish the causes of the riots” (Cody 
2001, 103-104). Going beyond this, I would argue that the Commission 
of Enquiry had failed to pose a basic and crucial question: Why did the 
riots occur in some localities, yet not in others? Due to this oversight, the 
Leach Report made no reference to the socio-economic marginalisation, 
deprivation, alienation and grievances of Malays and other communities, 
which could well have explained the mass participation and rapid spread 
of the riots in the villages, ghettos and other suburban parts of Singapore. 
The British only became aware of the correlation between mass violence 
and the socio-economic marginalisation of the local community during 
a Governors’ Conference held a year after the publication of the Leach 
Report, when issues pertaining to Muslims in Singapore were deliber-
ated at length.24
Although superficial and contested, the Leach Report had consider-
able influence on public understanding of the riots and worked to the 
benefit of the colonial government. The report attributed the outbreak of 
the riots to a few key factors. Foremost among these was the intense feel-
ings which developed within the Muslim community in Singapore, aris-
ing from the verdict regarding the custody of Maria Hertogh. Another 
aggravating factor was Maria Hertogh’s stay at a Roman Catholic Con-
vent, which heightened suspicions that there had been prior plans to 
forcibly convert the girl to Christianity. The third cause was the pub-
licity given by the press to the legal case and Maria Hertogh’s life at 
the convent. Muslim hatred of Europeans and Eurasians in the colony 
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was further intensified by public statements and speeches made by the 
“Nadra Action Committee”, whose chief members were Karim Ghani, 
Dr Burhanuddin, Mohammed Taha bin Kalu, Syed Ali Al-Attas, Darus 
Shariff and Mohammed Mustaza. Much of the document was devoted 
to providing intimate details on the role of the police force in the riots, 
with little coverage of the civilian government’s mishandling of the legal 
controversy. The report ascribed the riots to the failure of the Malay 
police in particular and to the police force as a whole for having failed to 
anticipate the possibility of an outbreak of mass violence and to employ 
necessary force at an early stage. This revealed the vulnerability of the 
security agencies to riots, resulting in the spread of mass violence from 
the area just outside the Supreme Court to other parts of the city. The 
Report recommended comprehensive reforms to remedy the problems 
of weak leadership, corruption, poor discipline, disorganisation and low 
morale within the police force.25
Above all, the British adopted a policy of appeasement and conces-
sion in order to redress both Muslim and non-Muslim grievances. The 
British authorities made full payment on all claims submitted by the 
Dutch Consulate to the tribunal in charge of compensating various 
 parties who had suffered from the loss of kin and property during the 
riots. The tribunal reported that, although the application in respect to 
the damages incurred by the Dutch Consulate was not supported by 
sufficient evidence, “in this case, diplomatic courtesy would apply [italics 
mine].”26 All applications for compensation from civilians belonging to 
the European and Eurasian communities were approved and  widows 
of uniformed servicemen were endowed with pension and monetary 
awards ranging from $10,000 to $20,000. Although the tribunal 
denied monetary compensation to Muslims in Singapore, they gained 
in other ways.
For many months following the riots, Muslims in Singapore and 
Malaya petitioned for the pardon of Thamby bin Osman, Habee Kas-
sim bin S.A. Kader, Thamby bin Sidek and Dawood bin Mohammed, 
who had all been sentenced to death for the murder of a British service-
man named John W. Davies. They were elated when, on 22 July 1952, 
the newly-installed Singapore Governor, John F. Nicoll, commuted the 
sentences of the four men. Instead of being executed, they would serve 
terms of life imprisonment, and would be eligible for early release for 
good conduct. The Utusan Melayu and Majlis editorials registered their 
appreciation of Nicoll’s gesture of clemency and commended the Gover-
nor’s move as “wise” (Utusan Melayu, 24th July, 1952). The British went 
on to acquiesce in the religious demands of Muslims and paid tribute 
to the contribution of the minority community in the development of 
Singapore and Malaya. The Municipal Commission assented to vari-
ous requests by Muslim civil servants to be exempted from performing 
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tasks that were contrary to their religious beliefs. Such a shift in policy 
stemmed from the demands of a nurse who applied for an exemption 
from family planning campaigns. The nurse argued that the campaigns 
were contrary to her religious beliefs (The Straits Times, 21st July, 1951). 
The quasi-governmental Muslim Advisory Board was expanded through 
the incorporation of three prominent personalities: Mahmood bin Abdul 
Wahab (a former Police Inspector), Syed Abdullah bin Yahya (the Presi-
dent of the Singapore Arab Union) and Haji Jubir Haji Amin (a com-
mittee member of Jamiyah). The lifting of restrictions on the annual 
celebrations of the Maulidul Rasul (Prophet Muhammad’s Birthday) in 
Singapore and Malaya (despite the ongoing Malayan Emergency) further 
encouraged positive feelings towards the colonial regime among Mus-
lims (Government Gazette, No. 66, Vol. VI, May 1951; Utusan Melayu, 12th 
December, 1951).
Conclusion
Viewed in terms of the number of casualties and the extent of the 
damage to property, the Maria Hertogh riots seemed to be less seri-
ous than major disturbances in other British territories in the post-war 
era. For example, in Bengal in November 1947, more than 200 died 
during what has been described as one of the bloodiest incidents of 
communal rioting between Muslims and Hindus in India (Batabyal 
2005, 272). The same degree of bloodshed took place in other colo-
nies, such as Aden (in 1947), the Gold Coast (in 1948) and Nigeria (in 
1949). Yet the significance of the mass violence that broke out in Sin-
gapore in December 1950 was to be found not so much in the lives it 
claimed than in the wide-ranging responses by the regional and  global 
communities, as well as the structural vulnerabilities of the  colonial 
system which had been laid bare. Reminiscing about his time as 
Deputy Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, Charles Jeffries noted 
that the Maria Hertogh riots were particularly significant, as they had 
exposed the weaknesses of British policies in the post-war period. The 
two days of violence severely stained the island’s reputation as one of 
the empire’s most secure and strategic points (Jeffries 1952, 203).27
With these observations in mind, this essay has sought to move beyond 
the uncovering of the contributing factors of the riots and the means 
by which they were suppressed to explore the lesser-known  terrain of 
the reactions of regional and global actors, regardless of the various 
strategies which this particular colonial regime employed in the riots’ 
aftermath. By viewing a case of collective violence through the lenses of 
‘outside in’, ‘bundles of relationships’ and ‘complex web’, while framing 
the event against the backdrop of a global climate of decolonisation, we 
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can see that resistance to the colonial administration remained intense 
following the quelling of mass violence and was manifested in various 
forms in Southeast Asia, across the wider Muslim World, and even as far 
away as Britain and the Netherlands.
Nonetheless, it was the recognition of the need to reform, adapt and 
react swiftly to the crisis through a combination of strategies that enabled 
the British to deal effectively with the changing conditions on the ground 
in the aftermath of the Maria Hertogh riots. The colonial government 
was able to anticipate and cope with such threats by tapping into the 
global information order. Through a policy of appeasement and conces-
sion, the British government quickly regained the trust of its subjects 
and diplomatic partners. Propaganda and a public show of respect for 
Muslims became effective tools in averting resistance in the aftermath 
of the riots. Underlying these strategies were the crucial roles played by 
selected officials and politicians in London and the outlying colonies and 
the support of various local organisations and personalities, who aided in 
the process of recovery and conciliation. Indeed, due partly to the variety 
of measures undertaken by the colonised and the colonisers, Singapore 
remained free from major outbreaks of violence perpetrated by Muslims 
and related threats emanating from overseas for more than four years 
after December 1950. The next serious riot (which has yet to be inter-
preted beyond its local context) occurred on 13 May 1954, when Chinese 
students took to the streets to protest the National Service Ordinance. 
The rioters were effectively crushed by scores of policemen, who were 
criticised for their indiscriminate employment of “excessive force” (Yeo 
1973, 191-192).
In conclusion, this chapter has provided a new frame of reference with 
which riots and mass violence in colonial settings can be better under-
stood. This is accomplished through establishing connections between 
local, regional and global developments and demonstrating that the 
effects and responses to riots in the colonies were, in some instances, far-
reaching and more serious than when viewed merely within their local 
confines. Seen from this vantage point, it becomes clear that colonial 
regimes implemented multi-faceted strategies and policies to regain the 
initiative when challenged. The sense of the past that emerges from this 
method of analyzing riots is thus one that is more analytical, if not more 
comprehensive: a history that brings together the roles of the colonised, 
the coloniser and even those who existed beyond the imperial system 
into a single framework of analysis. That said, there is much to be done 
in the effort to rethink and reconceptualise the study of riots in colonial 
Southeast Asia. The first step towards this is the development of a sense 
of openness among Southeast Asian historians to consider donning new 
scholarly lenses by incorporating the concepts, approaches, and methods 
devised by scholars outside their fields of expertise. Only then can new 
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and refreshing pathways in the historiography of violence in Singapore 
and the region be opened up for comparison with case studies from other 
parts of the world.
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“It was not even a sell-out: it was a handout, with virtually nothing 
 demanded or even bargained for in return”, an angry Arthur de la Mare, 
the former British High Commissioner in Singapore, wrote to the Secre-
tary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in November 1971. 
De la Mare was reflecting on the handover of the British military bases to 
the Singapore’s People’s Action Party (PAP) government between 1968 
and the end of December, when the remaining British forces would 
depart from Britain’s chief base in Southeast Asia.1 De la Mare castigated 
his colleagues for conceding the bases to Singapore without retaining a 
say in their deployment for economic purposes. With more than a tinge 
of regret, he lamented, “Had we so wished we had the opportunity not 
only to retain all that we needed but also to transform Singapore from a 
doubtful military bastion (it was never a very good one) into the forward 
base of British business and commerce in East Asia”.2 It was a scathing 
comment on the end of Singapore’s role in the British Empire.
Between crisis and catalyst
Yet, De la Mare’s remarks also reveal much about Singapore’s emerging 
new place in world history as a development-driven, industrial state at 
the end of the 1960s. They lend support to a new approach that extends 
beyond the imperial and national history frameworks within which 
 narratives of the British withdrawal have usually been located. Imperial 
historians such as John Darwin, looking through a Britain lens, typically 
focus on its  struggles to maintain a world presence in the 1960s and the 
convoluted process by which this ‘East of Suez’ policy was finally aban-
doned (Darwin 1988, 1991). When the call to pull out was finally made in 
January 1968, some historians have attributed it to the force of econom-
ics, particularly the sterling crises of 1966-67 and the devaluation of the 
pound in November 1967 (Darby 1973; Butler 2002; Hyam 2006). Other 
historians have pointed rather to the political actors: specifically, the 
 cabinet reshuffle that undermined the old guard which had supported 
the ‘East of Suez’ policy (Darwin 1988; Pickering 1998).
10 The British Military  
Withdrawal from Singapore and  
the Anatomy of a Catalyst
Loh Kah Seng
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In this literature, Singapore appears, if at all, as a passive, hapless 
appendage. By contrast, nationalist historians take a Singapore vantage-
point and view the run-down as one of a number of key events which ena-
bled the making of a ‘nation’. Like their imperial counterparts, they also 
frame the withdrawal as a crisis, but as Singapore’s crisis; this is encap-
sulated in the numerical terms in which the pull-out is usually framed: 
the economic importance of the bases, the number of workers affected 
and the blow to gross domestic product. C.M. Turnbull’s standard history 
text adopts the view that the pull-out momentarily ‘clouded’ the nation’s 
prospects for survival and turned out to be a blessing in disguise (Turn-
bull 1989, 293-4). A more recent book maintains that the run-down “gal-
vanised the fighting spirit of Singapore leaders, who went on to rally their 
people all the more” (Lee 2008, 265). Given the purported severity of the 
withdrawal in nationalist history, its actual impact on Singapore was so 
strikingly minimal that it ran the risk of becoming a non-event.
The withdrawal, which involved much British and Singapore negotia-
tion and collaboration, sits clearly at the nexus between the imperial and 
national histories. De la Mare’s complaint provides a glimpse into how 
freshly sovereign Singapore not only survived the crisis, but transformed 
it into a platform for a massive industrialisation programme based on 
foreign capital investment. The pull-out is an excellent case study on the 
linkages between imperial, national and local histories. Some scholars 
have located Britain’s decision to withdraw at the intersection between 
metropolitan politics and geopolitical developments in Southeast Asia 
(Hack 2001a; Hyam 2006). This paper follows a similar approach by 
examining the dynamics of Anglo-Singaporean collaboration for the 
mechanics of the pull-out, and adds a new one: social history. By using 
both official records and oral history interviews, this paper examines 
how a transnational event started by Britain’s power-brokers became a 
path-breaking catalyst for development thousands of kilometres away in 
a micro-state, with significant consequences for the life and work of its 
people.
The key to Singapore’s active connection to the imperial history of the 
British withdrawal lies less in political than in social and development 
history. The late colonial regime of post-war Singapore had launched 
a long process of transforming the island into what James Scott terms 
a “high modernist” state, geared towards development and governed 
rationally on scientific principles (Scott 1998). By the time the acceler-
ated timetable for the pull-out was announced, Singapore was well on its 
way to becoming such a society; in housing in particular, the relocation of 
semi-autonomous informal dwellers to public housing was already effec-
tively integrating them into the formal structures of the state (Loh 2009a, 
2009b). The British run-down facilitated this long-term process in sev-
eral ways: in the handover and economic conversion of the bases, the 
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growth of the industrial economy, retraining of redundant base workers, 
a massive expansion of technical and vocational education, and instilling 
social discipline in labour. While the official terms describing the event, 
namely, ‘withdrawal’, ‘pull-out’ and ‘run-down’, implied a contraction, it 
really prompted the opposite: development, conversion and mobilisation.
In this crucial sense, the British withdrawal was less a crisis – for either 
Britain or Singapore – than a catalyst, and it underscores the theme of 
change and transformation so central to the making of modern Singapore. 
The frame of crisis entails that, once it is resolved, history comes logically 
to an ‘end’, and this under-emphasises the terms of historical inquiry. 
The frame of catalyst, however, reveals not only the mechanics of crisis 
resolution, but also extends the enquiry forward in time. Although most 
of the concerns about the pull-out did not materialise, the withdrawal 
was nevertheless certainly not a non-event in history; rather it provided 
the impetus for magnifying and accelerating policies of change that had 
been initiated earlier. This approach can also be seen in  Khairudin Alju-
nied’s recent thought-provoking study of the 1950 Maria Hertogh riots. 
By bypassing the usual subject of the causes of the riots and exploring 
instead their ‘aftermath’, the historian can link up the imperial, regional, 
national, and local levels of history, thus providing greater insight into an 
event (Aljunied 2009b, 130).
Decolonisation and development: the bribe and the sweetener
When British Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced the accelerated 
timetable for Britain’s pull-out from east of Suez in January 1968, it meant 
that British forces would vacate the island completely by March 1971. This 
was a considerably shorter schedule compared to that of the 1967  British 
Defence White Paper, where half the forces in Southeast Asia would pull 
out by 1970/71 and the remainder in the mid-1970s. In Singapore, the 56 
British military sites occupied a tenth of the total land area and  contributed 
a fifth of gross domestic product. One-sixth of the island’s labour force 
depended on the bases for work, either directly for the 4,450 enlisted and 
23,000 civilian Singaporeans, or indirectly, including numerous service 
workers such as barbers, bus and taxi drivers, shopkeepers, and some 
8,000 female domestic workers (or amahs)  (Singapore Parliamentary 
Debates, henceforth SPD, 7 September 1967, 173-4). The run-down would 
also place a heavy economic burden on Singapore, which would need to 
build up its own defence and compensate for the loss of local spending by 
the British services. Singapore also faced a larger perennial challenge since 
the end of World War Two to industrialise and provide work for the grow-
ing numbers of young job-seekers and the unemployed (Ministry of Labour 
1977a). Speaking to Parliament when the accelerated withdrawal timeline 
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was publicised, Minister for Finance Goh Keng Swee warned that about 
half of the labour force employed at the bases would be retrenched between 
1967 and the actual run-down in December 1971 (SPD, 3 December 1968, 
38, 59).
These were the ‘facts’ of a national crisis that never came to pass. 
The question of defence was resolved through the creation of a citizen 
army and Singapore’s participation in the Five Power Defence Arrange-
ment, which was signed in 1971 (Chin 1983). The economic impact was 
on the whole offset by the government’s counter-recessionary develop-
ment plans, which facilitated the expansion of manufacturing, trade, 
transport, banking and finance, and tourism (Yeo 1970; Hon 1973). The 
departing British themselves contributed significantly to this growth by 
handing over the military bases to Singapore for defence and develop-
ment, towards which they also provided a sum of £ 50 million as Spe-
cial Aid over five years to help the island manage the crisis. Singapore’s 
unemployment rate tumbled from 8.1% in 1967 to 4.5% in 1973, while 
the economy experienced robust double-digit growth rates in this 
period.
Central to Singapore’s ability not only to avoid the predicted calamity 
but also to transform itself into a model of growth was the close collab-
oration between the British and PAP governments. While part of this 
relationship had always been visible in formal politics and diplomacy, 
much of it was less immediately obvious, but nonetheless just as crucial 
(in the form of development projects). Since the end of war, these had 
been integral to British decolonisation in  Singapore and were indeed so 
in wider imperial practice; from the mid-1950s onwards, an  important 
mission of the British Colonial Office was to ensure the orderly process 
of decolonisation by providing economic aid to the  colonies through 
the Commonwealth (Boyce 1999, 179-83). This “renewed sense of 
imperial purpose” led Britain to spend £ 344  million between 1946-70 
in an attempt to establish a “partnership” with its colonies throughout 
the world (Stockwell 2008, 274). In post-war Singapore and Malaya, 
the British sought to safeguard their economic and strategic interests 
in the region by restructuring local societies and economies in their 
own image (Tarling 1993). Decolonisation, then, did not simply mean 
grooming local politicians who appreciated British interests or sup-
pressing ‘communists’, but also engineering a viable economy and a 
citizenry instilled with the requisite social discipline.
This collaborative relationship became clear when the PAP came to 
power in 1959 and Singapore became a self-governing state. Despite 
some initial anti-colonial gestures, the new government quickly put 
into practice level-headed programmes of development, integration and 
mobilisation. The continued presence of the British military bases was 
accepted, even welcomed. At Singapore’s independence in 1965, the 
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left-wing Barisan Sosialis, the main opposition party, demanded the 
immediate removal of the bases, arguing that they not only encroached 
on Singapore’s sovereignty but were launching pads for Anglo-American 
aggression in the region (Plebeian Express 29 September 1965, 2). The 
government pointed to the bases’ contribution to the city-state’s defence 
and economy. In December, the Minister of State for Defence Wee Toon 
Boon referred to the continued presence of the British naval base at 
 Trincomalee in Ceylon for nine more years after the island was granted 
independence in 1948 (SPD 17 December 1965, 309).
The key local players in this Anglo-Singaporean collaboration 
were Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, his deputy Goh Keng Swee and a 
 supporting cast of senior civil servants. Much has been written, including 
by Lee himself, about his rush to London following the announcement 
of the accelerated withdrawal and his success in obtaining an extension 
of the final run-down from March to December 1971 (Lee 2000). But 
the roles played by the Singapore leaders went deeper. From the start, 
Lee and Goh had different responses to the accelerated pull-out. On 
reading an advance text of the withdrawal schedule in January 1968, 
“Mr Lee appeared stunned and took some time to adjust himself”, while 
“Dr Goh Keng Swee read the letter without any emotion and did not 
seem surprised by it”.3 A later British document exaggerated the reac-
tions of Lee and Goh as, respectively: “If you have to go, at least do not 
scuttle off and thereby rock the boat” and “If you have to go, go quickly 
because we want the real estate”.4
Despite these initial reactions and some disagreements over the details 
of the development plans, Lee and Goh both agreed on the significance 
of the pull-out and the substance of Singapore’s response. Lee was less 
worried about the actual economic effects than the psychological impact: 
the “crisis of confidence… with repercussions on investment and the 
expansion of jobs”.5 “This was something which we saw as a contingency 
which must occur”, Lee said in an interview in January 1968, “[I]t’s a 
question of timing”.6 The accelerated run-down would, in his view, 
deprive  Singapore of the requisite ‘breathing space’ needed to build up 
its defence and industry.7 Goh shared Lee’s concern about confidence, 
while his real worry, like Lee’s, was about security. Pondering the pos-
sibility of the run-down in early 1966, he even wondered if “the resulting 
slump might be no sad thing if it would bring down costs in Singapore”.8 
What the PAP leadership did in response to the accelerated timeline was 
not simply to address the economic effects, but to maintain investor con-
fidence in Singapore.
Britain, the perpetuator of the ‘crisis’, was willing to help Singapore do 
this. In appraising the purpose of the Special Aid later, British High Com-
missioner de la Mare bluntly stated in January 1970 that “the £ 50 million 
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was a bribe to keep the Singaporeans sweet” and achieve the three main 
aims of the British pull-out:
a to ensure the orderly withdrawal of British forces in accordance with 
our plans
b in the interests of political stability in the area to ensure the pros-
pect of a viable economy in Singapore and to avoid endangering the 
economy of Malaysia, and
c to safeguard our own trading and investment interests.9
The British accordingly took a “general and flexible approach” to the transfer 
of the bases.10 As early as November 1967, the British Ministry of Defence 
had accepted that “if it [the transfer of British lands] should come to a local 
argument, we have virtually no bargaining position at all”.11 Half a year later, 
when a Singapore delegation visited London to negotiate the terms of the 
Special Aid, the discussion focused on using the aid for development in 
the public and private sectors (particularly manufacturing and tourism), 
and ensuring that the approval of projects, disbursement of funds and 
repayment of loans would be simplified.12 There were no serious disagree-
ments over policy. As J.Y.M. Pillay, Permanent-Secretary at the Ministry of 
Finance, who took part in the aid talks, stated in December 1967,  Singapore 
had to “take organisational measures to put this aid to effective use”.13 He 
felt that the amount of aid was “not ungenerous”.14
Another example of Anglo-Singaporean collaboration can be seen in 
the ‘Malta precedent’, which highlights Singapore’s location in a wider 
Commonwealth history in the late 1960s. After visiting Malta in 1967, 
which had experienced a similar run-down, Lee Kuan Yew was extremely 
critical of its alleged “aid dependency” mentality, particularly of Maltese 
dock workers playing water polo in the naval dockyard (Lee 2000, 70-1). 
Like Singapore, Malta obtained its independence from Britain in 1964, 
but allowed the British to retain their military facilities on the island until 
1979. Malta was also economically dependent on the British, with 13% of 
its gainfully employed population working in the bases (Craig 1991). In 
fact, the Singapore government learned positive lessons from the Malta 
experience. In their exploratory negotiations with the British on the 
terms of the Special Aid in October 1967, the Singapore side repeatedly 
referred to the Malta precedents, e.g. transferring all British assets to the 
 Singapore government without charge.15 The provision of a three-month 
long retraining programme for retrenched base workers, discussed 
below, was also a Malta precedent.16 So little of this has been acknowl-
edged in public history, because Lee had not desired the Special Aid pro-
gramme to be given undue coverage in Singapore, for fear that the people 
would “get into a Malta frame of mind”.17 The way the ‘Malta precedent’ 
has been discursively rendered in Singapore history is testament to the 
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high modernist social engineering which occurred during and after the 
British withdrawal, as determined by the PAP government and particu-
larly by Lee himself.
‘No haphazard takeover’: conversion, redundancy and retraining
One strand of the accelerated withdrawal from Singapore led to another. 
The pursuit of economic development was to some extent mandated by 
the anticipated effects of the British withdrawal. In 1968, the PAP gov-
ernment quickly committed $ 150 million to a counter-recessionary plan 
and, over the period of the pull-out, a total of over $ 1 billion. Public 
works and construction were key planks in this programme, to which 
an additional $ 400 million was allocated to the 1968 budget to offset 
the deflationary effects of the run-down. The authorities also relaxed 
plot ratios in the Central Area and provided financial incentives, such 
as reduced property taxes, for private developers to increase the speed 
of construction of commercial buildings, offices and hotels, and other 
urban renewal projects (Singapore 1975). Not all the development efforts 
were, however, reactive: major construction projects originally planned 
for the late 1970s, such as road, drainage and sewerage development, 
land reclamation, public housing, and urban renewal, were also brought 
forward to absorb redundant labour (Tan 1972). De la Mare found Sin-
gapore’s initial anxieties over the pull-out to be remarkably ‘short-lived’, 
quickly replaced by an acute economic sense.18 Other British officials 
concurred in 1970 that “[a]lthough our declared aim was to mitigate the 
economic consequences of our withdrawal, in the event Singapore has 
adjusted to this more rapidly than we anticipated”.19
The Singapore government also established the Bases Economic Con-
version Department (BECD). Under the direct purview of the prime min-
ister, the department attempted to rigorously deal with the multi-faceted 
legal, economic and technical issues related to the withdrawal through a 
single public body. Its leadership, which was inter-ministerial, comprised 
Hon Sui Sen, the Department’s Commissioner and Chairman of the Eco-
nomic Development Board (EDB). Hon’s deputies were K.R. Chandra, 
the Permanent Secretary of Law, in charge of issues of transfer, conver-
sion and land use, and J.Y.M. Pillay, his counterpart from the  Ministry 
of Finance, who dealt with issues such as Special Aid and finance. The 
BECD’s work involved managing the handover of the  British military 
lands and assets; administering, developing, converting, and dispos-
ing of the lands and assets to civilian use; conducting negotiations over 
the delivery of British aid to help tide Singapore over the effects of the 
run-down; and using part of the aid for the retraining of redundant base 
workers.20
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The conversion of the bases was a success and in both real and 
symbolic terms a major boost to Singapore’s development. As early 
as October 1967, when the British Director of Lands and Claims in 
the Far East Command asked the Chief Surveyor of the EDB, “[W]
hat  Singapore was going to do with so much land – about 22 square 
miles”, the latter confidently referred to a map of the island and 
“named a planned use for practically all establishments and installa-
tions”. “This implies no haphazard takeover”, the Director concluded, 
“they know where they are going!”21 The converted bases aided the 
creation or expansion of several major industries in the early 1970s: 
the conversion of the naval dockyard at Sembawang into a commer-
cial shipyard; of Changi airbase into a recreational resort and later an 
international airport; of part of the military facility at Seletar airbase 
into Singapore Electronic and Engineering Limited for repairing and 
overhauling electrical and electronic equipment; and of Blakang Mati 
into a tourist resort, renamed Sentosa. The BECD also planned the 
establishment of an offshore oil-drilling site off Sembawang, support 
operations at Loyang and industrial estates at Ayer Rajah and Telok 
Blangah; and the relocation of the University of  Singapore from Bukit 
Timah to Kent Ridge. In the largest of the conversion projects at the 
naval dockyard, the British shipbuilding firm Swan Hunter provided 
vital technical and managerial expertise, as the Singapore officials “did 
not seem to have much grasp of the complexities of the commerciali-
sation project”.22
This is not to say there were no minor political or administrative hur-
dles in the process but, by and large, the transfer and conversion took 
place smoothly within the framework of Anglo-Singaporean collabora-
tion. Both the British and PAP governments generally agreed on the 
terms of the transfer of the bases. In the same year that the withdrawal 
was announced, Britain proposed, and Singapore accepted, the work-
ing premise to transfer without charge to Singapore military facilities 
required for the republic’s economy or defence, together with surplus 
items of non-operational moveable equipment.23 With up to a tenth of 
Singapore’s land area becoming available for economic use, the British 
pull-out was a major catalyst for development in a land-hungry and rap-
idly developing state. The government’s aim was not simply to prevent 
or absorb unemployment but to pursue a “positive, job-creation” strat-
egy, based on state-driven industrialisation, so that “conversion plan-
ning can foster, and be integrated with, wider economic changes both 
nationally and globally” (Southwood 1991, 195, 200). At the same time, 
the conversion enhanced Singapore’s industrialisation programme, 
because it coincided with the flow of international, particularly Ameri-
can, capital in the late 1960s to countries with cheap factory sites and 
low labour costs (Rodan 1989).
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Less successful were the BECD’s retraining programmes to help 
redundant base workers find new employment in industrial vocations, 
although retraining might have played a symbolic role in demonstrating 
Singapore’s will and ability to industrialise and maintaining investor con-
fidence. In a speech in 1968, Lee Kuan Yew explained why the redundant 
base worker had to be retrained:
It’s no use giving the man five weeks’ pay or one month’s pay for 
every year of service – he will spend that and having nothing, he 
will be on my dole. What I want is to keep up the man’s morale 
and self-respect.24
Here again, as in his stress on investor confidence, Lee emphasised the 
psychological; morale, he believed, was “three-quarters of the essence of 
the solution to the problems consequent on the reduction of the bases”.25 
This belief that the way to revitalise redundant workers was to provide 
them new skills rather than financial relief, was deeply rationalist.
The three-month long retraining programmes, modelled on those 
in Malta, were planned by the Organising Committee for the Training 
and Retraining of Redundant Base Personnel, established in April 1968 
under Ernest Wong, Director of Training in the BECD. The committee, 
like the BECD itself, was cross-ministerial in its work, coordinating the 
efforts of the National Trades Union Congress (NTUC), individual trade 
unions, EDB, and the ministries of education and labour. Discounting 
workers who were skilled or close to retirement, and those who could 
be re-employed from the naval dockyard to Sembawang Shipyard, the 
final figure of retrainees was 9-10,000, most of whom were white-collar 
administrative workers or unskilled labourers.26 Some 3,309 out of the 
10,000 retrenched workers at the Naval Base were re-employed by Sem-
bawang Shipyard in 1968 (SPD 3 December 1968, 38).
Economist Lee Soo Ann viewed the retraining as “an exercise in sheer 
hope which might very well end in frustration” (Lee 1971, 61). Here, the 
high modernist developmental project could not overcome individual 
resistance. The retraining was clearly inadequate in many cases for convert-
ing a white-collar worker into a skilled tradesman, as was highlighted by 
the government’s plea for employers not to discriminate against retrained 
workers. Lee Kuan Yew stated in his memoirs that the retrenched were 
readily absorbed into factory work provided by the emerging industries in 
Singapore (Lee 2000, 73). But if this was true in a general sense, there 
were nonetheless very divergent experiences. Hwang Peng Yuan, the Head 
of Promotion in the EDB, reflected later that when “you get a 40-year-old 
shopkeeper who was already earning $ 1,500”, “[i]t  doesn’t make sense 
for him to train as a machinist and start at $ 500”.27 In 1971, Hon Sui 
Sen admitted in Parliament that the redeployment of some retrenched 
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base workers was difficult, while many older workers had not responded 
favourably to retraining, prompting the government to terminate the pro-
gramme (SPD 17 March 1971, 759). There are no statistics on retraining, 
but a telling case was that of Lim Meng Jock, who joined the Naval Base 
as an accounts clerk in 1964, was retrenched in December 1968, and then 
completed two technical drawing courses. However, Lim did not become 
a tracer, but joined Sembawang Shipyard as a billing technician, another 
administrative position, before leaving to set up a catering business a few 
years later. The British withdrawal, he said, had “not much of an impact”.28
The emphasis on technical and vocational education also shaped the 
nature of work for generations of young Singaporeans in the 1970s and 
beyond. Following the announcement of the British pull-out, a new Tech-
nical Education Department was formed in the Ministry of Education 
(Singapore 1973). When Minister for Labour S. Rajaratnam spoke to 
the first graduating batch of 427 retrained base workers in July 1968, 
he made no distinction between the retraining of redundant base work-
ers and the new policy of promoting technical and vocational education 
due to the changing technological basis of the global economy, which 
was making white-collar and unskilled workers increasingly redundant. 
He spoke of the base workers as the “earliest victims” of this worldwide 
shift in the demand for labour, but noted their “good fortune” in receiv-
ing  special assistance from the government to find alternative work. He 
warned white-collar workers that one day soon they might be replaced by 
machines and computers.29
Because it clearly aided Singapore’s development, the British keenly 
endorsed the use of the Special Aid to finance and supply British exper-
tise for the expansion of technical and vocational education. The for-
mer  British army depot at Telok Blangah was converted into the fourth 
vocational institute in Singapore, which was capable of retraining 2,000 
workers a year initially, but eventually doubled that number (Ministry 
of Education 1969). The PAP government, with British assistance, was 
steadily transforming the economic, employment and social structures 
in Singapore. In 1972, commenting on the development of technical and 
vocational education, the new British High Commissioner S. Falle sur-
mised that “a major cause of the new release of disciplined energy which 
has produced this success was probably the galvanising effect on the Sin-
gapore government and people of the announcement of the  withdrawal 
of British ‘aid’ in the form of the spending power of our armed ser-
vices”.30 With the reforms, the experiences and outcomes of work for 
young school-leavers with different skill-sets were to vary widely (Salaff 
1988). From the 1970s, secondary, polytechnic and tertiary students with 
technical or vocational education were finding more highly paid jobs and 
more quickly than those trained more generally in the Arts. Males and 
English-educated University of Singapore students also did significantly 
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better than their female and Chinese-stream Nanyang University and 
Ngee Ann Technical College counterparts (University of Singapore 1976, 
1980; Pang 1972, 1973, 1974; Eng 1974).
The labour laws and ‘new release of disciplined energy’
The PAP government’s ability to push through far-reaching social and 
economic policies came from the mandate it received in the 1968 general 
elections. Following the announcement of Britain’s run-down, the leader-
ship decided to hold early elections some seven months in advance for 
a strong mandate from the citizenry at this difficult juncture. The party 
won all the seats in Parliament and polled 86.7% of the vote, although 
this was helped by the decision of the opposition parties (except the 
Workers’ Party) to boycott the polls. Foreign observers saw the early elec-
tions as an attempt by the PAP to obtain a popular mandate and push 
through a comprehensive economic package without having to spend 
time  debating or consulting the people (Far Eastern Economic Review, 
henceforth FEER, 59 (9), 29 February 1968, 360).
The companion policy to the educational reforms involved remould-
ing the character of labour, arguably the most comprehensive of the 
PAP’s policies designed to maintain investor confidence. With com-
plete control of Parliament, the PAP swiftly passed the Employment 
Act and an amendment to the Industrial Relations Act. Together with 
the Trade Unions (Amendment) Act, passed in 1966, this trio of labour 
laws redefined the relationship between labour, employers and the 
state in post-pull-out Singapore. By making it mandatory for unions to 
hold a secret ballot before a strike decision could be taken, the Trade 
Union  (Amendment) Act greatly undermined labour militancy, while 
a further amendment outlawed strikes in the essential services and 
sympathy strikes. The anticipated effects of the British withdrawal rein-
forced the government’s rationale for passing the Employment Act. In 
July 1968, when S. Rajaratnam explained the legislation as designed to 
help facilitate Singapore’s future development, he framed the pioneer 
batch of retrained base workers as the vanguard of an adaptable national 
workforce spearheading the island’s venture into manufacturing in the 
1970s.31 The Act aimed to maximise the productivity of labour by increas-
ing the number of working hours and cutting down on fringe benefits. 
Employees may not work overtime for more than 48 hours each month; 
may only obtain a maximum of one month’s bonus per annum; may 
not obtain retrenchment or retirement benefits if they had not continu-
ously served an employer for three or five years, respectively; and may 
only be paid double time, not triple time as previously, for work on a 
public holiday. The government also referred to the British withdrawal 
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in justifying the need for the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act. 
This legislation transferred significant powers to management, includ-
ing the right to hire and fire, while trade unions were also prohibited 
from obtaining terms superior to those stipulated in the Employment 
Act in the  “pioneer industries”, to which the government was seeking to 
attract foreign investment.
The act of passing these pro-capital laws signified the progressive 
intentions of Singapore to international investors. They were intended 
to enhance Singapore’s appeal as a site for foreign industrialists by shift-
ing the basic labour framework from employee protection to employer 
protection (Tan 1970, 25). Many workers and even labour leaders and 
PAP MPs were critical of certain provisions in the laws, although, sig-
nificantly, they accepted them as necessary for the industrialisation pro-
gramme.32 The overwhelming electoral mandate won by the government 
was expedient, because it meant that labour MPs and activists could not 
simply reject the laws out of hand (FEER 61 (30), 25 July 1968, 186). In 
Lee Kuan Yew’s view, it was the acute sense of anxiety over “an economic 
collapse” arising from the news of the British withdrawal which led the 
workers of Singapore to accept the tough labour laws (Lee 2000, 108-9). 
Peter Vincent, President of NTUC, the dominant umbrella of unions in 
Singapore, warned retrained base workers in 1968 that “the world does 
not owe us a living”. He urged them to support the new labour laws and 
“contribute to the further development of Singapore” through manufac-
turing and tourism.33 An NTUC seminar in 1969 formalised this change 
of the trade union movement’s role from being an independent player 
involved in “collective bargaining and traditional militancy” to playing 
an integrated ‘symbiotic’ role between government, management and 
labour in Singapore (Ministry of Labour 1977b, 2).
The PAP government’s belief in utilising the labour laws and retrain-
ing schemes, not only to equip workers with new skills but to create 
a new type of worker with a disciplined work ethic, was rationalist and 
quintessentially high modernist. The labour laws were not merely 
proscriptive but developmental in intent. The Employment Act aimed 
to “tighten labour discipline by providing against malingering and 
restrictive practices” (Ministry of Labour 1977a, 2). The conversion of 
the naval dockyard into Sembawang Shipyard encapsulated this social 
engineering. Ship repair work in a commercial dockyard, unlike in a 
naval facility, now became a seven-day-a-week preoccupation, including 
overtime.34 When the 3,309-strong civilian workforce of the naval dock-
yard was hired en masse by the shipyard, the management cracked down 
strongly on work absenteeism, frequent sick leave and social gambling 
at the dockyard, as mandated in the Employment Act (Chew 1998). As 
a former BECD official reflected on the discursive language of the new 
industrial economy, base workers “could no longer adopt a carefree or 
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lackadaisical attitude to their work as they would have to meet comple-
tion time of vessels” (Leong unpublished). The Barisan Sosialis alleged 
that “[o]n the excuse of fighting unemployment consequent on the sham 
‘British withdrawal’, workers are heavily oppressed and exploited” (Plebe-
ian 101, 9 January 1971, 2).
Many former base employees keenly felt this dramatic shift in the 
 culture of work at Sembawang Shipyard, although few understood the 
significance of the labour laws at the time. The amount and pace of work 
changed markedly along with the surge in the volume of ships calling 
at the shipyard. While working in the naval dockyard, Lim Shee Chee’s 
father, a fitter, would cycle to work in the morning, spend much of a 
typically slow day drinking coffee, cycle home for lunch, before return-
ing to his workplace; he would be home by 4.30 pm. “That’s the life of a 
servant of the British Empire”, Lim remarked.35 John Ng, a policeman at 
the Naval Base who retained his job at the shipyard when the British left, 
commented that there was not a single oil spill in the dockyard and work-
ers could “shake a leg” during lull periods.36 But at Sembawang Shipyard, 
Ho Shee Lim, a tradesman, felt that “every day was a mad rush”, as work-
ers now had more challenging targets to meet.37 Balachandran Nair, a 
mechanic at the naval dockyard who continued working in Sembawang 
Shipyard, observed that “work in the shipyard was a tough life”, “miles 
different” from that in the dockyard. As security guards increasingly 
cracked down on social gambling during working hours at the shipyard, 
the corporate focus on profits and individual betterment filtered down to 
many workers. “You sweated to get [a] bonus in Sembawang Shipyard”, 
Nair told me, adding, “Only thing good in Sembawang Shipyard is you 
get promoted if you worked hard”.38
Work in the shipyard also became more stressful because it was much 
more regulated. Along with the increased volume of work came changes 
in the supplement of rules for Sembawang Shipyard workers. Getting 
sick leave now became more difficult, at least in the eyes of the workers. 
In Nair’s account, the medical centre in the Naval Base was always full 
on Monday, as the British did not interfere with the workers’ entitlement 
to 14 days of sick leave per year. “If the British were still here”, Nair con-
cluded, “Singapore would not be what it is today”.39 John Chai, a trades-
man for steel fitting in Sembawang Shipyard, stated that as the amount of 
work increased after the commercialisation of the dockyard, the hazards 
of working onboard ship were greatly magnified. As one could get seri-
ously hurt by the release of toxic gas, an explosion or fire, objects falling 
from above, or slipping on a wet surface, he had to be “100% alert” at 
work. As he felt that the doctors in the shipyard were reluctant to grant 
medical leave unless one was seriously sick, Chai took care of the minor 
bruises and cuts he suffered at work by continuing to work and seeing a 
Chinese physician for treatment, or by self-medicating. Of the injuries, 
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Chai observed, “It’s nothing, [you] just have to take care,” adding, “That’s 
the way”.40 Chai’s remarks indicate the extent to which former base work-
ers were socialised into the post-pull-out industrial economy of Singapore.
In its review of Singapore in 1969, in the middle of the run-down, the 
British High Commission labelled the year as one of “non-stop action”. 
This was the “year of the Beaver”, with burgeoning construction work in 
Singapore – on “hotels, housing, office-blocks, factories, container ports, 
schools power stations, flyovers, community centres” – making it truly 
a “workers’ republic”. No small thanks because, the report concluded in 
self-gratifying fashion, Singapore had responded robustly to the short-
ened timeline for Britain’s withdrawal from the island. The writer of the 
report was Arthur de la Mare.41
From ‘Little Britain’ and ‘Kochu Kerala’ to modern Singapore
Mass redundancy due to the run-down was a central concern for the 
 Singapore government. In fact, most blue-collar workers of the naval 
dockyard were absorbed into Sembawang Shipyard, while the experi-
ences of white-collar employees, unskilled workers and service providers 
varied, depending less on the pull-out per se than on local factors such as 
one’s age, education, family composition, and social networks. The father 
of Lam Chun Chew, a senior clerk at the Naval Base, was retrenched, but 
this was the prelude to a ‘golden handshake’, as he received a five-figure 
redundancy benefit, found work in private firms and retired comfortably 
several years later. “I really believe you have picked a wrong candidate to 
relate to you of my father’s retrenchment story”, Lam told me, “simply 
because our situation was very different from others”.42 The grandmother 
of George Annadorai, who worked as an amah for a British family in RAF 
Seletar, also received a “handsome offering” when they departed. She was 
elevated from domestic servant to landlady overnight, using the money 
to build wooden houses in Jalan Kayu village just outside the base, which 
she rented out to villagers.43
Another amah, Tan Geok Hak, was not so fortunate. Working for the 
family of a British officer in Holland, the withdrawal cut her source of 
income without providing for any redundancy benefit. She became a 
home-based, piece-rated worker in Singapore’s informal economy, sew-
ing clothes and making paper bags for pressure lamps. Many older Chi-
nese amahs, she said, “retired” after the British withdrawal, an outcome 
which was less a voluntary than an enforced one.44 For Song Koon Poh, 
the son of a clerk working in the British Ordnance Depot, the run-down 
was a life-changing personal experience. Following his father’s retrench-
ment, Song had to forgo his opportunity to pursue his pre-university 
education and venture into the workplace to support the family, thus 
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fulfilling the Chinese tradition of family-based self-help. He joined a 
shipping company as an assistant boarding officer in 1971 at the age of 
17, benefiting from the boom in Singapore’s marine industry. His sister, 
like Tan, also contributed to the household by sewing clothes, for which 
she was paid by piece. As Song reflected: “We struggled as a family dur-
ing the years just before the British pulled out and immediately after”.45
Just as crucial as the economic consequences was the social impact of 
the British run-down. Its role as a catalyst was also to extend the political 
economy of life in Singapore into spaces previously under British mili-
tary control. On the one hand, the British bases were ‘Little Britains’ in 
the cultural and economic senses, self-contained enclaves governed by 
the British which “stood quite apart from the development going on in 
other parts of the Island” (Lim 1974, 23, 58). On the other, the military 
facilities also developed a unique, semi-autonomous ‘base culture’ owing 
both to the presence of British power and the Asian labour force residing 
in them. The Naval Base, for instance, was known to the locals as ‘Kochul 
Kerala’ or ‘Little Kerala’, after the rich cultural life of the large Malayali 
population living in the base, expressed in their religious and cultural 
organisations and activities (Liew 2006).
Socially and culturally, for many former base employees and residents, 
the British pull-out constituted the end of an era. Life in a British base 
was shaped by the unique combination of Western modernity and ver-
nacular culture. In the locals’ perception, the base represented the best of 
two different worlds: the kampong with its unauthorised housing, basic 
amenities but close community bonds, and the Western-style estate with 
its permanent housing, material comfort and modern amenities. In the 
Asian quarters in the Naval Base bounded by Kowloon, Delhi and Madras 
roads, the neighbours knew one another as far as 200 metres away, while 
adults and children of different ethnic groups intermingled freely. As John 
Ng, the naval policeman in the base who learnt Tamil from his neighbours 
and friends in the base, recalled, “You could see an Ah Seng, a Muth-
usamy and an Ahmad together”.46 For Cramon Chenteley, whose father 
was a fitter in the Naval Base, the area was not only “a protected place”, 
fenced up and closely guarded, but also a “kampong-like” environment 
where school-going children and youths were “free to play”. Yet, he was 
also happy that he did not have to endure water rationing while living in 
the base (they had piped water), or use a pail toilet (they had water closets) 
or an oil lamp (they had electricity).47
When the bases began to be run down, however, the residents began 
to experience the powerful integrating pull of the high modernist 
state and economy of Singapore. Here was ‘conversion’ of not only 
the uses of physical assets but also social and economic roles. Where 
once the rent in the base had been heavily subsidised and the utilities 
free, the residents now had to pay for the use of water and electricity. 
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As Vanessa, John Ng’s wife, a Punjabi, remarked, “Nothing is free after 
the British withdrawal”.48 Balachandran Nair, who moved out of the 
area when he got married and later moved into a Housing and Devel-
opment Board (HDB) flat in Ang Mo Kio estate, lamented, “You can’t 
get that life [in the Naval Base] back”.49 For those still living in the 
base, as more of their neighbours left, as George Annadorai recalled 
of RAF Seletar, there was an obvious ‘slow death’ to the social and 
cultural life of the community.50 The tipping point for many residents 
was when they moved out of the bases in the early 1970s as the British 
forces finally left. In the new HDB public housing to which many of 
them moved into, they encountered the lack of social and community 
interaction which many other Singaporeans had experienced a decade 
earlier: locked doors and a life centred around the demands of work, 
away from one’s residence. Like many former Naval Base residents, 
John Chai, the tradesman, moved into the Jurong Town Corporation 
flats built for workers in Sembawang. He hardly knew his neighbours, 
but eventually understood why: he typically left for work around 5 plus 
in the morning and returned home only at 10-11 pm after working 
overtime.51 As full-fledged worker-citizens of the post-pull-out state, 
the lives of Chai and other former base workers were being drawn into 
the emerging high modernist structures of Singapore, as the island 
became increasingly connected to an international web of industrial 
capital in the 1970s.
Conclusion
In 1974, Lee Kuan Yew thanked Her Majesty’s Government for the 
 ‘breathing space’ British forces had provided for Singapore’s develop-
ment.52 He had much to be thankful for: the accelerated British with-
drawal was not only the final chapter of decolonisation in Singapore, 
but also the first step in the independent city-state’s growth. The cata-
lyst, which began as a crisis for both Britain and Singapore, was forged 
at the intersection of imperial and national policies and enabled by the 
combined agency of the two parties. The British aim was to achieve 
successful decolonisation by continuing to encourage Singapore’s 
 development during the withdrawal. This meant providing aid and 
technical expertise to Singapore and handing over the bases promptly 
for its defence and developmental uses.
British policy coincided with the high modernist projects pursued by 
the PAP government, a programme that was also based on the post-war 
colonial blueprint. This programme sought to protect investor confi-
dence in Singapore in both concrete and symbolic ways, as envisaged 
by Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee. Despite de la Mare’s accusation 
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of a British ‘handout’, he admired the development of Singapore in the 
late 1960s and recognised the role played by the run-down; if anything, 
he was overly pessimistic about the role of his British colleagues in nego-
tiating the terms of the handover. In fact, as officials in both countries 
realised, the economic and strategic interests which Britain wanted to 
safeguard in a smooth pull-out would at the same time be served by facili-
tating the expansion of the Singapore economy. De la Mare’s view of the 
Special Aid as a “bribe” and “sweetener” was not so much wrong as not 
fully putting in context the close collaboration between Britain and Sin-
gapore in dealing with the effects of the run-down. The ‘Malta precedent’, 
which  Singapore drew on for its negotiations with the British and for 
addressing the effects of the withdrawal, was another slice of the connec-
tion between Singapore and another part of the Commonwealth.
The programmes of national development and social engineering, ena-
bled by Anglo-Singaporean collaboration during the withdrawal, spurred 
the transformation of the island state into an international industrial hub 
in the 1970s and elevated it to a new place in world history.  Rationalist 
projects to commercialise the military facilities, accelerate construction 
works, expand technical and vocational education, retrain redundant 
base workers, and forge a disciplined labour force both provided the raw 
material for Singapore’s growth and mobilised the people into their new 
role as members of a new ‘workers republic’. These were either ongoing 
projects now being systematically expanded in the context of a ‘national 
crisis’ or planned ones which were quickly brought forward. Not all the 
projects were entirely successful: the retraining was often inadequate and 
naturally invoked the resistance of middle-aged clerical workers, while 
the reform of technical and vocational education was to further divide 
the experiences of workers according to skill as well as language and sex. 
Fast pace of work, systematic routines and stress now characterised the 
working lives of many former base employees re-employed in the newly 
commercialised plants of production. Whatever their effects, the projects 
collectively defined the political economy of work in Singapore into the 
1970s and beyond.
Finally, the effects of a decision made in Britain were deeply felt at the 
local level, as the lives of base workers and residents were ‘converted’. 
This encapsulated strikingly James Scott’s point that high modernism 
sought not only to transform nature but also human nature (Scott 1998). 
During the PAP era from 1959 onwards, the British ordnance depots were 
the remaining semi-anachronistic spaces in the city-state which, while in 
their own ways modern, existed largely outside the  well-regulated struc-
tures of the newly emerging state that was predominant on the remain-
der of the island. The base residents, used to the unique blend of the 
material comfort and vernacular base culture of the ‘Little Britains’ and 
‘Kochul Kerala’, found their own identity dramatically redefined by the 
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scope of transformation during the run-down. Formerly ‘servants of the 
British Empire’, they were now being socialised as worker-citizens of the 
post-pull-out state. When they moved out of the bases, often to public 
housing estates close to their workplaces, the sense of community and 
neighbourhood which had for a decade shielded them from the politi-
cal economy of industrialisation gave way to a closely integrated rela-
tionship with the state and international capital. It was, naturally, the 
pull-out which enabled the final phase of the modernisation process 
the British regime had first started a generation earlier at the end of the 
Pacific war to be completed at the bases themselves. Wan Chan Peew, a 
clerk working at the Naval Base, was re-employed in the same vocation 
at Sembawang Shipyard. Recalling the conversion of the bases, the move 
of many base residents into HDB flats and the increase in his working 
hours from 36 to 44 per week, he observed, “It was such a buzz – rather 
than the pull-out!”53
Notes
1 This time-frame refers to the schedule planned in 1968; in fact, smaller British forces 
remained in Singapore until March 1976.
2 FCO 24/1019 Telegram from Arthur de la Mare to Alec Douglas-Home, 3 November 1971.
3 FCO 24/62, Note of a Conversation at the Commonwealth Secretary’s Luncheon for 
Mr Lee Kuan Yew on 16 January 1968.
4 FCO 24/1861, Memo on ANZUK Real Estate by P. G. de Courey-Ireland, South West 
Pacific Department, 10 October 1974.
5 FCO 24/62, Letter from Lee Kuan Yew to Harold Wilson, 18 December 1967.
6 FCO 24/62, Transcript of Interview, ‘Prime Minister Lee Explains his Difficulties’, 15 
January 1968.
7 FCO 24/62, Transcript of a Press Conference Given by the Prime Minister Mr Lee 
Kuan Yew at the City Hall, 9 January 1968.
8 FCO 24/62, Telegram from British High Commission to Commonwealth Office, 5 
January 1966.
9 FCO 24/888, Telegram from Arthur de la Mare to Roy Mason, President of the Board 
of Trade, 29 January 1970.
10 FCO 24/1861, Disposal of Service Assets in Singapore, 29 August 1974.
11 FCO 24/75, Note by the Ministry of Defence on Defence Lands and Fixed Assets in 
Malaysia and Singapore, 9 November 1967.
12 FCO 24/114, Opening Statement by Mr Hon Sui Sen, Leader of the Singapore Delega-
tion, Annex B, 8 March 1968.
13 Radio Corporation of Singapore, audio recording titled ‘Interview with Manual Pillay, 
Economic Development Board’, 6 December 1967.
14 Author’s interview with J.Y.M. Pillay, 26 November 2009.
15 FCO 24/75, Extract from Meeting in Singapore, 12 October 1967.
16 Radio Corporation of Singapore, audio recording titled ‘Interview with Manual Pillay, 
Economic Development Board’, 6 December 1967.
17 FCO 24/327, Telegram from British High Commission to Commonwealth Office, 2 
March 1968.
british military withdrawal from singapore and anatomy of a catalyst 213
18 FCO 24/888, Telegram from Arthur de la Mare to Roy Mason, President of the Board 
of Trade, 29 January 1970.
19 FCO 24/888, Letter from Roy Mason, President of the Board of Trade, to Judith Hart, 
Minister of Overseas Development, 24 February 1970.
20 Ministry of Culture 110/68, Memo from Secretary to the Prime Minister to All Perma-
nent Secretaries and Heads of Departments, 8 February 1968.
21 FCO 24/75, Extract from Presentation by Director of Lands and Claims, Far East Com-
mand, 13 October 1967.
22 FCO 24/114, Negotiations on Aid with Malaysia and Singapore, 8 March 1968.
23 FCO 24/114, Note by the British Delegation on the Transfer of Lands and Fixed 
Assets, Annex C, 8 March 1968; and Note by the British Delegation on the Transfer of 
 Moveable Assets, Annex D, 8 March 1968.
24 FCO 24/62, Transcript of a Press Conference Given by the Prime Minister Mr Lee Kuan 
Yew at the City Hall, 9 January 1968.
25 OD 39/8, Letter from Lee Kuan Yew to Reginald Prentice, Minister for Overseas 
 Development, 15 December 1967.
26 Radio Corporation of Singapore, audio recording titled ‘S. Rajaratnam at Graduation 
Ceremony of 1st Group of Trainees for Redundant Base Civilian Workers’, 29 July 1968.
27 Oral History Centre (henceforth OHC), interview with Hwang Peng Yuan, 29 
August 2002-4 April 2003.
28 Author’s interview with Lim Meng Jock, 17 November 2009.
29 Radio Corporation of Singapore, audio recording titled ‘S. Rajaratnam at Graduation 
Ceremony of 1st Group of Trainees for Redundant Base Civilian Workers’, 29 July 1968.
30 FCO 24/158, Telegram from S. Falle to Michael Walker, Overseas Development Admin-
istration, 21 February 1972.
31 Radio Corporation of Singapore, audio recording titled ‘S. Rajaratnam at the Graduation 
Ceremony of 1st Group of Trainees for Redundant Base Civilian Workers’, 29 July 1968.
32 OHC, interview with Seah Mui Kok, 6 July 1988, 17 June 1994.
33 Radio Corporation of Singapore, audio recording entitled ‘S. Rajaratnam at the Gradu-
ation Ceremony of 1st Group of Trainees for Redundant Base Civilian Workers’, 29 
July 1968.
34 Radio Corporation of Singapore, audio recording titled ‘Conversion of Naval Base – 
Swan Hunter Group’, 18 June 1968.
35 Author’s interview with Lim Shee Chee, 4 December 2009.
36 Author’s interview with John Ng, 16 December 2009.
37 Author’s interview with Ho Shee Lim, 15 December 2009.
38 Author’s interview with Balachandran Nair, 17 December 2009.
39 Author’s interview with Balachandran Nair, 17 December 2009.
40 Author’s interview with John Chai, 28 December 2009.
41 FCO 24/875, Singapore: Annual Review for 1969, 5 February 1970.
42 Author’s email correspondence with Lam Chun Chew, 13-17 November 2009.
43 Author’s interview with George Annadorai, 10 December 2009.
44 Author’s interview with Tan Geok Hak, 17 December 2009.
45 Author’s email correspondence with Song Koon Poh, 4-6 October 2009.
46 Author’s interview with John Ng, 16 December 2009.
47 Author’s interview with Cramon Chenteley, 10 December 2009.
48 Author’s interview with Vanessa Ng, 16 December 2009.
49 Author’s interview with Balachandran Nair, 17 December 2009.
50 Author’s interview with George Annadorai, 10 December 2009.
51 Author’s interview with John Chai, 28 December 2009.
52 FCO 24/1861, Conversation with Mr Lee Kuan Yew, 29 November 1974.
53 Author’s email correspondence with Wan Chan Peew, 10 January 2010.

In recent years scholars of Singapore’s history have called for the 
 historiography of the island to be reconfigured. Reviewing a wide range 
of studies on Singapore’s history and exploring ways to ask new questions 
about the island’s past, historian Albert Lau has proposed that historical 
narratives about the country should be contextualised more broadly. One 
alternative way of narrating Singapore’s history, he suggests, could be 
“within the framework of regional and world history” (Lau 2004: 50-51). 
Like Lau, Derek Heng, Kwa Chong Guan, and Tan Tai Yong have made 
a similar appeal for the Singaporean historical narrative to be rethought 
in a wider context. Eventually collaborating to write such a story, they 
focus in their jointly-authored book on the larger regional and interna-
tional economic and strategic environment that has affected Singapore’s 
development since the fourteenth century. International actors, global 
trade flows, and regional players have shaped the course of Singapore’s 
historically contingent and non-preordained journey towards becoming 
a global city-state (Heng, Kwa & Tan 2009). Finally, another collection of 
articles edited by Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied and Derek Heng have 
likewise reframed the historiography of Singapore, using comparative 
and transnational perspectives to rewrite the island’s history in a broader 
and more cosmopolitan context. The stimulating and thought-provoking 
essays in that volume ask new questions and generate new insights into 
how trans-regional linkages and concerns about global economic com-
petition ultimately shaped histories and identities in Singapore (Heng & 
Aljunied 2009). What ties these recent historiographical trends together 
is a profound recognition that insular narratives which privilege the local 
are no longer intellectually satisfying. Given the fact that Singapore’s eco-
nomic, demographic, and intellectual development has historically not 
been immune to forces unleashed by changing societies elsewhere in 
the world, these recent appeals for a reorientation of Singaporean history 
towards broader contexts and themes could not be timelier. A yawning 
gap needs to be bridged between lived experience and historical schol-
arship. As the island’s longstanding cosmopolitanism has rendered its 
11 Bringing the International and Transnational 
back in: Singapore, Decolonisation,  
and the Cold War
S.R. Joey Long
216 s.r. joey long
society and economy open to external influences and trends, it is impor-
tant to examine how Singapore’s connections to these international and 
transnational movements and developments have shaped its history 
(Harper 1997). The notion of an island entity – geographically situated 
at one of the most important and strategic economic crossroads in the 
world – that is impervious to external influences and developments is 
conceptually limited and historically unrealistic. If historians studying 
the island’s past adopt an analytical focus that is narrowly national and 
insular, they will miss much that has had an impact on Singapore. Con-
versely, to comprehend the multiple dimensions of Singaporean life, it 
is necessary to enmesh Singaporean history with other histories. Local 
history should be investigated in the context and light of other historical 
events taking place across the globe.
An earlier generation of astute historians working on the period prior 
to World War II were indeed sensitive to the connections of the island 
with broader global trends. For example, there is Wong Lin Ken’s work 
on how the opening of the Suez Canal and global economic develop-
ments profoundly affected Singapore’s economic growth during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (1978). Wang Gungwu’s writ-
ings on  Singapore’s demographic history, which is intimately connected 
to  Chinese migration patterns, also comes to mind (2003). And one is 
reminded of Anthony Milner’s scholarship on the movement of ideas, 
namely Islamic doctrines, from the Middle East to porous Singapore, 
which made the island “an Islamic centre of high reputation” before the 
turn of the twentieth century (1995: 159). Not only were these intellectu-
als aware of the wider dimensions of Singapore’s history – they clearly 
understood that commerce, migrants, and ideas crossed national bound-
aries.
Although much has been written about the history of decolonisation in 
Singapore in the twentieth century, tracing the local anti-colonial move-
ment’s campaign of resistance and defiance against the colonial order, 
there remains a telling oversight in the conventional literature’s ana-
lytical focus. The political, diplomatic, and ideological forces that were 
unleashed by the Cold War and which intersected with Southeast Asia’s 
and Singapore’s decolonisation experiences are hardly taken into account. 
Ostensibly following the trend blazed by John Smail (1961) to write histo-
ries that are ‘autonomous’ of external prerogatives and  perspectives, the 
conventional studies tend to confine their narratives to events and per-
sonalities within the fledgling nation-state. In such  studies, the latter is 
uncritically laid out as a self-contained unit where nationalists heroically 
battled and triumphantly overcame colonialists as well as communists 
and communalists to establish a non-communist and multiracial post-
colonial state (Bloodworth 1986; Clutterbuck 1984; Drysdale 1984; Fong 
1980). Such accounts, of course, serve their nation-building purposes. 
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But they have been rightly criticised for being overly didactic and whig-
gishly teleological. The so-called ‘Singapore Story’ that has been pro-
pounded by the victors also blocks out and suppresses other histories 
(Heng & Aljunied 2009; Hong & Huang 2008). Among the histories 
that have been overlooked is Singapore’s connection to the Cold War dur-
ing the years of decolonisation.
The period from 1945 through 1965 was arguably both the best of 
times and the worst of times for peoples in Southeast Asia. Many  within 
the sub-region looked forward to a new order following the end of 
World War II. With the colonial empires in disarray, national  liberation 
and  self-determination were eagerly anticipated. As Southeast Asians 
 organised and tussled to formulate their competing visions of how their 
 fledgling post-colonial states should be established, the Cold War started. 
If “war makes states,” as American scholar Charles Tilly once pointed out, 
so did the Cold War (Tilly 1985: 170). That global conflict has affected each 
of the post-war Southeast Asian states (Goscha &  Ostermann 2009). On 
 Singapore too one can detect the footprints left behind by Cold  Warriors 
and other external actors who sought to push their  agendas and preserve 
their interests on the island.
Motivated by their respective communist and liberal-capitalist ideolo-
gies and by the fear of losing out to their adversaries, the Soviet Union, 
China, and the United States all intervened in the late-colonial world 
to ensure that decolonisation proceeded in a way that advanced their 
interests. Apart from directly intervening in the late-colonial world, the 
major powers also intervened by proxy. International organisations such 
as labour groups sponsored by Moscow and Washington were further 
actively involved in seeking to sway peoples within the  late-colonial and 
post-colonial states into supporting the respective ideological camps 
(ibid; Westad 2005). While the Cold War adversaries tangled, the 
 colonial powers were also making their moves. They were not hurriedly 
 retreating without either putting up a fight or ensuring that their inter-
ests and informal influence were protected in what were progressively 
becoming their former colonies (Louis & Robinson 1994). Research has 
shown that Southeast Asians were not unaware of these manoeuvres 
and counter-manoeuvres. Some even courted great power assistance 
in their  campaigns against their international adversaries, the colonial 
powers, and their domestic rivals (Goscha & Ostermann 2009). National 
 histories that privilege only the heroics of the local tend to neglect such 
stories. The prevailing historiography of Singapore has certainly not 
brought these histories into sharp focus.
By locating Singapore in that complex world where the Cold War 
and decolonisation intersected histories that have been previously over-
looked can be reassessed. Such an approach could clearly contribute to 
a richer understanding of Singapore’s past. As extant stories become 
218 s.r. joey long
defamiliarised, unpredictable, destabilised, and seen in a new light, new-
found inquisitiveness about Singapore’s history could also be  stimulated. 
Historical narratives about Singapore might then rekindle citizens’ 
 engagement of a field of study that has been rendered trite by the influ-
ence of national education (Hong & Huang 2008). Such histories would 
further speak to contemporary concerns about the opportunities and 
stresses of globalisation, about how the nation state is implicated and 
entangled in the transnational flow of ideas, capital, goods, and human 
traffic that connect the island state to other parts of the world.
In the pages that follow, this chapter expands on the call to internationalise 
and trans-nationalise the history of Singapore. The aim here is not to com-
pletely subvert ‘Singapore the nation-state’ as a category for analysis. The 
chapter aims instead to broaden the boundaries of historical investigation 
and to re-examine the cosmopolitan island’s connections to  international 
politics, transnational movements, and global trends.  Specifically, this 
paper includes but also looks beyond the roles played by domestic actors 
in shaping the island’s affairs. It seeks to evaluate the actions and impact 
of colonial actors, a non-governmental organisation and external actors on 
Singapore. It analyzes how British strategic considerations, members of 
a labour international, and American and Taiwanese Cold Warriors influ-
enced decolonisation, provoked domestic conflicts, and contributed to the 
political process in Singapore. By embarking on such analyses, the tradi-
tional themes covered in the history of diplomacy, labour, and politics in 
Singapore are set in a wider context and hopefully enriched.
British Cold War policy and constitutional reform in Singapore
The impact of British Cold War policy on Singapore’s constitutional 
history remains an interesting puzzle that has yet to be satisfactorily 
resolved. In 1954, Britain joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation 
(SEATO). London wanted to collaborate with other powers such as France 
and the United States to thwart communist expansion into Southeast 
Asia.  Britain’s participation in the alliance, however, intertwined SEA-
TO’s concerns with Singapore’s affairs. SEATO burdened Britain with 
demands such that it had to tread carefully with regard to political change 
in Singapore during the 1950s. If Britain hastily granted more political 
autonomy to Singaporeans, this could adversely affect its ability to use the 
military installations on the island for SEATO military operations. How-
ever, if London retarded decolonisation to secure the bases for SEATO 
operations, it would risk incurring the ire of local nationalists. This per-
plexing dilemma with which British planners were confronted has not 
been explored in substantial depth in the literature. Certainly,  writers 
have alluded to SEATO’s influence on the  British decision to reject Chief 
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Minister David Marshall’s demands for greater self-government during 
the 1956 constitutional talks. But how central was SEATO to the British 
decision-making process? This has been not been clearly ascertained.1 
Also puzzling are the different attitudes adopted by the British towards 
Marshall and his successor, Lim Yew Hock. If the  British were tough on 
Marshall during the 1956 constitutional talks, they were more concilia-
tory towards Lim during the 1957 negotiation. What changed? SEATO 
certainly remained in operation throughout the period. The Harold 
 Macmillan administration also intensified its support for the alliance and 
endeavoured to strengthen SEATO’s deterrent capacities by upgrading 
the bases in Singapore for nuclear operations (Jones 2003). Yet the Brit-
ish ultimately entertained Lim’s demands for more political autonomy. 
Scholars have argued that it was Lim’s strident anti-communism that won 
Britain’s confidence (Drysdale 1984). This contention has merit. But were 
there other considerations? As in Marshall’s case, factors beyond the local 
would weigh heavily on the British decision to compromise. The outcome 
and repercussions of the October 1956 Suez crisis, in particular, would 
sway British minds. In sum, the subject explored here suggests that it is 
by locating the two historical episodes in their wider regional and interna-
tional contexts and showing how the external intersected with the domes-
tic that the British decisions during the 1956 and 1957 constitutional talks 
become easier to understand.
Formed in September 1954, SEATO was a product of the Eisenhower 
administration’s containment policy. It was an institution of collective 
defence, established to defend the non-communist Southeast Asian 
states from communist aggression (Dingman 1989).2 Despite Britain’s 
initial misgivings about the lack of Asian representation in the alliance, 
it joined SEATO because it believed the organisation could help defend 
Malaya and Singapore against communist aggression and enable the bur-
den of defence against communism in the sub-region to be shared among 
a larger pool of actors.3 Through Britain’s membership in the  alliance, 
however, Singapore was entwined in SEATO’s military operations. When 
SEATO strategists crafted defence plans from 1956 onwards, British rep-
resentatives agreed to designate Singapore as one of the key operations 
and logistics hub from which the alliance’s forces could be deployed to 
deal with a communist assault into Southeast Asia. So important was 
the island to these plans that British officials mused that “if Britain sur-
rendered the Singapore bases, S.E.A.T.O. would collapse.”4 As British 
planners were determined to adhere to their alliance commitments, they 
sought to ensure that the island’s bases would remain under firm British 
control.5 But developments in Singapore seemed to threaten that aspira-
tion. Agitation for political autonomy was becoming increasingly vocifer-
ous, and the recently-elected local administration did not appear capable 
of helping the British preserve the security of the bases.
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To defuse hostile sentiments against colonial rule, the colonial 
 government in Singapore had agreed to accept the reformation of the local 
constitution in 1954, granting Singapore greater internal  self-government. 
Elections held under this constitution in 1955 eventually paved the way for 
a local government to be formed. The new administration, which was led 
by David Marshall of the Singapore Labour Front, oversaw most domestic 
 matters, while the British retained control of foreign affairs, internal secu-
rity, and external defence. A deal was struck, nevertheless, for both sides 
to negotiate further for greater internal authority –  principally domestic 
police powers – to be handed over to the local government. The talks were 
scheduled to be held in London from late April through May 1956 and the 
Singapore delegation would be led by Marshall.
The British, however, were becoming increasingly disillusioned 
with Marshall and the pace of the political reforms. Military officers 
in  Singapore, in particular, balked at the threat the political reforms 
were posing to their capacity to meet Britain’s SEATO obligations. The 
Marshall administration’s ostensible inability to deal decisively with the 
widespread riots that erupted in 1955 distressed officers such as Gen-
eral Charles Loewen of General Headquarters, Far East Land Forces 
(GHQFELF). The mayhem, which shut down public services and 
blocked roads across the island, demonstrated that social disorder in 
Singapore could isolate the British military installations and cripple 
British regional military  operations. As the constitutional talks between 
Marshall and Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd approached, Loewen 
pointedly reminded London that Britain had commitments to regional 
institutions such as SEATO. Any political concessions granted Mar-
shall must therefore not weaken domestic security in Singapore and 
undercut Britain’s ability to support the alliance.6 For members of the 
 British Defence Co-ordination Committee Far East (BDCCFE), social 
order would be secured and regional responsibilities advanced if the 
British right to permit allied forces from organisations such as SEATO 
to use the bases, the British entitlement to control lands for military 
purposes, and the British control of internal security were retained.7 
Likewise, the top brass in London weighed in with the same stipula-
tions.8 In March 1956, the service chiefs further stated that, because 
Singapore was critical to the success of SEATO’s military operations and 
the defence of British interests in Southeast Asia, British negotiators 
should not hand domestic police powers over to local politicians. Such 
a move might undermine the security of the bases and hinder Britain’s 
capacity to meet its regional treaty obligations.9
Marshall, of course, was unaware that London’s position on internal 
security had stiffened when he declared in the Legislative Assembly in 
April 1956 that he would resign if the Colonial Office refused to surrender 
domestic police powers to the elected government.10 The chief minister 
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evidently saw external and internal security matters as administratively 
and operationally distinct, and was prepared to permit the British to over-
see the former while insisting locals handled the latter. But British offi-
cials viewed the two as inextricably linked. If the security of the bases 
was not adequately protected, London’s capacity to back SEATO would be 
severely undermined. With the Cabinet endorsing the military’s counsel 
that authority over internal security should remain under British control 
and with Marshall holding firmly to a converse view, the stage was set for 
the constitutional talks to collapse.11
It is by situating the April through May negotiations in the wider  context 
of British Cold War policy that the outcome of the talks and  Marshall’s 
reaction to the outcome become more comprehensible. Adhering to his 
government’s policy, Lennox-Boyd refused to turn internal security over 
to Marshall. With the colonial secretary conceding nothing, the chief 
minister returned to Singapore from London empty-handed. Marshall 
finally did understand, though, and with some bitterness, that the Brit-
ish viewed internal and external security matters as closely interlinked. 
Speaking in the Legislative Assembly on 6 June, Marshall resentfully 
charged that the British had refused to surrender their police powers 
because they wanted to continue to oversee the security of the bases and 
ensure that they were able to honour their obligations to SEATO. Pro-
gress towards greater self-government, Marshall angrily proclaimed, had 
been sacrificed as “a live offering to their god of brass, S.E.A.T.O.”12
International and regional politics, therefore, were very much at the 
core of Singapore’s decolonisation story. The reasons why constitutional 
reform in Singapore did not evolve to the next stage in 1956 are better 
understood when the island’s constitutional history is set in the wider 
context of the Cold War and British strategic priorities. Britain’s Cold 
War concerns and commitment to SEATO had evidently affected political 
developments in Singapore. Historical narratives that focus only on local 
struggles and contexts tend to neglect these larger factors that affected 
Singapore’s decolonisation experience. Indeed, if historical knowledge 
on why Marshall failed to make a breakthrough in the 1956 constitutional 
talks is enhanced when the context is widened, one’s understanding of 
his successor’s – Lim Yew Hock’s – success in obtaining concessions 
from the British can be further improved when the international context 
is incorporated into the analysis.
Unlike Marshall, who kept his word and resigned after the failed 
talks, Lim dealt with a less confident Britain. Lim confronted a British 
government that was keen to restore its moral authority after participat-
ing in a fiasco in Egypt. In October 1956, the British joined France and 
Israel in attempting to seize the Suez Canal. Global opinion, however, 
was against them. They were ultimately forced into a humiliating retreat, 
but not  without suffering serious damage to their international standing. 
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In Singapore, local politicians angrily denounced Britain’s imperialist 
actions. It seemed that Britain remained an unreconstructed imperialist 
and was not sincere about progressively devolving power to locals.13 To 
Colonial Office officials who were most sensitive to colonial opinion, Suez 
was a severe  setback. If Britain was no longer viewed as an enlightened 
colonial power that was preparing its colonies for eventual autonomy, Brit-
ish colonial policy would be treated with derision. Instead of an orderly 
transfer of power to those who the British trusted, militant groups might 
become more influential, hijack the anti-colonial movement, and force 
the British out. Lennox-Boyd – mindful of such  eventualities – lamented 
the fact that the Suez debacle had undercut much of the goodwill that 
was generated by Britain’s widely-publicised declaration to grant Malaya 
self-government. The same official who rebuffed Marshall now advised 
that Lim’s requests should be accommodated at the next constitutional 
talks. If the British alienated and undermined politicians such as Lim, 
Lennox-Boyd reasoned that extremists and communists might exploit 
Lim’s failures and the anti-colonial climate to enhance their political influ-
ence. With hostile forces in power, Britain’s unhindered use of its military 
installations on the island would be complicated. Significantly, Lim made 
British officials aware of that possibility in a private meeting in August. 
The British consequently decided that they would prefer to deal with Lim. 
He could be trusted as he had shown thus far that he was not militantly 
anti-British. Lim, furthermore, had been firm in suppressing agitators in 
Singapore. The more bellicose types, conversely, were less likely to con-
sent to British bases remaining on the island in exchange for political 
concessions.14
Colonial officials, therefore, seriously re-examined Lim’s plan, which 
he had floated in August 1956, to break the deadlock between the two 
sides. The contentious issue remained control over internal security. 
Lim resurrected Marshall’s proposal, which Lennox-Boyd had earlier 
 rejected, to introduce a tie-breaker Malayan vote into a security coun-
cil that oversaw domestic security. As the Malayan representative would 
most likely support Britain in prosecuting militants in Singapore, the 
British government should have little reason to worry about the safety 
of its bases.15 Although military officials became apprehensive about the 
deal and continued to advise caution, they finally concurred with the 
Colonial Office’s recommendation to compromise.16 Power was being 
transferred to friendly elements in Singapore, after all. If Britain showed 
itself to be a progressive colonial state, it could nurture amiable relations 
with Singaporeans who would be less likely to attack the Britain bases 
and cripple British regional operations. Still, the service chiefs would 
take no risks. They demanded that control of the bases should be secured 
from Lim “as of existing right” rather than via a treaty. This arrangement 
would enable Britain to continue to use  Singapore for SEATO and other 
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regional defence activities. Their demands were communicated to the 
Colonial Office, which was, in turn, requested to convey them to Lim.17
As the Lim government had neither the wish nor the capacity to 
manage external security, the talks in March and April 1957 went very 
smoothly. The British agreed to Lim’s proposal to form a committee com-
prising an equal number of British and Singaporean representatives plus 
one Malayan to manage internal security. Amendments would be made 
to the constitution, granting Singapore complete internal autonomy. 
 Britain would continue to oversee external security and would acquire 
the right to occupy and use the bases to meet its regional treaty obliga-
tions. A balance was finally struck – an arrangement that accommodated 
local political aspirations as well as British ambitions to exploit Singapore 
in order to advance their regional commitments.18
What the preceding narrative suggests is that the Cold War, SEATO, 
the Suez crisis, and the desire to maintain informal influence in the 
post-colonial state were critical factors that weighed heavily on Britain’s 
dealings with local politicians during the 1950s. Lim, of course, played 
his part by exploiting the international and domestic contexts to remind 
 British officials to deal justly with locals and to accommodate their politi-
cal aspirations. Such insights, of course, depend on liberating the narra-
tive from the domestic and locating it in wider processes and trends. In 
that broader framework, there was a balance in that neither the power 
of the coloniser nor that of the colonised in shaping the constitutional 
 process was overstated. Constitutional reform was the prerogative of the 
British in 1956 when they held the moral high ground on colonial mat-
ters. But Lim Yew Hock possessed the upper hand in 1957. By bring-
ing both the international and domestic contexts into sharper focus, the 
narrative helps underscore not only Lim’s agency in shaping the histori-
cal process, but also helps explain why constitutional progress advanced 
in 1957 and not in 1956. The local politician’s manoeuvres intersected 
in complex ways with the broader environment to affect constitutional 
reform in Singapore. By weaving all of these coexisting stories together, 
the historical narrative that is generated accentuates the limits of the 
power of the coloniser in dominating political change as well as the inge-
nuity of local politicians in harnessing metropolitan fears and  anxieties 
to advance their political programmes.
Transnational labour in Singapore
Apart from Singapore’s constitutional history, another area of study 
which can potentially be enriched if it is connected to wider contexts is 
the island’s labour history. Recent writings (Harper 2001; Wee 1999; 
Liew 2004; Liew 2006) have taken the ‘social turn’ and moved beyond 
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 traditional studies that focused on the ideological proclivities and politics 
of the labour movement (Drysdale 1984: 175-6, 182-5; Lee 1996). Exam-
ined and unpacked are the social aspirations of the workers and union-
ists and their everyday resistance and adaptation to social oppression 
and struggles. Still unstudied in great detail, however, is local labour’s 
connection to international labour groups. By tracing and analyzing the 
Singaporean workers’ movement’s relations to these organisations and 
weaving both of these histories together, the dynamics and meaning 
of the labour experience in 1950s Singapore can be better understood. 
One international labour organisation whose members were particularly 
active on the island was the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU). Indeed, to fully understand the intrigues and con-
flict between the pro-Labour Front government Singapore Trade Union 
 Congress (STUC) and the combative unions that were established along 
Middle Road, one has to appreciate the role played by ICFTU officials in 
hardening the divisions in Singapore’s labour movement. This section 
addresses that subject.
The ICFTU was an international labour organisation established in 
1949 to further the interests of non-communist unions worldwide. With 
the consent of the colonial authorities, it opened an office in Singapore in 
1951 and recruited the STUC as an affiliate.19 While the office consulted 
with local unions on collective bargaining and labour organisation dur-
ing the initial years, its activities on the island intensified from the mid-
dle of 1955, when it was called on to confront the so-called ‘Middle Road’ 
unions. The belligerent Middle Road leaders had initiated a series of 
strikes and labour unrest from March through June 1955, crippling many 
industries and threatening to bring the whole of Singapore to a standstill. 
With about 35,000 of the 120,000 blue-collar labourers in Singapore 
under its sway, Middle Road’s influence appeared to be on the upswing.20
These labour developments dismayed American Cold Warriors who 
thought the island was on the verge of union-led communist  subversion. 
If Singapore fell, American policymakers feared that this would trig-
ger a domino effect and lead to the collapse of other neighbouring 
states to communism. Such an outcome would be disastrous for US 
 containment policy in Asia. American officials thus decided to act. In 
dealing with labour problems in Singapore, US policymakers believed 
the  non-communist STUC should be strengthened and aided in the 
fight against Middle Road. The Americans also appealed to the ICFTU 
to help its  Singaporean affiliate.21 Such a request to the ICFTU was, in 
fact, dispatched in October 1955.22 Responding to the American entreaty 
and  following a similar though uncoordinated plea by British officials, the 
ICFTU dispatched Dhyan Mungat, the ICFTU’s Asian Regional  Secretary, 
and Thomas Bavin, a specialist union organiser from the ICFTU and 
International Trade Secretariats of Land, and Food and Drink Workers, to 
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Singapore.23 On their part, the Americans sent George  Leon-Paul Weaver, 
an African American labour official, to help the ICFTU and STUC. To 
avert any misunderstandings that the effort to strengthen the STUC was 
an American undertaking, Weaver obtained the consent of the ICFTU 
to operate in Singapore as its official.24 Adhering to diplomatic protocol, 
permission was further sought and eventually obtained from the British 
for Weaver to work with the ICFTU on the island.25
In seeking to build up the STUC, the ICFTU representatives had 
their work cut out. The STUC suffered from weak leadership and lacked 
staff to advance its programmes. It also lacked funds and did not have a 
proper office. In contrast, Middle Road was led by dynamic and young 
organisers who had little difficulty finding supporters or keeping their 
cause well-financed.26 Additionally, although the two umbrella organi-
sations differed in terms of their approaches to collective bargaining 
(the latter adopting a more antagonistic line), members of the two sides 
 tended to gravitate towards each other, as both ultimately understood that 
they were fighting for the common cause of workers’ rights.27 To pre-
vent Middle Road and its leaders from dominating the STUC and the 
labour scene, therefore, the ICFTU had to ensure that its affiliate had 
the means and the will to prevail in Singapore. In fact, as will be seen, 
without the ICFTU’s intervention, the STUC might have been absorbed 
into  Middle Road.
In the event, work to enhance the STUC proceeded in earnest once 
Weaver joined the ICFTU officials in Singapore from June 1956. First, 
Weaver was able to raise US$5,000 from his parent organisation in 
the United States, the Congress of Industrial Organisations, to aid the 
STUC. The money was subsequently used to furnish the bare STUC 
office and to employ a number of new staff. Second, the ICFTU advis-
ers attempted to increase the STUC’s revenues by reforming the way 
union dues were collected. Instead of directing the unions to pay a fixed 
sum to the STUC annually, the ICFTU proposed to the STUC leader-
ship that every union member should pay the institution M$0.50 yearly. 
Unions with a large membership such as the 15,000-strong Army Civil 
Services Union, therefore, would generate more funds for the STUC 
than in the old system. Third, the ICFTU organisers helped the STUC 
to round up smaller-sized affiliates and merge them into larger bodies. 
They effectively reasoned with the unionists of the smaller entities that 
their bargaining power would grow if they combined forces. Fourth, 
they sought to strengthen the STUC’s management. They helped to spot 
future leaders, and crafted organisation and negotiation programmes 
to train the next generation of STUC bosses. Fifth, they supported the 
STUC in collective bargaining. One such endeavour, which lasted from 
mid-1956 through early 1957, involved the Ford Motor Factory. Weaver 
mobilised his contacts in the United Auto Workers (UAW), and, together 
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with Bavin, engaged the Ford management in Singapore via a complex 
series of negotiations and strikes involving the Ford Motor Companies in 
Canada and the United States, the UAW, the US Department of State, the 
Malayan Trades Union Council, the ICFTU, and the STUC. Finally, the 
ICFTU representatives repeatedly fought off Middle Road’s attempts to 
bring STUC members into its fold. Preaching labour solidarity and that 
strength lay in numbers, Middle Road’s reconciliatory rhetoric had won 
over a number of STUC members. These unionists even attempted to 
rewrite STUC’s constitution to permit an amalgamation of STUC and a 
key Middle Road group, the Singapore Factory and Shop Workers’ Union. 
Bavin, however, intervened and dissuaded the STUC leaders from follow-
ing through with the initiative. Weaver, meanwhile, used every opportu-
nity given him to sow discord between Middle Road and STUC. When 
he was asked to speak at a gathering of Rotarians in August 1956, for 
example, he tore into Middle Road’s radicalism and told the meeting that 
employers would do better to negotiate with the STUC than trust Middle 
Road to honour any agreement.28
Overall, the outcome of the ICFTU’s interventions was mixed, but 
ultimately instructive of the manner in which external actors influenced 
labour developments in Singapore. Although Weaver’s initial injection 
of funds gave the STUC a new lease of life, the ICFTU could do little 
to resolve the longer-term financial health of the institution. By May 
1957, the 65,000-strong STUC was again short of funds as its affiliated 
union chiefs refused to adhere to the ICFTU’s proposal to reform the 
subscription process. Lacking money, the STUC management thus laid 
off its recently employed staff, and sharply retrenched its services and 
programmes. Still, through its efforts, the ICFTU did manage to help 
the STUC persuade unions representing seamen as well as workers in 
the financial sector to combine forces and strengthen their bargaining 
power. On the STUC’s behalf, Bavin’s and Weaver’s intervention at the 
Ford Motor Factory also turned out to be successful, with the employers 
eventually agreeing to improve the employees’ working conditions and 
to give them a much-needed wage hike. And lastly, the ICFTU officials 
decisively ended talk of any merger between Middle Road and STUC, 
with their activities provoking Middle Road’s hostility towards the STUC 
and ICFTU. This was one outcome the ICFTU worked hard to sustain 
and achieved it.29
What the discussion above shows is that labour’s divisions during the 
1950s were not preordained or immutable. Certainly, there was local 
rivalry and antagonism among the different labour factions. Yet external 
elements with interests beyond Singapore’s domestic concerns also inter-
vened to harden the rift. Labour developments on the island thus became 
caught up not only in domestic issues, but also in Cold War  politics. 
Historical analyses that focus only on the local would have missed those 
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domestic-external links and been historically poorer for doing so. They 
would have further overlooked the state of play in local labour’s struggles 
with multinational companies in Singapore, and their connections to 
international business and politics. The labour movement in Singapore 
was certainly not isolated from external solidarities that championed the 
same issues that it advocated locally: better working conditions, equitable 
pay, and social justice. Workers and unionists in Singapore had interna-
tionalist outlooks that went beyond the  boundaries of the island, and they 
did not hesitate to look to these solidarities to push their cause if such 
external assistance was warranted or available. By locating Singapore’s 
labour history in wider contexts and liberating it from the restrictions of 
the local, the complexity of its past is more accurately captured.
Internationalising domestic politics
While complex socio-political forces interacted and intersected in mul-
tifaceted ways to affect the labour movement in Singapore during the 
1950s, the island’s domestic politics was also not shielded from interna-
tional politics. Indeed, it was in the late-colonial and post-colonial world 
that much of the Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the 
United States was played out. It was also in the so-called Third World that 
intra-alliance tensions brewed over questions related to imperial busi-
ness and the manner in which the decolonisation process was advancing 
in the European empires. In Singapore, Britain faced challenges to its 
authority not only from local adversaries, but also from its allies, such 
as the United States. Although both shared similar strategic objectives 
in the Cold War and both were equally resolved to prevent late-colonial 
states such as Singapore from becoming subverted by communists, their 
methods for achieving those aims differed significantly. In fact, while the 
British readily cooperated in most instances with the Americans on the 
external defence of late-colonial states, London remained wary about per-
mitting Washington to intervene directly in the empire’s internal affairs 
(Louis 1987). During the 1950s, British officials had sent such a signal 
to American diplomats based in Singapore. Following the establishment 
of David Marshall’s government in 1955, the British had admonished 
the Americans and other foreign diplomats on the island to seek their 
agreement before engaging with local officials. The Americans, however, 
refused to comply, stealthily proceeding to meet with and cultivate the 
politicians as they saw fit.30
On their part, Singaporean officials were undoubtedly aware of the 
international and domestic environments in which they operated. His-
torians who overlook the broader context in which domestic politics 
developed during the 1950s invariably miss the political games that the 
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politicians played with external actors. Discussed in this section are Lim 
Yew Hock’s and Chew Swee Kee’s attempts to acquire foreign largesse for 
their party’s (the Singapore Labour Front, and after 1958, the Singapore 
People’s Alliance) political activities. Their actions offer intriguing exam-
ples of how local politicians acted with inventive agendas and political 
guile to further their individual and party interests. Rather than one-
dimensional nationalists, anti-colonialists, or anti-communists, whose 
sole purpose was to rid Singapore of their adversaries and establish their 
political agendas on the island, the local personalities were also skilful 
political players who exploited the opportunities created by Cold War 
dynamics and the uncertainties of decolonisation to advance their per-
sonal and political ambitions.
Lim Yew Hock’s strident anti-communism was particularly decisive in 
convincing US officials that he was worth supporting. The pro- Western 
and anticommunist image that he projected and attempted to sell to 
his potential foreign benefactor is testament to his astute appreciation 
of US political proclivities. In June 1956, shortly after becoming Chief 
Minister, Lim had told an American diplomat that he was determined 
to lead Singapore “towards a positive anti-communist position” and 
that he hoped the United States would “help [him] from time to time.”31 
Apart from restoring order and seeking to win the confidence of the 
British, Lim’s decisive measures against student and labour unrest in 
October 1956 were also calculated to establish his anticommunist cre-
dentials with the Americans. He would succeed. Following the crack-
down, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles wrote the American 
consul-general in Singapore, requesting that he convey Washington’s 
admiration of the Lim government’s resolute stance against commu-
nism.32 Under Lim, it seemed, late-colonial and post-colonial Singapore 
would not gravitate to the communist camp. That outcome, of course, 
hinged on his party staying in power. And for his party to stay in power, 
adequate finances were needed to fight elections. But as the Singapore 
Labour Front  prepared to contest the 1959 general election, which 
would usher in the commencement of full internal self-government in 
Singapore, Lim knew he needed to get his party’s finances in order. He 
approached the US government for financial assistance.
In November 1957, George Weaver, who had previously worked with 
Lim on labour matters in Singapore, carried a message from the chief 
minister to State Department officials in Washington. Weaver told the 
officers that Lim’s party was in need of funds and that the chief minister 
might approach the US government for aid. Queried about the sum of 
money Lim needed, Weaver “indicated that Lim thinks he will need about 
$100,000 (U.S.) to finance his political campaign.” He added, however, 
that from the American viewpoint, “any such assistance would be a cal-
culated risk and would involve two important problems: 1) how to handle 
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the payments and 2) how to monitor Lim’s disbursements.” If those two 
issues could be appropriately addressed, however, Lim should be aided.33
US State Department officers subsequently resolved to aid Lim. 
They thought about Weaver’s two stipulations, and eventually decided 
to approach British diplomats in Washington as well as British offic-
ers in Singapore to explore the possibility of funding Lim’s party. The 
long and short of this story is that these efforts ultimately came to a 
dead end. The British governor in Singapore, William Goode, ruled the 
proposal politically hazardous and potentially counterproductive. With 
the governor emphatically opposed to any external attempts to fund the 
Singapore People’s Alliance during the 1959 general election, the State 
Department refrained from interfering overtly in the domestic politics 
of Singapore.34
Although Lim’s effort to obtain financial support from the Ameri-
can diplomats fell through, his appeals for aid were taken seriously by 
 another American institution. It is unclear how the American Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) got wind of Lim’s predicament, but the cov-
ert agency decided to intervene. To resolve the difficulties Weaver raised 
about plausible deniability and American oversight of the use of the 
financial aid, the CIA communicated with a third party to handle the 
monetary transaction. Details of this third party – an ex-World War II 
psychological warfare expert turned businessman who was living in 
California – were furnished to the CIA by the Australian Secret Intel-
ligence Service (Toohey 1989). The CIA approached the businessman 
and obtained his pledge to assist the Lim government. Yet whether or 
not the third party did inject money into the Singapore Labour Front’s 
campaign war chest remains a mystery. The available primary and sec-
ondary sources on the affair are silent on any financial transaction being 
made (Smith 1976: 205-209 & 236-238). Still, it is notable here that 
Lim’s appeal had sent American officials from the CIA as well as the 
State Department scurrying to aid him. He was a shrewd politician who 
clearly knew how to exploit American insecurities about the Cold War for 
domestic political gain. Historical studies that depict Lim as a politically 
naïve and one-dimensional anticommunist Chief Minister need to be 
revised. The behaviour of politicians such as Lim are better understood 
when they are studied in the wider context of the Cold War, decolonisa-
tion, and domestic Singaporean politics.
While Lim Yew Hock managed to manoeuvre the Americans into locat-
ing campaign funds for him, Education Minister Chew Swee Kee was cul-
tivating another potential patron. Although Britain had accorded formal 
recognition to the People’s Republic of China, Chew had identified with 
Taiwan’s anti-communism and was nurturing close relations with Tai-
wanese representatives in Singapore. It is uncertain whether he expected 
something in return, but his overtures to the Taiwanese would eventually 
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bear fruit. When Chew set off on a tour of Japan and Hong Kong in Sep-
tember 1957 to solicit campaign contributions for the Singapore Labour 
Front, the Taiwanese representatives in Singapore arranged for the edu-
cation minister to meet with their foreign minister, George Yeh, in Hong 
Kong. At this meeting, Chew and Yeh talked about the political situation 
in Singapore. Yeh expressed his government’s appreciation for the Lim 
administration’s firm stance against communism while Chew reaffirmed 
his government’s intent to continue to deal decisively with Chinese com-
munist subversion in Singapore. More significantly, they discussed ways 
in which the Jiang Jieshi government could help the Lim administration 
fight communists on the island.35 Ostensibly, one of the ways in which 
Taiwan could assist the Lim Yew Hock government was by providing cam-
paign funds, which Chew subsequently received in October 1957. And in 
April 1958, there would be another infusion of money into the politician’s 
personal account.36 Unhappily for Chew and the incumbent government, 
details of the transactions and how Chew had misappropriated some of 
the donated cash were leaked and published in the media on the eve of 
the 1959 general election. Rival politicians swiftly took advantage of the 
exposé to verbally skewer the Singapore People’s Alliance and its politi-
cians for corruption. The Chew Swee Kee affair, in the end, dealt a fatal 
blow to the Singapore People’s Alliance’s hopes of carrying the election. 
Chew’s political career came to a scandalous end in 1959 (Ong 1975: 69).
Despite the opprobrium the education minister brought on his party 
and himself, it must nevertheless be recognised that Chew’s  interactions 
with and success in obtaining Taiwanese support for the Singapore 
 People’s  Alliance clearly reflect deft diplomacy. He evidently  understood 
that Singapore was embedded in the security interests of another state, 
which believed that the stakes in Singapore were sufficiently high to 
 warrant intervention against perceived communist subversion of the 
 strategic island. Sino-Taiwanese rivalry and the Cold War had transformed 
Singapore’s domestic politics into an international one with implications 
for the global balance of power. Equipped with that understanding, Chew 
could connect with his Taiwanese interlocutors and obtain the help that 
he thought was necessary for political success. For the electorate, however, 
his diplomatic skills did not excuse his lapses of character. Caught mis-
handling political donations for apparent personal gain, Chew would find 
himself and his party rejected by voters during the 1959 general election.
The foregoing discussion shows how the Cold War, American and 
 Taiwanese concerns about communism, and Singapore’s domestic 
politics could intersect in intricate ways to engender profound histori-
cal outcomes in Singapore. The complex interaction and deals brokered 
among different personalities in different parts of the world would con-
verge on the island and shape its politics during the 1950s. By bring-
ing them together in the narrative, new information and new angles for 
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understanding the lives, actions, and times of historical personalities 
such as Lim Yew Hock and Chew Swee Kee are illuminated. Like Lim, 
Chew is one among many multi-dimensional and enterprising personali-
ties in Singapore’s political history who should be reviewed and re-exam-
ined. For a start, they are more richly understood when they are located 
in wider concerns and contexts. Such renditions make these characters 
more complicated, to be sure. But the politicians also turn out to be more 
colourful and  multifaceted than they have thus far been portrayed in the 
literature. Their lives, aspirations, and personalities, however flawed or 
honourable, convey a cosmopolitanism and internationalism that tran-
scended the nationalist politics of their times.
Conclusion
With society in post-war Singapore marked by cosmopolitan sentiment 
and thought it is incumbent on historians to locate the history of Singapore 
in wider international and transnational frameworks. Contexts influence 
historical narratives, and broader contexts can shed new light on themes 
and subjects traditionally covered from a parochial national perspec-
tive. Singapore is clearly not an island to itself. Its history was bound 
up with world history and has been shaped by global historical events. 
And its history has also contributed to shaping global events such as the 
Cold War and the decolonisation of empires. The episodes discussed 
here merely offer a glimpse into the complexity of the developments in 
Singapore, and how they relate to Britain’s retreat from empire and the 
Cold War. But they are indicative of the fruitfulness of locating Singapore 
in world history. The circumstances of the Cold War imposed demands 
on the British that cut into their dealings with Singaporean politicians 
who were eager to taste new constitutional freedoms, suggesting that the 
autonomy of local actors in pursuing more liberties from colonial rule 
can be exaggerated. Yet, by expanding the context in which constitutional 
change evolved during the 1950s, the narrative presented here shows that 
local politicians such as Lim Yew Hock could also work the trends in 
international politics to their advantage. Such a manoeuvre would simi-
larly be pursued by Lim and his party colleague, Chew Swee Kee, in their 
quests for campaign contributions from foreign actors for their politi-
cal organisation. Finally, as social space opened up in Singapore with 
the progressive British retreat from empire, external actors, concerned 
about the security implications of the British withdrawal and its impact 
on the power balance in the Cold War, would rush in to press their claims 
on how these yawning spaces should be filled and shaped. To under-
stand why and what the ICFTU and its supporters did in Singapore is to 
understand how they contributed to the labour movement on the island, 
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ultimately missing a turn towards greater unity and consolidation during 
the 1950s. By bringing the international and transnational back in, new 
ways of comprehending the social and political histories of Singapore 
can be examined. The decolonisation period and its intersection with the 
Cold War should prove fruitful for further research.
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“You can always survive a mistake in domestic affairs but you can 
get  killed by one made in foreign policy” (Freeman 1997: 154)
“The foreign policy of Singapore must ensure, regardless of 
the nature of the government it has from time to time that this 
migrant community that brought in life, vitality, enterprise from 
many parts of the world should always find an oasis here whatever 
happens in the surrounding environment”2
Introduction
In studying Lee’s strategic thought, it is imperative to ask: what do I 
mean by ‘strategic thought’? The term ‘strategy’ means different things 
to different scholars. In the words of a strategic studies scholar, Bernard 
Loo, “at the end of the day, however, it seems to me that these notions 
of strategy really focus on the traditional definitions of security – the 
absence of external threats to states, in terms of both sovereignty as well 
as territorial integrity. In that regard, conceptions of geopolitics and how 
it translates into foreign policy exist quite comfortably within the rubric 
of security; and strategy (however defined) can be thought of as the logic 
that underpins the ways in which the use of instruments of power and 
force (both military as well as non-military) helps to ensure this ‘secu-
rity’.”3 This article is therefore about Lee Kuan Yew’s philosophy on for-
eign policy, his thinking on geopolitics as well as war and peace, all the 
while bearing in mind Raymond Aron’s dictum that strategic thought 
“draws its inspiration each century, or rather at each moment in history, 
from the problems which events pose” (Buchan 1970).
Lee’s strategic thought was essentially shaped by Singapore’s  unique 
situation as a small island state without a hinterland located in a strategic 
yet vulnerable region. It was formed against the backdrop of the worsen-
ing Cold War between the anti-communist West and the expanding com-
munist bloc, which stretched across the Eurasian mainland to China, with 
the nations of the nascent non-aligned movement caught somewhere in 
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between. As Lee reminded his audience in his S.  Rajaratnam Lecture in 
2009, “small countries have little power to alter the region, let alone the 
world.” The strategic challenge Lee faced from the very beginning was 
how to ensure “Singapore’s survival and prosperity as a sovereign and 
independent nation” (Lee Kuan Yew 2009: 5).
While much has been written about Lee and his leadership role in 
the development of Singapore, almost all studies have focused on his 
domestic policies and on issues of governance with hardly any reference 
to his foreign policy thinking. None of the reviews of Lee’s memoirs, The 
Singapore Story have much to say about his foreign policy. This is some-
what surprising considering the fact that Lee is generally acknowledged 
as Asia’s leading strategic thinker4, one who does not flatter but “who is 
known, from time to time, to speak bluntly”5, and someone who helps “us 
find direction in a complicated world.”6 There is therefore a gap in the 
literature waiting to be filled and ample space for a historian’s treatment 
of this subject.
This article is part of a much larger research project which attempts to 
document and contextualise the change and continuity of Lee’s strategic 
thinking and its evolution from the 1950s when he first embarked on a 
political career, to the present. With reference to timeframes, Lee’s tenure 
as Prime Minister coincided with the period of the Cold War. His tenure 
as Senior Minister (a title that he assumed after stepping down as Prime 
Minister in November 1990) and Minister Mentor (since August 2004) 
fell rather neatly into the post-Cold War period. This article however cov-
ers only the period from the 1950s to 1975 – the end of the Vietnam War 
and before the start of what is commonly known as the Second Cold War. 
As Lee noted, the fundamentals of Singapore’s foreign policy were forged 
during those “vulnerable early years” (Lee Kuan Yew 2009: 5).
With regard to sources, the documents of the Foreign and Defence Min-
istries (MFA and Mindef) as well as the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) 
remain closed (indefinitely). Without access to the primary documents, 
Lee’s two-volume memoir is possibly the next best source and a logical 
starting point for any research on Lee’s thoughts and actions. The mem-
oirs, we are told, had drawn on “unpublished Cabinet papers, archives in 
Singapore, Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the United States, as well 
as personal correspondence” (Lee 1998 & 2000). Accurate though they 
may be, memoirs cannot substitute for and can at best only supplement 
the documents of the period under study. For this paper, I am focusing 
my attention exclusively on the transcripts of Lee Kuan Yew’s speeches, 
talks and interviews pertaining to international politics from the 1950s to 
1975. This choice of source merits some elaboration. Lee delivered many 
speeches, gave numerous talks and interviews on the major international 
geopolitical issues of the day. These are easily accessible7, but have sur-
prisingly not been tapped into by scholars. One possible reason is that 
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historians these days consider records of what politicians said publicly as 
inferior to archival documents. Paul Readman reminded us that historians 
had always made use of speeches – from the Greek and Roman  historians 
to the historians of the nineteenth century (Dobson & Zieman 2009). 
This paper systematically examines Lee’s public statements on interna-
tional politics over the years – a valuable but underrated source (Dobson 
& Zieman 2009). Interestingly, Lee Kuan Yew indirectly gave some advice 
on how to interpret his political speeches and related  statements. In his 
speeches, talks and interviews, Lee said he needed to strike a balance 
between (a) “maintaining confidence and stability” with “the need to alert 
people” and (b) being polite and also truthful (“I have to be polite but also 
don’t want to be untruthful”).8 Historians seeking to make use of Lee’s 
public statements to understand his thinking should bear this in mind.
On the nature of international politics (the 1950s to August 1965)
Singapore achieved internal self-government in 1959, but foreign policy 
and defence remained under the purview of Whitehall until 1963 when 
Singapore merged with the Federation of Malaya to form Malaysia. From 
1963 till Singapore’s independence in August 1965, foreign policy and 
defence was controlled from Kuala Lumpur and not by Prime Minister 
Lee Kuan Yew. There is relatively little information on Lee’s views on 
international politics and foreign affairs before August 1965 compared 
to the period after. However, it is possible to get insightful glimpses into 
his strategic thought in the earlier period. For instance, he did make the 
point that foreign or external affairs was “a matter of life and death” and 
that it was “an extension of domestic affairs” – “what we say and what we 
do in the field of foreign politics is so often the external manifestation 
of our domestic politics, our internal hopes and fears that the  embassies 
that we established… reflected the affinity and identification of politi-
cal attitudes and political premises.”9 In a speech to the International 
Institute of International Affairs (Australia), which is perhaps his most 
substantial discourse on this subject pre-August 1965, he said that inter-
national affairs was as old as man. “From the first tribes to the modern 
nations, man may have learned how to use wood and stone and metal 
and gunpowder, and now nuclear power. But the essential quality of man 
had never altered. You can read the Peloponnesian wars, you can read the 
Three Kingdoms of the Chinese classics, and there’s nothing new which 
a human situation can devise. The motivations for human behaviour 
have always been there. The manifestations of the motivations whether 
they are greed, envy, ambition, greatness, generosity, charity, inevitably 
ends in a conflict of power position. And how that conflict is resolved 
depends upon the accident of the individual in charge of a particular 
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tribe or nation at a given time. But what has changed is the facility with 
which men can now communicate and transport not only ideas but also 
man himself and his weapons. Therefore, in a very old situation has been 
introduced a very alarming possibility which puts the whole problem of 
international relations now in a very different perspective.”10 To Lee, “no 
tribe in proximity with another tribe is happy until a state of dominance 
of one over the other is established. Or until it has tried to establish that 
dominance, and failed, and it is quite satisfied that it is not possible, 
whereupon it lives in fear that the other tribe will try to assert dominance 
over it. And the cavalcade of man will go on…”11
He was to reiterate this point in another speech in 1967, when he noted 
that developing countries like Singapore which had no “power” would 
need to “arrange their relationship with the developed countries in order 
to exercise some influence” in one of two ways: (a) pursue appropriate 
policies/strategies to tap power and/or (b) coming together to increase 
their capacity to influence events.12 There was thus much that one can 
learn from the study of history. He did not believe history was bunk, for 
it “has some relevance to tell us something about the natures of people 
and their cultures and their societies”13 and “it should teach us, if we can 
learn from experience at all, what should be avoided and what more can 
be done for a better tomorrow.”14
His education might also have shaped his early ideas on this subject. 
An address he delivered in 1967 when he received an honorary doctorate 
of Law from the Royal University at Phnom Penh, Cambodia, sheds some 
light on this. In his speech, he recalled being taught international law by 
the late Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Whewell Professor of International Law, 
in Cambridge, who later became a member of the International Court of 
Justice at The Hague. What stuck in his mind was the difference between 
municipal and international law: “The law of each individual country is 
binding on all its subjects except the sovereign. The law of the interna-
tional community has one missing element: enforceable authority. In 
legal theory, every government of every independent nation is sovereign 
and supreme.” As a young lawyer, Lee assisted in defending the mem-
bers of the University Socialist Club (USC)/Fajar editorial board who 
were charged with sedition for publishing an article entitled “Aggression 
in Asia,” which condemned the formation of the Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organisation (SEATO) (Yap, Lim & Leong 2009: 34-35). Lee was per-
sonally critical of SEATO. “SEATO is nonsense,” he said.15 When asked 
whether SEATO was an adequate framework for Southeast Asian security, 
Lee noted that SEATO was inferior to NATO, “… And until you convince 
Asia that you consider Asia as important to you, as Americans, as Europe 
is to America, you are going to find lots of Asians like me rather criti-
cal and really doubting because ninety per cent of you have come from 
Europe; you understand Europe better than you understand Asia.”16
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Two events in 1956 further shed light on Lee’s thinking of interna-
tional relations: the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt (also known 
as the Suez Crisis) and the Soviet invasion of Hungary. With regard to 
the former, Lee approved of the US response to the Anglo-French-Israeli 
invasion of Egypt, which “shocked and angered the whole non-European 
world” and was “a reminder of the perfidy and ruthlessness of the gun-
boat policy of the imperialist powers of a bygone age.” According to Lee, 
“fortunately, for the peace of the world, the Americans refused to support 
Britain and France, but instead joined the rest of the world in condemn-
ing the blatant act of aggression… The Egyptian blocking of the Canal 
symbolised the end of the gunboat age for Britain and France.” As for the 
invasion of Hungary, which he described as “bloody and brutal armed 
suppression of Hungarian patriots,” Lee noted that “history may well 
mark this event as the turning point of Soviet Communism in the West 
and perhaps in the whole world. Never before has any single event in 
the Communist world split the Communist parties of Europe as Russia’s 
cruel action in Hungary has done…”17
In a talk he gave in 1959, Lee observed that since the end of the Sec-
ond World War, “the political face of Asia has undergone more change 
than during any other equivalent period in Asian history. Events have 
taken place which are likely in the next few decades to shift the centre 
of gravity from Europe and the West to Asia and the East.” He believed 
that “the massive potential greatness of India and China” would domi-
nate the Asian scene” and “what happens to the rest of Asia” was bound 
to affect Malaya, including Singapore. In one of his earliest analyses of 
the development of the Cold War in Southeast Asia, Lee was of the view 
that if there were a free-for-all in Malaya, a movement of the Chinese 
urban proletariat might assume power and dictate the course of the revo-
lution. But this was impossible, as the British and the Americans “would 
never allow a free-for-all in Malaya.” If Communist China and the Soviet 
Union were prepared to intervene, as in Indo-China, and throw their 
weight on the communist side, then the position would be different and 
a small militant party might succeed in capturing power. But they are not 
“and will never be so stupid as to intervene.” Beijing wanted to win over 
80 million Indonesians, and many more millions of the uncommitted 
people in Southeast Asia. “And nothing is more likely to make the South-
east Asian countries more anti-communist than the spectacle of China 
coming to the aid of Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia.”
Thus Lee believed that “the immediate danger to Malaya is not Com-
munism but Communalism… There can be no Communist Malaya until 
there is a Malay-led Malayan Communist Party,” because it was the Malay 
peasantry and not the Chinese urban proletariat who determined the 
pace. And there was no likelihood of any significant  Malay-educated elite 
becoming disgruntled in the foreseeable future. In the meantime, the 
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communal tensions could easily increase. In his words, “there are bound 
to be groups who are prepared to exploit the dissatisfaction of the urban 
Chinese by making communal appeals. On the other hand, the Malay 
sector is equally opened to exploitation by communal and, this is more 
serious, by religious appeals…” Answering the question as to whether 
the existence of a left-wing government elected by a largely urban 
 Chinese population in Singapore would aggravate or alleviate the situa-
tion, he suggested that the answer depended upon how the Government 
in Singapore conducted its affairs, whether it pandered to Chinese chau-
vinism…” For there is no possible way of ensuring that the Singapore 
situation can be isolated from the Federation.”18
On the non-aligned movement
One of the most important and influential segments of the international 
community in the post-World War Two years was the newly independent 
Afro-Asian bloc of countries (or non-aligned nations), which comprised 
about a third of the world’s population. Lee explained: “They used to be 
called neutralists since it was believed that in a war they could remain 
neutral. But the age of the jet and the hydrogen bomb makes a mockery 
of any hope that anyone can escape the consequences of world conflict. 
And so, they began to be called non-aligned instead of neutralist. They do 
not line up with either the East or the West, either the Communists or the 
anti-Communists on any issue. But they take a stand on every issue that 
affects them. But unlike the countries within the two blocs, they decide, 
not according to the stand of either America or Russia, but according to 
the interests of their people, the under-developed peoples of the world.”19 
Lee believed in the idea of non-alignment, but with a caveat: “We are non-
aligned if we are asked to choose between competing power blocs. We are 
non-aligned if we are asked to choose between the interests of competing 
ideologies of Communism or Capitalism. But, we are not non-aligned, 
nor can we afford to be neutral, when our own existence, our happiness, 
and our future are at stake.” He recalled how at the time of the Soviet 
blockade of Berlin (1948), he did not understand how that conflict had 
anything to do with him, as he was non-aligned. “Today, I understand 
that had the fight been lost, I would not perhaps have emerged in South-
east Asia.”20
One of his top priorities was getting Singapore’s independence 
recognised by the Afro-Asian nations. In his press conference on 
26 August 1965, Lee revealed that it took almost two weeks before Egypt’s 
President Nasser decided to accord recognition. The African countries 
in particular, Lee revealed, had their reservations because of the British 
bases in Singapore. Lee and his colleagues had to convince them that he 
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was not a “neo-colonialist stooge” and eventually all, except Indonesia, 
recognised Singapore’s independence.21 Indonesia’s influence was con-
siderable. According to Lee, had Indonesia been willing to welcome 
Singapore into the ranks of the Afro-Asian nations, “it would have 
helped so much to settle our problems of legitimacy as an Afro-Asian 
nation.” But as Indonesia was not forthcoming, Singapore had to “do it 
the hard way: convince all Afro-Asian nations, almost one by one in the 
United Nations and at Afro-Asian gatherings…”22 Soon after independ-
ence on 9 August 1965, the then-Deputy Prime Minister Toh Chin Chye 
and Foreign Minister S Rajaratnam visited the Afro-Asian countries in 
September and October 1965. As Lee explained, “… we must maintain 
good relations with the Afro-Asian countries economically,  culturally and 
in the matter of trade.”23
Even so, Lee did not see the Afro-Asian bloc through rose-tinted 
glasses. As he told his Canterbury University (Christchurch, New Zea-
land) audience, “the first bloom of Afro-Asian solidarity against West-
ern domination in the period between ’45 and ’55, the high-water mark 
of which the Bandung Conference [1955] when Pantjasila and solidar-
ity of all former subject peoples in themselves believe in a new code of 
Afro-Asian ethics in peace, non-interference, non-aggression, mutual 
respect and regardless of size and power, mutual help. Well, that phase 
has gone…”24 Lee compared Southeast Asia with South Asia, which was 
in a period of malaise because the South Asians, who actually had much 
in common, were quarrelling amongst themselves. He reiterated his 
concern in the wake of Confrontation that Southeast Asia could be Bal-
kanised, which would play into the hands of the communists. He argued 
that the communists had a vested interest in the instability of the region, 
because instability generated economic and social discontent, which in 
turn undermined confidence in the incumbent regimes and their ability 
to produce solutions, thus creating the very situation the communists 
need to succeed.25
On the nature of international politics (post-August 1965)
Singapore became independent on 9 August 1965. Lee Kuan Yew was 
now fully responsible for Singapore’s foreign relations and defence. 
As he told his audience on 26 September 1965, “we have, on the one 
hand, to look after the international relations for our country, and on 
the other, we have to look after the livelihood of our people.”26 In subse-
quent speeches and interviews, he spelt out the rationale and principles 
of Singapore’s foreign policy: “We are now the arbiters of our foreign 
and defence  policies, and our strategic importance makes our foreign 
and defence policies a matter of interest not just to our immediate 
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neighbours but to a larger group of nations whose ideological and power 
conflicts have gripped the world in a cold war since the end of the Second 
World War… Singapore, first must decide where its long-term interests 
lie. And, within that context, a foreign policy must be designed to bring 
us the  surest guarantee of our survival and our prosperity.”27 Between 
pre and post-independence there was a world of difference. “This time 
we are playing for keeps and if we make a mistake there is no safety 
net underneath…” To Lee, Singapore’s survival is not negotiable. “This 
is something fundamental. We may be small but we are sovereign in 
(?) how we ensure our own survival.”28 In a speech entitled, “Changing 
Values in a Changing World,” he noted that economics and politics were 
closely inter-related and that there was a “sinking realisation” that “good 
economics must be the basis of good politics.”29 According to Lee (and 
he reiterated this premise on several occasions), “trade and industry is as 
important to us as defence and security,”30 and “defence and security is 
indivisible from trade and industry.”31 The promotion of trade was thus a 
key objective of Singapore’s security (foreign and defence) policy. “I am 
nobody’s stooge. I am not here to play somebody else’s game. I have a few 
million people’s lives to account for. And Singapore will survive, will trade 
with the whole world and will remain non-communist,” he declared.32 He 
exhorted the leadership in the business community to pay more attention 
to international politics. “The idea of a man being interested only in busi-
ness – not interested in what is politics; not interested in relations with 
other countries; interested only in business – in profits… I do not say that 
that attitude was wrong, but it is inadequate in this new situation…”33 Lee 
understood the concept of security very broadly. “There are other aspects 
of security which are equally pertinent in the long run (not just physical 
security): your economic viability, the capacity of your political structure 
to withstand pressures either of a social,  cultural or whatever nature. It is 
a multi-coloured question.”34
In a 1966 speech entitled “International Relations”35, Lee gave a lesson 
on the subject of ‘foreign policy’ when he highlighted “two things which 
we must always keep clearly in mind” whenever we talk about the foreign 
policy of a particular country. These were: (a) the foreign policy which 
is designed primarily for the long-term national interests of a group of 
people organised into a nation; (b) the foreign policy which is designed 
for the specific and special interests of the type of regime or the type of 
political leadership that is for the time being in charge of the destiny of 
that country. To confuse the two would lead to “grave misjudgements 
as to what are likely to be the power situations in various parts of the 
world from time to time.” He gave the example of Indonesia. There were, 
according to Lee, “certain aspects of policy which any Indonesian Gov-
ernment must pursue regardless of its particular ideological or political 
flavor. You can change governments but there are basic compulsions of 
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a people grouped together as to the things they want to do. But when 
you change governments, there are certain objectives which a previous 
regime pursued which are abandoned as unprofitable.”
Lee further identified two factors which must always be borne in mind 
when talking about the foreign policy of Singapore: (a) The juxtaposi-
tion of power interests in a particular region (which he considered as, 
if not more crucial than geography in determining Singapore’s strate-
gic importance); (b) the effect of human migration over time and space. 
Bearing in mind these two factors, Singapore’s foreign policy must firstly 
“ensure, regardless of the nature of the government it has from time to 
time, that this migrant community that brought in life, vitality, enterprise 
from many parts of the world should always find an oasis here whatever 
happens in the surrounding environment.” Thus a foreign policy for 
Singapore must be one as to encourage the major powers to find it, if not 
in their interests to help us, at least in their interests to not have us fail. 
And secondly, it, “must always offer to the rest of the world a continuing 
interest in the type of society we project.”
Finally, Lee placed considerable emphasis on ‘power’. He said that any 
foreign policy must achieve two objectives: the right political climate and 
power. “For you can have the best of political climates, but if the power to 
sustain your position is not there, then you must lose.”
On Singapore-Malaysia-Indonesia relations post-August 1965
With regard to Singapore’s relations with Indonesia and the Federation of 
Malaya, which “geography ordains that we shall always be neighbours”36, 
Lee had this to say, which is as true today as in 1959: “There is no doubt 
that with better relations with our neighbours, like Indonesia our trade 
may still increase. But we would be blind if we did not recognise the 
tremendous change in the pattern of trade and commerce in Southeast 
Asia. Both our two closest neighbours – the Federation of Malaya and 
Indonesia – have, not unnaturally, since they attained their independence, 
set themselves out to build their own industries. They want to establish 
their own trade lines with foreign countries without having to go through 
the merchants and brokers in Singapore.”37 With regard to Malaysia, as 
Foreign Minister S Rajaratnam said, “there is something unreal and odd 
about lumping our relations with Malaysia under foreign relations. But 
then some rather odd things do happen in the history of peoples and coun-
tries.”38 But that was the reality of separation. In the wake of separation, 
Lee said that “we do not believe that ties of kinship, history and geogra-
phy can be broken or destroyed just by one constitutional amendment,”39 
and “interdependence makes it inevitable, that maybe in ten years, maybe 
less, maybe more, (and) it must come back together again, perhaps under 
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somewhat different conditions and circumstances. But I have not the 
slightest doubt that that must be so,” a point he reiterated a year later: “I 
don’t see these boundaries as being immutable.”40 Lee made a distinction 
between ‘peoples’ and ‘governments’. “Friction between governments,” he 
said, “may come and go, (and) may change with time.”41
The ‘interdependence’ theme was reiterated in his speech during the 
first session of parliament in December 1965, when he said “… But I 
think we would be dishonest to ourselves if we did not express a pro-
found interest in the policies and the consequences of such policies upon 
the relationship between the communities in Malaysia which would, in 
turn, help to influence attitudes and relationships between communities 
in Singapore. I see the future more fraught with danger than before sepa-
ration – the long-term future. For, if there is a failure to understand this 
nexus between us, then it is extremely easy for one to embrace and to 
influence attitudes and policies in the other which, as I have said, must 
end in the polarisation of two opposing attitudes based on two opposing 
assumptions of superiority of race, language, and culture, which can only 
spell disaster for all.”42 That there were deep-seated differences between 
Singapore and Malaysia is obvious. Otherwise, it would not be neces-
sary to take such a drastic step as separation. Three and a quarter years 
after separation, Lee did not think the differences had been resolved, but 
acknowledged that both sides had moved some way to accepting the dif-
ference, although there were “compelling almost irresistible pressures on 
cooperation.” But the reality was that “the unity of the two in the security 
interest of both cannot be willed or wished away and we just have to learn 
to cooperate in a very quiet and commonsensical way or we both perish.”43
As for Indonesia, Lee made two points: Singapore would like to have 
“good and friendly” relations with Indonesia on the condition that neither 
side interfered in the internal affairs of the other. Although what hap-
pened within Indonesia is a matter “entirely for the Indonesian people” 
to decide, developments in the country “have the gravest consequences 
for all of us who live in the region…”44 With regard to Confrontation and 
Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio’s proposal that there should be 
bilateral negotiations with Singapore, Malaya and the Borneo states sepa-
rately, Lee’s response was that he was prepared “to talk to anybody, at any 
place, at any time, to achieve peace and security for Singapore.”45 It did 
not matter if Malaysia objected to the proposal. “We want to be friends 
with Malaysia, but that does not mean that we have to be unfriendly 
with all the people who are unfriendly to Malaysia. Their friends may 
be our friends… but Malaysia’s enemies need not be our enemies…”46 
The old aphorism, ‘Where you stand is where you sit’ is most true as Lee 
revealed that if Singapore were still happily part of Malaysia, he would 
have rejected Subandrio’s offer: “We would be outraged at the provoca-
tiveness of it. But, we are out of Malaysia and we have got to look at our 
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little sector.”47 That said, Lee also pointed out that it would be unwise, 
short-sighted and opportunistic for Singapore to improve relations with 
Indonesia at the expense of Malaysia. “Singapore wanted rapport with 
Malaysia, regardless of our position with Indonesia; and we want rap-
port with Indonesia regardless of our position with Malaysia.” All said, 
“We must never forget our abiding destiny as part of the continent of 
Asia.”48 In his first Parliament speech, Lee expanded on this point: “We 
are here in Southeast Asia for better or for worse and we are here to stay, 
our policies are designed to ensure we stay peacefully in Southeast Asia 
in accord and amity with our neighbours but with a right to decide how 
we order our own lives in our own home. And every action, every policy 
must be decided by this yardstick. Any policy which endangers our long-
term interests as a separate and distinct community in this region must 
be eschewed; and any act, any programme, and decision which will help 
us secure a more enduring future for ourselves and our progeny in this 
region must be pursued whatever the sacrifice.”49
In general, Lee felt that in foreign relations, “your best friends are 
never your immediate neighbor,” a point he reiterated on a number 
of occasions. “Your neighbours are not your best friend, wherever you 
are,” Lee declared in a speech on the subject of ‘International Relations.’ 
This is because “it gets too close and your neighbour’s hedge grows and 
infringes on your part of the garden and the branch of his fruit tree cov-
ers your grass and your roses do not get enough sunshine and so many 
things happen. And therefore our best friends, as has happened with so 
many other countries, are those who are farther afield with whom we 
can talk objectively.”50 Thus, he felt that with Malaysia, both sides should 
forget about sentiments and just do business with each other because “if 
we go into sentiments, emotions, feeling, there is going to be a great deal 
of antipathy… you can go into real orgies of bitterness and hate.”51
As for Indonesia, the abortive coup that took place there on 30 
September/1 October 1965, also known as the Gestapu affair, was the 
beginning of the end of Confrontation. Towards the end of 1965, there 
were rumours about the construction of a new cooperation framework, 
taking into account the new regional architecture. There was already 
ASA (Association of Southeast Asia), which was formed in 1961 – com-
prising Thailand, then-Malaya and the Philippines – which foundered 
because of the rift between Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah 
and was further complicated by Confrontation, which questioned the 
legitimacy of Malaysia. ASA was subsequently replaced by ASEAN in 
August 1967. In early 1966, when asked whether Singapore would con-
sider joining ASA, Lee said that Singapore was “extremely interested in 
regional cooperation,” be it “bilateral or multilateral” for economic, cul-
tural and social purposes. But he would want to know first the purpose 
of the organisation and the benefits for member-countries. Lee believed 
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that the idea of each small country being independent economically 
 (“economic autarky”) was “old fashioned and deleterious in its effect.” 52 
But he opposed MAPHILINDO, which he felt was exclusively Malay and 
Islamic and thus did not offer a sufficiently broad spectrum for Southeast 
Asian cooperation.53 Any proposal that focused on regional cooperation 
for mutual benefit was good, but such proposals must also be “political 
acceptable,” meaning that they should be presented “in a more realis-
tic way by a more representative cross-section of Southeast Asian coun-
tries” and that “the objectives are clearly defined as not part of the Cold 
War conflict.”54 He believed that, in the long term, joining or forming 
a regional association or group was “the only way in which the smaller 
and not very viable countries in Southeast Asia can sustain their separate 
existence in a world dominated by two or three superpowers.”55
In the early years of Singapore’s independence, given the poor relation-
ship with both Malaysia and Indonesia, it was not surprising that there 
were concerns, valid or not, that Singapore might be threatened if not 
swallowed up by one or the other, or both. In response to a question that 
Singapore was a “nut” and that Malaysia and Indonesia together were a 
“joined-up nutcracker,” Lee recalled reading an account of a conversa-
tion between Stalin and Tito in Milovan Djilas’s book, Conversations with 
Stalin. Stalin said to Tito: “Why not swallow Albania?” But the shrewd 
Tito did not do that because, according to Djilas, if Yugoslavia had done 
that, it might not be there today. He provided a fish allegory. “The big 
fish says to the medium-sized fish, “Why not swallow up the small one?” 
And the medium-sized fish if it is sufficiently unthinking goes and does 
it. Then, the big fish will eat not only the medium one but he will also 
have the smaller one! And I think that would be a more satisfactory meal 
all around because both will be eaten up in one gulp.”56 It is a no-brainer 
who the small, medium and big fish are Lee was referring to.
This was later expanded into one of Lee’s most memorable speeches 
on the nature of international relations entitled, “Big and Small Fishes 
in Asian Waters.”57 A number of points in this wide-ranging speech are 
worth highlighting: Lee spoke of the United Nations, in which in form 
and formality, all countries in the world, big or small are all independent, 
sovereign nations with equal voting rights. From that perspective, “we 
are all equal: we all pretend that we are equal. But we are all acutely con-
scious of the fact that we are not equal.” Referring to the five permanent 
members of the Security Council, “if the five big fish in the world decide 
that this should be so, then it must be so.” But the assumption was that 
the five would always remain big, and there was no provision for adjust-
ment. Drawing on history, Lee noted that “the belief that dictating a peace 
treaty with unconditional surrender on the Germans and almost uncon-
ditional surrender on the Japanese would be able to determine things for 
all time is just not true.”
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On the major powers and Southeast Asia
Lee, however, did not think that the future of Southeast Asia could be 
decided by Southeast Asians alone. The major powers (specifically, US, 
China and Soviet Union) would in varying degrees continue to maintain 
“a profound interest in the region” because of the region’s sizeable popu-
lation, minerals and other natural resources, and it housing one of the 
most important sea junctions in the world. None of the three powers, in 
Lee’s view, really understood the peoples of Southeast Asia.58 With regard 
to the Soviet Union, he saw Soviet naval expansion into Southeast Asian 
waters as a natural extension of their power and influence, which would 
not pose a threat “unless they are the only naval power in the area.” If 
there were several powerful fleets, they could all play a balancing role.59 
But he did not think there would be a sizeable Chinese naval presence in 
the region for some time.60
Turning to China, Beijing openly supported Indonesia’s confronta-
tion against Malaysia. In March 1965, Lee Kuan Yew offered one of his 
most substantial analyses about China vis-à-vis Southeast Asia to date. In 
response to the question as to whether the increase in power and influ-
ence of communist China worried him, Lee said yes if it led to the “mis-
calculations on the side of the Americans as to how far the Chinese would 
go in backing revolution in Southeast Asia”; and no because he did not 
believe that the Chinese “if you read their history – that they would want 
to conquer, physically South and Southeast Asia. They are very big, self-
possessed, completely self-confident people with enormous patience.” 
With their Middle Kingdom mentality, the Chinese just wanted a continu-
ation of the tributary system. The problem, accordingly to Lee, was not so 
much “Chinese aggression” (meaning: Chinese armed soldiers march-
ing down Southeast Asia). If that were to happen, “the problem would 
be much simpler,” because Communism would be equated to Chinese 
imperialism and the rest of Asia would certainly cooperate to fight it. Lee 
noted that the Chinese were “much more subtle… They believe in revolu-
tion. They are going to help revolution as they help revolution in South 
Vietnam via North Vietnam. There is not one single Chinese soldier in 
South Vietnam. There never will be, unless there is massive intervention 
by the Western powers which justifies their massive intervention… They 
are able to get proxies to carry the torch of revolution with tremendous 
fervor and zeal.”61
Singapore’s attitude towards China was the same as that towards 
Indonesia. “We want to be friends with our neighbours in Asia, whether 
it is the biggest nation in the world in population like China, or the big-
gest in Asia like Indonesia”, on the basis of “mutual respect for each oth-
er’s internal sovereignty and integrity and no interference in each other’s 
internal affairs.” Lee was glad that this time Beijing did not comment 
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on Singapore’s separation from Malaysia (unlike during the merger) 
and thought that this silence augured well for the future. In late-1965, 
China’s admission to the UN was being debated at the United Nations. 
Singapore supported Chinese admission to the UN by a simple vote or 
by a two-third majority and “without placing conditions,” because in his 
view, “it is wrong to place conditions.” Indeed he believed that China 
should never have been isolated.62 However, Lee had not yet decided 
on the “Two Chinas” policy. While he agreed that the issue was an out-
standing one, there was still no hurry to reach a decision. “Once China is 
admitted (to the UN), the government takes its place as the representative 
of the Chinese people. And whether the people in Taiwan are part of the 
Chinese people, or decide not to be part of the Chinese people… that is a 
matter to be decided at a later stage. My position is completely open on 
this.” When the time comes for Singapore to make that decision, it would 
be based on three criteria: (1) what is right, (2) how the decision would 
affect the interests of Singapore, and (3) how the interests of Singapore 
could be advanced (meaning: Singapore’s survival and capacity to pros-
per and to expand its trading and other relations with the international 
community) while doing what was right.63 Almost a year after Singapore 
became independent, Beijing still had not recognised Singapore. But it 
also did not condemn the country. The Chinese had expressed their wish 
to trade with Singapore, which Lee did not object to.64 Singapore was 
interested in any country that wanted to trade with it, be it Taiwan or 
China. Referring to Taiwan in 1968, he said that Taiwan had a bustling 
little economy which was bigger than Singapore, and “we are extremely 
anxious to increase our cooperation with them.”65 In 1970, Beijing still 
categorised Singapore as part of British Malaya. Thus, while economic 
relations with China were “very good,” political relations were not.66 The 
establishment of diplomatic relations between Singapore and China was 
however “absolutely inevitable,” but taking into account the concerns 
of Singapore’s neighbours, Singapore would give them “the honour of 
being first in establishing relations.”67
To Lee, one big power that would never lose interest in Southeast Asia 
was China and we could not “afford to forget that.” The border regions 
surrounding China were “vital to her and they should be neutral, if not 
positively friendly. And if you get weak and unstable situations, the 
manipulation that is possible – not with any military effort, just sheer 
economic manipulation and you know, the carrot and throw in with 
the ideological subversion, this would become quite a Balkanised situa-
tion.”68 He believed the Chinese were “determined, as a people, to unify 
and build a modern, wealthy Chinese nation.” When China became 
prosperous, “good luck to me, because I will be much safer.”69 He told 
his American audience that having lost China, they “have got to live with 
it.” China was now run by a group of men who want China to become 
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a great power. “Why shouldn’t they be great?” he asked. “You can’t stop 
them.”70 As for the suggestion that Southeast Asia should be neutralised 
(a proposal put forward by the Malaysians and subsequently adopted by 
ASEAN in 1971), Lee did not object. “Of course it is desirable to have a 
neutral Southeast Asia,” but he was sure that even the Prime Minister of 
Malaysia did not expect the proposal to become a reality anytime soon. 
His own preference: the more the great powers were interested in this 
area, the better.71 In a later speech, he would describe the idea of the neu-
tralisation of Southeast Asia as an example of creating a “Shangri-la in 
our minds,” “whistling in the dark, through the cemetery of Indochina.” 
But “Shangri-la is not for Southeast Asia unless one seeks the poppy 
variety.” His preference was for a continued presence of all interested 
powers in the region which could “add to a more stable balance of influ-
ence.”72
This is perhaps a good point to pause to consider Lee’s thoughts on 
two significant events during this period which had strategic implica-
tions for Singapore and the region: the Vietnam War and the British with-
drawal east of Suez. While both events had their own dynamic, they are 
not unrelated.
On the British withdrawal east of Suez
From very early, Lee felt very strongly about the need for a continuing 
British presence in the region. He said: ”British policy will for the fore-
seeable future be one of the most important factors in Southeast Asia – 
one of the most important non-Southeast Asian factors in Southeast 
Asia. I, for one, will be sorry to see it supplanted by American policy; 
and it is my hope that what has happened and what is happening in Laos 
may never find repetition nearer home… To us, who do not want to see 
Singapore and Malaya slowly engulfed and eroded by the Communists, 
it is an absolute ‘must’.”73 He would make this point again during the 
Confrontation. “No man in his right sense doubts that if there were no 
British bases in Singapore, Confrontation would not have stopped sim-
ply at sporadic guerrilla raids, bomb explosions and subversion.”74 In 
March 1965, when he was asked whether he expected the possible shift-
ing of the British naval base in the next four or five years, Lee replied that 
the British bases would “last for quite a long time.”75 He was however 
unwilling to answer a similar question in an interview about a fortnight 
later.76 However, he said that it was not a simple question of wanting to 
get rid of the British bases and influence in Malaysia. He again cited the 
ongoing Confrontation. “… As long as British bases in the region – a 
British presence in the region – enables us to carry on being ourselves, 
it’s all right with us.”77
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His views on the importance of the British bases in Singapore never 
changed. Arthur Cook of the London Daily Mail observed that Lee had 
“told practically every journalist” that Singapore could not do without the 
bases. The Prime Minister did not dispute this. According to Lee, more 
than 50,000 people’s livelihood depended on the bases and that was not 
counting the “multiplier effect.” He believed that there would come a 
time when the physical presence of British troops would be unnecessary, 
but “we will have an arrangement whereby, in case of emergency, press 
button ‘A’ and tanks, helicopters and rockets, and all the rest, can arrive 
within a few hours.”78 But Lee also wanted to ensure that the bases were 
used only to defend the interests of Singaporeans and Malaysians “that 
we consider one” as well as Australians and New Zealanders: “people 
who have been friendly to us, who are very close to us because of geo-
graphic proximity and historic experiences,” and not as “jumping-points 
for aggression” against China or Indonesia. Singapore, Lee emphasised 
was not Guantanamo.79
The issue of the British bases was more than just their importance for 
the security and economic well-being of Singapore. At another level, Lee 
was concerned about the emerging danger brought about by “Britain’s 
growing disillusionment” of its defence role east of Suez. By relinquish-
ing its role, the British would not be able to serve as a countervailing role 
against the United States. Lee was very wary of the US during this period. 
He told the foreign correspondents, “… I will be quite frank with you. If 
the British withdraw, I am prepared to go with the Australians and the 
New Zealanders. But I am not prepared to go on with the Americans.” He 
repeated this a few times during the interview: “… It is fundamental. If 
the British bases go, there will be no American bases in Singapore. This 
is a matter of the utmost importance for Britain, Australia, New Zealand, 
and for America to understand that.”80 Lee found Americans a “highly 
intelligent” and “often well-meaning” people and some American lead-
ers such as the late-President Kennedy displayed “growing greatness and 
depth.” But by and large, he felt that the American administration lacked 
depth, a point he reiterated during the interview, and “wisdom which 
comes out of an accumulation of knowledge of human beings and human 
situations over a long period of time.”81 The Americans had enormous 
wealth and power, “but one thing they cannot buy; and that is a corps of 
men who understand human beings and human situations.” Because of 
their lack of experience, he was convinced that that the Americans could 
not defend nor protect Southeast Asia from the communist threat ema-
nating from Vietnam (the Domino Theory). He was extremely scathing 
of the American management of the situation in Vietnam. “They don’t 
understand the overseas Chinese. They don’t understand the Vietnam-
ese. That is what [why?] it is such a mess.” He thought that in 1963, after 
the death of Diem, the Americans could have worked towards reaching 
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an accommodation with the Vietnamese communists in the South. But 
they did not, and “that was your last get-off point.”82
Lee was adamant that in the long-term interests of the region there 
should not be any “permanent occupation or permanent establish-
ment of American occupation forces or armed forces in South and 
Southeast Asia.” And the only way to ensure this was to have a solu-
tion which ensured that what was happening in South Vietnam could 
not be repeated, even after a lapse of time. If there was a possibility that 
the situation in South Vietnam could be repeated, “then the countries in 
the peripheral regions may well prefer some permanent American mili-
tary presence to self-respect.”83 He remained consistent in his view, even 
though in 1971 his relationship with the US had improved considerably. 
“We do not want a US base in Singapore… I do not want a Russian base, 
nor do I want a US base,” he stated categorically.84
Lee was very attentive to the psychological dimension of international 
relations which he would highlight on a number of occasions. When 
the British finally withdrew from east of Suez in 1971 and the security 
of Singapore, Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand was replaced by 
the Five-Power Joint Defence Arrangement (FPDA), Lee placed greater 
emphasis on the “psychological impact more than the realities of the five-
power.”85 Another notable instance was after the 1968 Tet Offensive, Lee 
reminded his audience that “the greatest danger in Southeast Asia – as 
in many parts of the world – is that the battle is lost by people, because 
the people who could lead and fight the battle do a little bit of arithmetic 
and decide that the odds are not worth taking and therefore never lead to 
fight the battle.”86
On the United States and the Vietnam War
We now turn to the Vietnam War, a subject to which Lee also paid a lot 
of attention. In his words, “Every day, you read the newspapers, and so 
do I. And the first page that I turn to is South Vietnam, foreign news, 
South Vietnam.”87 Lee described the problem facing South Vietnam as 
“a crucial issue.”88 On another occasion, he said that “the fate of Asia –89 
South and Southeast Asia – will be decided in the next few years by what 
happens out in Vietnam… that is the contest…”
Although Lee’s views of the Vietnam conflict over the years have been 
extensively reported, they have not been properly reflected by journalists 
and political commentators. One of his earliest comments on the conflict 
in Indochina was a passing remark he made in a 1962 speech to the 
Royal Society of International Affairs (London) in which he was critical of 
American handling of the situation in Laos, which at this time, was more 
important than what was happening in Vietnam. He expressed the hope 
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that “what has happened and what is happening in Laos may never find 
repetition nearer home.”90 His first direct comment on Vietnam was in a 
speech at Canterbury University (Christchurch, New Zealand) in which 
he said that South Vietnam was part of the region and if what happened 
there could be repeated in all the neighbouring countries, “then in a mat-
ter of a decade or even less if some of the intervening states between 
Malaysia and South Vietnam decide to anticipate history and be sure that 
they are on the side that appears like winning, then the whole region 
will be unscrambled and it would not be long before the Australians find 
themselves in difficulties.”91 He was worried that the West was not “suf-
ficiently alive to the acuteness of the conflicts which have now shifted to 
Southeast Asia.” He found the West “in disarray.” He saw the Americans 
as committed to containment with their military bases in Formosa, South 
Korea, Vietnam and the Philippines but “to contain what we sometimes 
fear is the uncontainable.” He saw the British, as playing “a secondary 
role, partly committed to contain, and partly hoping to strike out in some 
new more positive direction.” He lauded Whitehall for its “intelligent 
move when they exchanged diplomatic representation with China…” 
and posed the question that had the Americans adopted the same policy, 
“there might be very little to choose between President Ho Chi Minh and 
President Tito of Yugoslavia.” He found the French solution of neutrality 
as the panacea for all the ills of Southeast Asia dubious. As for the Dutch 
and Germans, who were helping Indonesia to restore their economy, he 
wondered if they could be “so completely and blissfully unaware that 
both Beijing and Moscow agreed that the Indonesians should be helped 
“to put Malaysia into a situation like Vietnam and Laos.”92
While Lee was sympathetic towards the South Vietnamese cause, he 
was equally critical of the regime there. In his speech during the debate 
on the provision for the External Affairs Ministry in the Dewan Ra’ayat 
in 1964, he supported the Malaysian government in establishing an 
embassy in South Vietnam (and also in South Korea) as telling the world 
that “we believe that if your neighbor is a Communist, he has no right 
either by subversion or by military might to overcome you.” But he also 
made the point that, “we should also let it be known that we would prefer 
to have forms of government far more liberal, far more democratic, far 
more tolerant than the regimes in Korea and or South Vietnam, but such 
a tolerant democratic regime is only possible when your neighbor leaves 
you in peace.”93 While he was careful not to pass judgement on the efforts 
of the South Vietnamese in public, he did make the point that it would be 
more effective if either the President or Vice-President of South Vietnam 
or the Prime Minister were to come forward to explain their situation to 
the world and not leave it all to the Americans to do it for them. At the 
same time, he also found the Americans having “a friendly habit of trying 
to help a person think for himself,” a trait which he did not particularly 
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like.94 He would prefer more selective use of America’s enormous range 
of weapons, more brains and feet, preferably Vietnamese brains and feet, 
rather than more power and gadgetry.”95
He believed that Beijing was trying to spread communism in Southeast 
Asia “by proxy” and in his assessment, was doing so effectively through 
the Vietnamese communists. “It’s not Chinese fighting the South Viet-
namese; South Vietnamese who believe in Communism are fighting on 
behalf of world Communism against the South Vietnam Army…” In one 
interview, he said he did not believe in the simple theory that the Chinese 
would “send their armies across and eat up Southeast Asia.” That would 
be “naked aggression” and the “whole of Southeast Asia would jell 
together and meet an incoming invader.” “But you have got this ‘Make 
it yourself kind of revolution’… Wars of national liberation… Here is the 
text: “We have an instructor. He will teach you how to organise and will 
slip you a few guns and more if necessary and, if it gets difficult, well, 
surface-to air missiles and so on.”96
As for the effectiveness of the air strikes by the US in North Vietnam 
following the Tonkin Gulf incident in August 1964, Lee thought that it 
was too difficult to assess at this point. “Everybody keeps their fingers 
crossed, and say well, just how the next piece of retaliation go.”97 Asked 
whether he had any solution to the Vietnam problem, he replied that 
there was “a general lack of optimism about a peaceful and a happy solu-
tion. So I think you’ve just got to try and find some solution, peaceful or 
otherwise, which will at least prevent the patterns from being repeated 
one after the other in Southeast Asia.”98 Although Lee did not use the 
term ‘Domino Theory,’ he once told a journalist when asked for his opin-
ion of the validity of the theory, “first, I don’t play dominoes. So don’t 
know what happens with dominoes.”99 Yet the scenario he painted essen-
tially refers to it: “If the Americans decide to pack it up because the posi-
tion is untenable in South Vietnam and the arena of conflict moves from 
South Vietnam across to Cambodia into Thailand; and if the Thais with 
their very keen sense of anticipation of history, decide not to resist the 
irresistible – or what they deem to be irresistible – then, it is very perti-
nent what happens to the 500 armed Communists wandering around 
the borders of Thailand and Malaysia. And, if Malaysia cannot be held, 
then Singapore must make adjustments accordingly. These then, are the 
major imponderables…”100
He subsequently elaborated on this conundrum in a May 1965 speech, 
which was his most detailed comment on the Vietnam problem to date: 
“We know that if the Communists are able to advance their frontiers to 
envelop South Vietnam it will be only a matter of time before the same 
process of emasculation by military and political techniques will overtake 
the neighbouring countries. On the other hand, we know that any exten-
sion or escalation of the war is dangerous and contrary to the ideals we 
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claim to espouse. We have been unable to advance a more constructive 
alternative than to talk of unconditional negotiations hoping that negotia-
tions may lead to a neutral South Vietnam. However, we know that this 
is hardly likely to be the end-result of negotiations. For what is required 
to keep the rest of Southeast Asia free from going through similar tribu-
lations is not just a neutral South Vietnam. As Asians we must uphold 
the right of the Vietnamese people to self-determination. As democratic 
socialists we must insist that South Vietnamese have the right not to be 
pressured through armed might and organised terror and finally over-
whelmed by Communism. So we must seek a formula that will first 
make it possible for South Vietnam to recover their freedom of choice 
which at the moment is limited to either Communist capture or per-
petual American military operations. Then after the South Vietnamese 
are able to exercise their collective will without duress from either side, 
ultimately, be it after five, ten or twenty years, they must have the right to 
decide their final destiny, whether or not they choose to be reunited with 
North Vietnam and on what terms.”101
From August to December 1965, the situation in Vietnam changed 
considerably as the American commitment increased. Lee’s views on 
the situation however remained the same. Lee felt that the situation was 
“very grim,” because both the will and the capacity to resist were largely 
imported. He hoped that the Americans were not just buying time but 
would be able to “do something besides just shooting everybody up.” He 
hoped that “a coherent self will emerge consisting of Vietnamese” and 
that the South Vietnamese could determine whether to merge with the 
North or stay distinct and separate. “The first prerequisite is that nobody 
should impose a solution on South Vietnam as to what South Vietnam 
should do.”102
It is worth comparing Lee’s May 1965 speech on Vietnam with another 
long response he gave about six years later in 1971 (which was almost a 
year since the war expanded into Cambodia) quoted in full here: “… now 
if South Vietnam is gone, so too goes Cambodia and Laos. Then the 
heat is immediately on the Thais, much faster than if only South Viet-
nam had gone with Cambodia and Laos as buffers for some time still to 
come.” Asked whether that would mean a Chinese communist takeover 
of Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, Lee replied, “I do not think things 
happen in that way. This is not a war that is lost or won decisively in 
pitched battles. It is relentless process of attrition. Which side has got 
the greater stamina? Who has the most patience? Whose weight is going 
to bear in the long run? I don’t see Russia or China reaching the tech-
nological levels and wealth of the Americans. But it does not mean that 
because you have the wealth and technology, your power is therefore 
felt all around the world… if China decides that they should concentrate 
their power and influence on the littoral states of Asia, they can bring 
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considerable bear in these areas. It is a gradual and relentless process. 
It is not going to happen overnight. There are many ponderables…”103
Lee was rather disparaging about the various attempts to broker a 
peaceful end to the Vietnam War: “No amount of peace missions as of 
now (1966) is going to produce even a sausage,” because the war was “a 
contest of wills.” He expected the “process of attrition” to continue104 until 
such time when both sides were convinced that they were “just bleeding 
to death on a stalemate.” Hanoi’s non-negotiable pre-condition for talks 
was that the Americans must first stop bombing the North. Should the 
United States cease the bombing of the North? Lee’s answer was that “all 
moral, right-thinking human beings would want all bombing to stop. 
And, it will be inhuman of me to say I want the bombing to go on – it is 
just utter madness. But, I think a lot of people must ask themselves “what 
is the end of this road? Is the bombing the end of the road?” The bomb-
ing cannot be the end of the road. Therefore, we must know whether 
the cessation of bombing – the beginning of the stalemate had been 
reached – recognition by both sides…” 105 In Lee’s assessment, bombing 
North Vietnam would not end the war, as the Vietnamese communists 
would run to the mountains. The bombing could be reduced or stopped 
without any decisive change in the course of the war and it is not a given 
that the North Vietnamese would go to the conference table once the 
bombing stopped.106
While Lee remained consistently critical of American management 
of the Vietnam War and opposed the idea of a permanent US base in 
Singapore to replace the British, he also realised the need for an American 
presence in Vietnam and Southeast Asia because of the British pull-out 
from the region. As he put it, while “the smaller countries in Southeast 
Asia would prefer the comfort of their own separate selves,” that would 
only be possible “if there are countervailing forces to enable them not to 
fall into the orbit of the lager powers in the continent.”107 He did not think 
that Vietnam was “the best place in Asia or Southeast Asia to have taken 
a stand.” The Americans drew the line in South Vietnam because, as he 
noted in 1965, they were ignorant of Vietnam and the region. Further-
more, an open society like the United States was not suited to fighting a 
protracted war. As he told the journalists Peter Simms and Louis Kraal, 
“you’ve gone in and raised the stakes with every commitment, increasing 
the price that you will have to pay for failure to live up to your declared 
objectives. The worry is whether your open society will allow you to con-
duct the kind of battle the South Vietnamese war is going to become – a 
protracted, bitter battle with no prospects of spectacular or decisive vic-
tory. The danger of popular pressures growing up around your institu-
tions of power, your Presidency and your Congress for swift and decisive 
victory, is the greatest danger in your Vietnamese situation. If you can 
just hold the situation and prevent the other side from winning, you 
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would have made a valuable contribution to the long-term stability of 
the region. If you cannot resist pressures for more intense effort and 
quicker results, then I see grave trouble for the whole of Asia, for the 
whole world.”108 Citing what happened in Aden as an example, Lee was of 
the view that it was not wise to have a timetable for American withdrawal 
as “it is better to have these things assessed quietly in qualitative terms 
and not in quantitative time-tables.”109
In 1968, Lee already anticipated that “long before 1975, there would 
be a decisive change in the situation in South Vietnam, and depending 
on how the Vietnam War was resolved, the rest of Southeast Asia would 
“fall into place…”110 Indeed, the decisive change came in less than a 
year after Lee made his forecast. The Tet Offensive which began on 30 
January 1968 was one of the turning points of the Vietnam War. On 
13 May 1968, the opening session of the peace talks was convened in 
Paris. Lee was of the view that the best one could hope for was a solution 
which would enable the South Vietnamese – communist and non-com-
munists – to express their will freely in choosing their government. This 
could only be achieved after a stage-by-stage withdrawal of both North 
Vietnamese and American troops and “perhaps with the help of some 
international peace-keeping force.”111 When President Nixon said that 
he would have peace in Vietnam with honour, Lee said in an interview, 
“How can you have honour unless you do not abandon those whom you 
have persuaded to go into battle with you?” In another interview on this 
topic of peace with honour, Lee said that while the US might have dis-
engaged from Vietnam in an honourable way, “whether there is peace 
in Vietnam is another matter.”112 Lee never expected the Vietnam War 
to end the way it did in April 1975: “But I would like frankly to say that 
perhaps never in all our scenarios that we envisaged such a catastrophic 
collapse of will and morale which led to this terrible disaster.”113
In a 4 April 1975 speech, Lee said that there was little anyone could do 
except to “watch the tragedy in Indochina work itself to its bitter end.” 
He hoped Thailand (now under a popularly-elected civilian administra-
tion) might resolve its economic and social problems faster than com-
munist subversion could be fomented. The rest of Southeast Asia would 
have to live with whatever political accommodation Bangkok made. He 
believed that Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia (“the secondary areas 
to the conflict in Indochina”) had become more stable and viable in the 
last decade. The Philippines was still beset by insurgency problems, but 
he hoped that that could be resolved in time. Also, the five countries 
were now linked into “a cooperative framework” which was ASEAN.114 
Lee’s views here may appear contradictory. So would there be or would 
there not be a communist threat to the non-communist Southeast Asia 
countries post-US withdrawal from Vietnam? If one reads Lee’s speeches 
carefully, the answer could not be a simple yes or no, but would have to 
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depend on whether both North and South Vietnam observed the terms 
of the Paris Peace Agreements, and to what extent. The course of events 
and scenarios could not be easily predictable, but the bottom line was 
that the continued American presence in the region post-withdrawal 
from Vietnam was absolutely essential. “The countries in Southeast Asia 
watching the mood in America and reading Senator McGovern’s policy 
to quit Southeast Asia immediately, started re-examining their security 
positions,” Lee revealed.115
On the nature of international politics (1971-1975)
There were signs that the international architecture of Southeast Asia was 
on the cusp of change, beginning with the July 1971 announcement of 
Henry Kissinger’s (until then) secret visits to Beijing and Nixon’s impend-
ing trip to China; China’s admission to the UN in October 1971; Nixon 
announcement in January 1972 of the withdrawal of another 70,000 
troops from South Vietnam by 1 July 1972, thereby bringing down the 
number of US troops there to 69,000 and his revelation of the on-going 
secret meetings between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho; Nixon’s visit to Bei-
jing and Moscow in February and May 1972 respectively; and the signing 
of the Paris Peace Agreement in January 1973, which all combined to 
make it possible for the US to disengage from Vietnam. By the 1970s, 
the region had also become more integrated and “the survival and politi-
cal integrity of each country will affect the security and perhaps even the 
survival of the others.”116 “The world,” Lee said, “is too inter-dependent 
for any country to insulate itself from the rest of the world…”117
Lee expected that in “the next few years, survival under ever changing 
economic, political and security conditions” would be one of the major 
concerns for the region. “The disengagement of American forces from 
Indochina ends one phase in the history of the region… For all of us 
in ASEAN, this is a period of intermission, waiting for the end of one 
phase of history, and the start of another, we hope, more promising era,” 
he said.118 He saw the end of the Vietnam War marking a new phase in 
the politics of Southeast Asia and indeed of the world. In his analysis, 
the Paris Peace Agreement was a consequence of “the new direct rela-
tions the great powers are establishing between themselves, over the 
heads of small nations.”119 Lee also drew attention to Moscow giving 
Nixon a red carpet welcome despite American bombing of Hanoi and 
Haiphong in spring 1972.120 For small nations, the great powers were 
no longer “moved by ideological considerations.” Their main concern 
was “the safeguarding and maximising of their national interests.” This 
fundamental change therefore required a “rethinking and reformula-
tion of the content of the concepts of non-alignment,” and for small 
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countries, such as Singapore, “the question now is not how to avoid 
being sucked into the warring camps of the two great powers, but how 
to have their interests taken into consideration when the great powers 
reach their compromises.” 121 All the above ideas were expanded and 
fleshed out in a series of three Jacob Blaustein lectures on international 
relations which Lee delivered in March-April 1973 at Leigh University 
(Bethlehem, Pennsylvania).122 Most memorably, Lee recalled the African 
proverb: when elephants fight, the grass suffers, and added that when 
elephants flirt, the grass also suffers. “And, when they make love, it is 
disastrous.”123
The central question was thus how the Southeast Asian countries 
should act to secure their interests in a multi-polar world. Much would 
depend on Washington’s “political nerve and diplomatic skill,” not in 
reducing her influence in the region faster than necessary. Equally impor-
tant, the ASEAN countries must recognise that they have common inter-
ests and not do anything that could harm these interests and allow the 
great powers to exploit them. “If the countries of Southeast Asia, whatever 
the differences and conflicts between themselves, can place their group 
interest beyond such interventions,” then non-communist Southeast 
Asia would have “a fair chance of preserving the maximum of freedom of 
choice provided by a balance between the great powers,” Lee concluded.124
On the same day that Saigon fell (on 30 April 1975), bringing the 
 Vietnam War finally to an end, Lee in his speech at the Commonwealth 
Heads of Government meeting, (Kingston, Jamaica) described 1973-1974 
as “two of the most momentous years of the history of the world since 
World War II” and “a turning point in history.” He declared that “it is 
power, and the use or non-use of power” that would decide the destiny of 
the world. It is the power of the Americans and the Russians, and later 
of the Chinese, and “how they restrain themselves and their allies, that 
will decide the framework of peace plus competition for influence.” And 
within this context, Southeast Asia would have to chart its future post-
Vietnam.125
Conclusion
This chapter hopefully provides a different way of understanding 
Singapore’s foreign policy – not so much at the operational level or the 
decision-making process, which it is unfortunately still not possible to 
reconstruct because of lack of access to the relevant archives. As Louis 
Halle said, “what the foreign policy of any nation addresses is the image 
of the external world in the minds of the people who determine the policy 
of that nation” (Halle 1960: 316). In the case of Singapore, it is surely the 
worldview of Lee Kuan Yew that had been most influential. Contextualising 
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his thoughts as they evolved is to acknowledge that human beings would 
always be unable to completely distance themselves from the emotionally 
and politically charged atmosphere of their time. This is only the first of a 
longer systematic treatment of Lee’s life-time of thoughts on international 
affairs, which must have been shaped – and continues to be shaped – by 
both contemplation and experience. Lee has this uncanny ability to foresee 
the political trends which must have helped Singapore to be so nimble in 
the conduct of its foreign relations. It might be worth reading this chapter 
in conjunction with Lee’s memoirs. As these were written many years after 
the events they describe, they are definitely more reflective. By including 
Lee’s summing up of his experience in this chapter, I have allowed his 
words to speak for themselves. Letting his thoughts come alive in this way 
will hopefully illuminate the framework of his Singapore story.
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Singapore: a knowledge economy?
Since the 1990s, the concept of a ‘knowledge economy’ has been used by 
the Singapore government as a way of rationalising and anticipating the 
next phase of the country’s development. Economically, it was intended to 
mark the transition from one phase of production – a labour and material-
intensive industrial economy – to one based on research and knowledge 
production. By doing so, the government hoped that it would further dif-
ferentiate Singapore from the other countries of the region, which were 
experiencing the Asian Economic Miracle and thus  becoming economi-
cally competitive. The knowledge economy had grander implications as 
well, particularly in terms of cultural processes. Here it can be noted 
that under the knowledge economy a range of  factors – physical, social 
and ethnic landscapes, business models and practices, national identity, 
Singaporeans, and the concepts of foreign, local and  cosmopolitan – all 
became reconfigured for life in the 21st century. Thus various arms of the 
government leapt into action,  churning out policy directives on industry, 
labour, information and  communications technology (ICT) and media 
that would take Singapore to the next level. On the ground, the govern-
ment courted investors, partners and talent with generous grants and 
research infrastructure, cleaned up its  intellectual property regimes, and 
emphasised a new model of  Singaporean-as-entrepreneur.
From the policy perspective, Singapore’s knowledge economy 
extended and adapted a pre-existing narrative of progressivist develop-
mentalism. Like many of its other national campaigns, the knowledge 
economy has been framed by a logic of technical-bureaucratic rational-
ity. According to Singapore’s political leaders, the knowledge economy 
is seen in terms of continued national economic growth, competition, 
and identifying areas of comparative advantage, particularly in the 
light of increasing competition unleashed by the wake of the Asian 
Economic Miracle. The knowledge economy is therefore predicated 
on this overused aphorism: Singapore, unlike its neighbours, has no 
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natural resources, only its people and an advantageous geographical 
location. Fortunately because of the ability of its political leadership, 
investment and developmental assistance from First World countries, 
and the calibre of its human resource, it has been able to prosper with-
out natural resources or an economic hinterland. Thus it is possible to 
see how the knowledge economy has been interpreted as a natural next 
step in Singapore’s development. Since the main requirement of the 
knowledge economy is knowledge work rather than large-scale, labour-
intensive industrial production, Singapore’s constant global connectivi-
ties and highly-skilled and pliable workforce mean that there are few 
obstacles in the way of this economic transition.
It is on this basis that I wish to contextualise the Singaporean knowl-
edge economy on the basis of various tensions that are ontological and 
geographical in nature. In abstract terms, Singapore’s conception of 
the knowledge economy raises a similar issue to those faced by OECD 
 countries. On the one hand, there is little clarity or consensus about what 
actually constitutes a knowledge economy (Kenway, Bullen, Fahey, & Robb 
2006), while on other there is a tacit sense of how politically it is intended 
as a form of teleological developmentalist progression, identifying a new 
post-industrial endpoint that will continue to separate First World socie-
ties from their industrialising counterparts in the Third World.
In this sense, Singapore recognises the knowledge economy as 
an evolution from the post-industrial or information society identi-
fied by Peter Drucker in the late 1950s and Daniel Bell in the 1970s, 
which emphasises new ways in which value is assigned to commodi-
ties. Under the knowledge economy, it is believed that new forms of 
 commodities such as complex electronic equipment, software, pharma-
ceuticals, film, books and music will displace traditional commodities 
because most of their value is derived from knowledge as a factor of 
their production rather than the usual labour and raw materials. This 
functional invariance is problematic because it reproduces Singapore 
as merely a node in the wider network of knowledge economies. In 
order to differentiate itself, Singapore makes use of a culturalist geog-
raphy, a sense of its own physical location, combined with a reinvented 
imagination of its cultural identity. But this too has its own preferences 
between the ‘global’ and ‘Asian’. As has been discussed in this volume, 
much of Singapore’s history has been framed through a continuous 
narrative of the island’s connectivities with the wider world, attributing 
Singapore’s success to its role as a port city and the extent to which capi-
tal, cultural and demographic flows have been facilitated. In this way, 
Singapore’s knowledge economy builds on these flows, in which the 
local and the global enable the circulation of knowledge  commodities, 
capital and resources.
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However, Singapore’s relationship with the wider world has tended to 
be seen in more ambivalent terms, particular in a period of time in which 
Singaporean narratives of progressivism have come to be  rearticulated 
through Asian culturalism. If the global homogenises Singapore’s knowl-
edge economy, Asia as an abstract region is intended to be the point of 
differentiation. Thus through Asian culturalism, Singapore’s leaders 
sought to convert its knowledge economy on various levels. Because of 
the state’s geographical and cultural proximity to Asia, it has attempted to 
marry physical convenience with its role as a knowledge comprador. Its 
location meant that knowledge workers and companies had easy access 
to regional subjects and local capital, while its new  culturalism suggested 
that Singapore possessed the regional knowledge on the one hand and 
on the other the skills to interface with the global knowledge network. 
But this creates more intellectual tensions than it resolves. For if the state 
embraces globalism as the basis for its continued social and economic 
development, the notion of Asia, despite state attempts to naturalise it in 
the imagination of its people, merely becomes peripheral. But it may also 
be argued that this makes the rationalisation of the knowledge economy 
highly disjunctive, depending on who the discourse targets. To global 
investors and partners, Asia is merely subordinated to global capital, but 
to its own people the Singapore government has attempted to Asianise 
the knowledge economy in such a way that its knowledge workers become 
accustomed to accepting the Asian ‘content’ as indigenously their own.
To the state, the tensions between the global and the Asian are not 
incommensurate and the idea of Singapore as a ‘hub’ – a redesigned 
nomenclature for the historical port city – has been offered as a resolution. 
But this resolution has not been entirely satisfactory because the hub is 
not spatially neutral, but rather invested with contradictory and dissonant 
meanings. In some instances, the Singaporean hub is seen to be global 
and at other times regional. And on many other occasions, the hub is 
seldom seen without a disciplinary prefix. It is  interchangeably  associated 
with an endless list of activities: trading, sea and air  transportation, 
 communications, media, IT, educational and so on.
What I aim to do in this chapter is to reposition the ‘hub’ as an explana-
tion for the disjunctures between the global and the Asian in Singapore’s 
knowledge economy discourse. To do so I provide a  narrative of Singapore’s 
knowledge economy in relation to these spatial concepts and ask what 
is at stake as the state attempts to fashion itself as an Asian knowledge 
expert. I begin with Asian knowledge as it is traditionally understood (as 
area studies), but then move on to show how this knowledge has also 
taken on a more popular or ‘soft’ form, in which  knowledge products 
such as broadcast journalism and financial services also lay claim to 
Asian expertise. This expertise is then contextualised under the new mis-
sion of Singapore’s universities and how all disciplines, regardless of 
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their orientation toward scientific universality, must now be abstracted 
for their ‘Asian’ value. It is on this premise that an alternative reading 
of Singapore’s knowledge hub is needed and this compels one to think 
about a type of Asian knowledge production that has a greater amount of 
tension and ambivalence towards historicism that has often been the case 
with the life-process of capital.
The knowledge economy and the global-Asia nexus
Some of the earliest public articulations of the knowledge economy by 
Singapore government officials were made during the early 1990s, but 
with little clarity about what it meant then.1 In some instances they rec-
ognised that technology was having a substantial impact on its citizen’s 
work and recreation, and more specifically the way it affected communica-
tions and information acquisition. In 1991 the National Computer Board 
launched the third phase of a longer-running nationwide computerisa-
tion strategy that began ten years earlier. This third phase, which became 
known as the IT2000 master plan, sought to transform Singapore into 
the “intelligent island”, as both a way of signalling new forms of com-
petitive advantage as well as improving Singaporeans’ quality of life. But 
more significantly it coincided with a period in which technology was no 
longer merely a facilitator of other social and economic activities but was 
a generator of wealth on its own terms. Thus, on the one hand it coin-
cided with the rise of the Internet, but on the other hand, it also produced 
the dot com boom, which at that time was virtually synonymous with the 
‘new economy’.
By 1999, after having witnessed the Asian Financial Crisis two years 
earlier, the knowledge economy was to receive much clearer introspec-
tion, while the differing perspectives of the concept offered by different 
ministries and government agencies suggested that the knowledge econ-
omy had become a more totalising organising force in Singaporean soci-
ety. A form of millenarianism took hold of government planning efforts, 
and various government initiatives were launched to prepare the various 
aspects of Singaporean society for life in the 21st century. Most of these 
had economic dimensions such as “Industry 21” and “Manpower 21”, 
which were to join other plans such as “InfoComm 21”, “Technopreneur-
ship 21”, and “Media 21” that were to materialise in the following four 
years. But most significantly, this year would best be remembered for 
the release of “Singapore 21”, a blueprint positing a set of national ideals 
that would take the country into the 21st century. In justifying the need 
to redesign these ideals, the official Singapore 21 publication character-
ises the future that world  citizens will need to confront, with the knowl-
edge economy fronting a list that also included the ‘borderless world’ and 
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demographic changes. On a much smaller scale, but no less important, 
was the EDB pamphlet, “A  Knowledge-based Economy”. As the govern-
ment body in charge of industrial development, improving the business 
environment and attracting foreign investment, the EDB attempted to 
sell Singapore’s knowledge economy to prospective international part-
ners and investors through a particular narrative. Here the EDB identi-
fies the ‘twin engines’ of the knowledge economy as manufacturing and 
service industries that emphasise technology and innovation. Most of the 
document deals with the clusters proposed by Industry 21: electronics, 
petroleum and petrochemicals, life sciences, engineering, education, 
healthcare, logistics, and communications and media, while asserting 
how Singapore is positioned to become a global or regional hub in each 
of these.
Also in that year there were a number of government speeches about 
the knowledge economy. Of particular interest was a lecture by then-
Deputy Prime Minister Tony Tan entitled “The Singapore Economy 
in the 21st Century”. In his speech, Tan stressed that the knowledge 
economy could be explained as one of “increasing weightlessness”. By 
‘weightlessness’, Tan was essentially stating that the economic value of 
products was rapidly becoming inversely proportional to the amount 
of materials used in manufacture. In other words, things such as com-
puter software, information, and financial transactions tended towards 
weightlessness because they were “infinitely expansible”, consisting 
of very little material mass and therefore delivering high value when 
 distributed.
Within the first few years of the new millennium, some of the promises 
of the knowledge economy were to be eviscerated almost as soon as they 
were offered. IT, for instance, was noted to be the knowledge economy’s 
driving force (see Tan 1998) and the InfoComm 21 initiative anticipated 
an IT sector teeming with 250,000 workers by 2010. However, with the 
bursting of the dot com bubble in March 2000, Singapore’s government 
planners were compelled to change the focus of the knowledge economy. 
Biotechnology and life sciences became increasingly recognised as the 
main drivers of the new economy and the technopreneur became rein-
scribed as the generic ‘risk-taking entrepreneur’, while IT returned to its 
secondary place as the facilitator for the various hubs in the knowledge 
economy.2
With Singapore experiencing an economic downturn, the Economic 
Review Committee reports that were released between 2002 and 2003 
could not, therefore, have been timelier. In presenting a wide-ranging set 
of recommendations for restructuring the Singapore economy and iden-
tifying new growth areas, it restated the fundamentals underpinning the 
knowledge economy while also introducing a number of graduated shifts. 
In broad terms it re-emphasised Singapore’s role as a node in the global 
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economy, the importance of creativity and entrepreneurialism, and the 
need for a diversified economy that integrated multinational companies, 
start-ups, and traditional businesses to produce innovative products and 
services (Singapore Economic Review Committee 2003: 5-7). But subtly, 
some other ideas were either introduced or accentuated. The commit-
tee now gave a firm recommendation for developing creative industries 
and providing educational services to students, mainly from Asia. From 
2005 onwards, overt public references to the ‘knowledge economy’ by 
government officials became rarer, even as some new government initia-
tives were inaugurated. The IDA, for example, cycled through a few more 
ICT plans. In 2003, it launched the “Connected Singapore” plan, which 
replaced InfoComm 21, and then again in 2006 the “Intelligent Nation 
2015” (iN2015) master plan sought to “navigate Singapore’s exhilarating 
transition into a global city, universally recognised as an enviable synthe-
sis of technology, infrastructure, enterprise and manpower”  (Singapore 
InfoComm Development Authority 2008). Also within the realm of 
 ‘creative industries’, interactive and digital media surfaced as a key area 
to develop and exploit.
Considering these developments, how does one locate or conceptu-
alise the global and the Asian in Singapore’s knowledge economy dis-
course? This is a curious proposition, because Singapore’s strategy of 
marketing itself to potential international collaborators and knowledge-
worker recruits has rested on the geographical and cultural advantages 
of being located in Asia and having a local workforce that is ethnically 
Asian (and therefore more linguistically and culturally conversant with 
the region) (Sidhu 2006). But in the public officials’ attempts to com-
municate with different audiences, such as its citizens/workforce or 
international partners, or to identify various plans of action, the vari-
ous geographies involved have been presented in more contradicting or 
incommensurable ways. In order to rationalise the widespread societal 
change in transitioning Singapore from a post-industrial society into 
an ‘Asian’ knowledge economy, Asia has been flexibly represented as an 
entity Singapore should differentiate itself from, as an economic com-
petitor, while also embracing it as a place for Singaporeans to invest in or 
as an entity collectively cautiously venturing into the knowledge economy 
(see Chen 2001).
Let me illustrate this by referring to two disjunctive neologisms 
adopted by former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong. The first is the 
 geographically based “Boston of the East”, which Goh introduced in 
1996 as a way of providing the Singaporean knowledge economy with 
an identity. In this instance, Goh was challenging Singapore’s two 
universities (at that time) to become the Harvard and MIT of Asia, by 
attracting the best students from Asia and beyond (Chua 1996). In 2000 
Boston was once again used as a model, but now given more depth by 
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Teo Chee Hean as not just a place occupied by two of America’s top uni-
versities but by “over 200 universities, colleges, research institutes and 
thousands of companies”. The geography depicted by the Minister for 
Education was intended to suggest that Singapore should adopt Boston’s 
industrial synergies:
It is a focal point of creative energy; a hive of intellectual, research, 
commercial and social activity. We want to create an oasis of talent 
in Singapore: a knowledge hub, an ‘ideas-exchange’, a confluence 
of people and idea streams, an incubator for inspiration. (Teo 2000)
Implicitly, however, the “Boston of the East” is a transplantation of a for-
eign model and its novelty is precisely something that does not exist in 
the ‘East’. So in order for a construct such as this to work, the East needed 
to be peripheralised – structured as less advanced – thus allowing for 
Singapore to be differentiated from the ‘East’.
In the year following Teo’s clarification, Goh presented another vision 
of Asia relevant to the Singapore knowledge economy that also inter-
twined Asia with the world. This came in his 2001 National Day Rally 
speech in which he urged Singaporeans to expand the boundaries of 
their hinterland. Southeast Asia, he implied, was the hinterland of the 
past. Now Singaporeans needed to think in terms of flight durations, 
and, by conceiving a seven-hour flight radius, ‘greater’ Asia was within 
easy reach:
Within a 7-hour flight radius of Singapore live 2.8 billion people, 
with hundreds of millions in the middle income group. We 
have only ourselves to blame if we do not fully exploit these 
opportunities. We should regard all the countries and cities 
which are within 7 hours of flying time from Singapore as our 
hinterland. (Goh 2001)
Naturally, China and India were included in Goh’s geography and his 
pervasive logic was clearly one of instrumental rationalism. Yet in this 
geography two themes co-existed: the importance of the Asian hinterland 
to Singapore’s economy and the unmentioned but assumed centrality of 
Singapore in this configuration.
Goh’s ‘seven-hour hinterland’ therefore uses the idea of the ‘hub’ as a 
way of locating Singapore’s relationship within the global and the Asian. 
While he was addressing a local audience, his implied positioning of 
Singapore at the centre of this (imagined) geography became a useful 
way to pitch Singapore’s competitive advantage to investors, partners, 
and foreign talent. Two of Singapore’s global interfaces: A*STAR, the 
agency that oversees high-level research in the country and the EDB have 
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used the “seven-hour geography” as a way of elevating Singapore’s hub 
status in various areas of research and industrial strength. For example, 
former EDB head, Ko Kheng Hwa explains it as “the regional gateway 
for global companies, and the global gateway for regional companies” 
(2003). But just as the “seven-hour hinterland” is constituted by simulta-
neously embracing Asia and centring Singapore, the idea of the hub also 
reveals the tensions between global and Asian regional scales. Overtly the 
state intends the hub to be a place that mediates and regulates flows of 
different values – human, capital, financial, plus commodities, informa-
tion and transportation – between Asia and the world.
The hub is seldom used unmodified and it is often prefixed by adjec-
tives such as ‘global’ and ‘Asian’ or by the evergreen ‘world class’ and 
then followed by a particular industrial cluster such as biotechnology, 
life sciences, education, and so on. However, how the global hub might 
be different from the Asian hub is not always clear. Is a global hub syn-
onymous with the Asian hub? Or does the latter suggest a specific node 
within the Asian region? The EDB pamphlet, for example, claims that 
Singapore aspires to be a world class or global hub in electronics, educa-
tion and healthcare but an Asian hub in logistics, communications and 
media (Singapore Economic Development Board 1999). There is no clar-
ity here if the EDB is being realistic about what the various sectors are 
capable of achieving or if it is intimating that specific sectors strictly cover 
certain geographical scales. But by extension, Singapore’s obsession for 
excellence has also led to a geographical hierarchy of superlatives, thus 
global hub or Asian hub is used depending on where the benchmarking 
is better.
Towards an Asian knowledge hub
In Singapore the language of modernity and progress has often been 
deployed as a way in which certain national pursuits are accorded 
 economic value, compartmentalised and prioritised over others, which 
then leads to functional differences in knowledge. Some forms of knowl-
edge are thus deemed to be essential for economic development and 
industrialisation, while others relate more to national development (e.g. 
housing, healthcare and education, national cultural identity, and foreign 
policy/national security). In this way, the science, technology and pro-
fessional fields such as law, medicine, and commerce have traditionally 
been valorised over other forms of knowledge or disciplines, such as the 
humanities and social sciences.
The story that I wish to tell now is about the transformation of such 
attitudes to knowledge into disjunctive formations that are valued pre-
cisely because they are not universal but because they demonstrate Asian 
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regional expertise. This change attempts to position Singapore as an 
intellectual comprador, selling its Asian expertise (which also includes 
science and technology) to the global knowledge economy. This story 
begins with the formalisation of Singaporean Southeast Asian studies 
in 1968 with the founding of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 
(ISEAS). According to ISEAS’s narrative, Southeast Asian studies did not 
previously exist (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 1998). In its earlier 
incarnation, Southeast Asian studies in Singapore were patchy and ‘dif-
fuse’ with the only sustained activity within the History Department at 
the University of Singapore3 (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 1998: 
6-7). The Parliamentary Act that created ISEAS was therefore described 
as ambitious. It was a response to regional political realities such as the 
founding of ASEAN and the many anxieties of a region confronting 
problems of modernisation, development, and conflict. It also aimed to 
distinguish itself from the Southeast Asian Studies taught in Western 
countries by claiming to be the first of its kind within the region itself; it 
was independent and not affiliated with any university, it encouraged its 
researchers to focus on places other than their home countries or on the 
region as a whole, and it sought to foster collaboration, both from within 
and outside the region (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 1998: 7-8).
The role of the state in directing academic knowledge production can 
also be seen in the less successful Institute of East Asian Philosophy 
(IEAP), which was established in 1983. As a unit within the National Uni-
versity of Singapore (NUS), the idea of the IEAP was to “put Singapore on 
the map as a centre for research into Confucianism as applied  philosophy 
suitable for the modern age” (Lee 2008: 540-1). But IEAP’s inaugura-
tion also coincided with the arrival of a ‘culturalist’ phase of Singapore’s 
ethnic management, which saw the advent of religious knowledge and 
moral education in its high school curriculum. Thus the production of 
knowledge about East Asian philosophies was implicitly linked to the 
state’s attempts to naturalise, validate, and ironically reunite (Chinese) 
Singaporeans with a presumed moral and philosophical code. The  failure 
of the Confucianism project in Singapore due to suspicions by other 
ethnic groups that the country was Sinicising has been fairly well docu-
mented (Chua 1995; Hong & Huang 2008). But as Edwin Lee reminds, 
this development also meant that the IEAP lost much of its legitimacy as 
well (2008: 542).
Both cases – ISEAS and IEAP – demonstrated that in order for their 
respective forms of regional knowledge production to be ‘useful’, they 
needed to resonate with a national cause. By the late 1990s, however, what 
constituted national utility became broader and more complex. For exam-
ple, the deprioritisation of government support of the arts in the 1960s, 
because it was deemed a luxury item suddenly came to the forefront in 
the Renaissance City project. Various disciplines in the humanities and 
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social sciences that would otherwise have been considered esoteric and 
valueless became increasingly relevant. For example, since its founding 
ISEAS’ prime interest in regional and political affairs was complemented 
by economic studies, social, cultural and gender studies. But the trans-
formation of the IEAP into the East Asian Institute (EAI) in 1997 under 
the wing of the acclaimed  scholar Wang Gungwu offers a key insight 
into how knowledge and value have moved in tandem. In George Yeo’s 
address at the official opening of the institute, the justification of the EAI 
was understandably tied to the rise of the East Asian economies and the 
urgency of securing Singapore’s place within them (see also Lee 2002):
The economies of the countries of East Asia are developing so 
rapidly that we can expect the East Asian region to account for 
some 40-50% of the world’s GNP some time in the middle of the 
next century. East Asia is therefore an enormous reality for all of 
us in Singapore. It is crucial that our political, intellectual, cultural 
and emotional perspectives take into account the economic trends 
transforming Asia and the world. (Yeo 1997)
In a sense the EAI allowed Yeo to rescue the IEAP from an ignominious 
fate; so, instead of the messiness of its Confucianist projects, the IEAP 
now became an institution that foresaw the rise and future importance 
of China. Notwithstanding the Asian financial crisis, the rise of the Asian 
economies, particularly those of China and India, was to be directly linked 
to the boom in the Asian knowledge industry. Coming on the heels of the 
EAI were a number of other Asian Studies research institutes that were 
launched in the following decade, especially the Asian Research Institute 
(ARI) and the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS). Such as the EAI, 
ARI and ISAS became university-level entities rather than belonging to 
a university faculty or school and one of the main justifications for their 
existence was also that of national instrumental rationalism. By then, the 
notion of ‘changing Asia’ or ‘Asia in transformation’ had become a well-
deployed state narrative, which was again used to frame ARI and ISAS 
(see Goh 2005; Shanmugaratnam 2006; Teo 2003). In the case of ARI 
it represented a changed national interest in which the whole of Asia, 
rather than discrete parts of Southeast or Northeast Asia, needed sys-
tematic academic inquiry from the perspective of research programmes 
in population, religion, migration, and cultural studies. And for ISAS, 
India’s rise in the global economy was seen to have strategic implica-
tions, compelling scholars to ‘reconceptualise East Asia’ by researching 
South Asia’s interconnections with the broader Asian region and its 
neighbouring sub-regions (Goh 2005).
The decade after 1997 should be noted for other consequences to the 
nature of Asian area expertise. First, apart from Asian research performing 
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an indirect role in boosting Singapore’s regional economic performance 
by providing knowledge, it also came to be involved in directly generat-
ing revenue. As part of the “Global Schoolhouse” strategy, the raising 
of the profile of Asian research was also intended as a way of attracting 
graduate students from overseas. Since EAI, ARI, and ISAS were uni-
versity bodies, student contact and collaboration with their researchers 
were facilitated. Furthermore, the three main universities started using 
their other forms of Asian expertise to attract students. For example, in 
order to compete for students/clients, the NUS’ Lee Kuan Yew School 
of Public Policy, the MBA programme at the Singapore Management 
 University, and the ‘elite’ Nanyang Fellows Programme at the Nanyang 
Technological University’s business school all adopted the same narrative 
of an unstoppable Asia on the rise, which created both opportunities and 
problems. These required the leadership which these programmes were 
well-placed to provide (Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy; Nanyang 
Technological University; Singapore Management University).
Second, academics and researchers were no longer the sole purvey-
ors of Asian expertise and in effect Singapore’s pursuit of the knowledge 
economy also led to the popularisation and softening of Asian knowledge. 
Thus alongside the universities and research institutes, both public and 
private bodies such as the National Library, the National Heritage Board, 
and a gamut of private corporations also saw their mission as provid-
ing and producing Asian knowledge. For example, private corporations’ 
provision of Asian expertise demonstrate some of the most interesting 
changes to how Asian knowledge is produced and distributed, because it 
distils state-led ideas about how the nation can differentiate itself in the 
competitive global economy. In 1999 Singapore’s Mediacorp4 launched 
Channel NewsAsia (CNA), an all news and current affairs TV station that 
was first targeted at local and subsequently (in 2000) regional profes-
sionals, managers, entrepreneurs and businessmen. Since the channel 
had to compete with established players such as CNN and BBC, it sought 
to differentiate itself by providing regional and international news with 
an ‘Asian perspective’. Similar to research institutes, CNA legitimises 
its knowledge production through the credentials of its journalists, who 
are mostly residents of the places they cover. While television news sta-
tions can claim expertise because their main business is information, 
the ability for financial institutions to be area experts appears somewhat 
dubious; after all their main activity is to provide financial services. Yet 
Singapore’s DBS Bank’s Asianisation from 2005 onwards is a curious 
development. This Asianisation was the result of a rebranding exercise, 
which saw DBS Bank reconceiving its clientele while also undergoing an 
intense phase of corporate culturalisation. This was triggered off by the 
liberalisation of Singapore’s financial services sector, which would see 
the entry of large multinational banks, and DBS Bank’s realisation that 
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the only way to compete was by specialisation, which in this case (such as 
the many discussed so far) was to present itself as an expert in the Asian 
financial scene:
We live and breathe Asia. Our competitive advantage lies in 
our understanding Asia’s cultural nuances, and in our ability to 
capitalise on this insight to help our customers in Asia deal with 
their most important needs.
With foresight and determination we built expertise over the years 
in capital markets, treasury, and wealth management. Today, we 
are able to leverage these capabilities in connecting our clients in 
Asia with our extensive distribution to traditional as well as ‘New 
Asian’ investors. (Tai 2006: 15)
These two transformations – the extension of the Asian area expertise 
beyond academic Asian Studies and its incorporation into the logic of 
the global schoolhouse – were accompanied by a third development that 
was to occur from the middle of the decade onwards. While the language 
of economic rationalism had been mainly used to justify state support 
for the various research programmes under the knowledge economy, 
 Singapore’s public officials were beginning to view them in ways other 
than generating revenue or new forms of economic value. The knowledge 
 economy, its corresponding effects on Singapore’s landscapes, demogra-
phy, society, and its diverse forms of research cultures and networks, was 
now valued abstractly for its broad role in national revitalisation. Thus, 
knowledge areas that cannot directly be used for financial profit become 
resignified on other terms. For instance, the Asian Civilisations Museum 
has often been interwoven into Singapore’s Renaissance City project, and 
in some ways also adds to the marketability of the country as a tourist 
destination. But the idea of national revitalisation through the knowledge 
economy is also a major ACM narrative. Tommy Koh’s opening address 
of the Empress Place branch of the ACM is quite telling, in this regard. 
In a short exegesis, the speech rearticulates the value of architectural her-
itage and conservation, before declaring the museum’s role in national 
learning and cultural reconnection. But most notably, the museum was 
also seen to spatially represent the knowledge  economy, which, borrow-
ing from George Yeo, was to “help us to plug into an  international cul-
tural network” while also displaying ‘synergy’ among the landmarks in 
the changing civic district area (Koh 2003). In this context, Shanmuga-
ratnam’s speech at ARI’s fifth anniversary is also quite  significant for its 
portrayal of a maturing knowledge economy  discourse, emphasising that 
different nodes in the economy should be considered differently in terms 
of their impact. In the case of ARI, it was to be seen as “global excellence 
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in research”, i.e. the way its research output is received and recognised by 
scholars elsewhere in the world. Additionally, ARI was seen in terms of 
the ‘balance’ it would bring to the wider scope of knowledge production 
in the NUS (Shanmugaratnam 2006).
Global-Asian knowledge and the ‘NUS Difference’
Do the various positions adopted by the state and society about the knowl-
edge economy represent a unique Singaporean or Asian appropriation/
reformulation of it? And if Singapore’s status as a knowledge hub  vacillates 
between the global and the Asian, how should we make sense of it? I argue 
that a response to these questions lies in the way the agency of the knowl-
edge worker is situated in relation to capital. For this I turn to Dipesh 
Chakrabarty’s reading of Marx. In his essay on ‘Two Histories of Capital’ 
Chakrabarty reminds us that Marx conceptualised two types of histories: 
the first are “histories ‘posited by capital’” and the second are “histories 
that do not belong to capital’s ‘life process’”, which he labels respectively as 
history 1 and history 2 (2000: 50). In the first case history is complicit with 
the logic of capitalism, allowing for the reproduction of capital, and is “the 
universal and necessary history we associate with capital [and] it forms the 
backbone of the usual narratives of transition to the capitalist mode of pro-
duction” (2000: 63). History 2, however, should be considered disjunctive 
rather than oppositional to history 1. While history 2 also lays claim to the 
same ‘antecedents’ of capital, as does history 1, its use of these antecedents, 
however, perform an opposing function, which is to reconfigure or appro-
priate them outside the context of capital (2000: 63-4). Surprisingly, Marx 
identifies two of these antecedents: money and commodities. It is easy to 
see how they fit into the life process of capital and therefore as necessary 
elements of history 1. But Marx also suggests that money and commodity 
can have an existence outside the history of capital, and this is where the 
various characteristics of history 2s arise. Chakrabarty writes:
Marx thus writes into the intimate space of capital an element of deep 
uncertainty. Capital has to encounter in the reproduction of its own 
life process relationships that present it with double possibilities. 
These relations could be central to capital’s self-reproduction, and 
yet it is also possible for them to be oriented to structures that do 
not contribute to such reproduction. History 2s are thus not pasts 
separate from capital; they inhere in capital and yet interrupt and 
punctuate the run of capital’s own logic. (2000: 64)
By relating history 1 with the innumerable variations of history 2, it 
becomes possible to create a “politics of human belonging and diversity” 
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by providing the basis on which “multiple ways of being human” could be 
related to a singular “global logic of capital” (2000: 67).
Let me now attempt to reconnect these various interpretations of 
knowledge capitalism to the way the global and the Asian are config-
ured to support Singapore’s knowledge economy and how its knowl-
edge workers can inhabit different value systems and also participate 
in the production of “history 1” and “history 2s”. In order to do this 
I shall  examine Singapore’s higher education sector and its attempts 
to differentiate itself in the global knowledge economy – in particular 
the activities of the National University of Singapore (NUS). As argued 
earlier, Singapore’s attempt to differentiate itself by identifying itself as 
the global knowledge hub in Asia does not mean that it is defining an 
alternate mode of production. On the contrary, all of Singapore’s main-
stream history is in effect the story of different configurations of capi-
talism playing themselves out, transforming and sublating Singapore 
into the logic of capital. The type of differences we are witnessing at 
this point are merely the contradictions and disjunctures that consti-
tute late capitalism (Appadurai 1990) and in this way, differentiation 
is indeed the ‘becoming’ that Chakrabarty associates with history 1. So, 
considering capitalism’s logic in Singapore, all of its subjects (both indi-
vidual and corporate) contribute to its reproduction. The higher educa-
tion sector is no exception. According to the narrative through “history 
1”, Singapore’s universities were, before the advent of the knowledge 
economy discourse, largely teaching and degree-granting institutions. 
However, with the articulation of Goh Chok Tong’s “Boston of the East” 
vision, its subsequent refinement by Teo Chee Hean, and the launching 
of the global schoolhouse initiative in 2003, the higher education land-
scape was to undergo a tremendous transformation. The universities 
had to take on a corporate model and underwent Americanisation.5 Stu-
dents became customers and were presented with a more broadly based 
and interdisciplinary curriculum (compared with the former British-
inspired system). The faculty were subjected to more stringent perfor-
mance assessments, including competition from imported foreign staff 
and were placed within an American-style rank, promotion, and ten-
ure system. As an institution the Singaporean university now needed 
to become a centre of excellence, a purveyor of educational services to a 
booming regional market, and a research entity. In short the universi-
ties were no longer organically autonomous but had to be plugged into 
a network that  included the private commercial sector, other research 
institutes, other universities in the world and the government.
Collectively, as the higher education sector – along with the other con-
stituents of the Singapore knowledge economy – faced the anxiety of uni-
versalisation and standardisation, competitively there was structurally 
little to distinguish Singapore from other knowledge economies.6 In the 
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broader language of the knowledge economy, the ironic juxtaposition of 
the global and the Asian gave Singapore a competitive advantage. To a 
large degree, NUS’ transformation during the first decade of the 21st cen-
tury heavily resonated with Singapore’s broader strategies of differentia-
tion. There are two tangents to this narrative, which coincided roughly 
with the tenures of two successive university presidents. Between 2000 
and 2008, the globalisation of NUS played the major focus, while its 
Asian emphasis was more ambivalently parcelled out to various depart-
ments and units. For example, the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences was 
identifying itself as an interdisciplinary expert in Asian Studies, while 
ARI and ISAS were formed. But this was to take place within the larger 
preoccupation with the ‘global’, a scale that was to fuel institutional devel-
opment as well as a form of competitive benchmarking. Indeed, in 2002 
the NUS changed its vision statement to “Towards a Global Knowledge 
Enterprise” and also gave its newsletter a name to reflect this purpose. 
But it is the series of university annual reports that articulate its sense of 
the global. During its centennial year, the 2005 annual report was enti-
tled, “Singapore’s Global University”. Asia was not mentioned much, 
except when contextualising NUS’ ranking against other universities. In 
most cases, the narrative describes how NUS has attempted to globalise, 
how it needs to foster global connections, and the urgency of establish-
ing itself as a ‘global brand’ (National University of Singapore 2005). The 
subsequent annual reports similarly continued to emphasise the role of 
globalisation in NUS. For instance, in the 2007 issue, entitled “The NUS 
Difference” the anxiety was one of competitiveness (National University 
of Singapore 2007). This was the year Singaporean universities were for-
mally detached from the Ministry of Education and became non-profit 
organisations. So the narrative was one of making NUS compete with 
other global institutions that had a longer history and bigger reputation.
In 2009, with the installation of a new president, ‘Asia’ took on a more 
corporate-wide role in the identity of the University. While Asia had pre-
viously been somewhat subordinated under the ‘global’, it was now the 
very entity that served to make NUS – and by imputation the rest of the 
Singaporean knowledge economy – unique among its competitors. To a 
certain extent, this change occurred because being ‘global’ was no longer 
sufficient, since this was the same theme adopted by other universities 
in the region and elsewhere. Once again, the trope of the hub came to 
the rescue:
The distinctiveness of being a leading global university 
centred in Asia opens perspectives and paves the way for the 
University to provide meaningful opportunities for students to 
gain international exposure while incorporating Asia-related 
contexts and perspectives. A new International Strategy was 
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also developed to enhance efforts in international contributions 
and further elevate the University’s position as the partner 
and university of choice in Asia for many of the world’s best 
universities and students. Among other things, this strategy 
would provide increased opportunities for students to broaden 
their intellectual and personal outlook. (National University of 
Singapore 2008: 19)
Consequently a new vision was conceived. While still retaining the idea 
of becoming a “global knowledge enterprise”, the NUS now also sought 
to be “a leading global university centred in Asia, influencing the future”. 
However, unlike the more problematic articulations of  Asian-centricity 
by Singapore government agencies such as the EDB, NUS’ perspective 
seems to have been more logically worked out, representing a region-
alisation of knowledge. The president, Tan Chor Chuan, felt that hav-
ing a culture of excellence and a talented body of students and staff 
were no longer enough (Tan 2008). The University now had to further 
distinguish itself by centring itself in Asia. This was to be manifested 
in four areas: ensuring students developed “a strong appreciation of 
global issues, alongside perspectives from Asia”; recruiting world-
class faculty who specialise in “strategic academic areas” and who have 
Asian expertise; developing NUS as a “magnet for talent” and becom-
ing the “preferred partner” for entities seeking partnerships in Asia; 
and becoming a thought-leader that articulates both global issues while 
“reflect[ing] Asian views and perspectives” (Tan 2008). This notion of 
Asian-centricity is a curious development because it is not easy to see 
how the particularity of Asian regional  knowledge could be reconciled 
with the universality of other domains of knowledge such as science 
and technology. In other words it might be easy to see how Asian-cen-
tricity can influence the research agenda in the humanities and social 
sciences, but how would this affect disciplines such as  physics, engi-
neering, and chemistry that are more universally-applicable in nature? 
This problem has to an extent been addressed by government officials 
in that the problems confronting the Asian region have cultural, tech-
nical, and policy implications, requiring different forms of attention 
and methods of resolution. In promoting Biotechnology, for instance, 
the EDB has asserted that Asia has a different demography of medi-
cal problems, which places Singapore in easy reach of a unique body 
of research subjects as well as a different pharmaceutical market. In 
a similar way, Tan’s vision of an Asian-centred university would call 
for identifying regional problems that require  solutions from different 
disciplines, while also suggesting that new forms of knowledge might 
emerge as a result of its activities within Asia.  Significantly, the uni-
versity’s commitment to Asia was then crystallised in the form of the 
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‘Global-Asia Institute’. While still a very new institution in which little 
research output has materialised, it sports the motto of “transcending 
boundaries of geography and knowledge”, aiming to “take a holistic 
approach to the fundamental issues confronting Asia and the world” 
(National University of Singapore 2009).
This story of NUS’ incorporation into the Singaporean discourse of 
the knowledge economy, its changing contentions with the global and 
the Asian, and its attempt to define regional ‘thought-leadership’ pro-
vides an interesting glimpse into the way transformations  within the 
knowledge capitalism in Singapore both reproduce the state’s wider eco-
nomic strategy and how this in turn re-consolidates the logic of capital-
ism. This story is thus Chakrabarty’s “history 1”, although it now deals 
more heavily with various attributes of late capitalism, such as the neces-
sity for differentiation and how, for scholars such as Leo Ching, such dif-
ferentiation is realised through the consumption and commoditisation 
of ‘Asia’ (Ching 2000). However, it must be noted that universities are 
also sites of critical self-reflection and, as such, they both reproduce the 
enveloping national discourse, while being capable of playing a more 
disjunctively resistant and subversive role. Thus universities also pro-
duce their fair share of “history 2s”, and by disjunctive I am asserting 
a feature of these histories which for Chakrabarty “do not constitute a 
dialectical Other of the necessary logic of History 1” (2000: 66) and are 
“not pasts that separate from capital… [but] they inhere in capital and yet 
interrupt and punctuate the run of capital’s own logic” (2000: 64). To do 
this I shall now revisit Asian Studies in NUS, especially through ARI, 
and discuss how its emergence relates to history 2.
Typically, Asian Studies and ARI could be incorporated in history 
1, as knowledge becomes commoditised, as the university attempts to 
find new ways of abstracting value and as faculty are transformed into 
knowledge workers whose labour power is monitored under the new 
conditions of knowledge capitalism. Yet scholars can also possess mul-
tiple subjectivities, playing a role as knowledge capitalists in attempts to 
secure funding or publicise the impact and value of their research, while 
also simultaneously assuming the role of the scholar in which research 
output is virtually de-commercialised. I argue that the result of these 
multiple subjectivities is not a consciousness that exists outside of the 
logic of Singaporean capitalism or styles of critique that might be fash-
ionable in Western academia. What materialises, therefore, is a form of 
ambivalence that vacillates between both positions. As an institution that 
attempts to identify its uniqueness as an Asian Studies institute and yet 
be global, ARI typifies this ambivalence.
In an earlier part of this chapter I presented the official narrative 
 surrounding ARI’s emergence. As a creation of the 21st century, its 
founders were undoubtedly aware of the many critiques of Asian Studies 
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qua area studies, particularly in the way it originated in Western insti-
tutions. For example, Edward Said has famously intimated that con-
temporary area studies is a latent form of Orientalism (1978) and a lot 
of research work conducted in the West is to some degree Oriental-
ist. Thus the anxiety at the inception of ARI, much like that of ISEAS, 
was that it should not be simply a replication of the Western institute 
of Asian Studies but had to uncover its unique niche. However, this 
process involves being both global and functional. During ARI’s early 
days, its international board, comprising highly ranked academics from 
Asian and Western universities, was charged with this responsibility. As 
part of ARI’s launch, for example, a ‘Roundtable on Research Priorities 
for Asia’ was held, which drew comments such as ARI needing to avoid 
the ‘hyper-professionalism’ in the US, but adopting a more interdiscipli-
nary stance and emphasis on problems particular to the region (quoted 
and cited in Lindsay 2003: 2). In the following years, ARI realised that 
being Asian meant that it had to focus on various topical areas, so con-
sequently the institute became divided into clusters on migration, the 
changing family, cultural studies, religion and globalisation, Southeast 
Asia-China interactions, and urban sustainability. These topical areas 
were to be the point around which both Asian and Western scholars 
could gravitate. This objective was mentioned in one of the ARI newslet-
ters as follows:
Singapore is a great location to bring together Asian and global 
scholars, in the hope of correcting some of the imbalance in the 
way the world’s ideas tend to be generated. We hope that regional 
scholars have a stronger voice, and scholars based elsewhere 
rethink some of their assumptions. (Reid 2004: 2)
So although the research agenda, foci, and the national/ethnic mix of 
ARI were to be different, the implicitly Western meta-language of Asian 
Studies appears to have been upheld, which again reflects more the 
multicultural anxieties that now dog Western centres of Asian studies 
rather than representing a problem unique to performing Asia research 
in Singapore. Thus, in order to counter the location of Singapore capital-
ism in ARI, one needs to juxtapose it against broader critiques of Asian 
Studies in the West.
Depending on the research interest and theoretical exposure, there will 
undoubtedly be different groups of scholars who will produce research 
work with varying sensitivities and disposition toward history 1 and 
 history 2 within ARI and the rest of NUS as well. So far, what consti-
tutes history 2 have been works that might be aware of Marxism or post-
colonial theory, which also cannot entirely be divorced from the logic of 
global/Western capital. Interestingly this has left some reflections that 
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articulate critical consciousness, but not necessarily a resolution of ten-
sion. For instance, ARI’s new director Lily Kong, a cultural geographer, 
is no stranger to various critical social theories. But, apart from her aca-
demic work, she also has various senior NUS administrative appoint-
ments. So, on the one hand, she can be thought of as performing the role 
of Marx’s ‘manager’ in reinforcing the various disciplinary mechanisms 
of the University’s capital and labour power. But as an Asian scholar, other 
tensions could also arise. Writing in the ARI newsletter after her directo-
rial appointment, she raises numerous problems related to  creating a 
balance between global/Western academic concerns and ARI’s identity 
as an Asian body:
On more than one occasion, Tony [Reid] had made it a point to 
promote the importance of offering to the world voices from 
Southeast Asia in particular. It is perhaps appropriate therefore 
that a child of Southeast Asia, located in a uniquely advantageous 
situation in Singapore, should succeed him in the quest to shape, 
influence, transform and balance the way the world understands 
Asia. Particularly, I bring to ARI an ‘in-between’ position – one 
which sees the possibilities of and need for critical engagements 
with Anglo-American scholarship, yet insistently advocating the 
need to stretch beyond that hegemony to develop Asian voices, 
perspectives and insights from Asia. (2008: 2)
The consciousness of hegemony is crucial here because critical schol-
ars are often anxious about how different entities can at the same time 
appear to be liberating and hegemonic – the West, the global, capital, 
the Singaporean State, the workplace – and the question of emancipa-
tion then becomes difficult to factor in. There is also another element 
of history 2 that needs to be considered, and this is the inadvertent 
return of Asia as a geographical entity. Insofar as the postmodern, post-
sovereign capitalism is concerned, Asia has become increasingly deter-
ritorialised and this is described through the experiences of the Asian 
Diasporas and human, cultural, and ideational flows. In this sense, 
Asian Studies is relevant and unique anywhere in the world, since Asia 
is no longer confined to the landmass between the Uralic-Altaic area 
and the Pacific Ocean. But, in attempting to become a Global hub in 
Asia, ARI (and Singapore) has had to once again reterritorialise Asia in 
order to sustain its very reason for existence. But how does this reter-
ritorialisation take place? Is it a reinscription of an Orientalised Asia? 
Instead of returning to Said (in which the answer would be obvious), I 
would prefer to extend this to the notion of hospitality that is primary to 
ARI’s cosmopolitan collection of scholars. In attempting to make itself 
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different, ARI’s attempt to attract researchers from Asia and the rest of 
the world is framed hospitably:
The Asia Research Institute seeks to address these needs from a 
uniquely advantageous situation in the heart of Southeast Asia, but 
equally enmeshed with China and India. It invites international 
scholars to reconsider their field from this Asian vantage point, 
and regional scholars to address a broader audience through this 
portal. (Asia Research Institute 2003)
And this is also echoed in the opening speech by Teo Chee Hean, which 
adorns and frames the opening pages of ARI’s 2003-2004 annual report:
This Institute is designed to differentiate itself… by its open 
invitation to the best minds in social and cultural research to see 
the world from the vantage point of our dynamic region. (Asia 
Research Institute 2003)
Although one might claim that the notion of ‘invitation’ is purely a for-
mality and incidental, its appearance is more suggestive of how ARI’s 
(and Teo’s) discourse asserts a reterritorialised and reconstructed Asia, 
this time centred in Singapore. This perspective comes from Derrida’s 
critique of hospitality in which the construction of positions of ‘host’ and 
‘guests’ are shifting and not intransigent. In effect, this takes place in the 
process of how the host self-constructs is intimately related to how a site 
in which hospitality is offered is given material reality (Derrida 2000). 
In the case of ARI, the site of hospitality is not Singapore per se. It is as 
much Asia as Singapore will allow it to be. As a result, the idea of locality 
in Asia becomes slippery and transposes easily onto each other. I close 
this section with a description of a Taiwanese scholar who, after working 
for many years in the US, narrates her relocation to ARI in Singapore as 
a homecoming and a return:
Personally, it is a home coming, back to Asia after a quarter of a 
century in North America… Returning to Asia now with a family is 
an emotional experience. Conversing in Mandarin or Hokkien with 
cab drivers and enjoying shaved ice and bak kut teh at the hawker 
stands bring back fond childhood memories that I am thrilled to 
share with my children. Professionally, I have returned at a time 
when exciting socioeconomic transformations are unfolding at an 
unprecedented speed in Asia, as a new world order is emerging in 
the economic, political, and cultural systems. As a family sociologist 
and a demographer, I have landed on a fertile ground for research 
on Asian families in transition. (Yeung 2009: 8)
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Conclusion
At this point in the 21st century, it seems reasonably clear that the knowl-
edge economy – or the prospect of ‘knowledge societies’ – is linked with 
the inter-relationships of global capitalism, technology, transnational-
ism, cultural and human flows, and even millenarianism. Furthermore, 
the knowledge economy represents changes in the nature of commod-
itisation, production, and a blurring of the distinction between labour 
and capital (Coronil 2000: 364-8). Thus, the knowledge economy is 
just like any other process in what Fernando Coronil sees as increas-
ing ‘globalcentrism’. While there are many transformations in the sense 
of global scales and the place of boundaries, the logic of capital does 
continue to be reinscribed. So in spite of the ‘newness’ of the concept 
of knowledge economy, many of its core principles remain anchored 
in capital, such as economic rationalism, wealth creation, and value 
generation. Singapore’s knowledge economy is undoubtedly situated in 
this context. However, as Appadurai reminds us, this global-centricity 
also needs to be thought of in terms of disjunctures and differences. 
So Singapore’s attempt to assert competitive advantage has been one 
of spatial disjuncture, an attempt to position Singapore as a mediator 
or comprador between two scales: global and Asian/regional. In this 
sense, Singapore as a knowledge economy depended on its existence 
as a “global knowledge hub in Asia”. In this arrangement, Singapore 
becomes the location through which different sorts of flow – human, 
capital, commodity, and information – transit. In terms of substance, 
Singapore’s knowledge economy is also similar, as science and technol-
ogy and their abstraction as value remain the primary preoccupation, 
while other areas that are less easily commercialised, such as the arts, 
humanities, and social sciences are indirectly factored in.
However, Asia has also been used by the Singapore knowledge econ-
omy in a potentially transformative way. Indeed Asia is not merely a geo-
graphical location that Singapore’s knowledge hub happens to be in, but 
is also a systematic way of producing modes and styles of knowledge. In 
this connection, Singapore has increasingly sought to transform itself as 
an Asian area expert in fields applicable to every conceivable aspect of 
Singapore’s repurposed economy. In this way, activities in science and 
technology are Asianised as are businesses and acts of entrepreneurial-
ism, and researchers are encouraged to make Asia relevant as a site of 
research problems and a potential market for knowledge commodities. I 
have argued that Singapore’s knowledge economy as a purveyor of Asian 
area expertise is not enough and that the knowledge economy could be 
explored in its alternative guise as knowledge capitalism, particularly 
through Marx’s conception of historicism – that there are histories that 
reproduce the logic of capital and also histories that are disruptive of or 
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external to capital’s life process. These disjunctures circulate around both 
the reproduction of global capitalism and Singapore’s ironic attempt to 
inscribe an Asian form of knowledge capitalism that both reproduces the 
former while also attempting to position Singapore as the (postcolonial) 
Other in relation to knowledge of the Western Other.
Notes
1 Although the concept of the knowledge economy has only been articulated by Singapore 
government spokesmen from the mid-1990s onwards, Ramcharan reminds us that it 
was really in the late 1980s that Singapore was, ironically, reluctantly pushed in that 
direction (2006: 322-4). This came in the form of intellectual property protection laws 
that were imposed by the US – part of the very same regime that the government now 
acclaims as one of the most vital aspects of Singapore’s knowledge economy.
2 Interestingly, the most recent figure released by the iDA shows that the IT sector had 
139,000 workers in 2008. With an annualised growth rate of 6.6%, this figure is likely 
to fall well short of the targets for 2010 (Singapore InfoComm Development Authority 
2009).
3 For instance, the birth of the Journal of Southeast Asian History in 1960 and the Interna-
tional Conference of Southeast Asian Historians a year later, and the short-lived Centre 
for Southeast Asian Studies. All were initiatives of the History Department in the Uni-
versity of Singapore.
4 At that time the company went under the name of Television Corporation of Singapore.
5 The Singaporean university curriculum was ‘Americanised’ because it was felt that the 
US university system better facilitated the development of creativity and entrepreneuri-
alism among students. The Americanised appointment system was also intended to 
identify faculty member’s main activity: either teaching or both teaching and research.
6 These changes to higher education in Singapore are in a broader sense not unique, as 
OECD countries have also converted their universities in very similar ways. This is the 
‘academic capitalism’ that Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) write about.
Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied is Assistant Professor at the Department 
of Malay Studies, National University of Singapore. He is the author of 
Rethinking Raffles (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2005) and 
Colonialism, Violence and Muslims in Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 
2009). His edited volumes include Reframing Singapore: Memory, Iden-
tity and Trans-Regionalism (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 
2009, co-edited with Derek Heng), Melayu: The Politics, Poetics and Par-
adoxes of Malayness (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2011, co-
edited with Maznah Mohamad). Aljunied’s current research interests lie 
in the overlapping areas of colonial history, the history of ideas, ethnic 
minorities and social identities in historical Southeast Asia. He is cur-
rently working on two major projects; a book manuscript on Malay anti-
colonial movements in British Malaya as well as the history and social 
memory of the Jabidah massacre in the Philippines (with  Rommel 
Curaming).
Cheng Guan Ang is Associate Professor and Head of the Humani-
ties and Social Studies Education Academic Group of the National 
Institute of Education (HSSE/NIE) and Adjunct Senior Fellow of the 
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. He is the author of Viet-
namese Communist Relations with China and the Second Indo-China Con-
flict, 1956-1962  (Jefferson : MacFarland, 1997), The Vietnam War from the 
Other Side: The Vietnamese Communists’ Perspective (London: Routledge-
Curzon, 2002), Ending the Vietnam War: The Vietnamese Communists’ 
Perspective (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004) and Southeast Asia and 
the Vietnam War (London: Routledge, 2010). He has also published in 
edited volumes as well as in journals including Asian Survey, Journal of 
Contemporary History, War and Society, War in History, Australian Journal 
of International Affairs, Security Dialogue, Southeast Asia Research, Cold 
War History, Asian Security and the Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. He 
is completing a paper on the Establishment of the Five Power Defence 
Arrangements (FPDA). He is currently working on three major research 
projects: (a) The International History of the Vietnam War: The Denoue-
ment 1967-1975 (Routledge Frank Cass, forthcoming); (b) Singapore/
ASEAN and the Third Indochina War (1978-1991) and (c) Lee Kuan 
About the Contributors
292 singapore in global history
Yew’s Strategic Thought. He was a Gerald R. Ford Foundation Research 
Grant Award recipient (Fall 2005),  Fulbright Singapore Researcher 
award recipient (2006-2007) and a Woodrow Wilson Public Policy 
Scholar (2006-2007).
Derek Heng is Assistant Professor at the Department of History, Ohio State 
University, U.S.A., where he teaches pre-modern Asian history,  historical 
thought and methodology, and world history before AD 1500. His research 
interests include the pre-modern economic interaction between South-
east Asia and China, pre-modern state formation of coastal port states in 
Maritime Southeast Asia and the historiography of Singapore’s past. His 
publications include Sino-Malay Trade and Diplomacy in the 10th through 
the 14th Century AD (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2009) and Singapore, 
A Seven-Hundred Year History (Singapore: National Archives of Singapore, 
2009). His edited volumes include Reframing Singapore: Memory, Identity 
and Trans-Regionalism (Amsterdam: Amsterdam  University Press, 2009, 
co-edited with Syed Muhd  Khairudin Aljunied), and New Perspectives and 
Sources on the History of Singapore: A  Multi-Disciplinary Approach (Singa-
pore: National Library Board, 2006). He is currently the editor of Berita 
Newsletter (Malaysia, Singapore Brunei Study Group, Association of Asian 
Studies, USA), and the North American representative of the Malaysian 
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.
Stephen Dobbs is the Chair of Asian Studies at the University of Western 
Australia. He has had a long- standing interest in the history of Singa-
pore and has written and published on the early development of the port 
of Singapore along the Singapore River. His research interests include 
maritime history as well as environmental and social history in South-
east Asia. He is currently working on a study of various proposals to con-
struct shipping canals through the Isthmus of Kra in southern Thailand. 
He is also working on a project with colleagues from UWA looking at 
questions of social justice and the role of engineers in the development 
of various major engineering projects along the Mekong River and its 
tributaries.
Huei-Ying Kuo is Assistant Professor of Asian history at the 
 Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at Rose-Hulman Insti-
tute of Technology in Terre Haute, Indiana, where she teaches courses 
in East Asian regionalism, maritime China, comparative business his-
tory, and race, class and gender at work. She obtained her PhD from 
the Dept. of Sociology at State University of New York at Binghamton 
and her MA and BA in sociology at National Taiwan University. She 
has published articles in Journal of Contemporary Asia, Enterprise and 
Society: International  Journal of Business History, Review: A Journal of 
about the contributors 293
the Fernand Braudel Center, China Information, among others. Her cur-
rent research interests are  imperialism and nationalism in East and 
Southeast Asia as well as Chinese overseas emigration in the making 
of modern capitalism.
Lai Chee Kien is Assistant Professor at the Department of Architec-
ture, National University of Singapore, and a registered architect in 
Singapore. He graduated with an M Arch. by research (1996) from 
the National University of Singapore and a PhD in History of Archi-
tecture & Urban Design from the University of California, Berkeley 
(2005). He researches on the histories of art, architecture, vernacu-
lar settlements, urbanism and landscapes in Southeast Asia. Recent 
research topics include post-1945 architecture & urban design in 
Southeast Asia, and the peri-urban spaces and landscapes in Singa-
pore and Malaysia. His publications include A Brief History of Malayan 
Art (1999) and Building Merdeka: Independence Architecture in Kuala 
Lumpur, 1957-1966 (2007).
Philip Holden is Associate Professor at the Department of English 
 Language and Literature at the National University of Singapore, and is 
currently Deputy Director of the University Scholars Programme at the 
same university. His research interests include life writing and Southeast 
Asian writing in English, often with a focus on issues relating to gender 
and multiculturalism. His present research examines the place of the 
short story as a global form under decolonization, and he is also doing 
preliminary work on a literary biography of W. Somerset Maugham. He 
is the author of Autobiography and Decolonization: Modernity, Masculinity, 
and the Nation-State (2008), and co-author of The Routledge Concise His-
tory of Southeast Asian Writing in English (2009). He has also published in 
Postcolonial Studies, Interventions, The Journal of Postcolonial Writing, The 
Journal of Commonwealth Literature, Biography, Life Writing, Philippine 
Studies and Textual Practice.
Jason Lim is Lecturer in Asian History in the School of History and  Politics 
at the University of Wollongong. He graduated with Honours in Asian 
Studies from Murdoch University in 1996. In 1998 he joined the Oral 
History Centre as a Research Officer. In 2007 he graduated with a PhD 
in History and Asian Studies from the University of Western Australia. 
He joined the Department of History at the National  University of Sin-
gapore as its Postdoctoral Fellow in 2008. His publications include Link-
ing an Asian Transregional Commerce in Tea: Overseas Chinese  Merchants in 
the Fujian-Singapore Trade, 1920-1960 (Brill, 2010). His current research 
 interests include overseas Chinese history, the economic and social 
294 singapore in global history
history of modern China and the social history of Malaysia and Singapore. 
His next publication will be on the Chinese trishaw industry of Singapore.
Kah Seng Loh is an independent scholar whose work investigates little-
studied subjects in the social and cultural history of Singapore and Malay-
sia and explores linkages between past and present in public history, oral 
history, social memory, heritage, and archival access. He is author of two 
books, Making and Unmaking the Asylum: Leprosy and Modernity in Singa-
pore and Malaysia (SIRD, 2009) and The Makers and Keepers of Singapore 
History (co-edited, Ethos Books & Singapore  Heritage Society, 2010), in 
addition to numerous articles published in peer-reviewed journals. His 
manuscripts on the 1961 Bukit Ho Swee fire and the University of Malaya 
Socialist Club are being reviewed for publication. He is currently working 
on book projects on the social and economic impact of the British mili-
tary withdrawal from Singapore in the late 1960s and on interdisciplinary 
approaches to oral history and memory in Southeast Asia.
S.R. Joey Long received his PhD in history from the University of Cam-
bridge, and is currently assistant professor of history and international 
affairs at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang 
Technological University, Singapore. He is the author of Safe for Decoloni-
zation: The Eisenhower Administration, Britain, and Singapore (Kent State 
University Press, 2011). His articles on the history of American foreign 
relations, the history of Singapore, and Asian and international secu-
rity have also been published in or are forthcoming from Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, Diplomatic History, European Journal of International Rela-
tions, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Rethinking History, South East 
Asia Research, and a number of edited volumes. Fellowships and awards 
he has received include a researcher grant from the J. William Fulbright 
Commission and the Lawrence Gelfand-Armin Rappaport Fellowship 
from the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. From 
March through June 2010, he was a History and Public Policy Scholar at 
the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, 
DC.
Torsten Tschacher is currently a postdoctoral researcher at the Clus-
ter of Excellence ‘Asia and Europe in a Global Context’ at Heidelberg 
 University, Germany. His research interests focus on the religious and 
literary traditions of Tamil-speaking Muslims in India, Sri Lanka and 
Southeast Asia. He is currently conducting research on the engagement 
of Tamil-speaking Muslims with diverse publics in colonial  Singapore. 
His recent publications include ‘Witnessing Fun: Tamil-speaking Mus-
lims and the Imagination of Ritual in Colonial Southeast Asia’, in Ritual, 
Caste, and Religion in Colonial South India (edited by Michael Bergunder, 
about the contributors 295
Heiko Frese and Ulrike Schröder; Verlag der Franckeschen Stiftungen 
zu Halle, 2010), and ‘Drowning in the Ocean of Tamil: Islamic Texts 
and the Historiography of Tamil Literature’ in Literature and Nationalist 
Ideology: Writing Histories of Modern Indian  Languages (edited by Hans 
Harder; Social Science Press, 2010).
Leong Yew is Assistant Professor in the University Scholars Programme, 
National University of Singapore. His first book, The Disjunctive Empire of 
International Relations (2003) examined the complicity between imperial 
discourse and contemporary 20th century texts on international politics. 
He is currently engaged in the examination of Asian identities, with his 
edited volume Alterities in Asia: Reflections on Identity and Regionalism 
(2011) being one of its outcomes. His next monograph, Asianism: The 
Politics of Regional Consciousness in Singapore, which queries Singapore’s 
ambivalent and simultaneous identification with and differentiation with 
Asia is forthcoming.

Abdullah, Munshi (1970), The Hikayat Abdullah / an Annotated Translation by A.H. Hill. Kuala 
Lumpur; New York Oxford University Press.
Abu-Lughod, Janet L. (1989), Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350. 
New York: Oxford University Press.
Adorno, T. (1974), Minima moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life. London: Verso.
Akashi Yo-ji (1970), The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, 1937-1941. Kansas: 
 Centre for East Asian Studies, the University of Kansas.
Aljunied, Syed Muhd Khairudin (2007), “The Role of Hadramis in Post-World War Two 
Singapore – A Reinterpretation”, Immigrants and Minorities, 25, 2: 163-183.
— (2009a), “British Discourses and Malay Identity in Colonial Singapore”. Indonesia and the 
Malay World, 37, 107: 1-21.
— (2009b), Colonialism, Violence and Muslims in Southeast Asia: The Maria Hertogh Controversy 
and Its Aftermath. London: Routledge.
Andaya, Leonard Y. (2008), Leaves of the Same Tree: Trade and Ethnicity in the Straits of Melaka. 
Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2008.
Appadurai, Arjun (1990), ‘Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy’, Public 
Culture 2, 2: 1-24.
Aron, Raymond (1970), “The Evolution of Modern Strategic Thought” in Buchan, Alistair (ed.), 
Problems in Modern Strategy. London: Chatto and Windus.
Asad-ul Iqbal Latif, (2009), Three Sides in Search of A Triangle: Singapore-America-India Rela-
tions. Singapore: ISEAS.
Asia Research Institute (2003), Annual report. Singapore: Asia Research Institute, National 
University of Singapore.
Azeez, A.M.A. (1968-69), ‘Some Aspects of the Muslim Society of Ceylon with Special 
 Reference to the Eighteen-Eighties.’ In Xavier S. Thani Nayagam et al. (eds.), Proceedings of 
the First International Conference Seminar of Tamil Studies: Kuala Lumpur – Malaysia, April 
1966, 2 vols., vol. 1, 746-762. Kuala Lumpur: International Association of Tamil Research.
Ballantyne, Tony (2003), “Rereading the Archive and Opening the Nation-State: Colonial 
Knowledge in South Asia (and Beyond)”, in Antoinette Burton (ed.), After the Imperial Turn: 
Thinking with and through the Nation. Durham: Duke University Press: 112-113.
Bakhtin, M.M. (1981), The dialogic imagination: four essays. Austin: University of Texas Press.
Barr, M. and Carl A. Trocki (ed.) (2008), Paths not taken; political pluralism in post-war Singapore. 
Singapore: NUS Press.
Batabyal, Rakesh (2005), Communalism in Bengal: From Famine to Noakhali, 1943-1947.  London: 
Sage.
Bayly, C.A. (1996), Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in 
India, 1780-1870. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bennett, George (1967), Wanderings in New South Wales, Batavia, Pedir Coast, Singapore 
and China: Being the Journal of a Naturalist in Those Countries During 1832, 1833 and 1834. 
 Facsimile edn., Australiana Facsimile Editions. Adelaide: Libraries Board of South Australia.
Bentley, Jerry H. (2006), “Globalizing History and Historicizing Globalization”, in Barry K. 
Gills and William R. (eds.), Globalization and Global History. New York: Routledge.
Bibliography
298 singapore in global history
Benton, Lauren (1996), “From the World Systems Perspective to Institutional World History: 
Culture and Economy in Global Theory”, Journal of World History, 7, 2: 261-295.
Birch, E.W. (1879), ‘The Vernacular Press in the Straits’, Journal of the Straits Branch of the Royal 
Asiatic Society 4: 51-55.
Bloodworth, Dennis (1986), The Tiger and the Trojan Horse. Singapore: Times Books Interna-
tional.
Blythe, Wilfred (1969), The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Singapore: a historical study. 
London and Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
Borschberg, Peter (2009), The Singapore and Melaka Straits: Violence, Security and Diplomacy in 
the 17th Century. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press.
Boyce, David George (1999), Decolonisation and the British Empire, 1775-1997. New York: 
St. Martin’s Press.
Braddell, Roland (1980), A Study of Ancient Times in the Malay Peninsula and the Straits of 
Malacca. Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.
Brandel, Judith and Tina Turbeville (1998), Tiger Balm Gardens: A Chinese Billionaire’s Fantasy 
Environments. Hong Kong: The Aw Boon Haw Foundation.
Brew, S.H. Jr. (1898), ‘Female education and its bearing upon the improvement of the race’ 
Gold Coast Aborigines May 21: 3-4.
Brown, C.C. (1970), Sejarah Melayu or Malay Annals. London: Oxford University Press.
Brown, Edwin A. (2007), Indiscreet Memories: 1901 Singapore through the eyes of a colonial 
 Englishman. Singapore: Monsoon Books.
Bryson, Norman (1990), Looking at the Overlooked: Four Essays on Still Life Painting. London: 
Reaktion Books.
Buck, D.D. (1997), The Declining Role of China in the International Tea Trade, 1880-1910, Occa-
sional Paper No. 97-05, Centre for International Studies, University of Wisconsin at 
 Milwaukee and Madison.
Buckley, Charles (1984), An Anecdotal History of Old Times in Singapore. Singapore: Oxford 
University Press.
Buckley, Charles Burton (1902), An Anecdotal History of Old Times in Singapore (With Portraits 
and Illustrations): From the Foundation of the Settlement under the Honourable the East India 
Company, on February 6th, 1819, to the Transfer of the Colonial Office as Part of the Colonial 
 Possessions of the Crown on April 1st, 1867. 2 Volumes. Singapore: Fraser & Neave.
Butler, L.J. (2002), Britain and Empire: Adjusting to a Post-imperial World. London; New York: 
I.B. Taurus.
Cameron, John (1965), Our Tropical Possessions in Malayan India. Oxford in Asia. Historical 
Reprints. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
Cancoanid (1885) ‘Ladies column,’ Western Echo November 18: 2.
Casely Hayford, J.E. (1896) ‘Hendrick Vroom, Esq., C.M.G.’ Gold Coast Independent June 13: 2.
— (1910) ‘The difficult art of thinking nationally,’ Gold Coast Leader November 26: 3.
Cevattamaraikka-yar Na-valar, Ki.A.Vu. (1886), Mala-kka-p pirave-cattirattu. Cinkappu-r: Tı-no-
tayave-ntiraca-lai.
Chakrabarty, Dipesh (2000), Provincializing Europe : postcolonial thought and historical difference. 
Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
Chan Heng Chee & Obaid ul Haq (ed.) (1987), The Prophetic & the Political: Selected Speeches and 
Writings of S. Rajaratnam. Singapore: Graham Brash.
Chandra, B.C. (1957), Department of Archaeology Annual Report on Indian Epigraphy for 1956-57. 
New Delhi.
Charles W. Freeman Jr. (1997), The Diplomat’s Dictionary. Washington DC: United States 
 Institute of Peace Press.
Chatterjee, P. (1993) The nation and its fragments; colonial and postcolonial histories. Princeton, 
Princeton University Press.
bibliography 299
Chaudhuri, K.N. (1990), Asia Before Europe: Economy and Civilisation of the Indian Ocean from 
the Rise of Islam to 1750. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Chen Kezhan (ed.) (1994), Anxi huaqiao zhi [Gazetteer of overseas Chinese from Anxi, Fujian]. 
Xiamen: Amoy University Press.
Chen Mong Hock (1967), The Early Chinese Newspapers of Singapore, 1881-1912. Singapore: 
University of Malaya Press.
Chen Tianlai (1938), Do-gyo- kumiai taiwan chasho- go-kai enkaku-shi [History of the Guild of 
Taiwan Tea Agencies]. Taibeishi: Do-gyo- kumiai taiwan chasho- go-kai.
Chen, Chuan 陈椽 (1993), Zhongguo Chaye Waixiao Shi 中国茶叶外销史 (A history of the 
 Chinese tea trade), Taipei: Bishanyan Chuban.
Chen, Fu Sheng (1947), ‘Fukien Exports Slump Due to War; People’s Livelihood Endangered’, 
The China Weekly Review, 105 (10): 270.
Chen, Jiarong & Qian, Jiang (2000), Zhufanzhi zhubu. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University 
Press.
Chen, Peter. (2001), ‘Keynote Address at the 10th Global Conference on the Harvard Project for 
Asian and International Relations, on Monday 27th August 2001 at 9.20 am at the  Suntec 
City Auditorium’. http://www.moe.gov.sg/media/speeches/2001/sp28082001.htm
Chen, Ta (1978), Emigrant Communities in South China: A Study of Overseas Migration and its 
Influence on Standards of Living and Social Change, first published by the Secretariat of the 
Institute of Pacific Relations in New York in 1940, New York: AMS.
Chew, Melanie (1998), Of Hearts and Minds: The Story of Sembawang Shipyard. Singapore: 
 Sembawang Shipyard Pte Ltd.
Chi, Ch’ao-ting (1980), Wartime Economic Development of China, first published by the Inter-
national Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations in New York in 1939, New York: 
Garland Publishing.
Chin Kin Wah (1983), The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore: The Transformation of a Security 
System, 1957-1971. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chin Peng (2003), My side of history, Singapore: Media Masters.
Chin, C.C. and Karl Hack (ed.) (2004) Dialogues with Chin Peng; new light on the Malayan 
 Communist Party. Singapore: Singapore University Press.
Ching, Leo (2000), ‘Globalizing the Regional, Regionalizing the Global: Mass Culture and 
Asianism in the Age of Late Capital’, Public Culture 12, 1: 233-57.
Choo, Eng Kang (1976), ‘The Singapore Trade Depression, 1900-22’, Academic Exercise in 
History, University of Singapore.
Chua Ai Lin (2008a), ‘Modernity, popular culture and urban life: Anglophone Asians in 
 colonial Singapore, 1920-1940, Ph.D. diss., University of Cambridge.
— (2008b), ‘Imperial Subjects, Straits Citizens: Anglophone Asians and the Struggle for 
 Political Rights in Inter-War Singapore.’ In Michael D. Barr and Carl A. Trocki (eds.), Paths 
not Taken: Political Pluralism in Post-War Singapore, 16-36. Singapore: NUS Press.
Chua Mui Hoong (1996), ‘PM Goh to NUS and NTU – Aim to Become World Class’, The 
Straits Times 22 September.
Chua, Beng-Huat (1995), Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore. London and 
New York: Routledge.
Chu-ka Kaikan [The Chinese Association] (2000), Roku chi sei kon: Kôbe kakyô yo shin-han 
 chukakaikan hyakunen-shi [Roots in a New Homeland: A Hundred Years of Chinese in 
Ko-be-O
-asaka and their Association]. Tokyo: Kenbun shuppan.
Clark, Hugh (2002), Community, Trade and Networks; Southern Fujian Province from the Third to 
the Thirteenth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Clunas, Craig (1996), Fruitful Sites: Garden Culture in Ming Dynasty China. Durham: Duke 
University Press.
Clutterbuck, Richard (1984), Conflict and Violence in Singapore and Malaysia, 1945-1983. 
 Singapore: Graham Brash, revised ed.
300 singapore in global history
Cody, Mary Kilcline (2001), “Mis-Fits in the Text: The Singapore Riots of 1950”. Unpublished 
Academic Exercise submitted to the Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian National  University.
Coedes, George (1930), “Les inscriptions malaises de Crivijaya.” BEFEO 30, 1-2: 29-80.
— (1964), Les estats hindouises d’Indochine et d’Indonesie. Paris: Boccard, 1964.
Colony of the Straits Settlements (1888), Blue Book for the Year 1887. Singapore: Government 
Printing Office.
Conceicao, Joe (2007), Singapore and the Many-Headed Monster. Horizon Books: Singapore.
Cooper, Frederick (2005), Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History. Berkeley, 
 University of California Press.
Coronil, Fernando (2000), ‘Toward a Critique of Globalcentrism: Speculations on Capitalism’s 
Nature’, Public Culture 12, 2: 351-74.
Cortesao, Armando (1944), The Suma Oriental of Tomè Pires and The Book of Francisco Rodrigues. 
London: The Hakluyt Society.
Craig, James (1991), ‘Escape from the Fortress Colony: The Politics of Economic Diversification 
in Malta’. In James Mayall and Anthony Payne eds. The Fallacies of Hope: The Post-colonial 
Record of the Commonwealth Third World. Manchester: Manchester University Press: 129-42.
Danahay, M.A. (2005), Gender at work in Victorian culture. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Daniel, Norman (1966), Islam, Europe and Empire. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Darby, Philip (1973), British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947-1968. London: Oxford University 
Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs.
Darwin, John (1988), Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-war World. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan Education.
Darwin, John (1991), ‘Britain’s Withdrawal from East of Suez’. In Carl Bridge ed. Munich to 
Vietnam: Australia’s Relations with Britain and the United States since the 1930s. Carlton, 
 Victoria: Melbourne University Press: 140-58.
Davidson, G.F. (1846), Trade and Travel in the Far East or Recollections of Twenty-One Years Passed 
in Java, Singapore, Australia, and China. London: Madden and Malcolm.
Davidson, Jamie S. (2008), From Rebellion to Riots: Collective Violence on Indonesian Borneo. 
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
de Querbeuf, Y.M.H. (1780), Lettres edifiantes et curieuses, ecrites des missions étrangères (de la 
Compagnie de Jesus), vol. 16. Paris: J. G. Merigot.
Derrida, Jacques (2000), Of Hospitality: Anne Dufourmantelle Invites Jacques Derrida to Respond 
(R. Bowlby, Trans.). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Dingman, Roger (1989), ‘John Foster Dulles and the Creation of the South-East Asia Treaty 
Organization’, International History Review 11 (3): 457-477.
Dirlik, Arif (2005), “Performing the World: Reality and Representation in the Making of World 
Histor(ies)”, Journal of World History, 16, 4: 391-410.
Dobson, Mirian and Ziemann, Benjamin (ed.) (2009), Reading Primary Sources: The Interpreta-
tion of Texts from Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century History. London: Routledge.
Drysdale, John (1984), Singapore: Struggle for Success. Singapore: Times Books International.
Duara, Prasenjit (2009), The Global and Regional in China’s Nation-Formation. London: Rout-
ledge.
Dunn, Ross E. (1985), “The Challenge of Hemispheric History (1000-1500 A.D.)”, The History 
Teacher, 18, 3: 329-338.
Earl, George Windsor (1971), The Eastern Seas or Voyages and Adventures in the Indian Archipe-
lago, in 1832-33-34. New York: Oxford University Press.
Eng, Annie Li Kheng (1974), A Report on the September 1974 Ngee Ann Technical College Graduate 
Employment Survey. University of Singapore, Economic Research Centre.
bibliography 301
Farish A. Noor (2004), Islam Embedded: The Historical Development of the Pan-Malaysian 
Islamic Party PAS (1951-3302) Vol. 1. Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Research 
Institute.
Fernandez-Armesto, Felipe (2006), The World, A History. Saddleback: Prentice Hall.
Firdaus Haji Abdullah (1985), Radical Malay Politics: Its Origins and Early Development. 
 Pelanduk Publications: Petaling Jaya.
Fong Sip Chee (1980), The PAP Story: The Pioneering Years. Singapore: Times Periodicals.
Frost, M. Ravinder (2003), ‘Transcultural Diaspora: the Straits Chinese in Singapore, 
1819-1918.’ Asia Research Institute Working Paper 10. Singapore: Asia Research Institute, 
National University of Singapore. <http://www.ari.nus.edu.sg/docs/wps/wps03_010.pdf>
— (2004), ‘Asia’s Maritime Networks and the Colonial Public Sphere, 1840-1920’, New Zealand 
Journal of Asian Studies 6(2): 63-94.
Gandhi, M.K. (1997), Hind swaraj and other writings. Ed. Anthony J. Pael. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Garrard, Charles Goodricke (ed.) (1898), The Acts and Ordinances of the Legislative Council of the 
Straits Settlements, from the 1st April 1867 to the 7th March 1898. In Two Volumes. London: 
Eyre and Spottiswoode.
Gocking, R.S. (1999), Facing two ways: Ghana’s coastal communities under colonial rule. Lanham: 
University Press of America.
— (2005), The history of Ghana. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 2005.
Goh Chok Tong (2001), Speech at the National Day Rally. National University of Singapore, 
Singapore. 19 August. Singapore: Ministry of Information and the Arts.
— (2005), ‘Reconceptualizing East Asia’, Keynote address at the official launch of the Institute 
of South Asian Studies. Orchard Hotel, Singapore.
Goh, K.S. (1960a), ‘Rectification of the English-educated.’ Petir 3 (7): 7, 8.
— (1960b), ‘Rectification of the English-educated.’ Petir 3 (9): 4-5.
Goh, Che Cheng Jace (1987), ‘The Chinese Huiguan in Singapore (1945-1959)’, Academic 
Exercise in History, National University of Singapore.
Goscha, Christopher & Christian Ostermann (ed.) (2009), Connecting Histories: Decolonization 
and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1945-1962. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center 
Press; and Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Goto- Ken’ichi (1995), Kindai Nihon to To-nan Ajia : nanshin no ‘sho-geki’ to “isan’ [Modern 
Japan and Southeast Asia: impacts and legacy of southward advance]. To-kyo- : Iwanami 
Shoten.
Go-to Ken’ichi (2003), Tensions of Empire: Japan and Southeast Asia in the Colonial and Postcolo-
nial World. Singapore: Singapore University Press.
Griffith, Tom (1997), The Travels of Marco Polo. Hertfordshire: Wordsworth.
Groeneveldt, W.P. (1876), Historical Notes on Indonesia and Malaysia Compiled from Chinese 
Sources. Batavia: S.N., 1876.
Groff, George Weidman (1921), The Lychee and Lungan. New York: Orange Judd Company.
Guillot, Claude (ed.) (1998), Histoire de Barus, Sumatra; le site de Lobu Tua. Paris: Association 
Archipel.
Gullick, J.M. (1958), Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaysia. London: University of 
London, Athlone Press.
Guo Chunyang (1919a), ‘Nan’yo- bo-eki to kakyo- [South Seas trade and overseas Chinese]’, 
Nan’yo- Kyo-kai Zasshi Vol. 5, no. 5: 41-44.
— (1919b), ‘Kaku Shun’o--shi yori [From Mr. Guo Chunyang],’ Nan’yo- Kyo-kai Zasshi 5, 
no. 10: 83.
Habermas, Jürgen (1990), Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Second Edition. Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.
302 singapore in global history
Hack, Karl (2001a), Defence and Decolonisation in Southeast Asia: Britain, Malaya and Singapore 
1941-1968. Richmond: Curzon Press.
— (2001b), Defence and Decolonisation. Richmond: Curzon Press.
Haja Maideen (1989), The Nadra Tragedy. Pelanduk Publications: Petaling Jaya.
Hall, Kenneth R. (1978), “International Trade and Foreign Diplomacy in Early Medieval South 
India”, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 21, 1: 75-98.
— (1985), Maritime Trade and State Development in Early Southeast Asia. Honolulu: University 
of Hawai’i Press.
— (2001), “Upstream and Downstream Unification in Southeast Asia’s First Islamic Polity: 
The Changing Sense of Community in the Fifteenth Century “Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai” 
Court Chronicle”, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 44, 2: 198-229.
— (2010), “Ports-of-Trade, Maritime Diasporas, and Networks of Trade and Cultural Integra-
tion in the Bay of Bengal Region of the Indian Ocean: c. 1300-1500”, Journal of the Economic 
and Social History of the Orient, 53, 1-2: 109-145.
Halle, Louis J. (1960), American Foreign Policy: Theory and Reality. London: Bradford & Dickens.
Han, Tan Juan (2008), ‘Han Wai Toon and the Legacy of the Sembawang Rambutan Garden’. 
In Low Sze Wee and Chow Yian Ping eds., Xu Beihong in Nanyang, 117-123. Singapore: 
Singapore Art Museum.
Han, Wai Toon (1953), ‘The Planting of Rambutans’. In Journal of the South Seas Society, 9, 2.
— (1960), Ancient Chinese Export Ware found in Nanyang. Singapore: The Youth Book Com-
pany.
Harper, T.N. (1997), ‘Globalism and the Politics of Authenticity: The Creation of a Diasporic 
Public Sphere in Singapore’, Sojourn 12 (2): 261-292.
— (1997), ‘Globalism and the Pursuit of Authenticity: The Making of a Diasporic Public Sphere 
in Singapore’, Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 12 (2): 261-292.
— (2001), ‘Lim Chin Siong and the ‘Singapore Story’’, in Tan Jing Quee and K.S. Jomo (ed.), 
Comet in the sky: Lim Chin Siong in history, 3-55. Kuala Lumpur: INSAN.
He, Simi 何思眯 (1997), Kangzhan Shiqi De Zhuanmai Shiye (1941-1945)
抗战时期的专卖事业 (一九四一一九四五) (The monopoly during Sino-Japanese War, 
1941-1945), Taipei:  Academia Historica.
Heng Pek Koon (1988), Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malaysian Chinese Associa-
tion. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Heng, Derek (2004), “Economic Exchanges and Linkages between the Malay Region and the 
Hinterland of China’s Coastal Ports during the 10th to 14th centuries” in John N. Miksic & 
Cheryl-Ann Low Mei Gek (eds.), Early Singapore, 1300s-1819; Evidence in Maps, Text and Arte-
facts, 73-85. Singapore: Singapore History Museum.
— (2006), “Export Commodity and Regional Currency: The Role of Chinese Copper Coins 
in the Malacca Straits Region, Tenth to Fourteenth Centuries”; Journal of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 37, 2: 179-203.
— (2009), Sino-Malay Trade and Diplomacy from the Tenth through the Fourteenth Century. Ath-
ens: Ohio University Press.
Heng, Derek Thiam Soon (1999), “Temasik as an International and Regional Trading Port in 
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries: A Reconstruction Based on Recent Archaeologi-
cal Data”, Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 72, 1: 113-124.
— (2001), “The trade in lakawood products between South China and the Malay world from the 
twelfth to fifteenth centuries AD”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 32, 2: 133-149.
— (2002), “Reconstructing Banzu, a Fourteenth Century Port Settlement in Singapore”, Jour-
nal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (henceforth JMBRAS), 75, 1: 69-90.
— (2008), “Structures, Networks and Commercial Practices of Private Chinese Maritime 
 Traders in Island Southeast Asia in the Early Second Millennium AD”, International Journal 
of Maritime History, 20, 2: 27-54.
Heng, Derek, & Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied (ed.) (2009), Reframing Singapore: Memory – 
Identity – Trans-Regionalism. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
bibliography 303
Heng, Derek, Kwa Chong Guan, & Tan Tai Yong (2009), Singapore: A 700-Year History – From 
Early Emporium to World City. Singapore: National Archives of Singapore.
Hill, A. H. (1960), “Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai, a revised romanised version”, Journal of the 
Malaysian Branch, Royal Asiatic Society, 33, 2.
Ho, Engseng (2005), The Graves of Tarim: Genealogy and Mobility across the Indian Ocean. 
 Berkeley: University of California Press.
Hoad, Neville (2009), paper given at ‘Why Homosexuality? Religion, Globalization and the 
Anglican Schism’ conference, Yale University, 17 October 2009.
Hodgson, Marshall G. S. (1974), The Venture Of Islam: Conscience And History In A World 
 Civilization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hodgson, Marshall G. S. (1995), Rethinking World History. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Holt, P.M. (1977), The Mahdist State in the Sudan 1881-1898: A Study of its Origins Development 
and Overthrow. Second Edition. Nairobi: Oxford University Press.
Hon Sui Sen (1973), Annual Budget Statement: Survey of the Economic Scene, Speech delivered in 
Parliament 26-27 February 1973. Singapore: Ministry of Culture.
Hong Lysa & Huang Jianli (2008), The Scripting of a National History: Singapore and Its Pasts. 
Singapore: NUS Press.
Horimoto Naohiko (1997), ‘Shingapo-ru no kanin ko-ni undo- to hiho-n so- keizai dantai [Chinese 
anti-Japanese activities and Japanese-associated economic groups]’, in Namikata Shôichi 
(ed.) Kindai ajia no nihonjin keizai dantai, Ch. 10. To-kyo: Do-bunkan shu-bban-sha kabushiki-
gaisha.
Horne, Gerlad (2004), Race War: White Supremacy and the Japanese Attack on the British Empire. 
New York and London: New York University Press.
Hotta Eri (2007), Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War, 1931-1945. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Hsu Hsueh-Chi (1992), ‘Riju shiqi de banqiao linjia [The Lin family of Banqiao during Taiwan’s 
Japanese colonial era],’ in Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica (eds.), Family Pro-
cess and Political Process in Modern Chinese History, 657-697. Taipei: Institute of the Modern 
Chinese History, Academia Sinica.
— (1999), ‘Riju shiqi Wufong Linjia de shanye jingying chutan [A preliminary study on busi-
ness management of the Lins in Wufong],’ in Huang Fusan, Wong Jiayin (eds.) Taiwan 
shangye chuantong lunwenji [Essays on Taiwan’s Business Tradition], 297-356. Taipei: Pre-
paratory Office of the Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica.
Hsu, Yun T’siao (1962), ‘Farewell to Mr. Han Wai Toon’. In Chronicles of Nanyang (original in 
Sin Chew Jit Poh), 3, 6: 70-72.
— (1970), ‘An Eulogy for Mr. Han Wai Toon’. In Journal of Southeast Asian Researches, 6: 37-44.
Hsü, Marco [Ma Ge] (1962), ‘Remembering Mr. Han Wai Toon’. In Chronicles of Nanyang (origi-
nal in Nanfang Evening News), 3, 6: 37-38.
Hsü, Marco [Ma Ge] (1967), ‘Han Rambutan Orchard painting and the colophons’. In Ming 
Pao, 27 March 1967: 4.
Huang Jianli (1995), ‘The Founding of the PRC and the Economic Concerns of Singapore 
Chinese Entrepreneurs’, in Leo Suryadinata (ed.), Southeast Asian Chinese and China: The 
Politico-Economic Dimension, 161-192. Singapore: Times Academic Press.
— (2008) ‘The Young Pathfinders: Portrayal of Student Activism’, in Barr and Trocki (eds.), 
188-205.
Huang, Pao Fang (1983), ‘Remembering Mr. Han Wai Toon’. In Yin Yu Ji (The Jade Chronicles), 
209-211. Singapore: SNPL Book Publications Department.
Huff, W.G. (1994), The Economic Growth of Singapore: Trade and Development in the Twentieth 
Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hughes, T.J. and D.E.T. Luard (1961), The Economic Development of Communist China, 
1949-1960, London: Oxford University Press.
304 singapore in global history
Hughes, Tom Eames (1980), Tangled Worlds: The Story of Maria Hertogh. Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies: Singapore.
Hyam, Ronald (2006), Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918-1968. 
 Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ide Kiwata (1938), ‘Fukken minzoku to Nan’yo- kakyo- [Fujian people and Chinese immigrants 
in the South Seas]’, Nan’yo- Kyo-kai Zasshin 24, no. 5: 25-36.
Inoue Masaji (1917), ‘Nan’yo- ni okeru hon-ho-jin no kigyo- [Our Japanese enterprises in the 
South Seas],’ Nan’yo- Kyo-kai Zasshi 3, no. 5: 194-201.
— (1942), Nanpo- kaitaku wo kataru [Talk about pioneering in the south]. To-kyo-: Unebi shobo-.
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (1998), Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: a commemora-
tive history 1968-1998. Singapore: ISEAS.
Jabatan Muzium- Muzium Brunei (2004), Sungai Limau Manis : tapak arkeologi abad ke-10-13 
Masihi. Bandar Seri Begawan: Jabatan Muzium- Muzium Brunei, Kementerian Kebuda-
yaan, Belia dan Sukan.
Jackson, James C. (1968), Planters and Speculators: Chinese and European Agricultural Enterprise 
in Malaya 1786-1921. Singapore: University of Malaya Press.
James, William (1880), “Great Men, Great Thoughts and the Environment”, Atlantic Monthly, 
46, 276: 441-459. http://www.cscs.umich.edu/crshalizi/James/great_men.html
Jeffries, Charles (1952), The Colonial Police. London: Max Parrish.
Jones, Matthew (2003), ‘Up the Garden Path? Britain’s Nuclear History in the Far East, 
1954-1962’, International History Review 25 (2): 306-333.
Kanan Ginko- (1932), Nan’yo- ni okeru konponteki ho-jin hatten-saku toshite no ichi-ko-satsu [Survey 
of the fundamental development of the Japanese in the South Seas]. Kanan Ginko-.
Kaneo Fumio (1980), ‘Ide Kiwata to Nihon no nanshin saisaku [Ide Kiwata and Japan’s 
policies on southward advance]’. In Historical Studies of Taiwan in Modern Time 1980, 
no. 3: 67-85.
Kawarabayashi Naoto (2000), Taiwan chagyo- no rekishiteki tenkai: Nihon shokuminchi ni 
okeru taigai bo-eki katsudo- [Emergence of the history of the Taiwan tea industry: foreign 
trade of a Japanese colony] Ph.D. Dissertation of O
-saka shiritsu daigaku gakuin.
— (2007), ‘Teiko Nihon no etsukyo- shakai no jinmyaku, Nan’yo- kyo-kai toiu kagami [Social 
Networks in the Expansion of Imperial Japan: Study of the South Sea Association,’ in Asano 
Toyomi (ed.), Nan’yo- gunto- no teiko- kokusai chitsujyo-, 97-138. Nagoyashi: Chukyo University.
Kazuki Sato (1997), ‘“Same Language, Same Race”: The Dilemma of Kanbun in Modern Japan’ 
in Frank Dikötter (ed.), The construction of racial identities in China and Japan, 118-135. Hono-
lulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Keith, Michael (1993), Race, Riots and Policing: Lore and Disorder in a Multi-Racist Society. Lon-
don: UCL Press.
Kenway, Jane, Elizabeth Bullen, Johannah Fahey and Simon Robb (2006), Haunting the 
 Knowledge Economy. London and New York: Routledge.
Keswick, Maggie (2002), The Chinese Garden: History, Art and Architecture. London: Frances 
Lincoln.
Kikakuin (1940), Kakyo- Kenkyo- Shiryo- [Research Data on Chinese Sojourners]. To-kyo:  Kikakuin.
Kimble, D. (1963), A political history of Ghana: the rise of Gold Coast nationalism, 1850-1928. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Kimura Masutaro- (1919), ‘Nan’yo- hatten-saku ni tsuite’ [Proposal of strategies to engage in the 
development of the South Seas],’ Nan’yo- Kyo-kai Zasshi 5, no. 5: 32-40.
— (1920), ‘Nihon tai nan’yo- no keizai kankei-jyo- [Economic relationship between Japan and the 
South Seas-first section]’, Nan’yo- Kyo-kai Zasshi 6, no. 11: 9-21.
bibliography 305
— (1921), ‘Nan’yo- keizai-kai to chinretsu-kan no jigyo- [Tasks for the economic circle of the 
South Seas], Nan’yo- Kyo-kai Zasshi 7, no. 8: 14-22.
Ko Kheng Hwa (2003), ‘Knowledge Powers Singapore Economy’. Information Age. 
http://www.infoage.idg.com.au/index.php/id;1626807812
Kobayashi Shinsaku (1931), Shina minzoku no kaigai hatten: Kakyo- no kenkyo- [Overseas 
 development of the Chinese people: Research of the Chinese sojourners]. Tokyo:  Kaigai-sha.
Koh, Tommy (2003), Speech at the official opening of Asian Civilisations Museum. Asian Civi-
lisations Museum, Empress Place, Singapore.
Kong, Lily (2008), ‘Word from the Director’, ARI News March: 2-3.
Ku Hong-Ting (1994), Dongnanya huaqiao de rentong wenti: Malaya pian [The problem of iden-
tities of the Chinese sojourners in Southeast Asia: research on Malaya]. Taipei: Lianjing 
chubanshe.
Kulke, Hermann (1993), “‘Kadatuan Srivijaya’ – Empire or Kraton of Srivijaya? A Reassessment 
of the Epigraphical Evidence”, Bulletin de l’Ecole Franciase d’Extreme Orient, 80, 1: 159-180.
Kuo, Huei-Ying (2006a), ‘Rescuing businesses through transnationalism: embedded Chinese 
enterprise and nationalist activities in Singapore in the 1930s Great Depression’, Enterprise 
and Society: International Journal of Business History 7, no. 1: 98-127.
Kuo, Huei-Ying (2006b), ‘Chinese bourgeois nationalism in Hong Kong and Singapore in the 
1930s’, Journal of Contemporary Asia 36, no. 3: 385-405.
— (2009), ‘Agency amid incorporation: Chinese business networks in Hong Kong and 
Singapore and the colonial origins of the resurgence of East Asia, 1800-1940’, Review: 
 Fernand Braudel Center 32, 3: 211-237.
Kuwabara, J. (1928), “On P’u Shou-Keng.” Toyo Bunko Research Department Memoirs 2: 1-79.
Kwa Chong Guan (2004a) ‘Sailing past Singapore’ in John N. Miksic and Cheryl-Ann Low 
Mei Gek, (eds.), Early Singapore 1300s-1819: evidence in maps, texts and artefacts, 95-105. 
Singapore: Singapore History Museum.
— (2004b), “From Temasik to Singapore: Locating a Global City-State in the Cycles of Melaka 
Straits History”, in John N. Miksic & Cheryl-Ann Low Mei Gek (eds.), Early Singapore, 1300s-
1819; Evidence in Maps, Text and Artefacts, 124-146. Singapore: Singapore History Museum.
Kwa Chong Guan, Tan Tai Yong and D. Heng (2009), Singapore: A 700-Year history. Singapore: 
National Archives of Singapore.
Laffan, Michael Francis (2003), Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The umma below the 
Winds. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon.
Laing, Ellen Johnston (1968), ‘Real or Ideal: the Problem of the “Elegant Gathering in the West-
ern Garden” in Chinese Historical and Art Historical Records’. In Journal of the  American 
Oriental Society, 88, 3: 419-435.
Lam P.E. and Kevin Y.L. Tan (ed.) (1999), Lee’s lieutenants: Singapore’s old guard. St Leonards: 
Allen and Unwin.
Lau, Albert (2004), ‘The National Past and the Writing of the History of Singapore’, in Ban 
Kah Choon, Anne Pakir, & Tong Chee Kiong (ed.), Imagining Singapore, 34-53. Singapore: 
Eastern Universities Press.
Ledger, S. (1997), The new woman: fiction and feminism at the fin de siècle. Manchester, 
 Manchester University Press.
Lee, John Michael (1967), Colonial Development and Good Government. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Lee Kuan Yew (1959) ‘Text of an address by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at the 
Singapore Union of Journalists Lunch at the Cathay Dragon Room on Sunday, August 16, 
1959.’ Singapore Government Press Statement INFS. AU. 66/59.
— (1998), The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew. Singapore: Times Editions, Singapore 
Press Holdings.
306 singapore in global history
— (2000), From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965-2000. Singapore: Singapore 
Press Holdings and Times Editions.
— (2002), ‘China in Transition’. Speech at East Asian Institute’s 5th Anniversary.
— (2009), Lee Kuan Yew, The Fundamentals of Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Then & Now. Singapore: 
MFA Diplomatic Academy.
Lee Soo Ann (1971), ‘The British Withdrawal and Singapore’s Economic Future’. Papers on 
Economic Planning and Development in Singapore. Singapore: Federal Publications: 52-64.
Lee Ting Hui (1996), The Open united front: The Communist struggle in Singapore, 1954-1966. 
Singapore: South Seas Society.
Lee, Edwin (2008), Singapore: The Unexpected Nation. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies.
Leifer, Michael (2000), Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability. London: Routledge.
Leong, Steven (1977), ‘The Kuomintang-Communist united front in Malaya during the national 
salvation period, 1937-1941, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 8, no. 1: 31-47.
— (1979), ‘The Malayan overseas Chinese and the Sino-Japanese war, 1937-1941’, Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies 10, no. 2: 293-320.
Lew S.F. (1898), ‘A Victim of chap-ji-ki,’ Straits Chinese Magazine 2: 70-72.
— (1900), ‘Lost and found,’ Straits Chinese Magazine 4: 174-178.
— (1901a) ‘The correspondence of Lew See Fah: Straits Chinese fathers’ Straits Chinese 
 Magazine 5: 48-50.
— (1901b), ‘The correspondence of Lew See Fah: Straits Chinese youths’ Straits Chinese 
 Magazine 5: 137-140.
Li, Shih-chen (Ming, 1994), Ben Cao Gang Mu (Compendium of Materia Medica). Edited by Qi 
Hao. Beijing: Xue Yuan Publishers.
Lian, Shi Sheng (1955), ‘Visiting the Han Rambutan Orchard’. Nan Xing Ji (Chronicles of 
 Southern Journeys), 100-104. Singapore: Nanyang Publishers.
Lieberman, Victor B. (2003), Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800-1830. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
— (2009), Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800-1830. Volume 2:  Mainland 
Mirrors: Europe, Japan, China, South Asia, and the Islands. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Liew Kai Khiun (2004), ‘The Anchor and the voice of 10,000 waterfront workers: Jamit Singh 
in the Singapore Story (1954-63)’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 35, 3: 459-78.
— (2006), ‘Labour formation, identity, and resistance in HM dockyard, Singapore (1921-1971)’, 
International Review of Social History, 51, 3: 415-39.
— (2006), ‘Labour Formation, Identity, and Resistance in HM Dockyard, Singapore (1921-
1971)’. Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, 51: 415-39.
Lim Ah Poh (1974), Changes in Land Use in the Former British Military Areas in Singapore. 
Unpublished academic exercise. Department of Geography, University of Singapore.
Lim, Jason (2007), ‘The Education Concerns and Political Outlook of Lim Keng Lian (1893-
1968)’, Journal of Chinese Overseas, 3, no. 2: 194-219.
Lim, Jason (2008), ‘The Promotion of Fujian Tea as a Chinese National Product in Singapore, 
1932-1940’, Journal of the South Seas Society, 62: 127-145.
Lim, Jason (2010), Linking an Asian Transregional Commerce in Tea: Overseas-Chinese Merchants 
in the Fujian-Singapore Trade, 1920-1960. Leiden & Boston: Brill.
Lim, Mu Hue (2005), Lim Mu Hue Woodcut Prints. Singapore: New Arts Graphics Sdn. Bhd.
Lin Man-houng (2001), ‘Overseas Chinese merchants and multiple nationality: a means for 
reducing commercial risk (1895-1935)’, Modern Asian Studies 35, no. 4: 985-1009.
Lin Xiantang (2000), Guanyuan xiansheng riji, Vol. 1 [Diary of Mr. Guanyuan, Vol. 1]. Taipei: 
Academia Sinica.
Lin Xing 林星 (2004), ‘Jindai Fujian Chengshi Fazhan Yanjiu (1843-1949): Yi Fuzhou, Xiamen 
Wei Zhongxin’ 近代福建城市发展研究(1843-1949年)以福州、厦门为中心 (Research 
into the development of cities in Fujian during the modern era, with Fuzhou and Xiamen 
bibliography 307
as examples), PhD thesis in History, Xiamen University, Xiamen, Fujian Province, People’s 
Republic of China.
Lin, W.C. [i.e. Lim Boon Keng] (1900), ‘Straits Chinese hedonism,’ Straits Chinese Magazine 
4: 108-111.
Lin, W.C. [i.e. Lim Boon Keng] (1899), ‘Some local Chinese worthies 1: Seah Eu Chin,’ Straits 
Chinese Magazine 3: 80-85.
Lindsay, Jennifer (2003), ‘Roundtable on Research Priorities for Asia’, ARI: Newsletter of the 
Asia Research Institute August: 2.
Lockard, Craig (1995), “Integrating Southeast Asia into the Framework of World History: The 
Period before 1500”, The History Teacher, 29, 1: 7-35.
Logan, J.R. (1854), “Notices of Singapore”, The Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern 
Seas, 9.
Loh Kah Seng (2004), ‘Beyond ‘Rubber Prices’ History: Life in Singapore during the Great 
Depression Years’, Master’s thesis in History, National University of Singapore.
— (2009a), ‘Change and Conflict at the Margins: Emergency Kampong Clearance and the 
Making of Modern Singapore’. Asian Studies Review. 33 (2), June: 139-59.
— (2009b), ‘Kampong, Fire, Nation: Towards a Social History of Postwar Singapore’. Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies. 40 (3). October: 613-43.
Louis, Wm. Roger & Ronald Robinson (1994), ‘The Imperialism of Decolonization’, Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History 22 (3): 462-511.
Louis, Wm. Roger (1987), Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the 
British Empire, 1941-1945. New York: Oxford University Press.
Ma, Huan (1970, translated by J.V.G. Mills), Ying-yai Sheng-lan: The Overall Survey of the Ocean’s 
Shores. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
MacLeod, Scott & MacGee, T.G. (1996), “The Singapore-Johor-Riau Growth Triangle: An 
Emerging Extended Metropolitan Region” in Fu-Chen Lo & Yue-Man Yueng (eds.), Emerging 
World Cities in Pacific Asia, 417-464. New York: United National University Press.
Manguin, Pierre-Yves (1991), “The Merchant and the King: Political Myths of Southeast Asian 
Coastal Polities”, Indonesia, 52: 47-52.
— (2002), “The Amorphous Nature of Coastal Polities in Insular Southeast Asia: Restricted 
Centres, Extended Peripheries”, Moussons, 5: 73-99.
Mao, Qixiong 毛起雄 and Lin Xiaodong 林晓东 (1993), Zhongguo Qiaowu Zhengce Gaishu 
东中国侨务政策概述 (A brief outline of policies on the overseas Chinese in China),  Beijing: 
Zhongguo Huaqiao Chubanshe.
March, Andrew (1966), ‘Self and Landscape in Su Shih’. In Journal of the American Oriental 
Society, 86, 4: 377-396.
Marwick, Arthur (1987), The Nature of History. London: Macmillan Education Limited.
Masabuchi Sahei (1930), ‘Waga kuni Nan’yo- bo-eki kigyo- [Our country’s business enterprises in 
the South Seas]’, Nan’yo- Kyo-kai Zasshi 16, no. 6: 21-34.
Masao To-kichi (1919), ‘Nan’yo- hai-ka undo- no kyo-kun [Lessons from boycotting movements in 
the South Seas],’ Nan’yo- Kyo-kai Zasshi 5, no. 10: 4-8.
McKinnon, E. Edwards (1984), Kota Cina: Its Context and Meaning in the Trade of Southeast 
Asia in the Twelfth to Fourteenth Centuries; vol.1 & 2. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Cornell 
University.
McNeill, William (1963), The Rise of the West. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Meulen, W.J. van der (1977), “In Search of Ho-Ling”, Indonesia 23: 90.
Mi Rucheng ed. (2002), Zhonghua minguo tielu shiliao, 1919-1949 [Historical data on railways in 
Republic of China, 1919-1949]. Beijing: Beijing shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe.
Miksic, John N. (1985), Archaeological Research on the “Forbidden Hill” of Singapore: Excavations 
at Fort Canning. Singapore: National Heritage Board.
— (2000), “Heterogenetic Cities in Premodern Southeast Asia”, World Archaeology, 32, 1: 106-
120.
308 singapore in global history
— (2004), “14th-Century Singapore: A Port of Trade”, in John N. Miksic & Cheryl-Ann Low Mei 
Gek (eds.), Early Singapore, 1300s-1819; Evidence in Maps, Text and Artefacts, 41-54. Singapore: 
Singapore History Museum.
— (2005), “Between Two Mandalas: Singapore, Siam, and Java (The Benjamin Batson Memorial 
Lecture 2005)”, ARI Working Paper Series, 51. Singapore: National University of Singapore.
Milne, J. (ed.) (1990), Kwame Nkrumah: the Conakry years – his life and letters. London: Panaf.
Milner, Anthony (1995), The Invention of Politics in Colonial Malaya. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Moor, J.H. (1968), Notices of the Indian Archipelago and Adjacent Countries: Being a Collection of 
Papers Relating to Borneo, Celebes, Bali, Java, Sumatra, Nias : The Philippine Islands, Sulus, 
Siam, Cochin China, Malayan Peninsula, Etc. London: Cass.
Murfett, Malcolm H. et al. (1999), Between Two Oceans: A Military History of Singapore from First 
Settlement to Final British Withdrawal. Singapore: Oxford University Press.
Nanyang minqiao jiuxianghui linshi daibiao dahui (1926), Nanyang minqiao jiuxianghui linshi 
dahui baogaoshu [Report of the extraordinary meeting of the Home Salvation Campaign of 
the Fujian Sojourners in the South Seas). Amoy [Xiamen]: Nanyang minqiao jiuxianghui 
linshi daibiao dahui.
NYSP: Nan Yang Siang Pau (Chinese Daily Journal of Commerce), Singapore: Nanyang shang 
bao she. September 1923-March 1939.
Nanyang Technological University (n.d.), ‘Nanyang Fellows Programme: Transforming the 
Next Generation of Asian Leaders’. http://www.nfp.ntu.edu.sg/index.asp
Nan’yo- Dantai Rengo-kai (1943), Dai Nan’yo- Nenkan, dai-nichi kai [Annual of the great South 
Seas]. To-kyo- : Nan’yo- Dantai Rengo-kai.
Nan’yo- Kyo-kai (1917), ‘Taiwan shibu yakuin [Membership of the Taiwan Branch]’. Nan’yo- Kyo-kai 
Zasshi 3, no. 7: 4.
— (1918), ‘Honkai ho-koku [Association’s report]’, in Nan’yo- Kyo-kai Zasshi 4, 7: 67-73.
— (1919), ‘Shingapo-ru Zhitsugyo- Kyo-kai sei-ro [Establishment of Singapore business associa-
tion]’, in Nan’yo- Kyo-kai Zasshi 5, 1: 69-71.
— (1934), ‘Eiryo- Mare ni okeru yunyu- menpu jinkenpu wariate jisshi [Quota enforcement of the 
importation of cotton and rayon textiles to British Malaya]’, Nan’yo- Kyo-kai Zasshi 20, 8: 96-97.
— (1939), ‘Teiji so-kai jigyo- ho-koku [Business report in the regular general meeting]’, Nan’yo- 
Kyo-kai Zasshi 25, no. 8: 1-25.
Nan’yo- Kyo-kai chosa-bu (1940), ‘Shina jihen to Nan’yo- (39)’ [Chinese Incident and the South 
Seas (39)], Nan’yo- 26, 12: 126-128.
Nan’yo- So-ko (1935), Nan’yo- so-ko kabushiki kaisha 15-nenshi [History of the 15 years of the 
Southern Godown Company].
Nathan, J.E. (1922), The census of British Malaya, 1921. London, Dunstable and Watford: Water-
low Sons Limited.
National University of Singapore (2005), Singapore’s Global University. Singapore: National 
University of Singapore.
— (2007), The NUS Difference. Singapore: National University of Singapore.
— (2008), Pursuing Excellence. Singapore: National University of Singapore.
— (2009), ‘NUS Global Asia Institute’. http://www.nus.edu.sg/globalasiainstitute/
Native, A. (2002) Marita: or the folly of love, ed. Stephanie Newell. Leiden: Brill.
Newell, S. (2002) ‘Introduction’ to A. Native, Marita: or the folly of love. Leiden: Brill. 1-37.
Nihon Naikaku To-kei-kyoku (1996) Nihon Teikoku To-kei Nenkan[Annual Statistics of the 
 Japanese Empire] Vol. 35-44 (Reprint). To-kyo: Do-yo shorin.
Nkrumah, K. (1957) Ghana: the autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah. London: Nelson.
— (1968) Dark days in Ghana. New York: International Publishers.
Nordin Hussin (1990), “Suatu Catatan Mengenai Masalah Fatwa di Johor dan Selangor: Kes 
Nadra 1950”, Jebat, 18: 335-357.
bibliography 309
Norris, George (1878), Singapore Thirty Years Ago: A Paper Read at a Meeting of the Mutual 
Improvement Society. Singapore: Straits Time Press.
O’Connor, F. (2003) The lonely voice: a study of the short story. Cork: Cork City Council.
Oguma Eiji (2003), Tan’itsu minsoku shinwa no kigen [The Myth of the Homogenous Nation]. 
To-kyo: Shin-yo-sha.
Ong Chit Chung (1975), ‘The 1959 Singapore General Election’, Journal of Southeast Asian Stud-
ies 6 (1): 61-86.
Pandian, Anand (2009), Crooked Stalks: Cultivating Virtue in South India. Durham and London: 
Duke University Press.
Pang Eng Fong (1972), Summary Report of a Re-survey of 1971 Arts, Social Science and Business 
Administration Graduates of the University of Singapore. Singapore: Economic Research Cen-
tre, University of Singapore.
— (1973), Employment Experiences of 1972 and 1973 University of Singapore Graduates. Singapore: 
Economic Research Centre, University of Singapore.
— (1974), A Report on the 1973 Singapore by Polytechnic Graduate Employment Survey. Singapore: 
Economic Research Centre, University of Singapore.
Pateman, C. (1989), The disorder of women: democracy, feminism, and political theory. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press.
Patton, A. (1989), ‘Dr. John Farrell Easmon: Medical Professionalism and Colonial Racism in 
the Gold Coast, 1856-1900.’ International Journal of African Historical Studies 22 (4): 601-
636.
Pelras, Christian (1996), The Bugis (The Peoples of South-East Asia & the Pacific). Cambridge, 
Mass.: Blackwell Publishers.
Pickering, Jeffrey (1998), Britain’s Withdrawal from East of Suez: The Politics of Retrench-
ment. New York: St. Martin’s Press in association with Institute of Contemporary British 
 History.
Pitt, Kuan Wah (1987), ‘From Plantations to New Town: The Story of Nee Soon’. In Lim 
How Seng and Lim Guan Hock, eds., The Development of Nee Soon Community, 193-225. 
Singapore: National Archives Oral History Department.
Poh S.K., Tan Jing Quee and Koh Kay Yew (ed.) (2010), The Fajar generation: the University 
Socialist Club and the politics of postwar Malaya and Singapore. Petaling Jaya: SIRD.
Post, Peter (1995), ‘Chinese business networks and Japanese capital in South East Asia, 1880-
1940’, in Rajeswary Ampalavanar Brown (ed.), Chinese business enterprise in Asia, 154-176. 
London and New York: Routledge.
— (2002), ‘The Kwik Hoo Tong trading society of Semarang, Java: a Chinese business network 
in late colonial Asia’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies (January 2002): 279-296.
Proudfoot, Ian (1993), Early Malay Printed Books: A Provisional Account of Materials Published 
in the Singapore-Malaysia Area up to 1920, Noting Holdings in Major Public Collections. Kuala 
Lumpur: University of Malaya.
Purdey, Jemma (2006), Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia, 1996-99. Honolulu: University of 
Hawai’i Press.
Raffles, Sophia (1991), Memoir of the Life and Public Services of Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles. 
New York: Oxford University Press.
Ramcharan, Robin (2006), ‘Singapore’s Emerging Knowledge Economy: Role of Intellectual 
Property and its Possible Implications for Singaporean Society’, The Journal of World Intel-
lectual Property 9 (3): 316-43.
Ramlah Adam (2004), Gerakan Radikalisme di Malaysia, 1938-1965. Dewan Bahasa dan  Pustaka: 
Kuala Lumpur.
310 singapore in global history
Reid, Anthony (1988), Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, vol. 1. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1988.
— (2004), ‘A Word from the Director’, ARI News October: 2.
— (2007), “Aceh between Two Worlds: An Intersection of Southeast Asia and the Indian 
Ocean”, in Himanshu Prabha Ray & Edward A. Alpers (eds.), Cross Currents and commu-
nity networks: the history of the Indian Ocean world, 100-122. New York: Oxford University 
Press.
Robinson, William (1998), “Beyond Nation-State Paradigms: Globalization, Sociology and the 
Challenge of Transnational Studies”, Sociological Forum, 13, 4: 561-594.
Robson, Stuart (1995), Desawarnana (Nagarakrtagama) by Mpu Prapanca. Leiden: KITLV Press.
Rodan, Garry (1989), The Political Economy of Singapore’s Industrialisation: National State and 
International Capital. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Roff, William R. (1967), The Origins of Malay Nationalism. New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press.
Rudolph, J. (1998) Reconstructing identities: a social history of the Babas in Singapore. Aldershot: 
Ashgate.
Said, Edward W. (1978), Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient. London: Penguin.
Sakai Kazumi (2007), ‘“Bunmei no shimei” to shite no Nihon no Nan’yo- gunto- inin-tochi: 
Kajyo to-ji no haikei [“Civilizing mission” under the Japanese South Sea Mandate: back-
ground to the excessive rule]’, in Asano Toyomi (ed.), Nan’yo- Gunto- no teiko-.kokusai chitsujyo-, 
57-95. Nagoyashi: Chukyo University.
Sakano Too-ru (2005), Teiko- nihon to Jinroi-gakusha [Japanese Empire and Anthropologists]. 
To-kyo: Keiso- shobo-.
Salaff, Janet W. (1988), State and Family in Singapore: Restructuring a Developing Society. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press.
Salmon, Claudine (2000), ‘Chinese Merchants in Southeast Asia’. In Denys Lombard and Jean 
Aubin eds. Asian Merchants and Businessmen in the Indian Ocean and the China Sea. New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press: 329-351.
Samy, A. Ma (2000), History of Tamil Journals (19th Century). Chennai: Navamani  Pathippakam.
Sassen, Saskia (1988), The Mobility of Labor and Capital; A Study in International Investment and 
Labor Flow. New York: Cambridge University Press.
— (1991), The Global City : New York, London, Tokyo. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Sastri, K.A. Nilakanta (1949), “Takuapa and its Tamil Inscription Part I”, Journal of the Malayan 
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 22: 24-30.
Sato Kazuki (1997), ‘“Same Language, Same Race”: The Dilemma of Kanbun in Modern Japan’ 
in Frank Dikötter (ed.), The construction of racial identities in China and Japan, 118-135. Honu-
lulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Scabose (1901), ‘Victoria, R. I.,’ Straits Chinese Magazine 5: 3.
Scott, James C. (1998), Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condi-
tion have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Seah, Leander (2007), ‘Hybridity, Globalization, and the Creation of a Nanyang Identity: The 
South Seas Society in Singapore, 1940-1958’. In Journal of the South Seas Society. Singapore: 
South Seas Society.
Sen, Tansen (2003), Buddhism, Diplomacy and Trade: The Realignment of Sino-Indian Relations, 
600-1400. Honolulu : Association for Asian Studies and University of Hawai‘i Press.
Shanmugaratnam, Tharman (2006), Speech at the 5th anniversary dinner of Asia Research 
Institute. University Hall, National University of Singapore, Singapore.
Shimazu Naoko (1998), Japan, Race, and Equality. London and New York: Routledge.
Shimizu Hiroshi and Hirakawa Hitoshi (1999), Japan and Singapore in the world economy: 
Japan’s Economic Advance into Singapore, 1870-1965. London and New York: Routledge.
bibliography 311
Shingapo-ru sho-hin chinretsu-kan (1919), ‘Shingapo-ru ni okeru hainichi-bo-do- jiken no shinso- 
[The truth of anti-Japanese riots in Singapore]’, Nan’yo- Kyo-kai Zasshi 5, no. 9: 39-49.
Shingapo-ru sho-hin chinretsu-sho (1931), ‘Eiryo- Marai ichiba ni okeru gomu kiyanbasu kutsu 
no jukyu- jo-kyo-’ [Conditions of demand and supply of rubber-soled canvas shoes in British 
Malayan markets], ‘ Nan’yo- Kyo-kai Zasshi 17, no. 5: 47-52.
Shingapo-ru sho-hin chinretsu-sho (1932a), ‘Eiryo- Marai ni okeru hakimono, ichi [Footwear in 
British Malaya, I]’, Nan’yo- Kyo-kai Zasshi 18, no. 3: 8-33.
— (1932b), ‘Eiryo- Marai ni okeru hakimono, ni [Footwear in British Malaya, II]’, Nan’yo- Kyo-kai 
Zasshi 18, no. 4: 16-45.
— (1933a), ‘Eiryo- Marai ni okeru honpo- sen’i-ko-gyo--hin, san [Japanese textile manufactures in 
Singapore III]’, Nan’yo- Kyo-kai Zasshi 19, no.9: 45-63.
— (1933b), ‘Eiryo- Marai ni okeru honpo- sen’i-ko-gyo--hin, shi [Japanese textile manufactures in 
Singapore IV],’ Nan’yo- Kyo-kai Zasshi 19, no. 10: 27-39.
— (1933c), ‘Shingapo-ru ni okeru honpo- sen’i-ko-gyo--hin [Japanese textile manufactures in 
Singapore]’, Nan’yo- Kyo-kai Zasshi 19, no. 11: 28-42.
— (1933d), ‘Shingapo-ru men-taoru shikyo- [Market reports of cotton towels in Singapore],’ 
Nan’yo- Kyo-kai Zasshi 19, no. 11: 101-104.
— (1933e), ‘Shingapo-ru shijou ni okeru honpo- jinken no chi’i to sono sho-rai’, Nan’yo- Kyo-kai 
Zasshi 19, no. 11: 103-108.
— (1936), ‘Eiryo- Marai ni okeru jinkenpu’, Nan’yo- Kyo-kai Zasshi 22, no. 2: 22-37.
Shingapo-ru Sangyo-kan (1941), ‘Eiryo- Marai orimono seihin ichiba tenbo- [Prospects of textile 
markets in British Malaya]’, Nan’yo- 27, no. 4: 60-63.
Sidel, John T. (2006), Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press.
Sidhu, Ravinder (2006), ‘How to Assemble a Knowledge Economy: Singapore’s Transnational 
Education Project’, Perspectives in Education 24, 4: 45-56.
Sim, Victor (ed.) (1950), Biographies of prominent Chinese in Singapore. Singapore: Nan Kok 
Publication Company.
Singapore Ann Kway Association 新加坡安溪会馆 (1974), Xinjiapo Anxi Huiguan Jinxi 
Jinian Tekan, 1922-1972 新加坡安溪会馆金禧纪念特刊,1922-1972 (50th anniversary 
souvenir magazine of the Ann Kway Association), Singapore: Singapore Ann Kway Asso-
ciation.
— (1992), Xinjiapo Anxi Huiguan Chengli Qishi Zhounian Ji Diyijie Shijie Anxi Xiangqin Lianyi-
hui Jinian Tekan, 1922-1992 新加坡安溪会馆成立七十周年暨第一届世界安溪乡亲联谊会
纪念特刊 1922-1992 (70th anniversary of the Singapore Ann Kway Association and the first 
World Ann Kway Convention), Singapore: Singapore Ann Kway Association.
Singapore Economic Development Board (1999), A Knowledge-based Economy. Singapore: Eco-
nomic Development Board.
Singapore Economic Review Committee (2003), New Challenges, Fresh Goals – Towards a 
Dynamic Global City: Report of the Economic Review Committee. Singapore: Ministry of Trade 
and Industry.
Singapore InfoComm Development Authority (2008), ‘About Us: About iN2015’, iDA 
Singapore. http://www.ida.gov.sg/About%20us/20070903145526.aspx
— (2009), ‘Facts & Figures: Singapore Infocomm Statistics at a Glance’, iDA Singapore. http://
www.ida.gov.sg/Publications/20061130175201.aspx
Singapore Management University (n.d.), An Unconventional MBA for Unconventional Minds: 
The SMU MBA. Singapore: Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management 
University.
Singapore Piece-goods Traders Guild (1994) Xinjiapo buhang shangwuju qingzhu chengli 85 
zhounian jinian tekan [Souvenir of the 85 annual of the Singapore piece goods traders guild]. 
Singapore: Singapore Piece-Goods Traders’ Guild.
312 singapore in global history
Singapore (1975), Master Plan: Third Review, 1975. Singapore: Planning Department, Ministry 
of National Development.
Singapore. Ministry of Education. Technical Education Department (1969), One Year of Techni-
cal Education April 1968-March 1969. Singapore: Ministry of Education, Technical Education 
Department.
Singapore. Ministry of Labour (1977a), Employment Act: Law and Practice. Singapore: Ministry 
of Labour.
Singapore. Ministry of Labour (1977b), Industrial Relations Act: Law and Practice. Singapore: 
Ministry of Labour.
Singapore. Radio Corporation of Singapore (1967), Audio recording titled ‘Interview With 
Manual Pillay, Economic Development Board’. 6 December.
Singapore. Radio Corporation of Singapore (1968), Audio recording titled ‘S. Rajaratnam At 
Graduation Ceremony Of 1st Group Of Trainees For Redundant Base Civilian Workers’. 
29 July.
Singapore. Radio Corporation of Singapore (1968), Audio recording titled ‘Conversion Of 
Naval Base – Swan Hunter Group’. 18 June.
Singapore. Technical Education Department (1973), Technical Education and Industrial Training 
in Singapore: A Brief Review of the Achievements of the Technical Education Department, 1968-
73. Singapore: Technical Education Department.
Singapore. University of Singapore, Economic Research Centre (1976), The Employment 
 Experiences of Post-secondary and University Graduates in Singapore, 1971-1975. Singapore: 
Economic Research Centre, University of Singapore.
Singapore. University of Singapore, Economic Research Centre (1980), The Employment 
 Experiences of 1969-1971 Vocational Graduates. Singapore: Economic Research Centre, 
University of Singapore.
Slaughter, Sheila and Gary Rhoades (2004), Academic capitalism and the new economy. 
 Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Smail, John R. (1961), ‘On the Possibilities of an Autonomous History of Southeast Asia’, Jour-
nal of Southeast Asian History 2, 2: 72-102.
Smith, Joseph B. (1976), Portrait of a Cold Warrior. New York: Putnam’s.
So, Kee Long (1998), “Dissolving Hegemony or Changing Trade Pattern? Images of Srivijaya 
in the Chinese Sources of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries”, JSEAS, 29, 2: 295-308.
Soh P.T. (1907), ‘Concerning our girls,’ Straits Chinese Magazine 11: 139-143.
Solomon, Eli (2008), Snakes and Devils. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Editions.
Song O.S. (1899), ‘Are the Straits Chinese British subjects?’ Straits Chinese Magazine 3: 61-67.
Song Ong Siang (1967), One Hundred Years’ History of the Chinese in Singapore. Kuala Lumpur: 
University of Malaysia Press.
Southwood, Peter (1991), Disarming Military Industries: Turning an Outbreak of Peace into an 
Enduring Legacy. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Spencer, George (1976), “The Politics of Plunder: The Cholas in Eleventh-Century Ceylon”, 
Journal of Asian Studies, 35, 3: 405-419.
Stern, Fritz (ed.) (1972), The Varieties of History from Voltaire to the Present. New York: Vintage 
Books.
Stockwell, Anthony (1986), “Imperial security and Moslem militancy, with special reference to 
the Hertogh Riots in Singapore”, JSEAS, 7, 2: 322-335.
Stockwell, Sarah (2008), ‘Ends of Empire’. In Sarah Stockwell ed. The British Empire: Themes 
and Perspectives. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers: 269-93.
Straits Settlements (1919), Straits Settlements Government Gazettes, Supplement to 1919: annual 
report on the Straits Settlement police force and on the state of crime for the year 1919, ‘secret 
 societies, etc.’ Singapore: Straits Settlement.
Straits Settlements (1934), Straits Settlement Government Gazettes, 1934. Singapore: Straits 
 Settlements.
Su, Jiqing 穌繼慶 (1981), Daoyi zhilue jiaoshi 島夷志略校釋. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju.
bibliography 313
Subramaniam, Sunjay (1999), “Connected Histories: Notes Towards a Reconfiguration of Early 
Modern Eurasia”, in Victor Lieberman (ed.), Beyond Binary Histories: Re-Imagining Eurasia 
to c. 1830, 289-316. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press.
Sun, Jian 孙健 (1992), Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Jingji Shi (1949-90 Niandai Chu) 
中华人民共和国经济史 (1949-90年代初) (Economic history of the People’s Republic of 
China from 1949 to the early 1990s), Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe.
Tai, Jackson (2006), ‘CEO’s Report: Committed to Strengthening our Franchise in Asia’, DBS 
Group Holdings Ltd Annual Report, 14-22. Singapore: DBS Bank.
Taiwan Dai-Ajia Kyo-kai (1938), Nanshi So-ko- cho-sa ho-koku-sho. Taipei: Taiwan Dai-Ajia Kyo-kai.
Taiwan Ginko- (1914), Nan’yo- ni okeru kakyo-: Shina ijyo-min [Overseas Chinese in the South Seas: 
emigrants from China]. Taipei: Taiwan Ginko-.
Taiwan Ginko- (1939), Taiwan Ginko- shijo-nenshi [40 Years of the Bank of Taiwan]. Taipei: Taiwan 
Ginko-.
Taiwan Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha (1942) Nan’yo- Kakyo- to sono taisaku [South Seas Chinese 
and the strategies to deal with them]. Taipei: Taiwan Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha.
Taiwan So-tokufu (1904), Taiwan Kansho- kiji v. 4, no. 4 [Old Customs in Taiwan, v. 4, no. 4]. 
Taipei: Taiwan So-tokufu [Reprinted and translated into Chinese by the Nantian chubanshe, 
1988].
Taiwan So-tokufu gaiji-bu (1943), Kakyo- keizai jijyo-, Taiwan So-to-kufu gaiji cho-sa No. 133 
 [Economic situations of overseas Chinese, Foreign affairs survey No. 133. Office of the 
 Governor-in-General, Taiwan]. Taipei: Ko-myo-sha sho-kai.
Taiwan So-tokufu shokusan-kyoku tokusan-ka (1935), Nettai sangyo- cho-sa-sho: Taiwan cha ni kan-
suru cho-sa [Report of tropical industry survey: survey on Taiwan tea]. Taipei: Taiwan So-tokufu 
shokusan-kyoku tokusan-ka.
Taiwan Tea Exporters’ Association (1965), The Historical Brevities of Taiwan Tea Export, 1865-
1965, Taipei: Taiwan Tea Exporters’ Association.
Tan Chor Chuan (2008), ‘Continuity and Transformation’, State of the University Address. 
National University of Singapore, Singapore. http://www.nus.edu.sg/soua/2008/
SoUA_10_Oct_08.pdf
Tan E.L. (1918), ‘National character and how it is acquired,’ S.C.L.A. Recorder 1(4): 7.
Tan Jake Hooi (1972), Urbanisation Planning and National Development Planning in Singapore. 
New York: Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group, Asia Society.
Tan Keong Choon (1981) OHC Synopsis Report No. 52. Singapore: National Archives.
Tan Pheng Theng (1970), The Economic Development of Singapore and the Labour Law 
Changes of 1968: A Case Study. Unpublished LLM Thesis. Harvard Law School, Harvard 
University.
Tan T.S. (1897), ‘Some genuine Chinese authors,’ Straits Chinese Magazine 1: 63, 64.
Tan Yew Soon and Soh Yew Peng (1994), The Development of Singapore’s Modern Media Industry. 
Singapore: Times Academic Press.
Tan, Tony (1998), ‘The Singapore Economy in the 21st Century’, The Chinese High Lecture 
1998. Chinese High School, Singapore. Singapore: Ministry of Information and the Arts.
Tanaka, Stephen (1993) Japan’s Orient: Rendering Pasts into History. London and New York: 
University of California Press.
Tarling, Nicholas (1993), The Fall of Imperial Britain in South-east Asia. Singapore: Oxford 
University Press.
Tay, Alice Erh Soon (1962), ‘The Chinese in South-East Asia’, Race, 4 (1): 34-48.
Teo Chee Hean (2000), ‘Education Towards the 21st Century: Singapore’s Universities of 
Tomorrow’, Speech at the Alumni International Singapore Lecture, Singapore, Jan 7, 2000. 
http://www.moe.gov.sg/media/speeches/2000/sp10012000.htm
— (2003), Speech at the official launch of the Asia Research Institute. Pan Pacific Hotel, 
Singapore. Singapore: Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts.
314 singapore in global history
Thomson, John Turnbull (1991), Glimpses into Life in Malayan Lands. Singapore: Oxford 
University Press.
Tibbetts, G.R. (1979), A Study of the Arabic Texts Containing Material on Southeast Asia. Leiden: 
Brill.
Tilly, Charles (1985), ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’, in Peter Evans, 
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, & Theda Skocpol (ed.), Bringing the State Back In, 169-187. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
— (1995), “To Explain Political Processes”, The American Journal of Sociology, 100, 6: 1594-1610.
To-go- An (1919), ‘Nan’yo- Kyo-kai no genkyo- to sono sho-rai [Nan’yo- Kyo-jai’s current situation and 
its future]’, Nan’yo- Kyo-kai Zasshi 5, no. 6: 105-116.
Toohey, Brian (1989), Oyster: The Story of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service. Victoria, Aus-
tralia: William Heinemann.
Tosh, J. (200), A man’s place: masculinity and the middle-class home in Victorian England. 
New Haven: Yale University Press.
Trocki, Carl (1979), Prince of Pirates: The Temenggongs and the Development of Johor and Singapore, 
1784-1885. Singapore: Singapore University Press.
— (1990), Opium and Empire: Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore, 1800-1910. Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press.
— (2007), Prince of Pirates: The Temenggong and the Development of Johor and Singapore 1784-
1885, Singapore: NUS Press.
Tschacher, Torsten (2009), ‘Circulating Islam: Understanding Convergence and Divergence in 
the Islamic Traditions of Ma’bar and Nusantara.’ In R. Michael Feener and Terenjit Sevea 
(eds.), Islamic Connections: Muslims Societies in South and Southeast Asia, 48-67. Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Tu Chao-yan (1993), Riban diguozhuyi xia de Taiwan [Taiwan under Japanese Imperialism]. Tai-
pei: Renjian chubanshe (Translated from Japanese to Chinese by Li Mingjun).
Tu, Youxiang 屠友祥 (1996), Zhou Qufei 周去非 : Lingwai daida 嶺外代答. Shanghai:  Yuandong 
chubanshe.
Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra (1977), Looking Back: Monday Musings and Memories, Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia: Pustaka Antara.
Turnbull, C. Mary (1972), The Straits Settlements, 1826-67: Indian Presidency to Crown Colony. 
London: Athlone Press.
— (1989), A History of Singapore, 1819-1988. 2nd edn. Singapore: Oxford University Press.
— (2009), A History of Modern Singapore 1819-2005. Singapore: NUS Press.
Ukers, W.H. (1935), All about Tea, two volumes, first published by the Tea & Coffee Trade 
 Journal in New York in 1935, Westport: Hyperion Press.
Unekawa Shizuo (1927), Kaiun ko-kokushi [The history of maritime transportation and national 
prosperity]. O
-saka : Kaiji Iho-sha.
Vella, Walter (1978), Chaiyo! King Vajiravudh and the Development of Thai Nationalism, assisted 
by Dorothy B Vella. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii.
Wales, H.G. Quaritch (1940), “Archaeological Researches on Ancient Indian Colonization”, 
Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 18: 8-10.
Wallerstein, Immanuel (1974), The Modern World System. New York: Academic Press.
Wang Gungwu (1981), Community and Nation: Essays on Southeast Asia and the Chinese. 
Singapore: Heinemann Education Books (Asia) Ltd.
— (2003), Only Connect! Sino-Malay Encounters. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press.
— (2005), ‘Within and Without: Chinese Writers Overseas’. In Journal of Chinese Overseas, 1-15. 
Singapore: Singapore University Press.
bibliography 315
Wang Shiqing (2008), ‘Taiwan tuozhi zhushi huishi zhi tudi touzi yu jingying – yi zongdufu 
chuzi zhi sheyoudi wei zhongxin [Land investment and management of the Taiwan Colo-
nisation Company: study of the investment by the Office of the Governor-General, Taiwan]. 
In Guoshiguan Taiwan wenxianguang (ed.). Taiwan tuozhi zhushi huishe dangan lunwenji 
[Essays on archives of the Taiwan Colonisation Company], 1-55. Nantou, Taiwan: Taiwan 
Wenxianguan.
Wang, Yunwu (1936), Ma Duanlin: Wenxian tongkao. Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan.
Watanabe Kaoru (1934), ‘Kaigai ni okeru sho-gyo- teki jiban no kaitaku to kokka kan’nen’, Nan’yo- 
Kyo-kai Zasshi Vol. 20, no. 4: 15-26.
Wheatley, Paul (1954), ‘Land Use in the Vicinity of Singapore in the Eighteen-Thirties’, Malayan 
journal of tropical geography, 2: p. 63-66.
Wee, C.J. W.-L. (1999), ‘The Vanquished: Lim Chin Siong and a progressivist national narra-
tive’, in Lam Peng Er and Kevin YL Tan (ed.), Lee’s lieutenants: Singapore’s old guard, 169-90. 
NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin.
Weiner, Michael (1995), ‘Discourse of Race, Nation, and Empire in Pre-1945 Japan’, Ethnic and 
Racial Studies 18, no. 3: 433-456.
Westad, Odd Arne (2005), The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our 
Times. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Winstedt, R.O. (1926), “Gold Ornaments Dug up at Fort Canning, Singapore”, Journal of the 
Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 6, 4: 1-4.
Wisseman-Christie, Jan (1998), “The Medieval Tamil-Language Inscriptions in Southeast Asia 
and China”, Journal of Southeast Asia Studies, 29, 2: 239-268.
Wolf, Eric R. (1982), Europe and the People Without History. Berkeley: University California 
Press.
Wolters, O.W. (1958), “Tambralingga” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 21, 
3: 587-607.
— (1967), Early Indonesian Commerce: A Study of the Origins of Srivijaya. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press.
— (1970), The Fall of Srivijaya in Malay History. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
— (1983), “A Few and Miscellaneous Pi-Chi Jottings on Early Indonesia” Indonesia, 34: 49-65.
— (1986), “Restudying Some Chinese Writings on Sriwijaya”, Indonesia, 42: 1-42.
— (1999), History, Culture and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives. Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1999.
Wong, Lin Ken (1960), ‘The Trade of Singapore, 1819-69’, Journal of the Malayan Branch, Royal 
Asiatic Society,33, 4: 1-315.
— (1978), ‘Singapore: Its Growth as an Entrepot Port 1819-1941’, Journal of Southeast Asian 
Studies 9 (1): 50-84.
— (1981), “A View of Our Past”, in Lee Yik & Chang Chin Chiang (eds.) Singapore in Pictures, 
4-26. Singapore: Sin Chew Jit Poh & Ministry of Culture.
Wong, Chin Soon (1987), ‘The Hainanese village that disappeared’. In Lim How Seng and 
Lim Guan Hock, eds., The Development of Nee Soon Community, 87-90. Singapore: National 
Archives Oral History Department.
Wong, Yoon Wah (2001), Post-Colonial Chinese Literatures: Thoughts on the Local and Multi-cul-
tural. Taipei: Wen Shi Ze Publishers.
Wurtzburg, Charles Edward (1954), Raffles of the Eastern Isles: (by) C.E.Wurtzburg. London: 
Hodder & Stoughton.
Xiamen huaqiao zhi bianzuan weiyuanhui (ed.) (1991), Xiamen huaqiao zhi [History of overseas 
Chinese from Xiamen]. Xiamen: Lujiang chubanshe.
Xiamen Shi Dang’an Ju 厦门市档案局 and Xiamen Shi Dang’an Guan 厦门市档案馆 (1997), 
Jindai Xiamen Jingji Dang’an Ziliao 近代厦门经济档案资料, Xiamen: Xiamen Daxue Chu-
banshe.
316 singapore in global history
Xie, Minggan 谢明干 and Luo Yuanming 罗元明 (eds.) (1990), Zhongguo Jingji Fazhan Sishi 
Nian 中国经济发展40年 (Forty years of economic development in China), Beijing: Ren-
min Chubanshe.
Xu Jiaozheng ed. (1965), Who’s Who in South East Asia. Singapore: Xu Jiaozheng.
Yamaoka Yuka (1995), Nakasaki Kashô keiei no shiteki kenkyû: kindai chûgoku shônin no keiei to 
chôbo [Business history of Chinese merchants in Nagasaki: management and accounting of 
Modern Chinese businesses]. Kyoto: Mineruva Shobô.
Yano To-ru (1975), Nanshin no keifu [Genealogy of Japan’s Southward Advance]. To-kyo: Chuoo-u 
ko-ron-sha.
Yao, Nan (1984), ‘Han Wai Toon and Han Rambutan Orchard’. Xin Yun Ye Yi Ji (Chronicles of 
Starry Clouds and Coconut Rain), 75-80. Singapore: SNPL Book Publications Department.
Yap, Sonny Yap, Lim, Richard and Leong Weng Kam (2009), Men in White: The Untold Story of 
Singapore’s Ruling Political Party. Singapore: Singapore Press Holdings Limited.
Yen Ch’ing-hwang (1989), ‘The Response of the Overseas Chinese in Singapore and Malaya to 
the Tsinan [Jinan] Incident, 1928’, in Ng Lun Ngai-ha and Chang Chak Yan (eds.) Overseas 
Chinese in Asia between the Two World Wars, 263-282. Hong Kong: Overseas Chinese Archives 
and Centre for Contemporary Asian Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
Yeo Kim Wah (1973), Political Development in Singapore. Singapore: Singapore University 
Press.
Yeo Kim Wah & Albert Lau (1991), ‘From Colonialism to Independence, 1945-1965,’ in Ernest 
Chew and Edwin Lee (ed.), A History of Singapore, 117-153. Singapore: Oxford University 
Press.
Yeo, F. Teng Yang (1970), Singapore: State of the Economy: 1970 Mid-year Report. Singapore: 
Economics Section, Economic Development Division, Ministry of Finance.
Yeo, George (1997), Speech at the Official Opening of the East Asian Institute. Singapore: 
Ministry of Information and the Arts.
Yeung, Wei-Jun Jean (2009), ‘ARI Special Feature 1’, ARI News March: 8.
Yeung, Yue-Man & Lo, Fu-Chen (1996), “Global Restructuring and the Emerging Urban Corri-
dors in Pacific Asia”, in Fu-Chen Lo & Yue-Man Yueng (eds.), Emerging World Cities in Pacific 
Asia, 17-47. New York: United National University Press.
Yong Ching-fatt (1987), Tan Kah Kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend. Singapore and 
New York: Oxford University Press.
Yorozu Cho-ho- (1918), ‘Kakyo- Ginko- setsuretsu no gi [Proposal for establishing an overseas 
Chinese bank]’, in Nan’yo- Kyo-kai Zasshi 4, no. 3: 74-76.
Young, Louise (1999), Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Yu, Lizhen 余丽珍 (1991), Xiamen Huaqiao Zhi 厦门华侨志 (Overseas Chinese from Xiamen), 
Xiamen: Lujiang Chubanshe.
Yvan, Melchior (18550, Six Months among the Malays and a Year in China. London: James Black-
wood.
Zhang Shuicun 张水存 (1997), ‘Zhang Yuanmei Chahang Jingying Shi’ 张源美茶行经营史 
(An economic history of Zhang Yuan Mei Tea Merchant), in Xiamen Shi Zhengxie Wenshi 
Ziliao Weiyuanhui 厦门市政协文史资料委员会 and Xiamen Zongshang Hui 厦门总商会 
(eds), Xiamen Gongshang Shishi 厦门工商史事 (Articles on the history of Xiamen industry 
and commerce), 217-222. Xiamen: Xiamen Daxue Chubanshe.
Zhongguo Chaye Gufen Youxian Gongsi 中国茶叶股份有限公司 and Zhonghua Charen 
Lianyihui 中国茶人联谊会 (2001), Zhonghua Chaye Wuqian Nian 中华茶叶五千年 (Five 
thousand years of Chinese tea), Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe.
Zhongguo Minzhu Jianguohui Fujian Sheng Weiyuanhui 中国民主建国会福建省委员会 and 
Fujian Sheng Gongshangye Lianhehui 福建省工商业联合会 (eds) (1986), Fujian Gongshang 
bibliography 317
Shiliao 福建工商史料 (Articles on the history of Fujian industry and commerce), volume 1, 
Fuzhou: Zhongguo Minzhu Jianguohui Fujian Sheng Weiyuanhui and Fujian Sheng Gong-
shangye Lianhehui.
Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Yuan 中国社会科学院 and Zhongyang Dang’an Guan 中央档案馆 
(1991), 1949-1952 Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Jingji Dang’an Ziliao Xuanbian – Nongye 
Juan 1949-1952中华人民共和国经济档案资料选编–农业卷 (Selections from the Eco-
nomic Archives of the People’s Republic of China on agriculture, 1949-1952), Beijing: 
 Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe.
Other Reference Materials
‘An Allegory: The Sorrowing Mother’ (1898), Gold Coast Aborigines March 12: 3.
‘By the Way’ (1899), Gold Coast Aborigines May 27: 3.
‘Editorial: The Race Question in Colonial Administration’ (1905a) Straits Chinese Magazine 
9: 1-6.
‘Editorial: The Need for an Asiatic Daily’ (1905b), Straits Chinese Magazine 9: 41-42.
‘Her Late Majesty the Queen Empress’ (1901), Straits Chinese Magazine 5: 1-2.
‘Journalism on the Gold Coast’ (1899), Gold Coast Leader May 27: 4-5.
‘News and Notes’ (1899), Straits Chinese Magazine 3: 68-72.
‘Our Programme’ (1897), Straits Chinese Magazine 1: 1-2.
‘Sketches of the lives and labours of our great men,’ (1898b), Gold Coast Aborigines March 5: 3.
‘Sketches of the lives and labours of our great men’ (1898a), Gold Coast Aborigines January 8: 
3-4.
‘The Chinaman in Pahang’ (1898), Straits Chinese Magazine 2: 37-38.
‘The Fanti Land’ (1902), Gold Coast Leader November 29: 4.
‘The Gold Coast Aborigines’ (1898) Gold Coast Aborigines January 1: 2-3.
‘The Travels of Chang Ching Chong’ (1898), Straits Chinese Magazine 2: 13-15, 64-67, 84-88, 
139-144.
‘What’s in a Name?’ (1902), Gold Coast Leader, July 5: 2-3.
‘William Addo, Esq. Barrister at Law’ (1896), Gold Coast Independent, July 11: 2.
P u b l i c at i o n s  S e r i e s
Monographs
Marleen Dieleman
The Rhythm of Strategy. A Corporate Biography of the Salim Group of 
Indonesia
Monographs 1
2007 (ISBN 978 90 5356 033 4)
Sam Wong
Exploring ‘Unseen’ Social Capital in Community Participation. Everyday 
Lives of Poor Mainland Chinese Migrants in Hong Kong
Monographs 2
2007 (ISBN 978 90 5356 034 1)
Diah Ariani Arimbi
Reading Contemporary Indonesian Muslim Women Writers. Representation, 
Identity and Religion of Muslim Women in Indonesian Fiction
Monographs 3
2009 (ISBN 978 90 8964 089 5)
Euis Nurlaelawati
Modernization, Tradition and Identity. The Kompilasi Hukum Islam and 
Legal Practice in the Indonesian Religious Courts
Monographs 4
2010 (ISBN 978 90 8964 088 8)
Edited Volumes
Sebastian Bersick, Wim Stokhof and Paul van der Velde (eds.)
Multiregionalism and Multilateralism. Asian-European Relations in a 
Global Context
Edited Volumes 1
2006 (ISBN 978 90 5356 929 0)
Khun Eng Kuah-Pearce (ed.)
Chinese Women and the Cyberspace
Edited Volumes 2
2008 (ISBN 978 90 5356 751 7)
Milan J. Titus and Paul P.M. Burgers (eds.)
Rural Livelihoods, Resources and Coping with Crisis in Indonesia. A Com-
parative Study
Edited Volumes 3
2008 (ISBN 978 90 8964 055 0)
Marianne Hulsbosch, Elizabeth Bedford and Martha Chaiklin (eds.)
Asian Material Culture
Edited Volumes 4
2009 (ISBN 978 90 8964 090 1)
Hans Hägerdal (ed.)
Responding to the West. Essays on Colonial Domination and Asian Agency
Edited Volumes 5
2009 (ISBN 978 90 8964 093 2)
Derek Heng and Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied (eds.)
Reframing Singapore. Memory – Identity – Trans-Regionalism
Edited Volumes 6
2009 (ISBN 978 90 8964 094 9)
Friederike Assandri and Dora Martins (eds.)
From Early Tang Court Debates to China’s Peaceful Rise
Edited Volumes 7
2009 (ISBN 978 90 5356 795 1)
Erich Kolig, Vivienne SM. Angeles and Sam Wong (eds.)
Identity in Crossroad Civilisations. Ethnicity, Nationalism and Globalism in 
Asia
Edited Volumes 8
2009 (ISBN 978 90 8964 127 4)
Khun Eng Kuah-Pearce and Gilles Guiheux (eds.)
Social Movements in China and Hong Kong. The Expansion of Protest Space
Edited Volumes 9
2009 (ISBN 978 90 8964 131 1)
Huhua Cao (ed.)
Ethnic Minorities and Regional Development in Asia. Reality and Challenges
Edited Volumes 10
2009 (ISBN 978 90 8964 091 8)
M. Parvizi Amineh (ed.)
State, Society and International Relations in Asia. Reality and Challenges
Edited Volumes 11
2010 (ISBN 978 90 5356 794 4)
Philip F. Williams (ed.)
Asian Literary Voices. From Marginal to Mainstream
Edited Volumes 12
2010 (ISBN 978 90 8964 092 5)
Philip Hirsch and Nicholas Tapp (eds.)
Tracks and Traces. Thailand and the Work of Andrew Turton
Edited Volumes 13
2010 (ISBN 978 90 8964 249 3)
Derek Heng and Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied (eds.)
Singapore in Global History
Edited Volumes 14
















Derek Heng is Assistant Professor at the History 
Department, Ohio State University. He specialises 
in pre-modern Sino-Southeast Asian economic 
interaction and early Southeast Asian state formation. 
Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied is Assistant Professor 
at the Malay Studies Department, National University 
of Singapore. His research encompasses colonial 
history, the history of ideas and social identities.
Singapore in Global History brings together scholars 
working in the fields of political science, international 
relations, history, sociology, literature, art history and 
architecture to explore ways in which Singapore’s 
history could be looked upon from a global perspective. 
The volume’s papers make a collective attempt at 
arguing, often in radically novel fashion, that Singapore 
can be conceived both as core and periphery, and that 
the logic of the post-colonial nation-narrative, which 
attributes Singapore’s success primarily to the roles of 
big men and strong government, are inadequate. 
This volume locates Singapore as a central space 
between the major termini of maritime Asia and the 
world, and articulates the island as a strategic location 
where the global processes find their nesting place, 
where its society is fundamentally affected by these 
processes, and where the roots of global transformative 
processes eventually emanate to far reaching parts of a 
globalising world.
This path-breaking and multidisciplinary collection of essays broadens 
the horizons of, and suggests new ways of approaching, Singapore 
history, from the fourteenth century to the present, by placing the 
island and its people in a larger comparative and global framework. 
Craig A. Lockard, Rosenberg Professor, University of Wisconsin-Green Bay
Publications Series 
Edited Volumes 14
ISBN  978 90 8964 324 7
6432477890899
 
